Conspiracy Theorists do not rant on endlessly, because they know that the more they say, the more easily they can be proven wrong.
Just an observation.
Ed, in the above thread, you are playing “connect the dots” in connection with Goldman, Sachs letters. Right idea. Wrong “connect the dots” game. The anthrax used in the mailings was made in America. The key portal to understanding is to learn about the cell culture — both in America and in the petri dish. And both relate directly to the program at GMU under discussion.
Scientists have determined that anthrax spores mailed to Capitol Hill last fall were made less than two years ago before being mailed. Moreover, contrary to what has often been implied or assumed, the technique to weaponize the anthrax used in the Fall 2001 was not the one used by the US Army in weaponizing anthrax in the 1950s. William Patrick’s process for weaponizing anthrax involved freeze drying and chemical processing whereas it was the process contemplated by Al Qaeda that involved spraydrying. “We made little freeze-dried pellets of anthrax,” Donald Schattenberg explained, “then we ground them down with a high-speed colloid mill.” The finding cast doubt on the hypothesis that the spores could have been stolen from a lab a long time ago.
At a break from a briefing before a Congressional subcommittee in December 2001, Dr. Richard Spertzel and Dr. Ken Alibek discussed access to the Ames strain and the method of weaponization. They might just as well have been demonstrating how to palm a basketball — with Dr. Alibek agreeing with Dr. Spertzel on the likely general method but, knowing of his microdroplet cell culture method and related processes, saying it is easier than Dr. Spertzel may think. At least everyone can agree that the product, fortunately, was not resistant to antibiotics. “It is responding to antibiotics,” the President said when he got the news. “That’s the best news you’ve had as president,” Condi Rice replied.
According to an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Scanning electron microscopy of the spores used in the Senate office attack showed that they range from individual particles to aggregates of 100 [microns] or more. Spores were uniform in size and appearance and the aggregates had a propensity to pulverize (i.e., disperse into smaller particles when disturbed).” A scientist from the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Doug Beecher, in a July 2006 issue of “Applied and Environmental Microbiology” reports that:
“a widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production. The issue is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations.”
Harvard University Matthew Meselson reviewed the language before publication. “The statement should have had a reference,” L. Nicholas Ornston, editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal told a trade periodical. “An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation.” Footnoted or not, the two sentences provide the best and authoritative insight on the question of the method of processing since the mailings. The two sentences essentially said what Dr. Alibek had been saying: “’[J]ust because you have a sophisticated product doesn’t mean the technique has to be sophisticated.’ “ Silica in the culture medium would not be a sophisticated “additive.”
The FBI scientists have been able to distinguish between water isotopes ratios in the anthrax. Brian Williams reports that investigators have told NBC that the water used to make the spores came from the Northeastern United States. researchers have been able to establish that anthrax grown in water in the Northeastern United States is distinguishable from anthrax grown in water from the Southeast and Pacific Northwest. In one published anthrax study, researchers grew Bacillus subtilis, a harmless bacteria that resembles Bacillus anthracis, using local water from five different U.S. cities. The scientists were able to distinguish those grown in various cities. The method can be used to narrow the number of possible origins of the water based on the number of oxygen and hydrogen isotopes. Similarly, a press release announced in September 2003 that University of Maryland researchers have developed a technique to help the FBI track the origins of deadly anthrax spores by identifying the medium used to grow it. The FBI asked Maryland professor Catherine Fenselau to turn her mass spectrometry lab to the forensic task of sleuthing how bacillus spores, such as anthrax, are prepared.
Interviewer Kestenbaum said: “Ehleringer is now creating a map showing how the isotope ratios of water vary anthrax was grown, it may rule some places out.” As defined by the Census Bureau, the Northeast region of the United States covers nine states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. A scientist explained the research in an NPR interview in 2004.
I infer from the NBC report that from the isotope ratios, authorities believe either that the anthrax was grown in one of the yellow (or perhaps light green) areas, but not one of the dark green, blue or red areas. It would be great if Ed could upload the isotope ratio map. The yellow swath includes much of the Northeastern United States — places like Syracuse, NY but also places like Ann Arbor and Minneapolis. If that is the isotope ratio range, Islamabad and Baghdad can be excluded. Pretty much all foreign locations apparently can be excluded, along with places with comparable oxygen isotope ratios such as Central New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio. Locales with such excludable ratios include Pakistan (Lahore), Iraq (Baghdad), and Singapore. Whereas pretty much only the adjacent parts of Canada above Northeastern US (e.g., parts of Ontario and Quebec) match the yellow swath that the scientists found distinguishing. The authors of one of the key articles noted that they couldn’t distinguish between North Carolina and Ohio — the dark green. Similarly, they can’t distinguish between Central New Jersey and North Carolina (again, the dark green). The key studies in the peer reviewed literature indicate that they were funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ehleringer and his colleagues published a March 2007 article titled “Stable isotope ratios of tap water in the contiguous United States” in “Water Resources Research, Vol. 43 (pdf available upon request). The study was funded by the “federal government.” The raw data survey results have been embargoed by the federal government.” ( I believe the agency would usually be identified). In other water isotope ratio studies the funding agency was identified as the Central Intelligence Agency or whatever agency it was. (It varied). Perhaps this March 2007 study was funded by the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation and was done specifically for the purpose of laying the scientific groundwork of a prosecution in Amerithrax. While Helen W. Kreuzer-Martin, the Maryland scientist in a study published in April 2007 titled “Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms,” was looking at the nutrients in the culture, the Utah scientist in this study is looking at the tap water. The DOJ/FBI likely hopes to put all the data together with the more familiar reasons to suspect someone (means, motive, modus operandi and opportunity), and put on a case that to a moral certainty proves it was committed by the perp(s) — where otherwise, absent the scientific evidence, there is a lack of a “smoking gun.” Here, based on this new science, there apparently is thought to be a smoking petri dish
The March 2007 isotope ratio study explains: “Here we present results from the first national-scale spatiotemporal survey of stable isotopes in tap water. The new data show that tap water samples exhibit high levels of spatially coherent isotope ratio variation that can be related to commonality in patterns of water source and postprecipitation history for water resources in different parts of the country. A strong relationship exists between tap water isotope ratios and those of annually averaged local precipitation (as estimated by geostatistical modeling), but robust differences between tap water and precipitation isotope ratios also exist in many parts of the United States. These patterns can be related to regional tendencies in water resource selection and water history, including patterns likely related to high-altitude dominated sources, seasonally based recharge, and evaporative loss from natural or artificial surface reservoirs. Our data provide the first evidence that large, spatially distributed isotope sample networks offer the potential to identify and characterize the magnitude and regional relevance of such processes within complex human-hydrological systems. ... We synthesize our data as a set of predictive tap water isotope ratio maps that, when interpreted with respect for the limitations of the underlying data, should benefit future water resources research efforts as well as fields such as ecology and forensic sciences where understanding of large-scale patterns of hydrological isotope ratio variation is increasingly important.”
I am not scientifically trained, but my understanding is that by looking at the oxygen, hydrogen and deuterium geospatial distribution, you can more precisely identify the geospatial location of where the water came from. For example, the deuterium map might be relied upon to eliminate an ambiguity left by the light blue/light green range of the oxygen and hydrogen maps.
The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology detected silica. The Daily News (New York) reported on October 30, 2001
[USAMRIID Major General John] Parker did disclose that the anthrax in question contained silica, a common substance found in sand and quartz.
“I don’t know what the significance of it is,” Parker said.
One expert said the presence of silica is significant, but he declined to say why, citing national security concerns.
“I don’t think I want to give people - terrorists - any information to help them, said Dr. Charles Bailey, a scientist at Advanced Biosystems Inc. and former commander of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
It appears, according to US bioweaponeer William Patrick and other experts that the product had an electrostatic charge. Former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson have opined that there was no special silica coating observable in the Scanning Electron Microscope (”SEM”). images they saw. The presence of any silica, Drs. Meselson and Alibek say, may have come from the environment because of the special tendency of anthrax spore coats to attract silicon. (The lead FBI scientist Dwight Adams relied on the study provided the FBI by Meselson in briefing the Congress in November 2002.) Indeed, the silica may have been in the culture medium and then removed as described by patents filed by researchers at Dr. Alibek’s Center for Biodefense at GMU. Dr. Alibek reports that, like Dr. Patrick, he was also given a polygraph.
In a March 31, 2003 public exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to my written question submitted in advance, Kenneth Alibek, former head of Russia’s biological program, to include its anthrax production program, said: “This anthrax wasn’t sophisticated, didn’t have coatings, had electric charge and many other things.” In other responses, he further explained: “There was no special need to add silica to this anthrax. Presence or absence of silica says nothing about whether it was state sponsored.”
US bioweaponeer William Patrick gave it a 7 out of 10 -— calling it professionally done but not weapons grade. In an interview with CBS, William Patrick explained that he had been given a polygraph in June 2002 about the anthrax letters. He reports that “The FBI that they wanted me to become a part of their inner circle of—of experts, and that in order to become a part of that inner circle of technical experts, that I’d have to pass a polygraph test.” In fact, he has not been quoted since, as he often was in 2001. Thus, this was a good indication of what scientific information the FBI credits or at least that they credit his expertise.
On April 11, 2003, Scott Shane reported that reverse engineering “carried out at the Army’s biodefense center at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, raises the disquieting possibility that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups could create lethal bioweapons without scientific or financial help from a state.” Quoting one outside bioterrorism expert. “It shows you can have a fairly sophisticated product with fairly rudimentary methods.” At last report, the reverse engineering reportedly was not able to recreate the identical product
Lisa Bronson, deputy undersecretary of defense for technology security policy and proliferation, has said that commercially available equipment used to make powdered milk could be used to make powderized anthrax. A spray dryer is used in chemical and food processing to manufacture dried egg, powdered milk, animal feed, cake mixes, citrus juices, coffee, corn syrup, cream, creamers, dried eggs, potatoes, shortening, starch derivatives, tea, tomatoes, yeast, and — last but not least — yogurt. Washington State University also has an informative discussion on the web. Making dried milk is not rocket science and doesn’t require a PhD. But, if experience is any guide, Al Qaeda has PhD’s and even rocket scientists who are sympathetic to its cause (indeed, even the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb).
Here is a further Q&A from a March 31, 2003 exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to a written question I submitted in advance to Kenneth Alibek, one of the world’s best known bioweaponeers and the former head of Russia’s biological program:
“Q. Could someone expert in making dried milk make the product used in the Daschle and Leahy letters?
A. Let me answer it this way — yes, actually it would be the same technique to make a powderized anthrax, but at the same time we shouldn’t overestimate the complexity of making it. Such a small amount, keep in mind
that the people who did it could have very simple equipment and very small equipment. But at the same time, when people talk about it being ‘weaponized’ — I can’t say it was sophisticated. I saw the particles — there were the size of 40 micros. We can’t say anything about the quality of this powder because we saw it after it had gone through mail sorting machines which create powerful pressure. There was no coating.
What I saw on micrograph was no coating. It was natural spores and for some people they mistakenly thought it wasn’t. Some experts said there was [no[ charge because it was fluffy and made a cloud when we put on scale. That is another mistake. It did have charge.”
To find the missing spraydryer, perhaps the FBI merely needs to find and trace the steps of Al Qaeda’s expert yogurt or dried milk or animal feedstuffs or rice hull processor. Dr. Alibek has told me that he now thinks that it was made using a fluidized bed dryer rather than a spraydryer.
A key fact is that of the exosporium, which is a loose-fitting protein envelope surrounding about 7-10 spore coats that overlay the cortex, had traces of silica. The exosporium is the spore’s outermost layer. The silica was not dispersed inside of the B. anthracis spore coats and cortex under the exosporium. Ari Fleischer discusses the silica in the anthrax in his book Taking Heat. He reports that he had argued at length with ABC News over its story that the additive was bentonite (which arguably was characteristic of the Iraq program) — and explains that from the start he had told ABC that it was silica, not bentonite, that had been detected. The suggestion that AFIP experts did not know the difference between silica and silcon is not well founded, and the scientist who performed the EDX specifically told the journalist that oxygen was also detected in ratios consistent with silicon dioxide.
One potential lead that was reported in the press concerned a $100,000 piece of equipment bought by someone from Pakistan paying cash who had it delivered to 215 Main St. in Ft. Lee, NJ, one mile from where pilot Nawaf al-Hazmi lived. Nawaf attended a critical meeting with Yazid Sufaat, the biochemist working on anthrax, in January 2000. The United States alleged in its indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui that on or about April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi was in Oklahoma (at the same time Zacarias Moussaoui was in Norman, Oklahoma). The individual from Karachi who had ordered the processor pled guilty to a check kiting scheme that raised the funds used to purchase the processor. The purchaser, Syed Athar Abbas from California and then New Jersey, used the name Arthur Abbas in making the purchase. The front company was Computers Dot Com, a computer peripherals wholesaling firm, owned by Abbas. A Syed Athar Abbas (with records showing a different age and a different social security number) had a computer peripherals wholesaling firm named Mixun Solutions, also based in Karachi. Mixun Solutions went defunct after the New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was arrested. According to the database PACER, he had initially been denied bail because he turned in two expired passports but failed to turn in the third. The New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was given back his passport after serving a 15 month sentence.
The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, held a hearing in July 2005 on “Engineering Bio-Terror Agents: Lessons from the Offensive U.S. and Russian Biological Weapons Programs.” The hearing evaluated Al Qaeda’s ability to develop and use catastrophic biological weapons — such as weaponized anthrax — as part of the Subcommittee’s broader review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) bio-threat assessment activities. The hearing also examined the known biological warfare capabilities developed by the U.S. and Russian offensive programs, and the potential of those capabilities being utilized in future terrorist attacks. Witnesses at the hearing included: Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Executive Director, Center for Biodefense, George Mason University; Dr. Roger Brent, Director and President, Molecular Sciences Institute; and Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General Hospital.
As Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General, explained:
“It is also important to note that the people who participated in that exercise used all open source information, they used the U.S. Patent Office and they used out of print microbiology textbooks. It is a scary incredible thing, and it is not just theoretical, it has already been capitalized both in laboratory modeling and in actual experience. I refer you back to the intelligence
community’s information on the American anthrax attack in 2001, which
we won’t discuss here.”
Ali Al-Timimi was a graduate microbiology student at George Mason University, where famed Russian bioweaponeer and former USAMRIID head Charles Bailey on March 14, 2001 filed a patent involving the use of hydrophobic silica in permitting greater concentration of biological agents. Here is a Floor Plan for the First Floor of Discovery Hall at George Mason University. The First Floor that intermingled the Center for Biodefense/Hadron and the GMU/ATCC computational sciences people. Proliferation of know-how serves to proliferate opportunities for access to that know-how.