Posted on 07/01/2007 8:58:07 AM PDT by TrebleRebel
WASHINGTON — In the fall of 1992, Kanatjan Alibekov defected from Russia to the United States, bringing detailed, and chilling, descriptions of his role in making biological weapons for the former Soviet Union.
----------- Officials still value his seminal depictions of the Soviet program. But recent events have propelled questions about Alibek's reliability:
No biological weapon of mass destruction has been found in Iraq. His most sensational research findings, with U.S. colleagues, have not withstood peer review by scientific specialists. His promotion of nonprescription pills — sold in his name over the Internet and claiming to bolster the immune system — was ridiculed by some scientists. He resigned as executive director of a Virginia university's biodefense center 10 months ago while facing internal strife over his stewardship.
And, as Alibek raised fear of bioterrorism in the United States, he also has sought to profit from that fear.
By his count, Alibek has won about $28 million in federal grants or contracts for himself or entities that hired him.
The Los Angeles Times explored Alibek's public pronouncements, research and business activities as part of a series that will examine companies and government officials central to the U.S. war on terrorism -----------------------
(Excerpt) Read more at latimes.com ...
In November 2004, Michael Mason, then the Assistant FBI Director in charge of the Washington Field Office and the Amerithrax investigation emailed Mr. Lake (see post above):
“I would tell you that any suggestion that the government is covering up for anyone is absolutely, categorically absurd *** I wouldn’t care if you lined up “experts” from every renowned university on earth.. It simply is not true. ***
I and the Amerithrax team are simply not part of some grand conspiracy, the objective of which is to keep the truth from the public..the mere thought is insulting to me and to all the people who have worked so hard on this case for the past three years. I wish this thing were more sexy, but it is not. It is dedicated public servants, some of the absolute best and brightest in this country, working extremely hard to find the person or persons responsible for the anthrax attacks of 2001. It’s just that simple.”
Conspiracy theories, indeed, factor significantly in the discussion of both 9/11 and anthrax. The same people who believe or argue that 9/11 was an inside job and not Al Qaeda, tend to argue that the 9/18 was an inside job and not Al Qaeda. Atta’s father is a classic example. It was only 4 years after the fact that he agreed his son had been involved — and at that time emphasized he was proud of the act of martyrdom.
So there is a grave risk that we face the same sort of failure in critical thinking that led to 9/11.
An FBI Special Agent in the Minneapolis, MN Field Office, Harry Samit unsuccessfully appealed to his superiors for a FISA warrant that would permit him to view the contents of Moussaoui’s computer in the weeks leading up to 9/11. He wrote an August 18, 2001 email : “What does everyone think of calling in the NSDA Behavioral Assessment quacks? They probably have a psych profile for an Islamic Martyr and could tell us if our 747 guys fit.” Samit’s memo had explained that Moussaoui was connected to a radical fundamentalist group in Chechnya, whose leader Ibn Khattab has ties to Bin Laden. “For this reason, it is imperative that his effects be searched in order to gather intelligence relating to these connections and to any plans for terrorist attacks against the United States or United States Persons to which he may be a party.” He wrote: “I am so desperate to get into his computer, I’ll take anything.” A colleague emailed Samit: “ thanks for the update. Very sorry that this matter was handled the way it was, but you fought the good fight. God Help us all if the next terrorist incident involves the same type of plane. take care Cathy.” The emails were dated September 10, 2001.
Authors John Schwartz and Minnesota University Professor Michael Osterholm in a book Living Terror published in December 2000 explain that bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and William Patrick each believed “he was working to match a threat from a resourceful and brilliant enemy. I keep that in mind when people ask me how anyone could do such a terrible thing: how anyone could contemplating creating chances that you could kill so many. The answer makes me terribly uncomfortable — it could be anyone, even the nicest guy you ever met.” Little did they know that just a couple miles from the UMn authors Zacarias Moussaoui had downloaded cropdusting materials.
The FBI’s stock profile concerning a biological agent was a lone, unstable individual. In October 2001, the profilers pretty much just reached into the filing cabinet. One Special Agent involved in profiling such incidents explained in a conference, at which Dr. Steve Hatfill was also a presenter: “The closest I’ve ever come to biological-chemical issues is when the toilet on the 37th floor gets backed up *** It isn’t the Middle Eastern people. It isn’t white supremacists. It is the lone individual, lone unstable individual. That statistically, from the cases that we have, is the biggest threat right now.”
Surprisingly, the profilers did not adjust their thinking based on 9/11 or the open source intelligence that Zawahiri had obtained anthrax for the purpose of weaponizing it for use against US targets. FBI profiler Fitzgerald, however, can be forgiven his flawed profile in early November 2001— the profile was fine but his expanded comments to the press about the profile missed the mark — because such a profile was far more useful in supporting warrants in the US in connection with a variety of leads that prudently needed to be pursued.
It is unlikely that profiling will be a particularly significant portion of any prosecution. It was not in the Unabom case. Kaczynski fits the profile relied upon by the Task Force in many (if not most) respects — but he differed from the profile in several important respects . Kaczynski was not among the top 200 suspects primarily because of his age. He was 13 years older than the age in the profile being relied upon by the Task Force. At the time of the first bomb in May 1978, he was 36. Significantly, although he may have a meticulous mind, he was very unkempt in appearance. It was thought that the serial bomber would be very neat. The UNABOM profile was then substantially revised based on the writings of the bomber. The most important change was that estimates of the bomber’s intelligence were greatly increased. Based on the content of the manifesto, the FBI profilers should have profiled someone who did not rely on technology — someone living in Wild Nature who had no electricity and a garden for self-sufficiency. Sometimes it seems that profilers have a tendency to say counter-intuitive things lest it seem like ordinary common sense.
The FBI profile, according to early reports, concluded that the letter writer is an American but is foreign-born (and not a native english speaker). The emphasis in the press reports, however, has always been on the suggestion that the mailer likely is “domestic” rather than foreign — a lone, male scientist who works in a lab. The profile was issued shortly after the White House meeting where it was agreed that Al Qaeda was the likely culprit, but that the theory and the possibility of a state sponsor would not be discussed. The FBI profile was widely criticized by experts and in editorials in the New York have been made for equipment costing as little as $2,500.
As then Attorney General Ashroft once said, an “either-or matrix” is not useful. “Domestic terrorism” is defined by the Antiterrorism Act of 1991. Judge Harold Baer explained in 2003 in Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that in distinguishing “international terrorism,” “[t]he main difference is that domestic terrorism involves acts that “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” Here, the anthrax mailings are reasonably understood as involving acts that “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” The District Court judge was “mindful that an expansive interpretation of ‘international terrorism’ might render ‘domestic terrorism’ superfluous.” By way of example, was longtime Al Qaeda operative and former US Army sergeant Ali Mohamed “foreign” or “domestic”? Are the young men from Buffalo — most of whom were US citizens and born here — “foreign” or “domestic”? Would a graduate or postdoctoral microbiology student sympathetic to Al Qaeda — living and working in the US — be considered “foreign” or “domestic”? Would an islamist PhD animal geneticist and nutrition researcher living in the US for decades be “foreign” or domestic”? What about an Iraqi-born US citizen Ph.D. expert in bacillus thuringiensis who knew one of the WTC bombers? Or what about the Egyptian who made frequent attempts to obtain maps of the water supply system of Canton, Ohio, and sought books dealing with anthrax? What about a graduate in bioinformatics with access to GMU’s DARPA-funded Center for Biodefense facilities? What about Mohammed Junaid Babar from Queens, whose mother worked at the WTC, who post-9/11 met left the US and met with Al Qaeda’s #3, Zawahiri’s chief aide al-Hadi. And, of course, there is the lovely and pious Aafia Siddiqui from the Brandeis biology department who completed her dissertation in 2001 and remained committed to helping the widows, orphans and refugees of conflicts such as in Bosnia. A hazmat courier who delivered anthrax to Paul Keim’s lab at Northern Arizona was interviewed twice — the first was around March 2002. He says it was in the second interview, around January 2003, that “middle eastern men” became the focus of the FBI’s questions.
An interesting article, “The Knowledge: Biotechnology’s advance could give malefactors the ability to manipulate life processes — and even affect human behavior” in The MIT Technology Review (March/April 2006) is based on interviews with Sergei Popov (an expert at GMU who had worked as a Russian bioweaponeer), University of Maryland researcher Milton Leitenberg, Harvard’s Matthew Meselson, Rutger’s Richard Ebright and others:
“After last year’s bioterrorism conference in DC, I called on Richard Ebright, whose Rutgers laboratory researches transcription initiation (the first step in gene expression), to hear why he so opposes the biodefense boom (in its current form) and why he doesn’t worry about terrorists’ synthesizing biological weapons.
‘There are now more than 300 U.S. institutions with access to live bioweapons agents and 16,500 individuals approved to handle them,” Ebright told me. While all of those people have undergone some form of background check — to verify, for instance, that they aren’t named on a terrorist watch list and aren’t illegal aliens — it’s also true, Ebright noted, that ‘Mohammed Atta would have passed those tests without difficulty.’ “
***
‘That’s the most significant concern,’ Ebright agreed. ‘If al-Qaeda wished to carry out a bioweapons attack in the U.S., their simplest means of acquiring access to the materials and the knowledge would be to send individuals to train within programs involved in biodefense research.’ Ebright paused. ‘And today, every university and corporate press office is trumpeting its success in securing research funding as part of this biodefense expansion, describing exactly what’s available and where.’
The analytical problem is that researchers tend only to focus on their narrow field. So an analyst focused on Al Qaeda may not know anything about US biodefense programs — an analyst knowledgeable about US biodefense programs may not know anything about Egyptian Islamic Jihad. To knowledgeably address the issue of infiltration and the use of universities and charities as cover — which the documentary evidence shows Zawahiri planned to do and did in his anthrax weaponization program — requires a willingness to become knowledgeable and investigate the different substantive areas.
Brian Levin, a domestic terrorism expert at the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University, once reasoned that “the people committing these acts are foreign-based or have foreign sympathies. It would seem to me to be improbable that a domestic extremist would be able to put together such an attack in such a short period.” Was there something forensically about the anthrax that the FBI was not disclosing relating to the detection of silicon dioxide (silica) that in addition to the strain used, pointed to someone with access to US biodefense information? Was the FBI truly fixated on Hatfill? Or was the media merely fixated on the possible lead they are in the best position to know about? The camera trucks can get to Frederick by the 5 o’clock news and be home in time for dinner. The cooperation of the Pakistan ISI is not required to be able to film the draining of a Maryland pond.
More fundamentally, all the really interesting stuff is classified. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (”FISA”) unit in the Department of Justice has traditionally been known as the “Dark Side.” Everything coming from Khalid Mohammed, according to Agent Van Harp, is classified. To understand the matter, journalists would have to have the cooperation of someone coming over from the Dark Side — which would be a felony. The solution to the Amerithrax case does not likely lie at the intersection of Bin Laden and Saddam streets among those cubicles at Langley with desktop PCs, not unlike any other office. Instead, it lies with the Zawahiri Task Force at Langley which hopefully has an intersection of Ayman Avenue and Rahman Road. If not, we might be looking at a different crossroads altogether.
The Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001— by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. addresses strategic analysis, training and staffing. Did the agents and analysts in the basement of Quantico who came up with the FBI’s profile have relevant training or input from analysts expert in Al Qaeda? Assuming they did, did an investigative bias creep into their approach to the anthrax mailings that should instead have been informed by a strategic understanding of Zawahiri’s Vanguards of Conquest and its modus operandi? Did the profilers know of the al Hayat letter bombs (related to the imprisonment of the blind sheik) and KSM’s threat to use biochemical weapons in retaliation for the detention of the blind sheik and other militant islamists? Just as with 9/11, the correct understanding of the anthrax mailings begins with a trail that leads back to Malaysia, Khalid Mohammed, Hambali, Yazid Sufaat, Rauf Ahmad, Zacarias Moussaoui, various charities, the Albanian returnees trial, Bojinka, and even the assassination of Anwar Sadat. As George Santayana said, “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”
Vice-president Cheney explained in mid-October 2001:
“What we do know - we know a number of things. We know that Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda Organization clearly have already launched an attack that killed thousands of Americans. We know that for years he’s been the source of terrorist attacks against the United States overseas, our embassies in East Africa in ‘98 — the USS Cole last year, probably, in Yemen. We know that he has over the years tried to acquire weapons of mass destruction, both biological and chemical weapons. We know that he’s trained people in his camps in Afghanistan, for example; we have copies of the manuals that they’ve actually used to train people with respect to how to deploy and use these kinds of substances. So, you start to piece it altogether. Again, we have not completed the investigation and maybe it’s coincidence, but I must say I’m a skeptic.”
“I think the only responsible thing for us to do is proceed on the basis that they could be linked. And obviously that means you’ve got to spend time as well, as we’ve known now for some time, focusing on other types of attacks besides the one that we experienced on September 11.”
Critics and supporters alike should check out the new biography on Cheney by Steve Hadley.
In late October 2001, top Administration officials — including CIA Director Tenet — surmised that Al Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax mailings, according to Woodward’s Bush at War: Tenet said, “I think it’s AQ — meaning Al Qaeda. “I think there’s a state sponsor involved. It’s too well thought-out, the powder’s too well refined. It might be Iraq, it might be Russia, it might be a renegade scientist, perhaps from Iraq or Russia.”
One intelligence official has suggested that one reason that the FBI has not emphasized the possibility of a foreign source is that it might require UN involvement in the investigation pursuant to certain biological weapons protocols. The US specifically rejected France’s suggestion in October 2001 that there be a UN resolution condemning the attacks on the grounds that the Security Council had no role to play unless there was clear proof that the perpetrator was foreign. Bob Woodward quotes Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Mr. Cheney’s chief of staff, in explaining why the administration did not acknowledge an al Qaeda link, even though it thought there was one: “If we say it’s al Qaeda, a state sponsor may feel safe and then hit us, thinking they will have a bye, because we’ll blame it on al Qaeda.”
In its March 31, 2005 Report to the President, the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities said: “competing analysis is of no use, even counterproductive, if there is no attempt at constructive dialogue and collaboration.”
In September 2005, Debbie Weierman, a spokeswoman for the FBI’s Washington field office said that this “globe-spanning investigation remains intensely active and broadly focused.” According to one recent letter to a Congressman rejecting the request for a briefing, the investigation has spanned six out of seven continents. The FBI has conducted 9,100 witness interviews, 67 searches and issued 6,000 grand jury subpoenas.
In a press conference in October 2005, Director Mueller said that the FBI was pursuing all domestic and international leads. He told the public to remember Oklahoma City. Remember 9/11. He declined to say if they had a suspect. That year, FBI agents visited Asia, Africa and Afghanistan in the course of the Amerithrax investigation. You can reach a partial video of FBI Director Mueller’s October 2005 Briefing on the Amerithrax Probe by clicking here.
Attorney General Gonzales told the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 18, 2007:
” Senator, Director Mueller, I believe, has offered to get the chairman a briefing. And we’re waiting to try to accommodate the chairman’s schedule to make that happen.
We understand the frustration and the concern that exists with respect to the length of time. This is a very complicated investigation. I know that the director is very committed to seeing it to some kind of conclusion in the relatively near future.”
Conspiracy Theorists do not rant on endlessly, because they know that the more they say, the more easily they can be proven wrong.
Just an observation.
Ed, in the above thread, you are playing “connect the dots” in connection with Goldman, Sachs letters. Right idea. Wrong “connect the dots” game. The anthrax used in the mailings was made in America. The key portal to understanding is to learn about the cell culture — both in America and in the petri dish. And both relate directly to the program at GMU under discussion.
Scientists have determined that anthrax spores mailed to Capitol Hill last fall were made less than two years ago before being mailed. Moreover, contrary to what has often been implied or assumed, the technique to weaponize the anthrax used in the Fall 2001 was not the one used by the US Army in weaponizing anthrax in the 1950s. William Patrick’s process for weaponizing anthrax involved freeze drying and chemical processing whereas it was the process contemplated by Al Qaeda that involved spraydrying. “We made little freeze-dried pellets of anthrax,” Donald Schattenberg explained, “then we ground them down with a high-speed colloid mill.” The finding cast doubt on the hypothesis that the spores could have been stolen from a lab a long time ago.
At a break from a briefing before a Congressional subcommittee in December 2001, Dr. Richard Spertzel and Dr. Ken Alibek discussed access to the Ames strain and the method of weaponization. They might just as well have been demonstrating how to palm a basketball — with Dr. Alibek agreeing with Dr. Spertzel on the likely general method but, knowing of his microdroplet cell culture method and related processes, saying it is easier than Dr. Spertzel may think. At least everyone can agree that the product, fortunately, was not resistant to antibiotics. “It is responding to antibiotics,” the President said when he got the news. “That’s the best news you’ve had as president,” Condi Rice replied.
According to an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Scanning electron microscopy of the spores used in the Senate office attack showed that they range from individual particles to aggregates of 100 [microns] or more. Spores were uniform in size and appearance and the aggregates had a propensity to pulverize (i.e., disperse into smaller particles when disturbed).” A scientist from the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Doug Beecher, in a July 2006 issue of “Applied and Environmental Microbiology” reports that:
“a widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production. The issue is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations.”
Harvard University Matthew Meselson reviewed the language before publication. “The statement should have had a reference,” L. Nicholas Ornston, editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal told a trade periodical. “An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation.” Footnoted or not, the two sentences provide the best and authoritative insight on the question of the method of processing since the mailings. The two sentences essentially said what Dr. Alibek had been saying: “’[J]ust because you have a sophisticated product doesn’t mean the technique has to be sophisticated.’ “ Silica in the culture medium would not be a sophisticated “additive.”
The FBI scientists have been able to distinguish between water isotopes ratios in the anthrax. Brian Williams reports that investigators have told NBC that the water used to make the spores came from the Northeastern United States. researchers have been able to establish that anthrax grown in water in the Northeastern United States is distinguishable from anthrax grown in water from the Southeast and Pacific Northwest. In one published anthrax study, researchers grew Bacillus subtilis, a harmless bacteria that resembles Bacillus anthracis, using local water from five different U.S. cities. The scientists were able to distinguish those grown in various cities. The method can be used to narrow the number of possible origins of the water based on the number of oxygen and hydrogen isotopes. Similarly, a press release announced in September 2003 that University of Maryland researchers have developed a technique to help the FBI track the origins of deadly anthrax spores by identifying the medium used to grow it. The FBI asked Maryland professor Catherine Fenselau to turn her mass spectrometry lab to the forensic task of sleuthing how bacillus spores, such as anthrax, are prepared.
Interviewer Kestenbaum said: “Ehleringer is now creating a map showing how the isotope ratios of water vary anthrax was grown, it may rule some places out.” As defined by the Census Bureau, the Northeast region of the United States covers nine states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. A scientist explained the research in an NPR interview in 2004.
I infer from the NBC report that from the isotope ratios, authorities believe either that the anthrax was grown in one of the yellow (or perhaps light green) areas, but not one of the dark green, blue or red areas. It would be great if Ed could upload the isotope ratio map. The yellow swath includes much of the Northeastern United States — places like Syracuse, NY but also places like Ann Arbor and Minneapolis. If that is the isotope ratio range, Islamabad and Baghdad can be excluded. Pretty much all foreign locations apparently can be excluded, along with places with comparable oxygen isotope ratios such as Central New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio. Locales with such excludable ratios include Pakistan (Lahore), Iraq (Baghdad), and Singapore. Whereas pretty much only the adjacent parts of Canada above Northeastern US (e.g., parts of Ontario and Quebec) match the yellow swath that the scientists found distinguishing. The authors of one of the key articles noted that they couldn’t distinguish between North Carolina and Ohio — the dark green. Similarly, they can’t distinguish between Central New Jersey and North Carolina (again, the dark green). The key studies in the peer reviewed literature indicate that they were funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ehleringer and his colleagues published a March 2007 article titled “Stable isotope ratios of tap water in the contiguous United States” in “Water Resources Research, Vol. 43 (pdf available upon request). The study was funded by the “federal government.” The raw data survey results have been embargoed by the federal government.” ( I believe the agency would usually be identified). In other water isotope ratio studies the funding agency was identified as the Central Intelligence Agency or whatever agency it was. (It varied). Perhaps this March 2007 study was funded by the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation and was done specifically for the purpose of laying the scientific groundwork of a prosecution in Amerithrax. While Helen W. Kreuzer-Martin, the Maryland scientist in a study published in April 2007 titled “Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms,” was looking at the nutrients in the culture, the Utah scientist in this study is looking at the tap water. The DOJ/FBI likely hopes to put all the data together with the more familiar reasons to suspect someone (means, motive, modus operandi and opportunity), and put on a case that to a moral certainty proves it was committed by the perp(s) — where otherwise, absent the scientific evidence, there is a lack of a “smoking gun.” Here, based on this new science, there apparently is thought to be a smoking petri dish
The March 2007 isotope ratio study explains: “Here we present results from the first national-scale spatiotemporal survey of stable isotopes in tap water. The new data show that tap water samples exhibit high levels of spatially coherent isotope ratio variation that can be related to commonality in patterns of water source and postprecipitation history for water resources in different parts of the country. A strong relationship exists between tap water isotope ratios and those of annually averaged local precipitation (as estimated by geostatistical modeling), but robust differences between tap water and precipitation isotope ratios also exist in many parts of the United States. These patterns can be related to regional tendencies in water resource selection and water history, including patterns likely related to high-altitude dominated sources, seasonally based recharge, and evaporative loss from natural or artificial surface reservoirs. Our data provide the first evidence that large, spatially distributed isotope sample networks offer the potential to identify and characterize the magnitude and regional relevance of such processes within complex human-hydrological systems. ... We synthesize our data as a set of predictive tap water isotope ratio maps that, when interpreted with respect for the limitations of the underlying data, should benefit future water resources research efforts as well as fields such as ecology and forensic sciences where understanding of large-scale patterns of hydrological isotope ratio variation is increasingly important.”
I am not scientifically trained, but my understanding is that by looking at the oxygen, hydrogen and deuterium geospatial distribution, you can more precisely identify the geospatial location of where the water came from. For example, the deuterium map might be relied upon to eliminate an ambiguity left by the light blue/light green range of the oxygen and hydrogen maps.
The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology detected silica. The Daily News (New York) reported on October 30, 2001
[USAMRIID Major General John] Parker did disclose that the anthrax in question contained silica, a common substance found in sand and quartz.
“I don’t know what the significance of it is,” Parker said.
One expert said the presence of silica is significant, but he declined to say why, citing national security concerns.
“I don’t think I want to give people - terrorists - any information to help them, said Dr. Charles Bailey, a scientist at Advanced Biosystems Inc. and former commander of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
It appears, according to US bioweaponeer William Patrick and other experts that the product had an electrostatic charge. Former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson have opined that there was no special silica coating observable in the Scanning Electron Microscope (”SEM”). images they saw. The presence of any silica, Drs. Meselson and Alibek say, may have come from the environment because of the special tendency of anthrax spore coats to attract silicon. (The lead FBI scientist Dwight Adams relied on the study provided the FBI by Meselson in briefing the Congress in November 2002.) Indeed, the silica may have been in the culture medium and then removed as described by patents filed by researchers at Dr. Alibek’s Center for Biodefense at GMU. Dr. Alibek reports that, like Dr. Patrick, he was also given a polygraph.
In a March 31, 2003 public exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to my written question submitted in advance, Kenneth Alibek, former head of Russia’s biological program, to include its anthrax production program, said: “This anthrax wasn’t sophisticated, didn’t have coatings, had electric charge and many other things.” In other responses, he further explained: “There was no special need to add silica to this anthrax. Presence or absence of silica says nothing about whether it was state sponsored.”
US bioweaponeer William Patrick gave it a 7 out of 10 -— calling it professionally done but not weapons grade. In an interview with CBS, William Patrick explained that he had been given a polygraph in June 2002 about the anthrax letters. He reports that “The FBI that they wanted me to become a part of their inner circle of—of experts, and that in order to become a part of that inner circle of technical experts, that I’d have to pass a polygraph test.” In fact, he has not been quoted since, as he often was in 2001. Thus, this was a good indication of what scientific information the FBI credits or at least that they credit his expertise.
On April 11, 2003, Scott Shane reported that reverse engineering “carried out at the Army’s biodefense center at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, raises the disquieting possibility that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups could create lethal bioweapons without scientific or financial help from a state.” Quoting one outside bioterrorism expert. “It shows you can have a fairly sophisticated product with fairly rudimentary methods.” At last report, the reverse engineering reportedly was not able to recreate the identical product
Lisa Bronson, deputy undersecretary of defense for technology security policy and proliferation, has said that commercially available equipment used to make powdered milk could be used to make powderized anthrax. A spray dryer is used in chemical and food processing to manufacture dried egg, powdered milk, animal feed, cake mixes, citrus juices, coffee, corn syrup, cream, creamers, dried eggs, potatoes, shortening, starch derivatives, tea, tomatoes, yeast, and — last but not least — yogurt. Washington State University also has an informative discussion on the web. Making dried milk is not rocket science and doesn’t require a PhD. But, if experience is any guide, Al Qaeda has PhD’s and even rocket scientists who are sympathetic to its cause (indeed, even the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb).
Here is a further Q&A from a March 31, 2003 exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to a written question I submitted in advance to Kenneth Alibek, one of the world’s best known bioweaponeers and the former head of Russia’s biological program:
“Q. Could someone expert in making dried milk make the product used in the Daschle and Leahy letters?
A. Let me answer it this way — yes, actually it would be the same technique to make a powderized anthrax, but at the same time we shouldn’t overestimate the complexity of making it. Such a small amount, keep in mind
that the people who did it could have very simple equipment and very small equipment. But at the same time, when people talk about it being ‘weaponized’ — I can’t say it was sophisticated. I saw the particles — there were the size of 40 micros. We can’t say anything about the quality of this powder because we saw it after it had gone through mail sorting machines which create powerful pressure. There was no coating.
What I saw on micrograph was no coating. It was natural spores and for some people they mistakenly thought it wasn’t. Some experts said there was [no[ charge because it was fluffy and made a cloud when we put on scale. That is another mistake. It did have charge.”
To find the missing spraydryer, perhaps the FBI merely needs to find and trace the steps of Al Qaeda’s expert yogurt or dried milk or animal feedstuffs or rice hull processor. Dr. Alibek has told me that he now thinks that it was made using a fluidized bed dryer rather than a spraydryer.
A key fact is that of the exosporium, which is a loose-fitting protein envelope surrounding about 7-10 spore coats that overlay the cortex, had traces of silica. The exosporium is the spore’s outermost layer. The silica was not dispersed inside of the B. anthracis spore coats and cortex under the exosporium. Ari Fleischer discusses the silica in the anthrax in his book Taking Heat. He reports that he had argued at length with ABC News over its story that the additive was bentonite (which arguably was characteristic of the Iraq program) — and explains that from the start he had told ABC that it was silica, not bentonite, that had been detected. The suggestion that AFIP experts did not know the difference between silica and silcon is not well founded, and the scientist who performed the EDX specifically told the journalist that oxygen was also detected in ratios consistent with silicon dioxide.
One potential lead that was reported in the press concerned a $100,000 piece of equipment bought by someone from Pakistan paying cash who had it delivered to 215 Main St. in Ft. Lee, NJ, one mile from where pilot Nawaf al-Hazmi lived. Nawaf attended a critical meeting with Yazid Sufaat, the biochemist working on anthrax, in January 2000. The United States alleged in its indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui that on or about April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi was in Oklahoma (at the same time Zacarias Moussaoui was in Norman, Oklahoma). The individual from Karachi who had ordered the processor pled guilty to a check kiting scheme that raised the funds used to purchase the processor. The purchaser, Syed Athar Abbas from California and then New Jersey, used the name Arthur Abbas in making the purchase. The front company was Computers Dot Com, a computer peripherals wholesaling firm, owned by Abbas. A Syed Athar Abbas (with records showing a different age and a different social security number) had a computer peripherals wholesaling firm named Mixun Solutions, also based in Karachi. Mixun Solutions went defunct after the New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was arrested. According to the database PACER, he had initially been denied bail because he turned in two expired passports but failed to turn in the third. The New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was given back his passport after serving a 15 month sentence.
The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, held a hearing in July 2005 on “Engineering Bio-Terror Agents: Lessons from the Offensive U.S. and Russian Biological Weapons Programs.” The hearing evaluated Al Qaeda’s ability to develop and use catastrophic biological weapons — such as weaponized anthrax — as part of the Subcommittee’s broader review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) bio-threat assessment activities. The hearing also examined the known biological warfare capabilities developed by the U.S. and Russian offensive programs, and the potential of those capabilities being utilized in future terrorist attacks. Witnesses at the hearing included: Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Executive Director, Center for Biodefense, George Mason University; Dr. Roger Brent, Director and President, Molecular Sciences Institute; and Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General Hospital.
As Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General, explained:
“It is also important to note that the people who participated in that exercise used all open source information, they used the U.S. Patent Office and they used out of print microbiology textbooks. It is a scary incredible thing, and it is not just theoretical, it has already been capitalized both in laboratory modeling and in actual experience. I refer you back to the intelligence
community’s information on the American anthrax attack in 2001, which
we won’t discuss here.”
Ali Al-Timimi was a graduate microbiology student at George Mason University, where famed Russian bioweaponeer and former USAMRIID head Charles Bailey on March 14, 2001 filed a patent involving the use of hydrophobic silica in permitting greater concentration of biological agents. Here is a Floor Plan for the First Floor of Discovery Hall at George Mason University. The First Floor that intermingled the Center for Biodefense/Hadron and the GMU/ATCC computational sciences people. Proliferation of know-how serves to proliferate opportunities for access to that know-how.
Conspiracy Theorists will generally just go away when their arguments have been shown to be nonsense. They'll sulk and start up again somewhere else or at some other time and place with new people they can try to convince.
True Believers cannot be proven wrong, since much or most of what they say is either true or cannot be disproven. It just does not prove what the True Believer believes it proves.
They do not go away. They wear you down with the endless presentation of irrelevant evidence which proves nothing but which they believe proves their case. They cite resources and claim that if you haven't read what they have read, then you are ignorant of the facts. If you have read what they have read, they claim you are misinterpreting it.
It's all about believing. If you do not put the "facts" together the way they put the "facts" together, then you are simply wrong. And there is no way to prove that is not true.
Everything ends up with being unable to prove the negative. You cannot prove that he is wrong, and to him that is proof that he is right. End of argument.
So is Falls Church, Virginia the key to the anthrax know-how? Why don’t you consult an expert in bioweapons, a microbiologist, and ask. Because the FBI has long been aware that it wasn’t just Ali that lectured on the day of judgment and the inevitable clash between Western Civilization by night — while passing Ken Alibek at the water cooler and working on Ken’s computer system during the day. That’s also where hijackers Nawaf and Hani lived — who by some accounts were at the level of Atta.
Nawaf Al-Hazmi was one of the two hijackers who had been at the January 2000 meeting at anthrax lab tech Yazid Sufaat’s Malaysian condominium in January 2000.
Nawaf Hazmi and a colleague had arrived the previous year in San Diego, where they had been unsuccessful in learning to fly. Upon arriving in San Diego in 2000, met with Imam named Aulaqi — perhaps even the same day as arriving. The 911 Commission Report said that Nawaf and his fellow hijacker and “developed a close relationship with him.” One pilot at the flight school in Arabic said that Nawaf wanted to learn to jets right away, rather than start with small planes. The pilot man thought Nawaf and his colleague, Khalid al-Mihdar, were either joking or dreaming.
They were joined in San Diego by Hani Hanjour, a good friend of Nawaf’s from Saudi Arabia.
Hani had been at al-Qaeda’s al-Faruq camp when Bin Laden or Atef told him “to report to KSM, who then trained Hanjour for a few days in the use of code words.” Hani then met with Aafia Siddiqui’s future husband al-Baluchhi in United Arab Emirates. Al-Balucchi opened an account for Hani who then traveled to San Diego.
The 911 Commission Report, however, notes that “[a]lthough Aulaqi admits talking several times with Nawaf several times, he has said he does not remember what they discussed. Aulaqi in early 2001 moved to Falls Church. Several months later, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who by then had joined them in San Diego in December 2000, also moved to Falls Church, Virginia.
On April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi received a ticket for speeding in Oklahoma, apparently while driving cross-country from San Diego to Falls Church, Virginia. (That’s where Moussaoui was).
Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour rented an apartment in Falls Church, Virginia, for about a month, with the assistance of a man they met at Aulaqi’s mosque. They lived at 3355 Row St., Apt. 3 in Falls Church. The hijackers attended sermons at the Dar al Hijrah mosque, where Aulaqi was now located. Ali Al-Timimi was located until he established the nearby center. Police later found the phone number of the Falls Church mosque when they searched the apartment of 9/11 planner Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Germany.
Various instructors have confirmed that Hani continued to have poor english and flying skills. Nawaf’s english and flying skills also remained poor.
On May 1, 2001, Nawaf reported to police that men tried to take his wallet outside a Fairfax, Virginia residence. Before the county officer left, al-Hazmi signed a “statement of release” indicating he did not want the incident investigated.
Hani and Nawaf then moved to Paterson, New Jersey, renting a one-bedroom apartment where they lived with some of the other hijackers.
On June 30th, his car was involved in a minor traffic accident on the east-bound George Washington Bridge.
Hani was stopped by police on August 1, 2001 for driving 55 mph in a 30 mph zone in Arlington, Virginia
Hani and Nawaf moved out of the New Jersey apartment on September 1. Hani was photographed a few days later using an ATM with a fellow hijacker in Laurel, Maryland, where all five Flight 77 hijackers had purchased a 1-week membership in a local Gold’s Gym.
On September 10, 2001, Hanjour, al-Mihdhar, and al-Hazmi checked into the Marriott Residence Inn in Herndon, Virginia where Saleh Ibn Abdul Rahman Hussayen, a prominent Saudi government official — who later was appointed to head the mosques at Mecca and Medina — was staying. He was the uncle of Sami al-Hussayen the webmaster of the Islamic Assembly of North America (”IANA”).
Connect the dots, Ed. Put yourself in the shoes of your adversary. But don’t think like a First Grader (or now a Sixth Grader) would think. Analyze the Amerithrax matter as if the country’s enemies were working to achieve the destruction of the United States and test the FBI’s theory that US-based operatives supporting Al Qaeda were responsible.
Kathryn Crocket, Ken Alibek’s assistant, brilliantly addressed these issues in her 2006 thesis.
She expresses her special thanks to Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. As you know, Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI and so the FBI credits his expertise. We, of course, all credit Dr.Alibek’s expertise. Katie successfully defended the thesis before an esteemed panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey.
She says that scientists who analyzed the power through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder.
She cites Gary Matsumoto’s “Science” article in summarizing the debate.
She says the FBI has vaccillated on silica.
“Regarding the specific issue of weaponization, according to several scientists at USAMRIID who examined the material, the powder created a significant cloud when agitated meaning that the adhesion of the particles had been reduced. Reducing the adhesion of the particles meant that the powder would fly better.”
She explains that “The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.”
On the issue of encapsulation, reports that “many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system. (Alibek and Crockett, 2005) The US and Soviet Union, however, used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form... Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer. “
She explains that one “possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation. By reducing the need for milling, she means permits greater concentration of the biological agent. (See the patents I’ve uploaded above) If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal.
My consulting military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the patents as relating to an encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens. In other words, his reaction was “wow”! To use technical jargon, his reaction was “ Ohmigosh!”
In “connecting the dots” one would want to consider whether any supporter of the militants had access to the now of this encapsulation technique. I’ve asked whether Ali Al-Timimi, the supporter of the Taliban who was working with Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, another GMU grad student at the department did. You are uninterested in the question even though the PhD student working with Dr.Alibek and Dr. Patrick has framed it brilliantly as the pertinent question in a very lucid analysis.
We might also consider whether any has expertise in such polymerization or encapsulation relating to drug delivery.
One scientist, biochemist Magdy al-Nashar is such an expert you might consult with on the subject. Dr. al-Nashar’s Ph.D. is in pharmaceutical enzymology. His dad said his son’s work was for medicine, not bomb-making. The current research interests are devoted to key aspects of biocatalytic materials and include the chemistry of enzyme immobilization on natural and synthetic polymeric supports, biocatalysis and the design and operation of biocatalytic processes with potential for technical applications. He is an expert in functionalized polymers.
The good doctor was detained in Cairo in July 2005 in connection with having leased an apartment used by London bombers to make bombs used to attack London’s transit system, denies any connection to Al Qaeda or any knowledge of what was planned. The flat was used to store things that were then sent to Afghanistan in care of el-Hadi, Zawahiri’s chief aide. Egyptian officials released al-Nashar. His PhD at University of Leeds’s biochemistry and microbiology department was granted May 2005.
He studied in North Carolina in 2000.
Magdy al-Nashar, 33, told investigators that he knew 19 yr.-old Lindsey Germaine, a Jamaican convert to Islam who lived in Aylesbury, about 140 miles away from the other suspects. He says he helped Germaine rent the apartment thought by officials to have been used to make the bombs. Traces of chemicals linked to the bombs reportedly were found in the rented flat.
One report stated that Al-Nashar was arrested and held briefly while in the company of a man later associated with the massacre of 58 tourists in Luxor. Some reports suggested that it was that “He was quizzed by Egyptian security services for two weeks but released without charge.” Al-Nashar’s brother, Muhammed, confirmed that his brother had once been arrested in connection to radical Islam. After Luxor probably hundreds were rounded up.
After the London bombing, Cairo attorney Mamdouh Ismail volunteered to represent al-Nashar. The Egyptian government would later allege that Mamdouh Ismail was Zawahiri’s chief conduit to jihadists in Yemen, Egypt and Iraq, via the Al Qaeda spymaster al-Hukaymah (aka Abu Jihad al-Masri). Ismail, a former EIJ member, announced in August 1999 that EIJ was renouncing violence because the organization had been infiltrated by intelligence services. In 1999, attorney Ismail sought to co-found the Islamic Party with Cairo attorney al-Zayat. Arrested in April 2007, he has been held incommunicado in Tora prison. His reported contact, Al Qaeda spymaster al-Hukaymah, was the author on US intelligence and law enforcement activitiies to include a section on the anthrax investigation.
Family, friends, neighbors, a former roommate at NC, and al-Nashar himself assure the public he is a good person and not involved in the London bombings and was committed to his research (and looking for a wife in Egypt while on holiday). He told police: “’I pray faithfully but that does not mean that I am a religious fundamentalist or extremist. ‘I was always keen to excel in my studies and had no relationships with any group or political party. My goal was to achieve something for my country.’” His ex-wife, who lived with him in Leeds for two years, said he was not a radical who mixed with strangers. Given the economies involved in making a commercial product using a far less expensive red seaweed, his work seems to be very promising commercial potential and wide application.
“I challenge the authorities to prove my involvement in this crime or my knowledge of it. I condemn the explosions.” Some — most notably the eminent and distinguished chemist TrebleRebel — argue that the anthrax in the second batch was actually highly sophisticated, using a novel (yet relatively simple) technique never before used in a known weapons program that involved functionalized polymers — specifically, polymerized glass. According to his webpage, Al Nashar’s expertise included functionalized polymers. Thus, authorities may be exploring these coincidences quite apart from the fact the bombers could have mixed the bomb chemicals on their own and there is said to be no link with the bombings or Al Qaeda. Although 75 security officials were present at his arrest, there has been no mention of the US FBI or CIA observing his questioning. Despite the number of officers, they politely waited until he was finished with his prayers.
An American FBI cooperating witness, Mohammed Junaid Babar from Queens, explained that the London bombers were connected to the Al Qaeda #3, al-Hadi (Zawahiri’s chief aide). He said at one time they suggested a plot by which Babar could get a job in a soccer stadium as a beer vendor. A syringe would be used to inject a beer can and would be taped over to prevent it from leaking.
errata/spelling - author of thesis is Kathryn Crockett.
Katie says of Al Qaeda (p. 20):
“This type of group would probably have access to sophisticated equipment, access to biological agents and dissemination technology, and would likely be able to produce weapons that cause significant harm.”
Katie now works in threat assessment for the USG.
Her thesis is a must-read for those following Amerithrax.
It might even put a Goosen in the steps of those who credit a Hatfill Theory.
Access to such know-how by supporters working at universities would have been execution of the plan evidenced by the correspondence to and from Ayman Zawahiri, the head of Al Qaeda’s anthrax weaponization program. The Defense Intelligence Agency (”DIA”) promptly gave me Ayman’s correspondence under the Freedom of Information Act when I asked nice.
By an email dated April 15, 1999, Ayman explained his plan to recruit a specialist to weaponize anthrax to Atef, Al Qaeda’s military commander. Jose Padilla pulled Atef from the rubble in November 2001. Among the correspondence written by Rauf Ahmad seized in Afghanistan, there were related handwritten notes about the plan to use NGOs, technical institutes and medical labs as cover for aspects of the work, and training requirements for the various personnel at the lab in Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Taliban, coalition forces and the media began to search the facilities in Kabul of the charity UTN ( “Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah,”) The charity was established by the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb.. In November 2001, The Economist that the “House of Anthrax” had been found. Documents found by journalists in November 2001 at a villa in Kabul occupied by UTN suggested brainstorming seminars on anthrax had been held to include diagrams suggestive of a plan to use a helium filled balloon to disperse anthrax across a wide area. The nondescricpt two-story villa occupied by the Pakistani aid group was in a quiet residential neighborhood of Kabul where a number of international charities were located. One downloaded document had the famous picture of former Secretary Cohen holding up a 5 pound bag of sugar. There were details about the U.S. military’s vaccination program downloaded from a Defense Department site on the Internet and other Defense Department documents relating to anthrax. There were 10 copies each of most of the documents. On the floor, there was what appeared to be a disassembled rocket alongside a helium canister, as well as two bags of powder. A detailed diagram scrawled in black felt tip pen on a white board shows what appears to be a balloon rising at various trajectories, alongside a fighter jet that is apparently shooting at the balloon. Beside the jet are the words, “You are dead, bang.”
There were also pictures of ground missiles linked by lines to the balloon. Mathematical calculations indicated the height at which the balloon would fly, the distance from which it would be shot down and the area over which its contents would be dispersed. Beside one of the balloons is the word “polystyrene” and beside another the word “cyanide.” Loose sheets of paper containing scribbles of missiles and balloons were strewn around the house, indicating those attending the seminar had been taking notes and doing calculations.
Although people can reasonably disagree on the conclusion to be drawn of the drawing on the white board showing aerial dispersal of anthrax by balloon, the drawings should be understood in the context of Ayman’s research and reading on the subject, and the supporters of the militants who worked at universities doing cutting edge work in polymerization, as well as highly classified work for the US military in bioinformatics. One email from Ayman to Atef lists Peace or Pestilence as one of the books he had read. (The author argued that said science should combat disease, not find devious ways to spread it. That book included a description of the Japanese research on anthrax leading up to WW II and the US concern that anthrax was being dispersed by balloons being sent to the US on high hot air currents. Unit 731 experimented extensively with anthrax bombs and hot-air balloons filled with the deadly disease. In late 1944, aerosol scentists at Ft. Detrick (then known as Camp Detrick) were alarmed when news of some large balloons, as large as 150 feet around, had been sighted silently floating over populated areas. Within a few months, over 250 balloons had been discovered in nine western states. The balloons are known only to have been armed with an incendiary device and killed and injured only a very few people.
A senior CNN producer who visited many UTN and Al Qaeda houses in Afghanistan, found the documents linking UTN to Jaish e Muhammad, the Army of the Prophet Mohammad, the Pakistani militant group that had been listed as a terrorist organization by the US on October 12, 2001. Other documents linked UTN to the Pakistan-based Saudi charity WAFA Humanitarian Organization and Al Rashid Trust, two other non-governmental organizations with ties to al-Qaeda that were designated on September 23, 2001 as supporters of terrorism.
The New York Times reported on the search of the home by US personnel. A group of men armed with pistols, reportedly Americans, wearing gas masks, rubber gloves and boots, then came to remove powdered chemicals. The men had instructed the guards posted by National Alliance to not go in the home because the chemicals could be dangerous. The room that had been littered with papers was empty today and had been swept or vacuumed by the Americans. Even after the second group visited the home, and cleaned it, several bags of chemicals were still strewn in the yard. Two small plastic bags each appeared to hold two to three pounds of brown powder. On the outside of one appeared the name “Mahlobjan” and the number 436. A second bag had the numbers 999 — or 666 — along with a crescent moon, the symbol of Islam. The New York Times reported that there was also a small seal stamped on the corner of the bag, with an eagle in its center. The worker at a charity next door, “Save the Children,” said that Mehmood had been a quiet neighbor and it was impossible to tell whether the men visiting the house were aid workers or not.
Pakistani authorities had detained UTN board members amid charges that their work in Afghanistan had involved helping Al Qaeda in its attempts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons. On October 12, the U.S. government, which pushed fo their arrest the organization on its list of individuals and organizations supporting terrorism. The same day the Jaish-I-Mohammed, the Army of Mohammed, was also listed. Authorities would later claim that a bacteriologist, a political activist , had harbored KSM in his home.
Ed, as additional background reading on anthrax as a weapon, you might read Dr. Alibek’s chapter, “Anthrax: A Disease and a Weapon,” a chapter that he and his GMU National Center for Biodefense colleagues, Catherine Lobanova and Serguei Popov, contributed to “in Emerging Infectious Diseases of the 21st Century Bioterrorism and Infectious Agents.” Ken co-edited the volume.
Dr. Lobanova is an M.D. and has worked as Ken’s assistant. (Yes, the GMU faculty only wished they had so many hardworking assistants; even the brilliant medico Gregory House from the series we both like, “House,” only had 3 assistants).
Historically, Serguei was a “go-to” man for viruses in the Russian program. (See Ken’s glowing description in Biohazard of the young man who came to speak.) He is very straightforward and responsive to questions. Dr. Popov, of course, has not had occasion to participate in a forensic study of the Daschle product, but he might be able to help you understand this issue of encapsulation and why it might have been done.
The scientist that Ayman Zawahiri used to infiltrate the UK biodefense establishment was named Rauf Ahmad. Rauf Ahmad wrote Dr. Ayman in 1999, that he had “SUCCESSED IN OBTAINING SOME OF THE IMPORTANT INTERNET CONNECTIONS AND TRIED TO SOLVE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR WORK DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH
[ABOUT 8 LINES REDACTED]
****QUESTION #1: WHO DID HE CONSULT WITH?****
After an earlier visit described in handwritten letter saying that the lab had only nonpathogenic strains, Rauf Ahmad visited a second lab on a long visit. He said “I SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED THE TARGETS DURING MY VISIT TO [name of lab redacted]
Rauf Ahmad discussed his training on a bioreactor. The learned Henry Niman explained that a bioreactor could be used to concentrate the anthrax product to the concentration level observed in the Daschle product.
He wrote: THEN I WENT TO [blanked out] TO MEET WITH DR. [redacted] in charge of [redacted] IN ORDER TO SEE THE FATE OF OUR DEMAND OF CULTURES. I VISITED ALONG WITH HIM ALL THE UNITS OF [redacted] INCLUDING THE SPECIAL CONFIDENTIAL ROOM IN WHICH THOUSANDS OF CULTURES ARE PLACED. HE ALSO SHOWED ME THE HIGHLY ADVANCED LEVEL-3 PATHOGEN LABORATORY.
*****QUESTION #2: WHAT LAB DID HE VISIT AT WHICH HE SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED THE TARGETS.*****
Relatedly, what did he mean by “successfully achieved the targets.”
I have uploaded scanned copies of some 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces describing the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; and the need for vaccination and containment. He explained that the lab director noted that he would have to take a short training course at the BL-3 lab for handling dangerous pathogens. Rauf Ahmad explained that his employer’s offer of pay during a 12-month post-doc sabbatical was wholly inadequate and was looking to Ayman to make up the difference. After an unacceptablly low pay for the first 8 months, there would be no pay for last 4 months and there would be a service break. He had noted that he only had a limited time to avail himself of the post-doc sabbatical.
I also have uploaded a fuller copy of earlier correspondence from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided the documents to me, along with 100+ more, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (”FOIA”).
Yazid Sufaat got the job handling things at the lab instead of Rauf Ahmad. More importantly, Zawahiri, as George Tenet has noted in his May 2007 book, kept things strictly compartmentalized at the highest level in connection with his PROJECT ZABADI — leaving the Amerithrax Task Force much to do.
The Pakistan ISI stopped cooperating with the CIA in early 2003. I first identified Rauf Ahmad (I used to refer to him as Abdur Rauf) in 2002.
Question: I have uploaded the resume of a Pakistan government scientist Rauf Ahmad. He is an ecotoxicologist, not a microbiologist. Skilled in the absorption of pesticides sprayed as aerosols into the skin. Is this the resume of the Rauf Ahmad who attended the 1999 and 2000 conferences for the Society for Applied Microbiology and who wrote the handwritten and typed letters in the Summer and Fall of 1999 to Ayman Zawahiri about setting up a lab? (I don’t know). After providing me his resume and graciously offering to answer any further inquries, saying he was looking forward to an “optimistic exchange” (as I was also), he has not responded to any questions. I made the mistake of letting know in a follow-up message (before hearing substantive details from ) that I had Rauf Ahmad’s correspondence with Ayman.
http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com
Wow, you folks have been busy while I have been away. Here are some responses for you.
Post 56 - I most definitely am not saying in my dissertation that microbiologists are the people we need to turn to for our biodefense expertise. In fact I am saying the exact opposite, that though they are an important source of SOME types of information, there is an over-reliance upon them due to our own ignorance of biological weapons. We don’t know any better than to rely upon them, physicians, and public health experts. All of them are important BUT all of them have particular areas of expertise that only provide a small part of the picture. Biodefense is a highly eclectic science.
Post 65 Yes, faulty intelligence analysis occurs as a result of overreliance upon the people we incorrectly believe to be fully qualified. The example regarding growth in a mineral media was Burkholderia mallei (causative agent of glanders). Another example was Yersinia pestis (causative agent of plague). Just because an agent grows in a lab by a microbiologist under certain conditions does not mean that the requirements remain the same while production is scaled up. This would apply to growth of both harmful and beneficial organsisms.
Post 78 - Sorry, Dr. Alibek is completely engaged in building his biopharmaceutical production facility, the hospitals, hospice, and a whole host of other healthcare related endeavors. I choose not to distract him.
Take care, I’ll check back in next weekend.
Debra
If you want to read the other side of the story — written in response to the LA Times article that started this thread — you can download
“Getting to Know the Real Ken Alibek”
along with a
“Brief Biography Ken Alibek”
at the new website created for the purpose.
http://dr.debra.anderson.angelfire.com/
Kamal Habib, quoted by the Washington Post in today’s article, wrote for Assirat, for which GMU’s Al-Timimi was on the Advisory board.
Then he contributed to Al-Manar Jadeed, IANA’s quarterly journal (in Arabic), as did many distinguished Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group deep thinkers.
They debated all these issues in a running dialogue from 1998 to 2001.
IANA’s webmaster Sami al-Hussayen once pleaded by email that Al-Manar Jadeed was out of control, printing what they wanted and then sending IANA the bill, while risking getting IANA officials in trouble (which then, in fact, happened).
For example, IANA websites published a fatwa in June 2001 saying it was a duty to kill as many as possible, such as by flying a plane into a building.
IANA websites prominently distributed the views of Sheik al-Hawali who was working closely with both Sami and with GMU microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi.
Egyptian Extremist Rewriting Rationale For Armed Struggle
Jailhouse Dissent Seen as Challenge to Al-Qaeda
By Ellen Knickmeyer
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 15, 2007; Page A18
“Jihad today is no longer a religious idea. It’s a political idea, a protest against U.S. activities,” said Allam, the retired state security director, sitting on his flower-lined patio next to the Mediterranean, his words accompanied by the crash of waves notorious for their undertow. “The whole world has to do revisions.”
Upon the renunciation of violence against civilians, up to 5,000 Egyptian Islamic Jihad members stand to be released.
If Ayman had tactical sense, he would relent to the revision and target only combatants (as provided for by the hadiths) or else the same 5,000 will simply be scooped up again. As Ali used to say, there needed to be a fiqh, an interpretation of the islamic jurisprudence relating to the conduct of warfare, suitable for the time.
It was Cairo attorney Mamdouh Ismail, who attempted to found a different islamist party at the same time IANA writer Kamal Habib did, who was arrested in later March 2007. He was the one who volunteered to represent the expert in functionalized polymers. Attorney Ismail is being held incommunicado.
Along with the capture of al-Hadi, Zawahiri’s chief aide, who is knowledgeable about Project Zabadi, the arrest of Mamdouh Ismail potentially puts Amerithrax investigation in a radically new footing.
Another 2006 biodefense PhD thesis supervised by Dr. Alibek is by Dustin R. Razsi, Ph.D., Senior Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. It is titled “The ability of intelligence to prevent domestic bioterrorism.”
For starters, check out the section on Amerithrax and also the section on access to the pathogen at a culture repository. “ [O]vert human intelligence collection from non-traditional sources” is DHS code for FreeRepublic. ; )
Dr. Razsi joined the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2004 and
currently serves as the Senior Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS
Headquarters. He advises the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer and other senior
officials on WMD matters and directs the intelligence analysis and production on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons topics, as well as public health security issues. He coordinates DHS’ WMD intelligence efforts across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, the Intelligence Community, and the Interagency.
Prior to joining DHS, Dr. Razsi designed and executed medical preparedness and response exercises for domestic and international audiences on behalf of The Surgeon General of the Army. Dr. Razsi previously also held positions within the Intelligence Community focusing on foreign biological weapons programs and served as a nonproliferation policy analyst for the Department of the Army, handling biosecurity, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention protocol negotiations, and chemical demilitarization. Dr. Razsi began his career conducting immunology research at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta.
Dr. Razsi is an adjunct assistant professor in the Department of Molecular and Microbiology at George Mason University, where he teaches biodefense science and policy.
An abstract:
After the anthrax letter attacks of 2001 and subsequent revelations of al-
Qa’ida’s intent to acquire and use biological weapons there has been much
activity in biodefense, almost exclusively in the areas of preparedness and
response. However, it has been said that the best defense is a good offense. A system that relies on early warning and improved response will not prevent a bioterrorist attack; in order to stop an event before it occurs, an effort must
be made to pursue potential bioterrorists and identify, disrupt, and prevent
future bioterrorist attacks.
Intelligence is the primary means by which the U.S. Government identifies
terrorist plans and activities, therefore a review of intelligence capabilities
directed against the domestic bioterrorist threat is valuable in determining
gaps in bioterrorism prevention. Although there has been significant review of foreign intelligence activities against weapons of mass destruction, there has been no public review of how best to position and build intelligence resources specifically for the domestic bioterrorist threat. This dissertation first analyzes the likelihood of domestic bioterrorism and builds the case for an evolving bio-threat from actors based in the United States. Next, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement policies, programs, and collection
capabilities are reviewed to determine the level of effort and effectiveness in
preventing domestic bioterrorist threats. This study finds that U.S. anti-
bioterrorism policies and programs neglect domestic preventive measures yet
international efforts focus heavily on such issues. Case studies of past
biological weapons targets reveal that traditional intelligence and law
enforcement methods are ill-suited to identify and prevent acts of domestic
bioterrorism. This study recommends a shift from a national strategy of
“biodefense” to a more comprehensive “counter-bioterrorism” approach to include a domestic bio-intelligence capability. Specific recommendations include new concepts for domestic collection of biological intelligence, creation of a biosecurity inspection organization, and overt human intelligence collection from non-traditional sources.
The full-text is available for you to read if your local library has access
to ProQuest Dissertation.
Ed,
Students report that Professor Razsi is very good at explaining biology to non-biologists and could help you understand the reason for encapsulation in the Amerithrax context. Katie’s thesis is wonderful, but she is not a microbiologist.
Dr. Razsi’s 2006 thesis, supervised by Ken Alibek, considers domestic terrorism to include the pursuit, [etc]. or use against humans in the United States. For the purposes of his study, domestic bioterrorism can be perpetrated by U.S. Persons or non-U.S. persons located within the United States.
This was always a common mistaken Mr. Lake made — he would seize on Ari Fleischer’s use of the word ‘domestic” and ignore Attorney Ashcroft’s explanation of how the term was being used.
Dr. Razsi explains:
“”Not all bioterrorists work in a laboratory or have access to dangerous pathogens. Several of the measures recommended focus on biohazardous facilities because the nexus of people and pathogens is a critical vulnerability and possibly a rich information source that currently is untapped. However, intelligence can be collected from a variety of sources, including academia and the private sector, for those who do not have access to pathogens still pose a bioterrorist threat. Such persons are the ‘locals’ and have the best feel for detecting odd situations that ‘don’t feel right ‘... — they are accustomed to the culture and nuances of daily life and better at separating suspicious activity from normal occurrences.
The importance of this reporting stream cannot be underestimated. In 2003, CBS News reported on al-Qa’ida’s efforts to pursue B anthracis — as a biological weapon. A top al-Qa’ida planner, Hambali allegedly was pursuing development of a biological weapons laboratory and recruited Yazid Sufaat — a member of al-Qa-ida affiliate group Jema Islamyah. According to media reporting, Sufaat obtained a degree in chemistry and laboratory science from California State University at Sacramento. Although Sufaat reportedly has been captured by Malaysian authorities, this information demonstrates the possibility that future terrorists could be studying in U.S. universities or working in the U.S. biotechnology sector and could use their knowledge for malicious purposes. Sufaat was a foreigner but future actors could be U.S. Persons.”
“There are dozens of examples in which U.S.-based students, scientists, or medical personnel exploited their positions and attempted or succeeded acquiring, developing, or using biological weapons. Given these cases it is important to have an open channel to the front line observers — professors, technicians, managers, and others who have information of importance.”
“By making individuals aware of signs they should watch for and how to report them, we elicit overt, voluntary human intelligence from a nationwide network that already is in place and knowledgeable. No government agency could cover that much territory nor would it be tolerated by the scientific and academic communities.”
I first identified Yazid Sufaat as an anthrax lab tech in March 2002. Ed gave his usual unthinking rebuttal, using the “conspiracy theory” and “true believer” ad hominem labels. (It spares him any critical analysis of the facts). His argument against Al Qaeda being responsible is that the hijackers were dead, dead, dead.
In November 2002, the FBI first interviewed Yazid.
President Bush says they didn’t realize his central role in Zabadi until after Hambali were captured in 2003. Then his assistants Barq and Wahdan were captured.
Tenet says Sufaat wrapped up his work in the Summer and briefed Ayman and Hambali over the course of a week. He says Zabadi, the anthrax weaponization program, was compartmentalized at the highest level.
That’s what I told the CIA about Ayman’s anthrax program in December 2001 and we’re still talking about First Graders five years later. Personally, I think the suppression of information relates partly because DARPA doesn’t want to take the hit for allowing a hardline Salafist, who had a high level security clearance relating to bioinformatics work, access to a DARPA funded Center for Biodefense. I don’t bother to call it a cover-up. I just urge that if the FBI and CIA doesn’t bring this is to a close, they risk having to explain the next 9/11 to some pretty upset folks.
And if the GMU Biodefense threat assessment folks are clueless about al-Timimi because he was a few years ahead of them, how the heck do they think they are going to pierce the networking that led to the folks recruited by Ayman and Atef?
The key, the final piece to the puzzle, is Islambouli, the brother of Sadat’s assassin. He was long in a cell with KSM. It turns out he is the key to Amerithrax.
9/11 SKEPTICS' LUNATIC FRINGE
By ANDREA PEYSER
July 16, 2007 -- THIS time, they've gone too far. A group of 9/11 conspiracy theorists - whackos who deny that jumbo jets brought down the World Trade Center - is on the attack. But their latest target isn't the government, which they claim destroyed the buildings with explosives.
They're using a vicious Internet assault to pick on an elderly widow.
"They're dirty sons of bastards! They are not real men," feisty Ellen Mariani, 69, told me. Ellen lost her husband aboard United 175 on Sept. 11, 2001.
"They have no respect for women, no respect for the dead and no respect for little children who now have been orphaned."
Ellen is the subject of a blistering battering on the Web site of an outfit that calls itself "9/11 Researchers." While conspiracy theories are nothing new - Rosie O'Donnell gave voice on "The View" to the belief the government was involved - these bozos blast fellow conspiracy groups for not going far enough.
On their Web site, Ellen's current, private home address is listed for every whack job to see. There also is "evidence" that her husband helped plan the attacks.
And it goes on.
One thing we should all have learned from 9/11 and the anthrax attacks is that whackos come in all shapes and forms.
On Islambouli part of a cell with KSM, see Gertz’ 2002 book about the breakdown in intelligence that led to 9/11.
KSM took over from the Al Qaeda mililtary head Atef as head of the anthrax weaponization operation. (see emails to Atef about anthrax weaponization)
It is a matter of historical record that Islamboulli was part of a cell with KSM.
See Gertz’s 2002 book. He also addresses the al Hayat letter bombs to NYC and DC newspapers and people in symbolic positions which was the key to profiling the modus operandi.
And, so the usual intelligence or true crime analyst would ask:
Where in the world is Islambouli?
Who did he visit when he came to the US to plan the next attack, as described in the December 1998 Presidential Daily Brief to President Clinton that warned of a plannned attack involving airplanes and other means. (see PDB reprinted in 9/11 Commission Report). Everyone focuses on the PDB in the summer of 2001 directed to President Bush while forgetting that there was a PDB with the same substance from December 1998 to President Clinton.
The 9/11 Commission Report contains a copy of the declassified December 1998 PDB and discusses Islambouli.
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