MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN A
NONCOOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS
FROM THE U.N. EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ
by Jonathan B. Tucker
“The systematic destruction of evidence also took place at sites involved in the Iraqi BW program.Two weeks before the first UNSCOM biological inspection team visited the research laboratory at Salman Pak in August 1991, the Iraqis tore down several structures at the site that had survived the Coalition bombing campaign unscathed, including buildings housing fermenters, an aerosol inhalation test chamber, and a small incinerator. The steel aerosol chamber was crushed and deposited at a dump several kilometers away. The Iraqis then bulldozed the site and covered it with fresh dirt to erase any remaining evidence. They also burned reams of documents, leaving melted looseleaf binders and piles of ashes scattered around the site. According to a member of the UNSCOM team that visited Salman Pak: Although the Iraqis were able to produce some original research papers and hand-drawn sketches of the layout of the buildings now reduced to rubble, they were unable to produce any documentary evidence to support their assertions, claiming that everything was destroyed by the bombing. Although none of us wanted to admit it, one thing became painfully clear: the only thing we were going to get from the Iraqis was what they wanted to give us.
24 Impeding Inspections During no-notice inspections of sensitive sites, the Iraqi minders have found excuses ranging from transportation bottlenecks to bad weather to delay the U.N. teams arrival and buy time to remove incriminating evidence. Since inspections of undeclared sites far from Baghdad require the use of a helicopter to transport the inspection team, the Iraqi authorities insist on 15 hours notice to stand down their air defenses so that the U.N. helicopters can fly safely. Although inspection teams try to avoid revealing the location of the target site by declaring a large block of airspace for the helicopter to fly through, the Iraqis still derive useful clues from the advance notice, particularly if they are concerned about a particular clandestine facility within the declared zone.
25 On a few occasions, the Iraqis have also threatened to open fire on UNSCOM helicopters if they approach secure areas such as presidential palaces. Once the inspectors arrive on-site, plant managers sometimes refuse to provide requested documents or give answers that are inappropriate to the questions asked. Another common delaying tactic is for Iraqi officials to feign incomprehension and request the services of an interpreter even though they are capable of speaking fluent English in other situations.U.N. inspection teams are generally not allowed to interview more than a few senior engineers and technicians employed at an inspected facility, regardless of the type of site visited. During plant walk-throughs, minders from the National Monitoring Directorate may prevent plant workers from responding to inspector pressure the few individuals who speak some English to work through an interpreter. In addition, the fact that the minders videotape all interviews has a chilling effect on the willingness of plant workers to speak freely. At times, Iraqi stalling tactics have verged on intimidation. During a biological weapons inspection at Salman Pak, for example, Iraqi soldiers deliberately placed live munitions and a radioactive source inside bunkers that were to be inspected. In addition to frightening the UNSCOM inspectors, this tactic delayed the inspection until the ordnance had been removed and a nuclear expert had been called to check the radioactive source.
26 On another occasion, the Iraqi authorities tried to prevent the excavation of a field near Salman Pak suspected of containing buried biological munitions. The Iraqi officials brought in Moslem clergymen who spent two hours pleading with the UNSCOM team that the field was a grave site and that digging would be sacrilegious. Although the chief inspector finally ordered the excavation to proceed, only one trench had been completed before the backhoe broke down and work had to cease because of the intense midday heat. On subsequent days the clergymen did not return and the excavation proceeded, but no incriminating evidence was found.”
Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker is Director for Chemical/Biological Weapons Proliferation Issues at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Prior to this appointment, he worked at the
U.S. Department of State, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the Chemical and Biological
Policy Division of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and on the staff of the Presidential Advisory
Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses. He has also served as a UNSCOM inspector in Iraq.
NEWS FLASHBACK - CLINTON - “Saddam must be ousted”
Tacoma News Tribune
December 20, 1998
U.S. and Britain halt airstrikes against Iraq
Sub-headline, Citing significant damage, Clinton says Saddam must be ousted to avoid future threats.
BAGHDAD, Iraq President Clinton ended the air campaign against Iraq on Saturday saying: Im confident we have achieved our mission. Yet despite suffering more than 400 punishing bomb and missile strikes over four nights, Saddam Husseins government remained defiant and said it would bar any return of U.N. arms inspectors to the country.
SNIP
In blunt language, Clinton called for the ouster of the Iraqi leader. So long as Saddam remains in power, he will remain a threat to his people, his region and the World.
SNIP
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So lets look at just how much of a continued threat Saddam really was AFTER Clinton made the above statement. This is just a partial list of the times Iraq fired at American and British aircraft patrolling the Northern No Fly Zone during Operation Northern Watch. Some of the data was not available, like the entire year of 2000. The list also does not include other violations, such as locking air defense radar onto Coalition aircraft. If all the violations were included, the list would be much much longer.
Sooooooo with all of these documented attacks on our aircraft patrolling the Northern No-Fly Zone after Clinton said Saddam must be ousted, why is Bush and Cheney being persecuted for doing just that? I feel Bushs only mistake was placing too much emphasis on the WMD and not building a better case based on the countless other violations of the cease fire.
13 Jan 1999 SAM systems track and fire on Coalition aircraft
25 Jan 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to surface to air missile launch
28 Jan 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
11 Feb 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
12 Feb 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
15 Feb 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
1 Mar 1999 Iraq fires anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft
14 Mar 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
1 Mar 1999 Iraq fires anti-aircraft artillery at coalition aircraft
6 Mar 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
25 May 1999 Coalition aircraft respond to Iraqi AAA fire
04 Sep 2001 Iraqi AAA fired at, radar targets ONW aircraft
27 Aug 2001 ONW aircraft fired upon, coalition responds
17 Aug 2001 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar
07 Aug 2001 Iraqi missiles and AAA fired at ONW aircraft
18 Jul 2001 USAF F-16 aircraft crashes in Turkey
14 Jun 2001 ONW aircraft respond to targeting radar, AAA
23 May 2001 ONW aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar
30 Apr 2001 AAA fired at ONW aircraft
06 Apr 2001 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft
22 Feb 2001 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar
12 Feb 2001 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar
24 Jan 2001 Iraqi missiles and AAA fired at ONW aircraft
04 Dec 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
02 Dec 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
28 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
18 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
17 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
30 Oct 2002 ONW aircraft defend against Iraqi anti-aircraft threat
22 Oct 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft
26 Jun 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft, Coalition responds
19 Jun 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft, Coalition responds
28 May 2002 ONW aircraft fired upon, Coalition responds
01 May 2002 Iraq fires AAA at Northern Watch Aircraft
28 Feb 2002 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar
04 Feb 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft
31 Jan 2003 Iraq Attacks Operation Northern Watch Aircraft Monitoring No-Fly Zone
04 Feb 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft
28 Feb 2002 ONW Aircraft fired upon and targeted by radar
19 Apr 2002 Iraq targets Coalition aircraft
01 May 2002 Iraq fires AAA at Northern Watch Aircraft
28 May 2002 ONW aircraft fired upon, Coalition responds
19 Jun 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft, Coalition responds
26 Jun 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft, Coalition responds
04 Jul 2002 ONW aircraft threatened, Coalition responds
23 Aug 2002 Iraqi targets coalition aircraft
27 Aug 2002 Iraqi targets coalition aircraft
09 Oct 2002 Iraq threatens coalition aircraft
22 Oct 2002 Iraq fires AAA at ONW aircraft
18 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
28 Nov 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone
02 Dec 2002 Iraq attacks ONW aircraft monitoring No-Fly zone