Posted on 07/01/2007 5:23:20 AM PDT by mainepatsfan
1863 : The Battle of Gettysburg begins
The largest military conflict in North American history begins this day when Union and Confederate forces collide at Gettysburg. The epic battle lasted three days and resulted in a retreat to Virginia by Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.
Two months prior to Gettysburg, Lee had dealt a stunning defeat to the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville. He then made plans for a Northern invasion in order to relieve pressure on war-weary Virginia and to seize the initiative from the Yankees. His army, numbering about 80,000, began moving on June 3. The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Joseph Hooker and numbering just under 100,000, began moving shortly thereafter, staying between Lee and Washington, D.C. But on June 28, frustrated by the Lincoln administration's restrictions on his autonomy as commander, Hooker resigned and was replaced by George G. Meade.
Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac as Lee's army moved into Pennsylvania. On the morning of July 1, advance units of the forces came into contact with one another just outside of Gettysburg. The sound of battle attracted other units, and by noon the conflict was raging. During the first hours of battle, Union General John Reynolds was killed, and the Yankees found that they were outnumbered. The battle lines ran around the northwestern rim of Gettysburg. The Confederates applied pressure all along the Union front, and they slowly drove the Yankees through the town.
By evening, the Federal troops rallied on high ground on the southeastern edge of Gettysburg. As more troops arrived, Meade's army formed a three-mile long, fishhook-shaped line running from Culp's Hill on the right flank, along Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge, to the base of Little Round Top.
(Excerpt) Read more at history.com ...
Heck, Hill sent Ewell an engraved invitation on 6/30.
I think Jeb gets a bad rap in history, first he was given orders by Lee to scout the Army of the Potomac to see if it was following him. I'm not quiet sure about how many miles he traveled in doing this mission but it looks like he traveled quiet a bit in doing this mission. It looks like maybe this mission lasted about a week and covered about 70 miles or so. To expect Jeb to stay far behind you as you march off far ahead of him into Pennsylvania wasn't to smart. Both Lee and Staurt were working in enemy territory, so Lee should of known that the odds of Staurt running into unexpected trouble would be great, which he did. Considering the mission that Lee had in mind he should of not sent so many Cavalry men off with Staurt and should of kept half of them in closer vicinity of his troops positions. If Stuart had a smaller mission like say a two day mission before he met with Lee again it probably would of turn out different, considering Staurt ran into probably many more skirmishes then he had expected which slowed him down. I think at this point Lee was taking too big of a gamble, and the cards in his hands were not that great.
Hill’s note told him he was at Cashtown but Lee’s orders to Ewell were for him to move his corps either there or towards Gettysburg “as circumstances might dictate”. Ewell decided towards Cashtown but by a route so he could turn towards Gettysburg if need be.
Bayonets!!!
Charles Marshall gave a speech in January 1896 to “correct the impression that has prevailed to some extent that the movement of the cavalry was made by General Lee's orders, and that at a critical moment of the campaign he (Lee) crossed the Potomac river and moved into Pennsylvania, sending the entire cavalry force of his army upon a useless raid."
The fact is, Stuart was ordered to the east of the Bull Run Mountains, to get between the Union army and Washington, to gather supplies, damage communications, and march to the right of Ewell... Early being at York.
Stuart's communications were to be with Ewell. It would be nigh impossible for Stuart to communicate with Lee about the movements of the Union army. For that job, Robertson and Jones were left with specific orders to move to the right and rear of the army as it advanced into Pennsylvania.
Stuart received three orders (if you count the one reported by McClellan in his biography of Stuart. Since details of this order show up in the official report, it probably did exist) telling him to march east of the Bull Run Mountains.
Stuart's orders on 6/22 were clear. Lee wrote: "If you find that he (Hooker) is moving northward and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flanks, keep him informed of the enemy’s movement, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army."
Longstreet endorsed the orders: "I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment, will in a measure, disclose our plans. You have better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.”
Where as the 6/23 orders a more confusing, they still order Stuart around the Union army. The only contigency in which he was to cancel the order was if he found the Union army marching any direction but north.
The only discretion left Stuart was whether he could get through the Bull Run Mountains. He could and he did.
Lee was not without cavalry. He had plently of cavalry with him. On 6/30, Lee knew that Buford was in Gettysburg and generally where the Union army was. Harry Heth brought on the battle by going for shoes with his entire division and artillery. Which would be true if Hill hadn't already notified Ewell on 6/30 that he was going to Gettysburg to find out exactly what was in front of him.
But no matter... On July 1, after the day's battle, Lee made the decision to attack. It no more had to do with Stuart or information.
One thing is sure: the Confeds would have been 12/12 in having higher losses than the Union. That's not good, especially if you are, supposedly, the "defender," and even worse if you have no other strategic material advantages.
Ewell writes, by time the note reached me, Hill was engaged.
If Burnside had listened to Hancock... (I mean as long as we are doing the what-if game) Perhaps, Lee would have listened to Jackson, who wanted the line to be on the North Anna River so he could have room to manuever, which was denied him at Fredericksburg because of the Union guns on Stafford Height.
Vicksburg was twice as important as Gettysburg. In fact, even though Lee retreated... the status quo remained the same... even as it did after the Union loss at Chancellorsville. Only in hindsight, did Gettysburg become the “high-water mark.”
No, Stuart’s orders were to ride to the right of Early at York. So... Stuart was headed where he was supposed to.
OK. I get your point now.
R.E. Lee should have listened to Longstreet and slipped to the right flank (south) and found himself better ground to fight a defensive battle.
True. I’m just finishing a book on the German economy during WWII. It was maddening reading how they were trying to maximize production against a coalition they could never hope to defeat.
Sherman's march from Chatanooga to Atlanta, to the sea!
Both for his use of railroads and for his constant flanking maneuvers that pushed the rebels backward without a fixed battle.
He wanted to rest Virginia from having to sustain two armies for the summer. And he wanted more than just the agricultural bounty from PA... he wanted to refit his army from shoes to hats. He needed everything.
He did too; held up the Confederates just long enough to get the Union on the field.
Cost him, though.
The Southerns were not the only ones who were worn out. The North was too.
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