It's too long to post as a thread (it's like reading a pamphlet) but you might be interested in taking a peek (it gets better as it goes along).
Essentially, the lieutenant colonel is an expert on the lawful use of force in combat and he testified for the defense.
I am there.
OK....I didn’t even get past the first answer. You know where my mind went with the spelling!
BTW...WOW! You work hard.
Question, Red. Just getting into this testimony. Lt. Col. Bolgiano mentions working with Colonel Hays Parks. I’m assuming this is the same guy who testified in Chessani’s hearing. Did Parks testify for the prosecution?
From Red’s link at Post #142... Squares with actions in Hamdania, damnit!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Now, briefly, I don’t presume to lecture on the law; but I think it is important to understand the over arching guidance that comes down from on high. And the overarching guidance emanates from understanding rules of engagement accompanying the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3121.01B. The relevant portions here is it sets forth in its unclassified version a number of things.
First of all, the unit commanders at all levels will ensure that the individuals within their respective units are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense. That is an important mandate. That is not an option. It comes down right from on high. The problem is that against a declared hostile, there is confusion as we talk about these rights and responsibilities under ROE.
To understand rules of engagement, sometimes these terms get mixed up. And the first one that gets mixed up that I see all the time is the concept of PID.
“PID” is a term under the rules of engagement matrices as they flow down from the Chairman’s rules through the classified and unclassified ROE that has everything to do with identifying a declared hostile. And without getting into any classified aspects of the current ROE, suffice it to say that in previous conflicts, our National Command Authority has designated certain forces as declared hostile which we can kill on sight. That is the legal authority.
When you think about it, that is an awesome, awesome responsibility and authority to give to a young Marine. But we do it. In other words, if a young Marine or higher level command can positively identify – and that’s a little misleading in itself, because PID really means reasonable certainty. If a command can gain PID on a target, they can engage them where they sleep, where they are doing whatever. You don’t have to wake them up to make it a fair fight. So that’s where PID has relevance. You want to make sure you are targeting the right folks.
Excellent, Red. I’ll have to check it out. Thanks!
Pamphlet, hell -- more like a short story. And a well crafted one at that!
LCol. David G. Bolgiano made a lot of very succinct points, but the most telling to me was the following exchange that, unless LCol. Ware follows through, will reoccur once more under the current JCS:
We finally get to the relevance to DoD. If we look at ROE, traditional modern standing rules of engagement, had their genesis in the late 1970's at the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff level. Unfortunately, at the time most of these were drafted, the Chairman was a Naval Officer. I don't mean that disrespectfully. I just mean it in the sense that the ROE was gauged towards carrier battle groups and large weapon systems, vice rules for use of force for the individual at the tip of the spear.
That is important for a number of reasons because the ROE for a carrier battle group -- a carrier battle group commander is somebody generally 50 years of age or older, been to all the senior service schools, has 25 years experience behind him, and hopefully has a great deal of judgment, wisdom, and life experiences to base threat assessments on; vice the recipient of our rules for use of force at the tip of the spear is generally an 18, 19, 20-year-old Marine with not a lot of life's experiences to make judgment under such situations.
The ROE for the carrier battle group is also predicated on the fact that the carrier battle group commander, due to our intelligence systems in place, the national intelligence estimates for CIC is aircraft above 300 nautical miles over the horizon, has a great deal of time generally, minutes, if not hours, to do threat assessments, even for attacking vampires or bogeys, which are airborne threats to his carrier battle group.
He has time to implement what are called special instructions or SPINS. I won't talk about the classified nature of them for a specific mission; but suffice to say they are essentially checklists for when you can employ certain weapon systems.
So that carrier battle group has the luxury of saying to a bogey out there, if they turn this many degrees towards our carrier battle group, increases speed to above 400naughtsknots, decreases altitude below this, that signals hostile intent, if not a hostile overt act, and we can splash him; vice the Marine at the tip of the spear, has mach one eyeball to do threat assessments and has about a second or less to make those decisions under the high stress they would encounter.
(I'm former Navy, so am well aware of the fact that the Battle Group works as a team. He further states that the Marine Squad should also be treated the same as a BG, wherein their collective responses and collateral damage should be judged the same way. He finds it telling that they are not.)
He was also, in my opinion, very dismissive of the positions taken by JAG and NCIS with respect to the Marines in a combat situation being treated
He made a lot of very telling instances from his own experiences, as well as those from cases he's investigated -- all of them leading to the basic underlying premise that a Marine or Soldier under fire is allowed and expected to respond with overwhelming force, in order to stop the attack. He specifically states that kill is not the operative tendency, but preventing further aggressive action is.
I trust/hope that all of the other Defense Teams have a chance to acquire this, and utilize it in their briefs going forward.
None of them should have been charged. Period!
Hey Girl! What do you make of this?
Q. Now, sir, you know that Lance Corporal Sharratt is actually charged with UCMJ violations, common law murder. Is that correct?
A. That’s Correct.
Q. He is not charged with a LOAC violation or an ROE violation.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Again, I don’t want to put words in your mouth. The ROEs simplest form of it, which is inherent right to self-defense?
A. Yes