Posted on 07/01/2007 8:58:07 AM PDT by TrebleRebel
WASHINGTON — In the fall of 1992, Kanatjan Alibekov defected from Russia to the United States, bringing detailed, and chilling, descriptions of his role in making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union.
----------- Officials still value his seminal depictions of the Soviet program. But recent events have propelled questions about Alibek's reliability:
No biological weapon of mass destruction has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S. colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.
And, as Alibek raised fear of bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that fear.
By his count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that hired him.
The Los Angeles Times explored Alibek's public pronouncements, research and business activities as part of a series that will examine companies and government officials central to the U.S. war on terrorism -----------------------
(Excerpt) Read more at latimes.com ...
I guess it means you shouldn’t even be mentioning evidence in an “on-going criminal investigation” in a peer reviewed scientific journal in the first place.
The bottom line here is that Beecher’s article is NOT a source of what the FBI know or do not know. It was an irresponsible thing to write in a scientific journal - the reviewer should never have allowed it, not without documented proof. Who was the reviewer again? Oh, yes, it was Matthew Meselson, wasn’t it?
Have you read about his involvement in Sverdlovsk? Or do you need remimded - yet again?
The article didn't mention any evidence.
Your argument is that because he DID NOT mention critical evidence it shows that the FBI is covering up some illegal U.S. government bioweapons program.
Have you forgotten your own argument?
Douglas Beecher's article describes established facts from routine microbiology. It says,
... even in a crude state, dried microbial agents have been long considered especially hazardous. Experiments mimicking laboratory accidents have demonstrated that simply breaking vials of lyophilized bacterial cultures creates concentrated and persistent aerosols.
and
While size analysis of freshly prepared powders may bear signatures of the production process and predict some of their performance characteristics, size determinations for material recovered after it has been deployed must be viewed with circumspection. Particle size distributions are dynamic (13), changing as a powder experiences different conditions upon handling, such as compaction, friction, and humidity among other factors.
and
Particles aerosolized from purified powdered spores consist either of individual spores or aggregates of individual spores. The great majority of particles are generally the smallest particles in the population (2), which are single spores in spore powders.
and particularly this statement:
In essence, even if most of a spore powder is bound in relatively few large particles, some fraction is composed of particles that are precisely in the size range that is most hazardous for transmission of disease by inhalation.
So, while he uses such general and well-known established information elsewhere in the article, your gripe seems to be that he was doing something sinister when when he applied such established information to the attack spores of 2001 this way:
Individuals familiar with the compositions of the powders in the letters have indicated that they were comprised simply of spores purified to different extents. However, a widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production. This idea is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations.
All he's really saying is that it has been long known to just about every microbiologist that simple purified spores are extremely dangerous. He's just adding that any attempt by conspiracy theorists to claim that only spores which have been "weaponized" with sophisticated techniques are dangerous, is just plain moronic bulls**t.
Where's the argument in that?
Ed, I certainly agree that relying on your words is the most compelling way of describing your theory.
On December 9, 2001, you wrote:
View profile
More options Dec 9 2001, 7:09 pm
Debby,
Your comment that it was his ex-wife who reads the tabloids really got me to thinking, and I mentioned that comment on my web page at
http://extra.newsguy.com/~detect/anthrax.html
I don’t know how young the child is, but he/she would have to be young enough to not realize what was happening. It’s a really great theory. I’d been trying to figure out how he could get a kid to write the letters for him, and then your comment made it clear: he used his own kid! It’s probably just wild speculation, but it sure fits.
Thanks for the feedback. I really appreciate it.
Ed”
Beecher is saying that anyone who says that simple spore preparations are not particularly dangerous is misguiding research and preparedness efforts for bioweapons attacks. It is a stupid and dangerous thing to say or even imply.
You can argue that he shouldn't have mentioned the attack anthrax, but the article was about the "Forensic Application of Microbiological Cultural Analysis to Identify Mail Intentionally Contaminated with Bacillus anthracis spores." It's all about how the anthrax contaminated mail bags in 2001 were examined and all the precautions used, etc. It is about how cross contamination occurred and how you cannot really put anthrax into an envelope without heavily contaminating the outer surface of the envelope. The purpose of the article is to provide original research and inside information about the work done in this area after the anthrax attacks of 2001.
To say that they shouldn't have provided this information unless they also answered all the conspiracy theory questions about coated spores is just plain STUPID. It's STUPID if you say it, and it's STUPID if the editor of the magazine says it.
In reality, the whole argument is about the fact that Beecher said that people who worked directly with the attack anthrax say it was "comprised simply of spores purified to different extents." And there are conspiracy theorists who believe otherwise -- totally basing their beliefs on a comment in a newsletter published by AFIP which said that "silica" was DETECTED in the spores by a device that can detect UNSEEN elements.
Since the "silica" believed or imagined to the present could not be seen, the powder was "comprised simply of spores purified to different extents." There should be no dispute.
But clearly conspiracy theorists will find fault in anything that does not directly address their beliefs, and they'll find fault in anything that disproves their beliefs.
What is your point? That no one should ever learn anything new because it might cause them to change their mind about something or learn that what they said in the past may not have been entirely correct?
The editor of the journal is correct. It should never have passed peer review.
For the editor to admit that speaks volumes of just how improper this was.
But probably the person to blame for this was the reviewer, Meselson. He already has a history of media mamipulation and the sleazy suppression of evidence.
CHAPTER NINE Incident at Sverdlovsk
With his well-deserved and impressive academic/scientific credentials, his views were usually sought and carefully listened to. He also became an important figure for the US media to consult. His opinions about Sverdlovsk were widely quoted in the serious press, books, and prestigious scientific journals. The record shows that after 1980 his publicly stated views on Sverdlovsk broadly agreed with the explanations issued by the Soviets themselves.
http://www.fortfreedom.org/y04.htm
In 1987 Meselson returned with more false and scandalously
doctored whitewash of Soviet biochemical warfare in Foreign Affairs.
The following article, apart from summarizing the whole issue, also
throws light on Meselson’s sleazy suppression of evidence.
Let’s consider whether there is a connection between GMU microbiology student Al-Timimi, who the FBI has said they think may have been involved in the anthrax crimes, and the attempt to establish shariah in northern Iraq or plots to conduct terrorist acts of violence against US targets. Yesterday it was revealed that in October 2001, a CI claims that a message from Bin Laden to Albany imam asked him to check out flight schools and asked how close he could get to a [redacted] aircraft.
In briefing before the District Court judge in the Aref matter, the prosecutors explained the connection between Aref and Al-Timimi’s IANA colleague Rafil Dhafir, a respected oncologist in Rome, NY, and the Syracuse-based IANA spin-off/dba Help The Needy.
“Aref’s [Albany imam in 2001] 1999 journal also shows a series of contacts with Mullah Krekar (who, as discussed infra, subsequently founded the terrorist organization Ansar al Islam). Meetings in 1999 with Mullah Krekar and others, in Damascus on August 10, and in Arbil on August 27,
were followed by discussions on August 28 of “M Krekar lectures, like a center abroad,” and on August 29 of “Our resistance for abroad M. [center] for M. Krekar.” On September 15, 1999, discussions of an “American plan” are noted. (Previously, on January 24, 1999, an entry noted
“We had our daily meeting at the center we talked about the following points: 1- Changing program in America let’s keep quiet and not answer anyone. ...
Prior to meeting with Mullah Krekar, Aref already had applied for refugee status in the U.S. Less than four months after meeting with Mullah Krekar, Aref departed Syria for the U.S. (on October 26, 1999). One week earlier, an October 18, 1999 letter from the Islamic Center in Arbil (recovered in 2002 from the premises of “Help the Needy,” a charity run by Dr. Rafil
Dhafir in Syracuse, New York), introduced Aref as “our representative,” and instructed, “We expect cooperation from all of you.”
[Dr. Dhafir was the Vice-Chairman of the Islamic Assembly of North America and was close to GMU microbiology student Dr. Ali Al-Timimi and, for example, spoke alongside him in Toronto in July 2001 and in London in August 2001, as did “911 imam” Awlaki from Falls Church, VA, the fellow who met with hijacker Nawaf.
Aref’s 1999 journal reflects contacts with Dhafir on November 8 (“Dr. Rafil called me and gave me his address and offered his help”), and on November 21 (“Dr. Rafil called me and asked me for some things and talked about some plans of action”). Earlier this year, Dhafir was convicted in U.S. District Court in Syracuse of illegally sending nearly $4 million to Iraq in violation of the Iraqi embargo. United States v. Dhafir, 03-CR-064 (N.D.N.Y.) (NAM), docket 458 (jury verdict) (February 10, 2005). Dhafir is awaiting sentencing; the government calculates his sentencing guidelines range as 324-405 months. Following his arrival in the U.S., Aref maintained contact with the IMK center in Damascus. According to his Journal, on November 23, 1999 Aref “called center and spoke to Mr Azad.” Toll records for Aref’s Albany telephone reflect a call on November 23, 1999 to the IMK center in Damascus; as well as 13 other such calls, the last call in October 2001.
***
According to Aref’s Journal, he was meeting with Mullah Krekar in Arbil, where the “our representative” letter to Dhafir originated, on August 27: “we arrived to Arbil at 10:30” and “tonight I saw Mamosta Sheikh Ali . . . and Mamosta Krekar ... “ The August 28 and 29 entries refer to discussions of an “abroad center” for Mullah Krekar.
***
The foregoing history brings the matter full circle to the Rawah notebook. Aref has had contacts with terrorists and discussions about terrorist acts. He was introduced to the U.S. as a representative of the IMK, and had contact with someone from whom cooperation was expected, someone who illegally sent nearly $4 million to Iraq in violation of the embargo (and who faces a guideline range of 324-405 months). In June 2003, Aref’s name and telephone number were found in a notebook recovered from a terrorist camp at Rawah. The foregoing facts demonstrate dangerousness.”
Thus, the USG suspected Al-Timimi of having rock star status in a charity that was proposed to serve as the American base of a group that then joined with others to form Ansar al-Islam. The go-between was a guy who (according to an unnamed CI) was asked a few weeks after 9/11 to report back to Bin Laden about flight schools and how close he could get to a [redacted] aircraft.
So under the government’s theory of the case, the next 9/11 was indeed at stake and warranted their aggressive prosecution of these individuals.
Those not familiar with the evidence, secret and otherwise, thought it seemed like it was selective prosecution. It was selective prosecution. And thank goodness for that.
A recent letter bomber, Adel Mohamed Arnaout, is in the news in connection with letter bombs he sent in Toronto. He had grudges against a former attorney, a former employer, a former neighbor...
Profilers, however, think that usually when a batch of mailbombs go out, the motive is political.
The al-Hayat letter bombs to newspaper offices in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions are instructive.
NPR set the scene. It was January 2, 1997, at 9:15 a.m. at the National Press Building in Washington, D.C. The employee of the Saudi-owned newspaper Al Hayat began to open a letter. It was a Christmas card — the kind that plays a musical tune. It was white envelope, five and a half inches by six and a half inches, with a computer-generated address label attached. It had foreign postage and a post mark — a post mark in Alexandria, Egypt. It looked suspiciously bulky, so he set it down and called the police. Minutes later they found a similar envelope. These were the first two of four letter bombs that would arrive at Al Hayat during the day.” A fifth letter bomb addressed to the paper was intercepted at a nearby post office. They all looked the same. Two similar letter bombs addressed to the “parole officer” (a position that does not exist) arrived at the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth. It seemed evident how some Grinch had spent the holidays in Alexandria, Egypt.
Egyptian Saif Adel (Makawwi), thought to be in Iran, was involved in military planning. Adel was a colonel in the Egyptian Army’s Special Forces before joining Al Qaeda. He helped plan the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Africa. He was also a planner in the attack on the USS Cole and has served as the liaison officer between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Adel assisted Atef, who had overall responsibility for Al Qaeda’s operations. There was part of a long-running disagreement with Saif Adel (Makawwi) and Ayman, however. As Attorney Al-Zayyat has said, Makkawi had many times claimed responsibility for operations that were carried out inside Egypt but when the perpetrators were arrested, it would be al-Zawahiri’s name whose name they shout loyalty to from the docks. Some would even say they did not know a person named Makkawi. After the letter al-Hayat letter bombs were sent in January 1997, Saif Adel (Makawwi) gave a statement denying responsibility on behalf of the Vanguards of Conquest. He got admonished by the unnamed but official spokesman for the Vanguards organization — chastising him as not being authorized to speak for the organization (or even being a member).
On January 7, 1997 Col Muhammad Makkawi purporting to be speaking for the Egyptian Vanguards of Islamic Conquest denied responsibility for sending the letter bombs. He said: “Those are messages of admonishment. There is no flirtation between us and the Americans in order for us to send them such alarming messages in such a manner.” Makkawi said that “the Vanguards of Conquest “are heavyweight and would not embark on such childish actions.” US press and political commentaries had hinted at the Vanguards of Conquest organization’s involvement in these attempts. In his statement to `Al-Hayat, Makkawi added “I am surprised that we in particular, and not other parties, should be accused of such an operation.”
But then someone else credited with being the Vanguards official spokesman denounced Makkawi’s authority to speak for the group, referring to the January 5th statement it had made denying responsibility. This other claimed spokesman said “We welcome any Muslim who wants to join us, and if Makkawi wants to [join us], he will be welcomed to the Vanguards march, but through the organizational channels. But if words are not coupled with actions, we tell him: Fear God, and you can use a different name other than the Vanguards to speak on its behalf.” The spokesperson for the Vanguards of Conquest was Al-Sirri, based in London.
The FBI would not speculate as to who sent the letters or why. But this was your classic “duck that walks like a duck” situation. As NPR reported at the time, “analysts say that letter bombs are rarely sent in batches, and when they are it’s generally prompted by politics, not personal animus.” Al Hayat was a well respected and moderate newspaper. It was friendly to moderate Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt — just as, say NBC and CBS. That, without more, was accurately discerned by observers at the time as sufficient to make the newspaper outlet a target of the militant islamists. The newspaper, its editor explained, does not avoid criticizing militant islamists. The Al Hayat Editor-in-Chief explained: “We’ve been opposed to all extremists in the Arab world, especially the fundamentalists.” Mohammed Salameh, a central defendant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was sent to Leavenworth in 1994. The other three Egyptian extremists convicted in the bombing were sent to prisons in California, Indiana and Colorado. Like the blind sheik, Abdel Rahman, Salameh had complained of his conditions and asked to be avenged. The Blind Sheik was particularly irked that the prison officials did not cut his fingernails.
Rahman was convicted in 1995 of seditious conspiracy, bombing conspiracy, soliciting an attack on an U.S. military installation, and soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. His followers were indicted for plotting to bomb bridges, tunnels and landmarks in New York for which Rahman allegedly had given his blessings. The mailing of deadly letters in connection with an earlier attack on the World Trade Center, was not merely the modus operandi of militant islamists, it was the group’s signature — it’s their calling card. Khaled Abu el-Dahab, a naturalised American, from Silicon Valley in a confession detailed in a state security document from Egypt’s defense ministry dated October 28, 1998, explained that he was trained to make booby-trapped letters to send to important people, as well as asked to enroll in American aviation schools to learn how to fly gliders and helicopters. He was a friend of Ali Mohammed, a former special forces officer in the Egyptian army and former US Army Sergeant.
Al Hayat reporters, editor and owner were not expressing an opinion — though the owner did lay out various possibilities (e.g., Iraq, Iran etc.). The owner of the paper had commanded Saudi forces during the Persian Gulf War, when Bin Laden was so upset about American troops on the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, al Hayat had recently opened up a Bureau in Jerusalem, giving it a dateline of Jerusalem rather than al Quds, which some thought blasphemous. But none of the possibilities would plausibly explain why the letter bomb was sent to Leavensworth where three of the WTC 1993 defendants were imprisoned, including Ramzi Yousef’s lieutenant who had asked that his mistreatment be avenged. (That was the criminal genius who returned to Ryder to reclaim his deposit after blowing up the truck at WTC). Egyptian security officials claimed that said that the letters were sent from outside of Egypt, the stamps were not available in Egypt, and that the postmark was not Alexandria as reported. Whatever the place of mailing, the sender likely was someone who was upset that KSM’s and Ramzi Yousef’s associates had been imprisoned, to include, most notably, the blind sheik. Whoever is responsible for the anthrax mailings, it is a very good bet that they are upset the blind sheik is detained. That should be at the center of any classified profile of the crime.
On December 31, 1996 Mohammed Youssef was in Egypt — having gone to Egypt months before. The al Hayat letter bombs related to the detention and alleged mistreatment of the blind sheikh and the WTC bombers were sent 10 days earlier — on the Day of Measures. In 2006, he was named as co-defendant with Hassoun, Daher, Padilla and Jayyousi. Youssef was born in Alexandria. Do authorities suspect the “Florida cell” of being involved in the al Hayat letter bombs? Kifah Jayyousi’s “Islam Report” over the years — distributed by Adham Hassoun in Florida and Kassem Daher in Canada — expressed outrage at detention/extradition due to terrorism law and also what he perceived as attacks on his religion by some newspapers. His headlines on the internet groups blazed “Just In! First Muslim Victim of New Terrorism Law!: US Agents Arrest Paralegal Of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman Without Charge Prepares To Hand Him To Egyptian Regime,” soc.religion.islam, dated April 27, 1996 and “Islam Report (Newspaper Attacks Our Religion! Act Now!,” soc.religion.islam, Apr. 16, 1996
In connection with the January 1997 letter bombs, Ayman got the know-how to send sophisticated electronic letter bombs from Iraqi intelligence according to one item from the highly controversial Feith memo. In the al Hayat letter bombings, Ayman allowed the finger to be pointed at Libya. In the Amerithrax letters, he allowed the finger to be pointed to a United States biodefense insider. Tenet in his May 2007 book included Saif Adel as among “al-Qa’da’s leadership to the group’s highly compartmentalized chemical, biological, and nuclear networks.”
After the Al Hayat letter bombs to newspapers in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions, in January 1997, both the Blind Sheikh and his paralegal, Sattar, were quoted in separate articles in Al Hayat (in Arabic) denying that they or their supporters were responsible. The Blind Sheikh commented that al Hayat was fair and balanced in its coverage and his supporters would have no reason to “hit” them. Sattar noted that the bombs were mailed on December 20, one day before the brief in support of the blind sheik on appeal. He questioned whether someone (like the FBI) was trying to undermine the appeal’s prospects. The same sort of counterintuitive theory was raised in connection with the earlier letter bombing of newspapers to DC and New York City and people in symbolic positions. But that time it was Ahmed Abdel Sattar who noted that the bombs were mailed on December 20, 1996 one day before the brief in support of the blind sheik on appeal. He questioned whether someone (like the FBI) was trying to undermine the appeal’s prospects. This time, Mr. Sattar did not need any help making the argument with respect to the anthrax letters — numerous people with political agendas rushed to do it for him.
In September 2006, in a Sahab Media production called “Knowledge is for acting,” there is a clip in which Al Quds editor Atwan refers to his visit with OBL in 1996 (see his 2006 book The Secret History of al Qaeda) and he says that Bin Laden was planning to attack America “and America prisons in particular.” That was an apparent reference to the Al Hayat letter bombs sent to newspapers and prisons in January 1997. There were recurrent references to Abdel-Rahman in the tape.
It was, in part, because of the al Hayat letter bombs that the authorities only ever most seriously considered either the Egyptian militants or someone with access to threat intel information who could make it look like the Egyptian militants. With all due respect to Dr. Hatfill, he would not have been clever enough to do such a good job at framing Zawahiri.
The research does not absolve those who are responsible for promoting myths in the first place. What the psychological studies highlight, however, is the potential paradox in trying to fight bad information with good information.
...
The research is painting a broad new understanding of how the mind works. Contrary to the conventional notion that people absorb information in a deliberate manner, the studies show that the brain uses subconscious "rules of thumb" that can bias it into thinking that false information is true. Clever manipulators can take advantage of this tendency.
...
The experiments do not show that denials are completely useless; if that were true, everyone would believe the myths. But the mind's bias does affect many people, especially those who want to believe the myth for their own reasons, or those who are only peripherally interested and are less likely to invest the time and effort needed to firmly grasp the facts.
The research also highlights the disturbing reality that once an idea has been implanted in people's minds, it can be difficult to dislodge. Denials inherently require repeating the bad information, which may be one reason they can paradoxically reinforce it.
Indeed, repetition seems to be a key culprit. Things that are repeated often become more accessible in memory, and one of the brain's subconscious rules of thumb is that easily recalled things are true.
I can only hope that when someone simply posts the same words over and over it isn't enough convince people reading this thread that those words are true.
Here is a recent comment from a law review by a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist on the role of the media in covering a bioterrorist event.
“Copyright (c) 2006 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
2006 / 2007
38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 581
LENGTH: 3055 words
SYMPOSIUM: THE FIFTH PLAGUE: ESSAY: Media Responsibility During a Terrorist Attack
NAME: Josh Meyer *
BIO:
* Josh Meyer has been a staff writer for the Los Angeles Times for seventeen years and covers a wide range of issues — from politics and government to law enforcement — through general assignment work and investigative projects. Meyer has reported on terrorism and related intelligence, law enforcement, and national security issues for the newspaper’s Washington bureau since shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. ..
SUMMARY:
... To prepare for my role as a national reporter in the bioterrorism drill at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, I read everything I could find on the proper role of the media in the event of a terrorist attack. ... In a future bioterrorism attack, such as the outbreak of human-transmissible Foot and Mouth Disease, the media’s role will be even more important, and not just as the key information provider for the public. ... Law enforcement agencies are often even worse than public health officials when it comes to disclosing information to the media, particularly during potential terrorist attacks and outbreaks such as the anthrax mailings. ... I agree that the media should not question everything the government does, especially when a bioterrorism attack is unfolding. But I also believe that the second most important role for the media in covering a bioterrorism attack, after informing the public, is precisely to question what the government is doing, especially if that government action does not appear to be in the best interests of the public. ...
TEXT:
[*581]
In covering a bioterrorism attack, the primary role of journalists is the same one they have fulfilled for centuries when potentially life-threatening events occur: they must be the eyes and ears of the public. The media should immediately inform the populace of the attack and update citizens on all relevant developments, not merely those that the government approves for dissemination. There are a few exceptions to that rule, which I will discuss later. But for the most part, reporters should act as aggressive intermediaries, finding out everything that they can about the attack from the government or other sources. Specifically, the media’s concerns should include: the nature of the attack, its potential health impacts, and the identity of the perpetrators. The media should relay this information to the public as it becomes available, and the information should be as complete and accurate as possible.
While the media surely will face resistance in trying to obtain this information, I believe that the media’s aggressive lobbying for information and prompt public disclosure of it will be critically important to public health and safety. Many public health and bioterrorism experts have espoused this belief in their published comments and writings. An alert and diligent media could help to save lives, mitigate the potential for widespread panic, and help people cope in a potentially overwhelming atmosphere of fear, chaos, and human tragedy.
***
In a future bioterrorism attack, such as the outbreak of human-transmissible Foot and Mouth Disease, the media’s role will be even more important, and not just as the key information provider for the public. Whether terrorists attack by spreading pathogens through the air, water, or food supply, authorities probably will not know that such an attack has occurred until many citizens begin showing symptoms of a particular disease — perhaps this will happen across a wide geographic area that transcends several local and even state health and law enforcement jurisdictions. The public (and many if not most government officials) will end up getting their information from CNN and other televised news broadcasts and from the printed press. In the days and weeks following the attack, government officials will communicate through intranets, but the public will remain glued to their television screens, radios, BlackBerry devices, and cell phone visual displays for the latest developments. Newspapers and magazines will play an important role by providing more in-depth coverage, with context and analysis from experts supplementing the reporting. The analysts can provide insight into what is happening and what they think people should do. And the all-important live televised news conferences that have become such a staple of major events in our 24/7 news cycle will play a major role too.
***
Law enforcement agencies are often even worse than public health officials when it comes to disclosing information to the media, particularly during potential terrorist attacks and outbreaks such as the anthrax mailings. The FBI in particular has an almost Pavlovian response to media requests for information: they refuse to provide information and often go to great lengths to ensure that even the most basic facts remain unknown to the public. Ted Wasky acknowledged this during our daylong seminar, saying he and his colleagues at the bureau have learned the hard way that if they do not share information with reporters, the reporting will still occur — but it probably will not be the whole story and it may not be even remotely accurate. Incomplete or erroneous information can induce panic, or, equally dangerous, lull them into a false sense of security. “We have learned the lessons from Katrina, that when you do not feed the beast they are going to go out and get fed somewhere else,” Wasky said.
That was the case in the anthrax attacks, where the nation’s new Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge implored the media to work closely with government authorities to help get the word out to an anxious public and keep it informed. In reality, however, Homeland Security officials and the FBI engaged in a virtual blackout of officially sponsored information. That forced reporters to scramble for tidbits of information that came in the form of unauthorized leaks from government officials who often had incomplete information or, worse, their own agendas for spinning whatever information they had. The result was often contradictory information, [*585] which in turn further confused and perhaps even jeopardized a public that did not know how to react.
During our exercise, Cleveland Plain Dealer managing editor Tom O’Hara said the anthrax case is only one of many that have made it harder for reporters to do their job of giving readers the whole story. “I have been dealing more with attorneys on sort of keeping reporters off the stand and out of jail more in the last two or three years than I had been in the twenty-seven years before that,” O’Hara said. I agree with his assessment of the prevailing anti-media environment. But this hostility toward the media is not surprising.
***
Ted Wasky emphasized the importance of law enforcement and public health authorities “becoming partners with the media.” He suggested, “Media needs to be your ally in this particular instance, not questioning everything you do.” I agree that the media should not question everything the government does, especially when a bioterrorism attack is unfolding. But I also believe that the second most important role for the media in covering a bioterrorism attack, after informing the public, is precisely to question what the government is doing, especially if that government action does not appear to be in the best interests of the public. That higher purpose calls for digging for information the government may not even know about or that the government is intentionally withholding. It also calls for asking uncomfortable questions. ...
***
To be sure, there is always the chance that terrorists could read such articles and get an idea of how to exploit holes in the safety net. But my experience dealing with the terrorist threat has shown that terrorists, particularly Islamic militants affiliated with Al Qaeda and related organizations, are already trolling the Internet and doing their own research into such vulnerabilities. Writing about those vulnerabilities is unlikely to offer much aid and comfort to the enemy.”
Here is some of the exchange that went on with respect to suppression of information relating to the criminal or national security investigation:
PROF. GUIORA: Suppose that Agent Wasky says “Please do not print this?”
JUDGE POLSTER: Hypothetically, I would want to know if release of that information would endanger people. Would it endanger lives, or would it compromise a very important criminal investigation, and balance that with the public right to know [the information]. [That is a] critical right in our country, and we guard that zealously. Generally once the media has something, they are free to print it. It is very difficult to get a prior restraint, but there are situations where they are imposed.
AGENT WASKY: As I said before, protection of life is paramount. We will damage a crime scene if it means saving somebody’s life. ... In the end, if we protect someone’s life, that might be a potential witness. We do not know. Why get him in danger? . .
PROF. GUIORA: Hypothetically speaking, could you foresee coming in front of Judge Polster and asking for prior restraint?
AGENT WASKY: In this case, no. The only way I could see [grounds for prior] restraint is if the information they would print would endanger someone’s life. As he said, if we had information from a singular source, that would identify the source and this terrorist group would kill that person. Not knowing the facts, [prior restraint] would be the only way of us coming and preventing someone from giving them someone’s life. [We would also have grounds for prior restraint if] that information was obtained through classified means, and that classification is of significant interest to national security. When I say national security, that means other people’s lives are at risk or the technique of getting it has saved other lives and that technique [needs to remain confidential to continue to be effective]. It is not necessarily the information that . . . is classified, and that understanding is very important.
Protecting sources of information protects how we get the information . . . . We can sanitize the information in a general fashion to get it out to the public, as long as we can be assured that how we get it remains confidential, because that might save someone’s life tomorrow. Osama Bin Laden, someone divulged that he was using a certain type of telephone. Classified information. Sources and methods. Not that we were able to find him, but it was how that was done that compromised a significant national security interest . . . we can not ever capture it that way anymore because it is out there. . . . [This is]why we might go to ask for a restraining order.
***
MR. MEYER: It is working too. If there is another anthrax attack nobody is going to talk to reporters about it because we were all subpoenaed in the Steven Hatfill case, and we can all end up in prison.”
Comment:
Disclosure that the USG was intercepting Bin Laden’s satellite phone used in communicating the 1998 embassy bombings is a real life example. A device was put in the battery and then delivered by someone from Northern Virginia (and St. Louis) to Afghanistan. It was the satellite phone bought by the fellow (Khaleel Ziyad) living with the Dad of Al-Timimi’s friend, co-defendant Royer. There has been no public prosecution of that leaker but both Richard Clarke and Michael Scheuer agree it was a disastrous leak with ruinous consequences.
Given the context and history of past investigations involving Al Qaeda, jpl and treblerebel, it is not surprising that they know how to zealously safeguard classified information.
The reality, though, as Richard Clarke and Michael Scheuer have often said, most intelligence is open source.
It is public knowledge that when Brian Ross reported on December 20, 2001 that they were investigating former Battelle employees, experts knowledgeable about anthrax, such as Dr. A and Dr. B at GMU, were slated to be polygraphed, along with dozens of other scientists.
They worked for Battelle, for example, in 1997.
Huh?
For the view of a sociologist on these issues, see September 2007, Vol 97, No. 9 | American Journal of Public Health 1578-1583
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax Attacks of 2001: The Organizational Backstory
It is by Caron Chess, PhD and Lee Clarke, PhD. Caron Chess is with the Department of Human Ecology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. Lee Clarke is with the Department of Sociology.
For GMU faculty and biothreat analysis students, the current (September 2007) issue is at both GMU Law Library and Fenwick. An electronic copy is available through OVID.
&otFor yet another recent view of these issues, Ed, see
“Mediating the Anthrax Attacks: Media Accuracy and Agenda Setting During a Time of Moral Panic; in the Atlantic Journal of Communication 2007, Vol. 15, No. 1, Pages 19-40
and
Terror, Tort, and the First Amendment
HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES AND MEDIA LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS from Fall 2006 issue of the Brooklyn Law Review.
The law student, for examples, cites the close student of the investigation (and well-sourced on technical issues) Deborah MacKenzie as authority on the issue of silica.
31 MacKenzie, The Insider, supra note 24; An Interview with Van A. Harp, supra note 19. The anthrax particles in the letter were of a uniform size, highly concentrated with no debris, coated to prevent clumping and had been treated with an unusual form of silica to facilitate the drying process. MacKenzie, The Insider,
[NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 9, 2002, at 88 [hereinafter MacKenzie, The Insider].
The sourcing of the other articles above is equally meaty.
But everything is virtually worthless if it is not put in context. What good is quoting an article from February of 2002 when it's clear that people were operating under all sorts of misconceptions back then and that the media was filled with BAD information? It's just burying the facts under an endless stream of words.
Check the comment I just put on my web site. It's about what Senator Leahy said just a day or two ago about the Amerithrax investigation. Here's the part that TrebleRebel will enjoy:
I wish they had turned this investigation over to some good sheriff or police chief somewhere. I think it’s been very badly handled.
Whether or not you understand that it is just someone's opinion and not holy writ, it's still very interesting.
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