Posted on 09/12/2007 7:31:38 PM PDT by TigerLikesRooster
Lost in Translation?
The problem with the press availability between Presidents Bush and Roh after their meeting in Sydney last week was not a glitch in interpretation that then led to a seemingly awkward moment as Roh asked Bush to clarify his point about ending the Korean war. Nor was the problem that Roh apparently tried to press President Bush for a more conciliatory public message to DPRK leader Kim Jong il in advance of Roh’s trip to Pyongyang next month.
The problem is that Roh’s behavior during that press availability demonstrated a total lack of appreciation for how far the U.S. position has come on North Korea, and how allies should behave in public.
Multilateral meetings like APEC and the UN General Assembly afford leaders the opportunity to hold several meetings on the side with key allies and partners. These “bilats” are often the object of intense internal jockeying within the U.S. government as the President has only limited time and every regional affairs office in NSC or State wants the President to meet with their leaders. The ROK usually ranks fairly highly because they are a stalwart ally, with troops in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, and because there are always pending issues to discuss including North Korea and the Six Party talks.
After these bilats, no one, including designated public spokespersons for the two leaders, should discuss what is said between the two leaders in these private meetings. Discussions about longer-term strategy and diplomacy regarding Six Party talks or the upcoming inter-Korean summit need to be shared quietly between the two heads of state. A public message that characterizes the meeting is usually then carefully coordinated between the two sides. As a column (Lee Ha won) correctly noted (in his editorial) on September 10 this is why summits are often framed as “successes.”
The problem at Sydney is that Roh was unable to maintain this distinction between public messages and private discussions. Roh probably did press the President in their private meeting to offer the prospect of a peace treaty to Kim Jong-il. I would not be surprised if Roh did not also ask Bush for a letter or even a verbal message that he could convey to Kim.
President Bush’s public response was fully consistent with the September 2005 Joint Statement. A process of discussions on a permanent peace regime to end the Korean war may start as the DPRK denuclearizes, but will not be completed without full and verifiable dismantlement in the North. Roh’s pressing Bush in public for more than that is not at all consistent with ROK national security interests. Did Roh want Bush to say that he would publicly offer Kim a peace treaty in advance of denuclearization? Why would the ROK want to sign a peace treaty that would effectively recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state?
Instead, the ROK president might have used the press availability at APEC to show some public appreciation for how hard the U.S. has worked to move the Six Party process forward. Just after the BDA issue was resolved with US officials working hard behind the scenes to support the return of the money, Roh was quoted in a speech in Korea saying that despite Washington hardliners’ best efforts to stop the Six Party process, the ROK government has prevailed in moving the denuclearization process forward. This statement showed no appreciation for the patience and political will exhibited by Washington in the Six Party talks. It is bad to treat one’s closest ally in public as occurred in Sydney. It is worse to be unappreciative of how much effort the Bush administration has already put into moving the Six Party process forward.
The writer is Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University and was on the White House National Security Council from 2004 to 2007 and Deputy Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Six Party talks.
Roh is a kind of shock jock. It pleases me to no end to see hitherto Roh supporters squirming these days. They are morons, too.
Ping!
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Army may not be what it used to be, but it still could probably make Roh’s wish come true. The North Korean Army would surely be glad to finally, officially, formally end the Korean War’s technically-unfinished battles if we would pull our thirty-some thousand troops out of the peninsula, as many (younger) South Koreans insist.
Maybe those Korean Christians in Afghanistan still embarrassed and rankled Roh. Maybe Roh was playing to a certain part of his home audience.
the argument above for waiting to change relations with N. Korea until after N. Korea abandoned their nuclear program is so obvious & overwhelmingly in S. Korea’s interest that the context overwhelms the content of Roh’s comments. I could be wrong. But there’s no indication that Roh made similiar comments in private discussions. So maybe his public line was a sop to christian moms in S Korea. or soccer moms. (korean presbyterians are likely to be pretty anti communist.)
Thanks for posting this.
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