http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13664&Itemid=131
“GEN. DUBIK: The prime minister had put Gen. Mohan(sp) in change of the Basra Operation Center. He’s gone down there several weeks and made a very good assessment of the situation. Since he’s been down there, the minister of defense has deployed a special operations, special forces battalion. The minister of interior has formed a palace guard trained by the British and equipped by the government of Iraq. The division is gonna be replaced by the 14th Division being formed now so that Basra area has two divisions instead of just one. That training is ongoing right now. And there are at least two brigades more that will be formed over the next month and moved into Basra. The minister of defense is also considering some shifting of some other forces from other parts of the country but those are his decisions to make and I shouldn’t comment on until he makes them. But this is, the situation in Basra has been under close study from the minister of interior, minister of defense, and prime minister for the last few weeks.”
“...last few weeks” That was 29 Aug2007. The decision to accellerate the build up of IA in Basrah, was not even finalized at the end of Aug. To anyone that knows anything about military planning, that indicates a serious scramble to re-align forces. This was the first announcement of the sudden expansion of Basrah and that 14th was moving up in schedule.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/09/iraqi_security_force_2.php
From my write up of events during August:
Of particular significance, was the establishment of the Basrah Operational Command under the command of General Mohan (four-star equivalent). The establishment of the Basrah Operational Command, 14th Division, addition of at least two more brigades to the two already stationed in Basrah, and the dispatch of the first expansion battalion from Iraqi Special Operations Force indicate serious concern for the situation in Basrah. As the Vice Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint staff said: “We do not have enough forces there. That is why we are having a new division, the 14th Division, to be built in Basrah, especially with the possibility that the British might be leaving us in time.” (Note: MNSTC-I PAO has confirmed that the nomenclature 13 is not being used; thus, the 14th Division is the designated number for the next Iraqi Army division.)
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/stories/Press_briefings/2007/070910%20gen%20petraeus%20-%20%20amb%20crocker%20qa%20transcript%20%28parts%201-9%29.pdf
Bottom of Page 26: Notice that Basrah is not even mentioned for PIC. Karbala after Ramadan, then Anbar in January. The decision for PIC is not unilateral and Basrah is not reported ready in the official documents...
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Signed-Version-070912.pdf
- Graphic on page 27 on PIC.
- Right column of page 38 references the diversion of 12th Div assets to form 14th. Decision made by PM in Jul 2007.
http://www.dvidshub.net/media/pubs/pdf_2594.pdf
Movement of 3-9 Tank Bde to Basrah on first page.
http://www.alsabaah.com/paper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=49857
Reformation of Basrah IP ordered. Note: This is the government’s newspaper.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/iraqi_security_force_4.php
My write up of monthly events incl Basrah.
http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/article/22615
Questionable source but, this is from a politician that wants UK out:
Nassif Jassem al-Abadi from the Islamic Dawaa movement welcomed the hand over of the security file, but he acknowledged that there is a shortage in weapons and security forces.
He told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI) that “withdrawal is a cheerful thing for all Iraqis, but there is a lack in weapons and security forces.”
He voiced hope that security forces could be able to assume “these great responsibilities.”
I do not normally bother with the political statements and links unless they provide hard numbers or unit ID’s. My notes, writing and focus is on ISF force development and assisting another writter in Afghan security force development. Do not overlook the links in the articles...
I’ve still yet to see any suggestion whatsoever that the transfer of Basra province was ever expected to be later than the handover is actually going to be. Your continued assertions that a handover date of early 2008 represents an acceleration of 6 - 12 months is completely unsupported by any source, all of which initially expected the handover to complete in Spring 2007.
“The decision to accellerate the build up of IA in Basrah, was not even finalized at the end of Aug. To anyone that knows anything about military planning, that indicates a serious scramble to re-align forces. This was the first announcement of the sudden expansion of Basrah and that 14th was moving up in schedule.”
The article says that General Mohan assessed the situation and resources have been juggled That has also happened in many other areas at various times in response to operational needs. The whole army is being put together in a ‘scamble’ (as your link to the interview with General Dubik amply demonstrates) so that’s hardly a suprise.
I note you don’t quote the section before General Dubik’s reply where General Bergner address the journalist’s implication that the British forces were leaving precipitously:
“To your first point. The British government just very recently their prime minister has come out and said very clearly that they are committed to the mission, that they are engaged here in Iraq, that they are not on a timeline, that they are going to make sure that they achieve the necessary conditions for the Iraqi people and the Iraqi security forces to be successful. And so, I think first of all we have to start with their commitment and their government’s position which has been stated very clearly in the last couple of days.
I think it’s also important to make sure we use some right terminology. What the Coalition forces in Basra are in the process of doing is consolidating some of their forces and handing over facilities to Iraqi security forces to operate from. And so they are consolidating and they are transitioning. They’re not leaving. So there’s a difference there in terminology.”
“Bottom of Page 26: Notice that Basrah is not even mentioned for PIC. Karbala after Ramadan, then Anbar in January. The decision for PIC is not unilateral and Basrah is not reported ready in the official documents...”
This is very disingenous. Petraus doesn’t mention Basra at all, as he is just giving a few examples, rather than an exhaustive list. In the douments you refer to Basra is reported ‘partially ready’ for transfer, exactly the same as Anbar province which, as you say, is currently expected to be handed over at about the same time as Basra is expected to be handed over.
And then some other quotes from people saying that there ‘could’ be problems ‘if’ British forces were removed too quickly without training the Iraqi army sufficiently. Which has been consistently stated won’t happen.