A recent letter bomber, Adel Mohamed Arnaout, is in the news in connection with letter bombs he sent in Toronto. He had grudges against a former attorney, a former employer, a former neighbor...
Profilers, however, think that usually when a batch of mailbombs go out, the motive is political.
The al-Hayat letter bombs to newspaper offices in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions are instructive.
NPR set the scene. It was January 2, 1997, at 9:15 a.m. at the National Press Building in Washington, D.C. The employee of the Saudi-owned newspaper Al Hayat began to open a letter. It was a Christmas card — the kind that plays a musical tune. It was white envelope, five and a half inches by six and a half inches, with a computer-generated address label attached. It had foreign postage and a post mark — a post mark in Alexandria, Egypt. It looked suspiciously bulky, so he set it down and called the police. Minutes later they found a similar envelope. These were the first two of four letter bombs that would arrive at Al Hayat during the day.” A fifth letter bomb addressed to the paper was intercepted at a nearby post office. They all looked the same. Two similar letter bombs addressed to the “parole officer” (a position that does not exist) arrived at the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth. It seemed evident how some Grinch had spent the holidays in Alexandria, Egypt.
Egyptian Saif Adel (Makawwi), thought to be in Iran, was involved in military planning. Adel was a colonel in the Egyptian Army’s Special Forces before joining Al Qaeda. He helped plan the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Africa. He was also a planner in the attack on the USS Cole and has served as the liaison officer between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Adel assisted Atef, who had overall responsibility for Al Qaeda’s operations. There was part of a long-running disagreement with Saif Adel (Makawwi) and Ayman, however. As Attorney Al-Zayyat has said, Makkawi had many times claimed responsibility for operations that were carried out inside Egypt but when the perpetrators were arrested, it would be al-Zawahiri’s name whose name they shout loyalty to from the docks. Some would even say they did not know a person named Makkawi. After the letter al-Hayat letter bombs were sent in January 1997, Saif Adel (Makawwi) gave a statement denying responsibility on behalf of the Vanguards of Conquest. He got admonished by the unnamed but official spokesman for the Vanguards organization — chastising him as not being authorized to speak for the organization (or even being a member).
On January 7, 1997 Col Muhammad Makkawi purporting to be speaking for the Egyptian Vanguards of Islamic Conquest denied responsibility for sending the letter bombs. He said: “Those are messages of admonishment. There is no flirtation between us and the Americans in order for us to send them such alarming messages in such a manner.” Makkawi said that “the Vanguards of Conquest “are heavyweight and would not embark on such childish actions.” US press and political commentaries had hinted at the Vanguards of Conquest organization’s involvement in these attempts. In his statement to `Al-Hayat, Makkawi added “I am surprised that we in particular, and not other parties, should be accused of such an operation.”
But then someone else credited with being the Vanguards official spokesman denounced Makkawi’s authority to speak for the group, referring to the January 5th statement it had made denying responsibility. This other claimed spokesman said “We welcome any Muslim who wants to join us, and if Makkawi wants to [join us], he will be welcomed to the Vanguards march, but through the organizational channels. But if words are not coupled with actions, we tell him: Fear God, and you can use a different name other than the Vanguards to speak on its behalf.” The spokesperson for the Vanguards of Conquest was Al-Sirri, based in London.
The FBI would not speculate as to who sent the letters or why. But this was your classic “duck that walks like a duck” situation. As NPR reported at the time, “analysts say that letter bombs are rarely sent in batches, and when they are it’s generally prompted by politics, not personal animus.” Al Hayat was a well respected and moderate newspaper. It was friendly to moderate Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt — just as, say NBC and CBS. That, without more, was accurately discerned by observers at the time as sufficient to make the newspaper outlet a target of the militant islamists. The newspaper, its editor explained, does not avoid criticizing militant islamists. The Al Hayat Editor-in-Chief explained: “We’ve been opposed to all extremists in the Arab world, especially the fundamentalists.” Mohammed Salameh, a central defendant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was sent to Leavenworth in 1994. The other three Egyptian extremists convicted in the bombing were sent to prisons in California, Indiana and Colorado. Like the blind sheik, Abdel Rahman, Salameh had complained of his conditions and asked to be avenged. The Blind Sheik was particularly irked that the prison officials did not cut his fingernails.
Rahman was convicted in 1995 of seditious conspiracy, bombing conspiracy, soliciting an attack on an U.S. military installation, and soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. His followers were indicted for plotting to bomb bridges, tunnels and landmarks in New York for which Rahman allegedly had given his blessings. The mailing of deadly letters in connection with an earlier attack on the World Trade Center, was not merely the modus operandi of militant islamists, it was the group’s signature — it’s their calling card. Khaled Abu el-Dahab, a naturalised American, from Silicon Valley in a confession detailed in a state security document from Egypt’s defense ministry dated October 28, 1998, explained that he was trained to make booby-trapped letters to send to important people, as well as asked to enroll in American aviation schools to learn how to fly gliders and helicopters. He was a friend of Ali Mohammed, a former special forces officer in the Egyptian army and former US Army Sergeant.
Al Hayat reporters, editor and owner were not expressing an opinion — though the owner did lay out various possibilities (e.g., Iraq, Iran etc.). The owner of the paper had commanded Saudi forces during the Persian Gulf War, when Bin Laden was so upset about American troops on the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, al Hayat had recently opened up a Bureau in Jerusalem, giving it a dateline of Jerusalem rather than al Quds, which some thought blasphemous. But none of the possibilities would plausibly explain why the letter bomb was sent to Leavensworth where three of the WTC 1993 defendants were imprisoned, including Ramzi Yousef’s lieutenant who had asked that his mistreatment be avenged. (That was the criminal genius who returned to Ryder to reclaim his deposit after blowing up the truck at WTC). Egyptian security officials claimed that said that the letters were sent from outside of Egypt, the stamps were not available in Egypt, and that the postmark was not Alexandria as reported. Whatever the place of mailing, the sender likely was someone who was upset that KSM’s and Ramzi Yousef’s associates had been imprisoned, to include, most notably, the blind sheik. Whoever is responsible for the anthrax mailings, it is a very good bet that they are upset the blind sheik is detained. That should be at the center of any classified profile of the crime.
On December 31, 1996 Mohammed Youssef was in Egypt — having gone to Egypt months before. The al Hayat letter bombs related to the detention and alleged mistreatment of the blind sheikh and the WTC bombers were sent 10 days earlier — on the Day of Measures. In 2006, he was named as co-defendant with Hassoun, Daher, Padilla and Jayyousi. Youssef was born in Alexandria. Do authorities suspect the “Florida cell” of being involved in the al Hayat letter bombs? Kifah Jayyousi’s “Islam Report” over the years — distributed by Adham Hassoun in Florida and Kassem Daher in Canada — expressed outrage at detention/extradition due to terrorism law and also what he perceived as attacks on his religion by some newspapers. His headlines on the internet groups blazed “Just In! First Muslim Victim of New Terrorism Law!: US Agents Arrest Paralegal Of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman Without Charge Prepares To Hand Him To Egyptian Regime,” soc.religion.islam, dated April 27, 1996 and “Islam Report (Newspaper Attacks Our Religion! Act Now!,” soc.religion.islam, Apr. 16, 1996
In connection with the January 1997 letter bombs, Ayman got the know-how to send sophisticated electronic letter bombs from Iraqi intelligence according to one item from the highly controversial Feith memo. In the al Hayat letter bombings, Ayman allowed the finger to be pointed at Libya. In the Amerithrax letters, he allowed the finger to be pointed to a United States biodefense insider. Tenet in his May 2007 book included Saif Adel as among “al-Qa’da’s leadership to the group’s highly compartmentalized chemical, biological, and nuclear networks.”
After the Al Hayat letter bombs to newspapers in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions, in January 1997, both the Blind Sheikh and his paralegal, Sattar, were quoted in separate articles in Al Hayat (in Arabic) denying that they or their supporters were responsible. The Blind Sheikh commented that al Hayat was fair and balanced in its coverage and his supporters would have no reason to “hit” them. Sattar noted that the bombs were mailed on December 20, one day before the brief in support of the blind sheik on appeal. He questioned whether someone (like the FBI) was trying to undermine the appeal’s prospects. The same sort of counterintuitive theory was raised in connection with the earlier letter bombing of newspapers to DC and New York City and people in symbolic positions. But that time it was Ahmed Abdel Sattar who noted that the bombs were mailed on December 20, 1996 one day before the brief in support of the blind sheik on appeal. He questioned whether someone (like the FBI) was trying to undermine the appeal’s prospects. This time, Mr. Sattar did not need any help making the argument with respect to the anthrax letters — numerous people with political agendas rushed to do it for him.
In September 2006, in a Sahab Media production called “Knowledge is for acting,” there is a clip in which Al Quds editor Atwan refers to his visit with OBL in 1996 (see his 2006 book The Secret History of al Qaeda) and he says that Bin Laden was planning to attack America “and America prisons in particular.” That was an apparent reference to the Al Hayat letter bombs sent to newspapers and prisons in January 1997. There were recurrent references to Abdel-Rahman in the tape.
It was, in part, because of the al Hayat letter bombs that the authorities only ever most seriously considered either the Egyptian militants or someone with access to threat intel information who could make it look like the Egyptian militants. With all due respect to Dr. Hatfill, he would not have been clever enough to do such a good job at framing Zawahiri.
Here is a recent comment from a law review by a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist on the role of the media in covering a bioterrorist event.
“Copyright (c) 2006 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
2006 / 2007
38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 581
LENGTH: 3055 words
SYMPOSIUM: THE FIFTH PLAGUE: ESSAY: Media Responsibility During a Terrorist Attack
NAME: Josh Meyer *
BIO:
* Josh Meyer has been a staff writer for the Los Angeles Times for seventeen years and covers a wide range of issues — from politics and government to law enforcement — through general assignment work and investigative projects. Meyer has reported on terrorism and related intelligence, law enforcement, and national security issues for the newspaper’s Washington bureau since shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. ..
SUMMARY:
... To prepare for my role as a national reporter in the bioterrorism drill at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, I read everything I could find on the proper role of the media in the event of a terrorist attack. ... In a future bioterrorism attack, such as the outbreak of human-transmissible Foot and Mouth Disease, the media’s role will be even more important, and not just as the key information provider for the public. ... Law enforcement agencies are often even worse than public health officials when it comes to disclosing information to the media, particularly during potential terrorist attacks and outbreaks such as the anthrax mailings. ... I agree that the media should not question everything the government does, especially when a bioterrorism attack is unfolding. But I also believe that the second most important role for the media in covering a bioterrorism attack, after informing the public, is precisely to question what the government is doing, especially if that government action does not appear to be in the best interests of the public. ...
TEXT:
[*581]
In covering a bioterrorism attack, the primary role of journalists is the same one they have fulfilled for centuries when potentially life-threatening events occur: they must be the eyes and ears of the public. The media should immediately inform the populace of the attack and update citizens on all relevant developments, not merely those that the government approves for dissemination. There are a few exceptions to that rule, which I will discuss later. But for the most part, reporters should act as aggressive intermediaries, finding out everything that they can about the attack from the government or other sources. Specifically, the media’s concerns should include: the nature of the attack, its potential health impacts, and the identity of the perpetrators. The media should relay this information to the public as it becomes available, and the information should be as complete and accurate as possible.
While the media surely will face resistance in trying to obtain this information, I believe that the media’s aggressive lobbying for information and prompt public disclosure of it will be critically important to public health and safety. Many public health and bioterrorism experts have espoused this belief in their published comments and writings. An alert and diligent media could help to save lives, mitigate the potential for widespread panic, and help people cope in a potentially overwhelming atmosphere of fear, chaos, and human tragedy.
***
In a future bioterrorism attack, such as the outbreak of human-transmissible Foot and Mouth Disease, the media’s role will be even more important, and not just as the key information provider for the public. Whether terrorists attack by spreading pathogens through the air, water, or food supply, authorities probably will not know that such an attack has occurred until many citizens begin showing symptoms of a particular disease — perhaps this will happen across a wide geographic area that transcends several local and even state health and law enforcement jurisdictions. The public (and many if not most government officials) will end up getting their information from CNN and other televised news broadcasts and from the printed press. In the days and weeks following the attack, government officials will communicate through intranets, but the public will remain glued to their television screens, radios, BlackBerry devices, and cell phone visual displays for the latest developments. Newspapers and magazines will play an important role by providing more in-depth coverage, with context and analysis from experts supplementing the reporting. The analysts can provide insight into what is happening and what they think people should do. And the all-important live televised news conferences that have become such a staple of major events in our 24/7 news cycle will play a major role too.
***
Law enforcement agencies are often even worse than public health officials when it comes to disclosing information to the media, particularly during potential terrorist attacks and outbreaks such as the anthrax mailings. The FBI in particular has an almost Pavlovian response to media requests for information: they refuse to provide information and often go to great lengths to ensure that even the most basic facts remain unknown to the public. Ted Wasky acknowledged this during our daylong seminar, saying he and his colleagues at the bureau have learned the hard way that if they do not share information with reporters, the reporting will still occur — but it probably will not be the whole story and it may not be even remotely accurate. Incomplete or erroneous information can induce panic, or, equally dangerous, lull them into a false sense of security. “We have learned the lessons from Katrina, that when you do not feed the beast they are going to go out and get fed somewhere else,” Wasky said.
That was the case in the anthrax attacks, where the nation’s new Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge implored the media to work closely with government authorities to help get the word out to an anxious public and keep it informed. In reality, however, Homeland Security officials and the FBI engaged in a virtual blackout of officially sponsored information. That forced reporters to scramble for tidbits of information that came in the form of unauthorized leaks from government officials who often had incomplete information or, worse, their own agendas for spinning whatever information they had. The result was often contradictory information, [*585] which in turn further confused and perhaps even jeopardized a public that did not know how to react.
During our exercise, Cleveland Plain Dealer managing editor Tom O’Hara said the anthrax case is only one of many that have made it harder for reporters to do their job of giving readers the whole story. “I have been dealing more with attorneys on sort of keeping reporters off the stand and out of jail more in the last two or three years than I had been in the twenty-seven years before that,” O’Hara said. I agree with his assessment of the prevailing anti-media environment. But this hostility toward the media is not surprising.
***
Ted Wasky emphasized the importance of law enforcement and public health authorities “becoming partners with the media.” He suggested, “Media needs to be your ally in this particular instance, not questioning everything you do.” I agree that the media should not question everything the government does, especially when a bioterrorism attack is unfolding. But I also believe that the second most important role for the media in covering a bioterrorism attack, after informing the public, is precisely to question what the government is doing, especially if that government action does not appear to be in the best interests of the public. That higher purpose calls for digging for information the government may not even know about or that the government is intentionally withholding. It also calls for asking uncomfortable questions. ...
***
To be sure, there is always the chance that terrorists could read such articles and get an idea of how to exploit holes in the safety net. But my experience dealing with the terrorist threat has shown that terrorists, particularly Islamic militants affiliated with Al Qaeda and related organizations, are already trolling the Internet and doing their own research into such vulnerabilities. Writing about those vulnerabilities is unlikely to offer much aid and comfort to the enemy.”