Posted on 07/01/2007 8:58:07 AM PDT by TrebleRebel
WASHINGTON — In the fall of 1992, Kanatjan Alibekov defected from Russia to the United States, bringing detailed, and chilling, descriptions of his role in making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union.
----------- Officials still value his seminal depictions of the Soviet program. But recent events have propelled questions about Alibek's reliability:
No biological weapon of mass destruction has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S. colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.
And, as Alibek raised fear of bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that fear.
By his count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that hired him.
The Los Angeles Times explored Alibek's public pronouncements, research and business activities as part of a series that will examine companies and government officials central to the U.S. war on terrorism -----------------------
(Excerpt) Read more at latimes.com ...
VM, the fellow who had Ali Al-Timimi’s phone number, and GB, the former USAMRIID head who is a prolific Ames anthrax researcher, provided further explanation in the related patent below. Given that my consulting expert who makes anthrax simulants for the US Government, and you’ve never made an anthrax simulant, and don’t work with microbiological organisms, I’m surprised you don’t see the value of consulting with Dr. Spertzel.
“[0026] As one embodiment of the invention, a surfactant may be added to the cultivation medium during or after the cultivation medium’s preparation. According to the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) Compendium of Chemical Terminology, 2d ed. 1997, a surfactant is “a substance which lowers the surface tension of the medium in which it is dissolved, and/or the interfacial tension with other phases, and accordingly, is positively adsorbed at the liquid/vapour and/or at the interfaces”.
[0027] The addition of surfactants tends to aid and facilitate the binding process between the cultivation media and hydrophobic particles.”
***
Where silicon dioxide particles are used, such particles ought to be hydrophobic and ought to have a surface area between approximately 50 and 380 meters.sup.2 per gram of weight.”
They explain that surfactants include synthetic polymers.
**
The porous medium may include hydrophobic particles (sometimes be referred to as hydrophobic beads or beads). In an embodiment, the porous medium is a hydrophobic powder. Hydrophobic particles may help protect the inoculated mixture from contamination, as well as water penetration from neighboring cultivatable droplets. An example of hydrophobic particles includes silanized silicon dioxide.”
***
It is contemplated that the present composition of cultivatable droplets coated with hydrophobic particles will vary, depending on a multitude of factors. Factors include, but are not limited to, the cell type, the size of the individual droplets, and the desired final density and growth phase. In one embodiment of the invention, the ratio of individual hydrophobic particles to droplets may be within a range of 99:1 and 1:99. In another embodiment of the invention, the ratio of individual hydrophobic particles to inoculated mixture may be within a range of 2:1 and 1:2.
***
Generally, hydrophobic particles are held on the surface of water with weak Van der Waal’s forces. It is well known in the art that the interface between a hydrophobic particle and water surface can be substantially stabilized in the presence of surfactants in a solution. This interaction is comparable to the well known phenomenon of soap bubbles. Apart from soap and other detergents, many other particles (e.g., activated carbon, activated alumina, etc.) are well known for their ability to adsorb liquids or gases. With respect to the invention, it is expected that the surfactant would anchor a hydrophobic particle at the cultivatable droplet surface once the surfactant adsorbs the hydrophobic particle.
***
0042] Cultivatable droplet stabilization may also be affected when the cultivatable droplet volume to aerosil volume ratio is relatively high. When this case occurs, cultivatable droplets may tend to come into contact with each other. Upon contact, cultivatable droplets may form a multilayer of beads between the surfaces of the cultivatable droplets, as shown in FIG. 3. Stability of such contacting cultivatable droplets may depend on how strongly beads are anchored to the cultivatable droplet surface. If the beads can be easily moved and/or displaced form the contact area, the cultivatable droplets may coalesce. However, if the beads are anchored and/or cannot easily move out of the water surface, cultivatable droplets may be stabile.”
***
[0043] Various techniques may be used to create and stabilize cultivatable droplets. As an exemplified embodiment, inoculated mixture may be transformed into cultivatable droplets via a jetting technique. As shown in FIG. 5, cultivatable droplets 515 may be ejected from a thin capillary tip when pressure 505 is applied to a micro-syringe pump 510. To catch the cultivatable droplets 515, a container 520 lined with a porous medium (such as an aerosil layer) may be used. The porous medium can be a hydrophobic powder, fibrous powder, etc. The container 520 can be, but is not limited to, a Petri dish, beaker, cup, etc., to achieve a near uniform-to-uniform coating. The aerosil layer may be subjected to slow mixing using a bar magnet 525 and a magnetic stirrer 530, which can aid in controlling mixing speed. Hydrophobic fumed silica, such as Aerosil.RTM. R 972, having an average diameter of 16 nm, may be used. By varying the pressure and diameter of the tip, the size of a cultivatable droplet’s diameter may be controlled. For example, a flow rate of about 8 mL/hour through a glass capillary tip ranging from about 30-50 .mu.m can produce highly homogenous cultivatable droplets with average diameters between approximately 100-200 .mu.m.
***
045] Another technique is the showering technique. As shown in FIG. 7, an inoculator 705 having inoculated mixture may be connected to a pump 710. Using nozzles 715, the pump (which may include a motor) may pump inoculated mixture from the inoculator 705 to a sprayer 720. Droplets may be formed by using the sprayer 720 having an array of holes to disperse inoculated mixture. The sprayer 720, which can resemble a shower head, may be created by punching holes in a Teflon film. Holes may vary in diameter, for example, from 50-100 .mu.m. Alternatively, a shower head may be used. To catch cultivatable droplets 725, a vessel 730 (such as a bucket, can, jar, dish, beaker, etc.) may be used. The vessel 730 may include a porous medium (e.g., a cloud or layer of aerosil 740). The porous medium can be a hydrophobic powder, fibrous powder, etc. The presence of the cloud of aerosil 740 may enable effective coverage of dispersed droplets by aerosil particles. Because droplets 725 tend to be heavier than the aerosil particles 740, the droplets are likely to encounter the aerosil particles 740 and may be stabilized. As the inoculated mixture is sprayed into the vessel 730, the cultivatable droplets 725 formed may encounter a propeller 735 attached to a motor 745 before, at the same time or after encountering aerosil particles 740. Although not necessary, a propeller 735 may be used for distributing the cultivatable droplets 725 uniformly and/or stir the aerosil particles in a way such that cultivatable droplets 725 and aerosil particles 740 may make contact with each other. In other words, the spinning rate of the propeller 735 may be controlled with the motor 745 by the user.
***
[0046] Alternatively, the invention also allows for a third technique where inoculated mixture may be introduced to hydrophobic particles prior to conversion into droplet form. This technique is known as blending. Here, as shown in FIG. 8, using a pump 815 and nozzle 820, inoculated mixture may be pumped into a blender 825 having aerosil. It is possible that the pump 815 may pump inoculated mixture from a syringe 810 or some other form of container (such as a glass, jar, beaker, tube, etc.). Alternatively, inoculated mixture may be manually placed at the bottom of a blender 825 and overlayed with a porous medium (e.g., aerosil). The porous medium can be a hydrophobic powder, fibrous powder, etc. As an embodiment, the ratio of inoculated mixture to aerosil is about 1 to 4 (volume to volume). A cocktail of dispersed cultivatable droplets may be rapidly formed with the blender’s knives revolving at around 7,000 to 12,000 rpm. It should be noted that using this technique may result in smaller sizes of atomized and cultivatable (stabilized) droplets. The size may be between roughly 10 .mu.m to 50 .mu.m. This technique may be used over the jetting and showering techniques in applications where higher dispersion of inoculated mixture is desired.
***
[0048] Once stabilized, cultivatable droplets may be separated from remaining/excess aerosil particles. Because the density of aerosil particles tends to be substantially different from that of water, separation may be accomplished in a variety of ways. Examples include, but are not limited to, centrifugation, wind chamber, etc. The invention may subject cultivatable droplets to centrifugation, or an equivalent vortexing process (such as vortexing by hand/thumb). This aspect may be accomplished by placing cultivatable droplets in a centrifuge tube and spinning the tube in a centrifuge. The rate of spinning may vary in speed and length of time as determined by the user. For instance, cultivatable droplets may be centrifuged at about 2,000 revolutions per minute for about 5 minutes. However, it should be noted that there is no definitive rate or time that is necessary for separation so long as separation is achieved. When cultivatable droplets have collected at the bottom of a centrifuge tube, cultivatable droplets may be collected using a retrieving device, such as a pipette.
***
[0049] If wind chamber is exercised, air may be used to blow light aerosil particles away while cultivatable droplets fall and collect at the bottom of the wind chamber. If a user decides to exercise this method, aerosil may be collected and reused after sterilization.
***
[0050] However, it is not always necessary to separate the hydrophobic particles, or even excess hydrophobic particles, from cultivatable droplets. For instance, because silicon dioxide is frequently used in soil treatment, there is no need to remove the silicon dioxide from cell cultures that are grown for purposes of soil treatment, where silicon dioxide is used as the hydrophobic particle. Furthermore, since hydrophobic particles may limit the potential for the spread of contamination, it may be desirable to maintain cultivated cells within individual cultivatable droplets for storage purposes.”
*PING*
Welcome to FR - I like the name ;)
Nonsense. He works for the FBI labs. The FBI's labs examined the spores. Beecher's entire article is about handling and examining the spores. He was doing original research. He and the FBI scientists are the main source for the article. Beecher is saying they examined the anthrax spores as part of original research and there were no additives.
Do you really expect him to cite the article he wrote as a source for the article he wrote?
The news article in Science magazine had no original research and was cited as an example of bad and misleading information.
Even Science Magazine says that the Matsumoto article is not science. Here's part of the letter I received from Don Kennedy, the editor of Science Magazine back in January of 2006:
Dear Mr. Lake:
First, your suggestion that we "retract" the Matsumoto piece is inapplicable. That was a News article; it didn't report original research, and the authors of News articles report views of the science as they have found it following investigation. This often sparks disagreements.
He went on to say that he wouldn't censor Matsumoto's views.
Some people might be dumb enough to believe that a "news article" by a reporter with "views" is more reliable than original science reported in a scientific report by an FBI scientist, but some people are dumb enough to believe almost anything -- particularly conspiracy theorists.
You wrote:
Beecher, I believe, was duped into adding this sentence by his reviewer, Meselson, who we all know has an agenda.
No, I don't think that "we all know" that Professor Meselson has some kind of "agenda" and is duping the FBI.
What is that agenda? Please tell us.
I can see that Doug Beecher may have been asked or persuaded by Professor Meselson to add the comments about the attack spores having no additives. He should be applauded for doing so. We're all complaining that the FBI isn't releasing enough information about the attack anthrax. Let's hope he persuades or "dupes" the FBI into releasing MORE information.
My discussions with people at the FBI indicates that they feel they cannot get in the middle of idiotic arguments generated by conspiracy theorists and True Believers. They know from experience that it would just generate MORE idiotic arguments from the conspiracy theorists and True Believers. It just causes the media to distribute more widely the idiotic theories from these conspiracy theorists and True Believers.
He may not be quite as extreme a left-wing radical as someone such as Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, but he definitely leans in that direction.
So, it's not much of a surprise that he would go out of his way to try and portray the anthrax attacks as being "domestic" as opposed to a foreign terrorist attack.
Because let's be totally honest here: a foreign biological terrorist attack on America would pretty much undermine everything the life work of him and those who think like him.
“I can see that Doug Beecher may have been asked or persuaded by Professor Meselson to add the comments about the attack spores having no additives. He should be applauded for doing so.”
He should not be applauded for publishing unsupported information in a peer reviewed scientific article. Editors of microbiology journals agree that is quite improper.
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/government/84/8449gov1.html
This is the FBI’s first public statement on the investigation since it began analyzing the material in the Leahy letter and the first time the bureau has described the anthrax powder. Beecher, however, provides no citation for the statement or any information in the article to back it up, and FBI spokeswomen have declined requests to interview him.
“The statement should have had a reference,” says L. Nicholas Ornston, editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal. “An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation,” he says.
excerpts from Mangold and Goldberg’s Plague Wars:
CHAPTER NINE Incident at Sverdlovsk
Page 76:
The Soviets now went to extraordinary lengths to buttress their lies and make them supportable and credible worldwide. What had begun as a local cover-up in Sverdlovsk, now became an international fairy tale, a fiction of breathtaking audacity.
Page 77:
Throughout the rest of the 1980s, Matthew Meselson, a respected Harvard professor of microbiology and longtime arms control activist, unwittingly helped the Soviet caravan of deception and disinformation gain acceptance in the West.
Meselson emerged as the leading scientific expert to oppose his own government’s interpretation of Sverdlovsk in favour of the Soviets’ old tainted-meat cover-up. He defended the Soviets’ case publicly and doubtless from the most honest of beliefs. President Reagan was now in the White House and, no matter how forcefully his administration complained about Sverdlovsk, Meselson remained utterly convinced that there had been an accident with bad meat and it had nothing to do with any secret biological weapons plant.
.........
With his well-deserved and impressive academic/scientific credentials, his views were usually sought and carefully listened to. He also became an important figure for the US media to consult. His opinions about Sverdlovsk were widely quoted in the serious press, books, and prestigious scientific journals. The record shows that after 1980 his publicly stated views on Sverdlovsk broadly agreed with the explanations issued by the Soviets themselves.
Page 81:
But the guilty involvement reached even higher. Next, it emerged that Boris Yelstin himself also must have known about the cover-up. In May 1992, Yeltsin’s new Russian government formally acknowledged what was now well known, but still had no official imprimatur. The man who had been the powerful communist party chief of the Sverdlovsk region in 1979 was none other than President Boris Yeltsin. He now admitted that the outbreak had been caused by an accident at the biological weapons facility, and not by natural causes. This presumably correct version became the official position of the Russian government, and remains so to this day.
Meselson, however, remained unfazed. In the face of Yeltsin’s admission and the Russian and US press disclosures, the professor assembled a team of expert American scientists and went with them to Sverdlovsk in June 1992 to see for himself. They interviewed two outstanding Sverdlovsk doctors Faina Abramova and Lev Grinberg who participated in the 1979 autopsies at Hospital 40. For thirteen years, these brave pathologists had secretly hidden incontrovertible medial evidence from the KGB including preserved tissue samples, slides, and autopsy reports which proved that the victims had died from breathing in the anthrax.
Meselson later claimed that he and his team had made the discovery of the new truth from these important witnesses, but again, the facts were against him. The two Russian doctors had previously spoken to Soviet reporters and the Wall Street Journal, so Meselson was simply taking credit for being the final arbiter who had authenticated the evidence.
After making a second trip to Sverdlovsk, Mesleson finally published his results in 1994 in the journal Science; the article accepted that the tainted-meat story was bogus. But, perversely, he still would not admit that the US government had been right for fifteen years, or that he had been wrong. Rather, he trumpeted the fact that he anf his team had finally uncovered the “defenitive proof” that the true cause of the outbreak was pulmonary anthrax.
“This should end the argument about where the outbreak came from,” Meselson somewhat pompously told the New York Times “Right up until now, people have still been debating the matter.”
Yet, to the bitter end, Meselson still clung to a benign interpretation of Soviet motives. He noted that the cause of the accident was still not determined, which implied that it may have involved only a Soviet research centre, one for finding an antidote to an anthrax attack, and not a military production centre for biological weapons. By clinging to this position, he could still argue that the Soviets were not violating the BWC, but were conducting permissable research under the treaty.
Yes indeed, sir. I’ll take a good old fashioned, unbiased, well constructed X-Ray spectrometer over a couple of shady, deceptive Russophiles every day of the week, and twice on Sunday.
More Meselson frauds for your entertainment and edification:
http://www.fortfreedom.org/y04.htm
Kucewicz is the WSJ’s outstanding writer who revealed the extent
of Soviet research on Soviet biochemical warfare in a brilliant series
of articles in April-May 1984 [AtE Jun 84]. He also reported
convincing evidence that the Soviets had supplied biochemical weapons
to their surrogates in SE Asia, who used them on the recalcitrant
Hmong people and elsewhere. The evidence was revealed in two
outstanding WSJ articles (9/6/85 and 3/31/86), but disputed by the
“liberal” science writers of the New York Times, Science, and others.
A particularly vicious piece palmed off as scientific research was
published in the Sept. Scientific American by Harvard biochemistry
prof Matthew Meselson and two others. Meselson, whose trip to SE Asia
had been financed by the leftist MacArthur Foundation, collected bees’
feces (droppings) far away from any war zone, examined the material by
electron microscopy and other methods, not surprisingly found some
toxins in it, and not surprisingly found no man-made toxins
attributable to Soviet weapons. His trivial and irrelevant
experimental findings were never under dispute; his conclusion
attributing all evidence of Soviet biochemical warfare to bee feces is
little short of scientific fraud.
In 1987 Meselson returned with more false and scandalously
doctored whitewash of Soviet biochemical warfare in Foreign Affairs.
The following article, apart from summarizing the whole issue, also
throws light on Meselson’s sleazy suppression of evidence.
http://www.aim.org/publications/special_reports/NewsStand06-14.html
ARNETT: Meselson says the gas described by the commandos fits the description of sarin nerve gas, which the military calls GB.
MESELSON: You have nausea; you defecate; you urinate; difficulty in vision; difficulty in breathing; then convulsions; then paralysis; and then death. All rather quickly.
Then:
http://www.cnn.com/US/9807/02/tailwind.johnson/
CNN retracts Tailwind coverage
Defense Department spokesman Ken Bacon reacts to CNN’s retraction
July 2, 1998
(CNN) — Cable News Network on Thursday retracted its story that the U.S. military used nerve gas in a mission to kill American defectors in Laos during the Vietnam War.
The story was broadcast June 7 on the CNN program NewsStand. CNN Interactive also carried the report.
The Pentagon said it was pleased by the 54-page CNN retraction.
So, you're saying .... what? That Professor Meselson is some supermastermind behind some sinister plot to cover up the true nature of the attack anthrax?
Are you saying that he somehow "duped" the FBI into lying about the nature of the attack anthrax? Wouldn't that mean he also "duped" everyone else who said or implied that they saw no additives in the anthrax?
For example, did he also "dupe" General Parker of USAMRIID into saying a week after they started examining the Daschle anthrax that, even though silicon and oxygen were detected in the anthrax, and "although we may see some things on the microscopic field that may look like foreign elements, we don't know that they're additives, we don't know what they are, and we're continuing to do research to find out what they possible could be. They're unknowns to us at this present time."?
Surely, after a week he'd have been able to tell if the spores were coated or not. Do you believe he is part of Meselson's sinister plot?
Or are you simply saying that, because you disagree with Professor Meselson's political views, he must be opposed on anything he says -- even if he's right?
Dr. Beecher, with whom I corresponded in getting a copy of the article to distribute, was not directly involved in the forensic examination as you suggest. If you are suggesting that his understanding is based on what he was told by a fellow FBI scientist, however, that would be correct. (And personally, regardless whether it fit the usual standard for sourcing in a peer reviewed article, I think it is the most authoritative statement we have, so long as it can be construed consistently with the AFIP finding. (Which it can).
But the article is best left to speak for itself to include the express disclaimer. Dr. Beecher was very circumspect and limited in what he said, but the article never pointed to a direct role relating to the detection of siliica etc.
In my lay opinion, the method described in the patents above are fully consistent with what Dr. Beecher wrote. One man’s “sophisticated additive” is another person’s beach sand or soap detergent or substance available at your local Home Depot or Elmer’s Glue or commercially available product used with BT (bacillus thuringiensis).
These patents were dual use and not classified. Thus, by definition, state sponsorship is not required.
And according to the expert opinion of a military microbiologist, the forensic findings are consistent with the method described in the patents.
As for Dr. Meselson, his main point has been: it’s best to wait for official results to be announced by the FBI. Whatever critique or interpretation he placed on the AFIP’s EDX in Lois Ember’s article, he’d agree that absent access to the extensive research done by the FBI, he’s not in a good position to judge.
His only agenda, it would seem, would relate to catching the anthrax perp.
Any institution associated with access to the strain or know-how, OTOH, would have an institutional motive to suppress information of such access and then take steps to avoid any future access to such technical knowledge, such as the elimination of such programs, restrictions on the right of students to consult with Ken etc. so as to avoid civil liability.
The GMU Assistant General Counsel, indeed, made a special point to me that the Florida counsel had not involved GMU. Director Bailey was already in a bunker mode, referring me to counsel over the simplest question relating to confirming what the directory indicated about al-Timimi’s location.
But that Florida matter has been on appeal, I believe. If Florida counsel has any sense, he’ll take the necessary civil discovery on these issues.
But it's "unsupported" only to people who refuse to believe it.
Perhaps he could have cited statements made by experts who stated that they saw no additives in the anthrax. He could have provided testimony by hundreds of microbiologists to "prove" that you do not need additives to make anthrax spores "fly." But he didn't.
It certainly would have been nice if he had published pictures of the attack anthrax to show that there were no additives, but such pictures are evidence in a crime. Going as far as he did was probably as far as he could go.
“Or are you simply saying that, because you disagree with Professor Meselson’s political views, he must be opposed on anything he says — even if he’s right?”
I think JPL is saying that after Meselson’s documented deceptions over many years - Sverdlovsk, Yellow Rain and Operation Tailwind - he is not to be trusted much in any opinion he expresses on chemical and biological weapons.
The story personally related to me by Dr. Alexis Shelokov concerning Meselson’s outrageous dismissal of autopsy slides shown to him by courageous Soviet Drs. Faina Abramova and Lev Grinberg is enough for me to understand Meselson’s character.
I have no doubt whatsoever that Meselson is a true expert in his scientific area of expertise, but we're at war now with a bunch of fascists who want to kill us, and when it comes to the defense of the country, I wouldn't give two cents for anything the man says.
The man really should be where his heart lies: in Moscow or St. Petersburg where he can research bee shit, not here in America perpetrating his little con jobs.
In his Acknowledgements, Beecher acknowledges assistance from a whole host of people who would have had experience with the actual attack anthrax.
Only a true conspiracy theorist would believe that Beecher could lie in such an article and all those other people would silently go along with it.
“absent access to the extensive research done by the FBI”
Are you claiming the FBI have a fully equipped BW analysis lab, or had one back in November 2001?
Why do you think they asked USAMRID for help on this matter? AFIP published their results. Probably the FBI didn’t much like that.
And the FBI chief scientist, Dwight Adams, has admitted, under oath, that there were key details concerning the nature of the attack anthrax that he witheld even in confidential briefings to senators:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_anthrax_attacks
In late 2002 Senators Daschle and Leahy called in the FBI to explain the Washington Post story “FBI’s Theory On Anthrax Is Doubted”, Washington Post, October 28, 2002. This was later on reported in “Anthrax Powder — State of the Art?”[25] . The latter article described how Dwight Adams, chief FBI scientist, told Senators Daschle and Leahy that there were no special additives in the senate anthrax and that the silica was “naturally occurring”. However, Adams admitted that there was scientific information concerning the nature of the anthrax organism that was deemed by his superiors too sensitive to share with Senators Daschle and Leahy:
Connolly: Earlier you testified that regarding the scientific aspect of the investigation there was information that was simply in your view too sensitive to share to the public about the particular characteristics of the organism sent in the mail. Is that correct?
Adams: In so many words, yes, sir.
Connolly: I don’t want to mischaracterize it. If you think I’ve mischaracterized it in any way then, please, put your own words on it.
Adams: No, that’s fine.
Connolly: Did you feel like you had the same restrictions in informing the senate, congress, or their staff in terms of what it is you would reveal to them about the particular characteristics of the organism that was sent?
Adams: As I’ve already stated there was specific information that I did not feel appropriate to share with either the media or to the Hill because it was too sensitive of the information to do so.[26]
Nobody went along with it. The likely explanation for the article is the following. Beecher originally submitted an article to the journal that did not contain these sentences concerning additives. The article was reviewed by Meselson after it was reviewed by the FBI and allowed to go out.
Meselson then persuaded Beecher to add these comments. The FBI did NOT re-review the altered article.
Then the $hit hit the fan. Suddenly Beecher’s article became headline news. The FBI had to react. They reacted by issuing a wishy-washy, meaningless statement covering everyone’s butts. And they gagged Beecher from further comment.
Dr. Meselson and Dr. Alibek in unison (see letter to WP) said that they didn’t silica.
There’s no basis to dispute them (just reason to credit AFIP’s finding that it was detected by the EDX). And no reason to suggest that they would publicly misrepresent their view given that it was all verifiable by folks such as Dr. Patrick.
Dr. Alibek simultaneously argued in detail that Al Qaeda was responsible.
Who does Dr. Meselson think was responsible?
I saw him on Charlie Rose about October 10 or 12, 2001 with Dr. Steve Morse and he had a very impressive demeanor and struck me as dispassionately interested in the mystery of the letters being solved — with no axe to grind or agenda.
What does Dr. Morse think on the subject of silica? He was in charge of DARPA’s biological countermeasures and would have had close contact with Ken and GMU. Who does he think is responsible?
Given that he is not a witness, and instead science is involved, there’s really no need for any heat on the subject — just light.
But let’s take note again: the key expert relied upon by Ed thinks Al Qaeda is responsible. While 200 million may now think Al Qaeda is responsible for the anthrax mailngs, there are not more than 3 people on the planet that think a First Grader wrote the letter. And that’s a FACT.
There’s a 2007 PhD thesis at Princeton you may want to see on Yellow Rain.
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