Posted on 06/19/2007 4:43:36 PM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
Saudi King Says Middle East Crisis Will Affect The World
DUBAI, June 19 (Bernama) -- The Saudi king has warned of an impending "explosion" in the Middle East, saying that it will not only affect the region but will spread all over the world, the English daily Gulf News reports.
"The Middle East region suffers from the longest conflict in our contemporary history which is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Israel's occupation of Arab lands," King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, said in an interview with the Spanish El Pas newspaper which was published simultaneously in Al Riyadh newspaper yesterday.
"At this point in time we are exerting efforts to solve this conflict, but we are witnessing an expansion of the crisis to include other countries like Iraq and Lebanon," he said.
"This makes the region replete with troubles that pose grave concerns for us. My fears are the fears of all reasonable men that the explosive situation will not be confined to the region but will extend to the whole world," he added.
The Saudi monarch yesterday began a five-nation trip that will take him to Spain, France, Poland, Egypt and Jordan.
King Abdullah also underlined the importance of solving the problem of Iran's nuclear programme peacefully in a way that guarantees all countries in the region to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=268361
(Excerpt) Read more at bernama.com ...
June 21, 2007 PM Anti-Terrorism News
(Pakistan) New Photos Show Secret Pakistan Plutonium Plant - ABC News:
Pakistan completing third reactor, suggesting expanded arsenal
http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/06/new-photos-show.html
The Pakistan Connection - Arrests of 3 near Iranian border, possibly
headed to Europe or US, renews doubts on Pakistan
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19339015/site/newsweek/
(India) Two suspected Pakistan-trained terrorists held in Lucknow with
seven kg RDX - near the Lucknow railway station
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Two_terrorists_held_in_Lucknow_with_seven_kg_RDX/rssarticleshow/2139762.cms
(India) 11 convicted in 1993 RSS blast
http://www.chennaionline.com/colnews/newsitem.asp?NEWSID=%7BF7F5EFFC-878C-439E-9A07-80E2D77DFBCD%7D&CATEGORYNAME=CHN
(Iraq) General says 80 percent of top Al Qaeda leaders fled Baquba
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/21/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Baqouba.php
(Iraq) Australians ‘repelled Iran navy’ Iranian naval forces tried to
capture Australian Navy team but repelled
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6228342.stm
Lebanon declares victory in camp war on militants (updated) - Not all
terrorists have surrendered
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070621/ts_nm/lebanon_fighting_dc;_ylt=AnhoDfjkjZfcgE4N1xEsLQDMWM0F
(Gaza) Alan Johnson ‘kidnapper’ interview - Mumtaz Dagmoush interview
on BBC reporter’s kidnapping
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/alan+johnson+kidnapper+interview/568877
(Gaza) A Visit to Fatah’s Torture Chamber - Hamas opens Fatah prison to
public
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,489898,00.html
(Somalia) Five Killed in Capital
http://allafrica.com/stories/200706210864.html
Somalia: Eight tons of weapons detonated in the capital by Ugandan
troops
http://www.shabelle.net/news/ne3132.htm
(Russia) Hizb ut-Tahrir activists convicted in Magnitogorsk - Third
case in Chelyabinsk region
http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=11651077&PageNum=0
Commentary: Oil dependency is fueling Islamic terrorism: ex-CIA head
http://www.cjnews.com/viewarticle.asp?id=12061
(USA) Police: Guns, animal rights literature found in explosives probe
- Animal Liberation Front mags and nitro found
http://www.coloradoan.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070621/UPDATES01/70621012
North Korea threatens South over sea intrusion - Seoul denied intrusion
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/world/20070621-0351-korea-north-navy.html
http://www.panamareals.com/news/archives-true.do
Date: Jun 21, 08:20 PM
Solidarity Leader Lech Walesa Calls Venezuela’s Chavez a ‘Demagogue’
Lech Walesa, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former Polish president, said Chavez is offering Venezuelans things “that don’t belong to him.”
Date: Jun 21, 07:50 PM
Brazilian Airports Boost Security Against Passengers Angered By Delays and Cancellations
The problems continued Thursday, with 411 of the 1,114 flights scheduled between midnight and 3 p.m. being delayed for more than an hour and 104 others being canceled, according to Brazil’s airport authority, Infraero.
Date: Jun 21, 07:06 PM
Ex-Mexico Governor Re-Arrested for Drugs
A Mexican judge on Tuesday ordered Villanueva’s release after he served six years on charges he laundered alleged drug money through Swiss banks while serving as governor.
Date: Jun 21, 07:05 PM
Venezuela Military Fighter Plane Crashes, Pilot Dies During Training Flight
The French-made Mirage 50 plummeted to the ground during a routine training flight near the Libertador air force base in central Aragua state, President Hugo Chavez said during a speech in the presidential palace.
Date: Jun 21, 06:45 PM
Europe-Based Cordoba to Lead Rebuilding Colombia at Copa America
Despite being picked as a favorite to win the 1994 World Cup, and having won the 2001 Copa America at home, Colombia has failed to qualify for the last two World Cups.
Date: Jun 21, 05:30 PM
Mexican Government Calls Australian ‘Big Brother’ TV Program Offensive
The Foreign Relations Department released copies of protest letters its embassy in Australia sent to the program and the Australian government complaining that show participants threw water balloons at a Mexican flag and poked fun at Mexican people during a broadcast June 15.
Date: Jun 21, 04:16 PM
House OKs Plan to Broadcast to Venezuela
The amendment, proposed by Rep. Connie Mack, a Cape Florida lawmaker who has been sharply critical of Chavez, suggests the Broadcast Board of Governors, which oversees operations like the Voice of America and Radio and TV Marti, allot $10 million for its Venezuela operations.
Date: Jun 21, 04:05 PM
Ecuador Changes Position on Occidental Case
Occidental denies any breach of contract and Ecuador had refused to recognize the arbitration claim.
Date: Jun 21, 02:40 PM
Venezuela’s Chavez Inaugerates New Bridge Linking Capital to Airport
Throngs of government supporters cheered the Venezuelan leader as he cut a ribbon in front of the 900-meter (2,950-foot) bridge and climbed aboard a jeep that drove him across the concrete and steel structure.
Date: Jun 21, 02:05 PM
Putin Will Go to Guatemala for IOC Vote on 2014 Winter Olympics
The winner will be selected on July 4 at an International Olympic Committee assembly in Guatemala City.
Date: Jun 21, 01:50 PM
Mexico’s Cemex Extends Offer for Australia’s Rinker
Cemex has already secured control of the company, gaining 63.71 percent of Rinker’s shares through the tender so far.
Date: Jun 21, 01:50 PM
Brazil to Resettle Palestinian Refugees Who Fled Iraq
“The refugees suffered arbitrary arrests and torture committed by armed militias after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell in 2003,” UNHCR’s Brazil office said in a statement released late Wednesday.
Date: Jun 21, 12:15 PM
Stocks Stall for Brazil’s Developers
Shares of Gafisa, the second- biggest Brazilian homebuilder, gained 34 percent last year after an initial public offering in February.
Date: Jun 21, 09:50 AM
Former Mexican Governor Released, Re-Arrested for Extradition to US on Drug Charges
Federal police arrested Mario Villanueva as he was leaving a maximum-security prison west of Mexico City before dawn and took him to a prison in the capital, the federal Attorney General’s Office said in a news release.
Date: Jun 21, 08:20 AM
Brazil’s Growing Dispute: Energy Vs. Environment
How that dispute is resolved, advocates on both sides say, could determine nothing less than Brazil’s vision of its future at a moment when it is simultaneously facing energy and environmental pressures and casting envious glances at faster-growing developing countries, like India and China.
Date: Jun 21, 06:40 AM
Sloppy Controls Blamed in Panama Syrup Scandal
Since then, his condition has become only too well known to Panamanians who have friends or relatives among the hundreds of identified victims.
Date: Jun 21, 04:06 AM
Glacial Lake Vanishes in Southern Chile
Park rangers at Bernardo O’Higgins National Park said they found a 100-feet-deep crater in late May were the lake had been in March.
Date: Jun 21, 12:51 AM
Mexican Judge Orders Ex-Gov’s Release
Prosecutors said Villanueva received $500,000 for each of several shipments he aided.
Date: Jun 21, 12:50 AM
Two Killed, Dozens Injured in Mass Brawl Inside Mexican Border Prison
The two gangs, the “Aztecas” and the “Mexicles,” which have frequently faced off before, began fighting after prison authorities relocated some of the prisoners to other cell blocks.
Date: Jun 20, 11:40 PM
Basque Select Side Beats Venezuela 4-3 in Friendly
The match was the last for Venezuela before it hosts the Copa America starting Tuesday.
Date: Jun 20, 11:20 PM
Mexico Court Bars Tijuana Mayor From Running for Baja California Governorship
Jorge Hank Rhon, a colorful businessman with a fortune worth an estimated US$500 million (€375 million), a dog track and a private zoo of 20,000 animals, took a leave of absence as Tijuana’s mayor in February in order to mount his bid to be governor.
Date: Jun 20, 10:55 PM
Mexico Mourns Mariachi Singer and Movie Star Antonio Aguilar in Mexico City
Aguilar died late Tuesday after a long fight with pneumonia, Medica Sur hospital spokeswoman Shere Sanchez said.
Date: Jun 20, 07:20 PM
Chile: Farm Town Promotes Recycling and Ecotourism
The dirt roads, colonial history and low-key activity in the sleepy Chilean farming town of Alhue make it hard to remember that downtown Santiago is just two hours away.
Date: Jun 20, 06:45 PM
Guyana Judge Grants Bail to Sons of Suspect in Plot to Bomb Airport in New York City
Kareem and Iqra Kadir, sons of plot suspect Abdul Kadir, a former opposition legislator in the South American nation, were released on US$180 (€134) bail each on the illegal munitions charges, according to defense attorney James Bond.
[live links at url]
Had a nap and woke up to find the Calif. Earthquake group chasing lakes that disappear, so I joined in the googles........and talk about fun googles, they go all over the place and I could not resist posting a few.............Laughing.....evily...........
http://www.geocities.com/Area51/Rampart/2653/rep96g.txt
POLICE CHASE UFO OCCUPANTS AT HUNTSVILLE AIRPORT
Saturday afternoon, May 25, 1996, saw some real excitement at
Huntsville International Airport in Alabama. As Delta Flight 1436 from
Dallas-Fort Worth began circling to land, an “unusual-looking aircraft”
swooped onto the runway without tower permission and taxied over to the
privately-owned airplane parking area. The craft was described as a
“triangle-shaped object.” The tower called on the pilot to identify
himself and his aircraft but received no response.
Three occupants emerged from the UFO and began walking among
the parked airplanes. Airport security men arrived and, when cut off
from their vehicle, the trio ran across the runway, right in front of
Delta Flight 1436, which had just touched down.
Kate D., a Delta passenger, said she looked out her window and saw
“what looked like three children” running out onto the tarmac. Kate
described the occupants as “small and child-like” and “wearing metallic
suits and white helmets.” Kate said the Delta pilot made “a
touch-and-go landing” and took off again before running down the fleeing
occupants.
The trio ducked into the terminal through the baggage area. An
airport
security man spotted them and gave chase. People in the terminal
thought it was some sort of Memorial Day weekend publicity stunt.
The tower called the Huntsville, Alabama police, and two cruisers
responded. Officer Ted Williams of the Huntsville P.D. said, “One of
them I could have sworn we had cornered by the newstand. We should have
had them then. I don’t know how they got past us down to the TCBY.”
The officers caught up to the occupants at the TCBY yogurt stand,
and then stopped, as if they’d run into an invisible wall. A waitress
on the main concourse said, “It was like the officers couldn’t move.”
After grabbing some packages of Dannon’s Yogurt, the three UFO
occupants ran toward the baggage claim area. Meanwhile, outside the
terminal, a convoy of U.S. Army humvees from the Redstone Arsenal, three
miles east of the airport, pulled off the Joe Wheeler Highway and
surrounded the terminal, blocking all of the exits.
Just then, the delta-winged UFO began to move. Witnesses saw
the three occupants in the cockpit window. The UFO then “rose straight
up and took off at high speed.” It zoomed away over the town of
Madison, north of the airport.
[This could not be left alone on the internet, there are others on the page, but I fell in love with this one....granny]
History of the area, Southern Calif Desert:
Crime news:
[added Meldrum and photos at link]
http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/alert/alert.htm
Get e-mail updates when new crime alerts information is posted
Photograph of and link to Meldrum Greg Harvey Meldrum Greg Harvey allegedly fled the United States after being convicted for child rape and sodomy in Kentucky.
Photograph of and link to Noel Lopez Noel Lopez is wanted for conspiracy to transport minors to engage in prostitution in New Jersey.
Photograph of and link to Igor Fisherman Igor Fisherman is wanted on racketeering and fraud charges in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Photograph of and link to Semion Mogilevich Semion Mogilevich is wanted on racketeering and fraud charges in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Photograph of and l ink to Anatoli Tsoura Anatoli Tsoura is wanted on racketeering and fraud charges in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Photograph of and link to Plaurent Dervishaj Plaurent Dervishaj is wanted for being a fugitive from a foreign country.
Photograph of and link to Daniel Andrea s San Diego Juan Jose Esparragoza-Moreno is wanted on drug charges in Texas.
Photograph of and link to Jose Gustavo Badillo Jose Gustavo Badillo is wanted for rape in Oklahoma.
NEWS FROM FBI.GOV
Gotcha: Highlights from Closed Cases
Read about the FBI’s Top Priority, Counterterrorism
FBI’s Innocent Images National Initiative
Preventing Fraud on the Internet
Famous FBI Cases
FBI NEWS QUIZ
Snapshot of Recent Investigations
06/20//07
Photograph of New paper - with text ‘FBI News Quiz’
A six-month undercover investigation in California dubbed “Operation Tarnished Eagle” recently halted a plot involving hundreds of automatic rifles, Stinger missiles, anti-tank rockets, claymore mines, and other arms. One federal official said of the bust: “This investigation read like a movie script, but turned out to be reality.” Here in the form of a quiz is a look at the California takedown and some other interesting recent cases from our 56 field offices.
1. In the case above, what was the alleged target of the plot?
A. Los Angeles International Airport
B. U.S. military bases in Southern California
C. The Laotian government
D. The logging industry
Answer
2. Six men were charged in New York for an elaborate “retagging” scheme that began in 1999. What were they doing?
A. Buying high-end clothes with bogus price tags
B. Altering or replacing VIN plates on stolen cars
C. Spray-painting “good” graffiti over “bad” graffiti
D. Manipulating population data on tagged wildlife
Answer
3. Our office in Los Angeles arrested a man suspected in at least 39 bank robberies since 2005. Agents gave the robber a nickname based on the clothes he was seen wearing on surveillance tapes. What was his moniker?
A. The Trenchcoat Bandit
B. The Wig Bandit
C. The Bathing Suit Bandit
D. The Goofy Hat Bandit
Answer
4. A Chicago man was charged on June 1 with uploading what to an Internet website?
A. The first four episodes of the TV show 24
B. The Fantastic Four movie sequel
C. More than a thousand images of child porn
D. A leaked copy of the seventh and final book in the Harry Potter series
Answer
5. One of the nation’s largest ambulance providers has agreed to pay the U.S. $2.5 million in a legal settlement. What is the company alleged to have done?
A. Refused to deliver patients after 9 p.m.
B. Moonlighted as a limo service
C. Offered hospitals discounts for referrals
D. Converted “retagged” vans into emergency vehicles
Answer
6. A 47-year-old California man was sentenced on June 11 to more than five years in prison and ordered to pay more than $1 million for a “phishing” scheme that included identity theft and credit card fraud. How was this particular sentencing significant?
A. He didn’t own a computer
B. He pleaded insanity
C. Case was the first conviction under a 2003 CAN-SPAM law
D Defendant was, in fact, a fisherman
Answer
Answers:
1: C
An investigation by the FBI, our Joint Terrorism Task Force in Sacramento, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Explosives disrupted a plot to overthrow the government of Laos and reduce government buildings to rubble. More than 200 federal agents and local law enforcement officers executed warrants in six cities. Among those arrested: a general in the Royal Lao Army in the 1960s and 1970s who emigrated to the U.S. in 1975. Read more
2: B
The defendants were arrested for allegedly “retagging” and selling hundreds of stolen vehicles. “Retagging” is a scheme to alter, replace, or tamper with vehicle identification number (”VIN”) plates and stickers to hide the fact that they are stolen. The cars are then sold as if they have legitimate titles and paperwork. Read more
3: D
FBI agents on June 13 arrested a 56-year-old Ladera Heights man they suspect is the “Goofy Hat Bandit” responsible for bank heists in Los Angeles, Orange, and Riverside counties. The bandit earned his moniker by consistently wearing hats during his robberies, including various colors of fishing hats, fedoras, and baseball caps. Read more
4: A
He uploaded to the LiveDigital.com website the first four episodes of 24 before they aired on television in January . He also put links to the illegal postings on another website. The first two episodes—the season premier of the sixth season—were leaked eight days before being broadcast back-to-back on national TV. Read more
5: C
The Arizona-based Rural/Metro Corporation allegedly had contracts with hospitals in Texas that offered illegal discounts in exchange for referrals. The full cost of the deliveries was then billed to Medicare. The company agreed to pay $2.5 for violating the False Claims Act. Read more
6: C
An Azusa man was the first person convicted by a jury under the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, which prohibits, among other things, deceptive subject lines in e-mails. Jeff Goodin was found guilty in January of sending thousands of e-mails to America Online users that appeared to be from AOL’s billing department. The e-mails prompted recipients to “update” their personal information on phony AOL webpages that Goodin used to swipe information and make unauthorized purchases. Read more
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/newsquiz062007.htm
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/idtheft061807.htm
CORPORATE TAKEOVER
A New Twist on Identity Theft
06/18/07
Signature on corporate document
Late last month, we helped wrap up a case that took identity theft to a whole new level: one company trying to steal $23 million by pretending to be another company.
It was made possible by a remarkable coincidence: two private security companies with nearly identical names. One of the firms, based in Michigan, was named Executive Outcome Inc. The other, based in South Africa, was called Executive Outcomes Inc.
The criminal maneuvering began in late 2001, when a British debt collector called the Michigan-based Executive Outcome, run by Pasquale John DiPofi. The collection agency asked if DiPofi wanted help collecting $23 million owed by the government of Sierra Leone for military equipment, security, and training.
One slight problem. The millions of dollars weren’t owed to DiPofi’s company. It was owed to the other firm, Executive Outcomes, a half a world away.
“This probably started as a crime of opportunity,” says Special Agent William Fleming, who worked the case out of our office in Clinton Township, Michigan. “When the call came in, the coincidences of the similar company names and all that money on the table must have been a huge temptation.”
And one DiPofi couldn’t resist. He hired the collection agency to pursue the debt. He and an employee, Christopher Belan, then began producing documents to back up their claim. They also registered a new company in Michigan and in England to mirror the name of the South African company.
The debt collector went ahead and filed paperwork with the government of Sierra Leone on DiPofi’s behalf. That’s when alarm bells starting ringing: Sierra Leone had already agreed to a payment plan with the South African company. Understandably, the government balked when the new claim was submitted. A legal skirmish followed between DiPofi and the South African company.
Then, the conflict turned malicious. A representative of the South African company got a phone call urging him not to be “greedy” and to reach a settlement with DiPofi’s company soon-or else. The representative also received a letter with several interior pictures of his homes in London and Paris.
That’s when we got involved. The representative called the police…who called our special agent assigned as a Legal Attaché in London…who turned the case over to Agent Fleming.
Obtaining a search warrant, Fleming searched DiPofi’s office and found evidence of the forged documents. Most were conveniently created on DiPofi’s office computer.
DiPofi and Belan never collected a dime. They both pled guilty to conspiracy, wire fraud, and other charges. Each received prison time and paid $51,000 to the South African representative they threatened to compensate for the extra security he hired.
“This was definitely one of the most unusual cases I’ve worked: an American company pretending to be a foreign company to scam a foreign government,” Fleming says. “We’re just glad he didn’t get away with it—for the sake of the South African company and the government of Sierra Leone.”
Does this kind of corporate identity theft happen often? Not that we’ve seen, but it’s good for businesses to be alert to the possibility. You just never know…
Resources:
- Sentencing Press Release
- More on Identity Theft
- More White-Collar Scams
http://louisville.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/fen_phen061407.htm
Office of the United States Attorney
Eastern District of Kentucky
Three Lawyers in Fen-Phen Settlement Case Indicted
on Charges of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 14, 2007
For Further Information Contact
Courtney Yopp Norris (859) 685-4811
COVINGTON, Ky. — Three lawyers from Lexington, Ky., who represented over 400 plaintiffs in a civil suit over injuries sustained by the diet drug Fen-Phen, were indicted today by a federal grand jury for charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
In July 1998, William J. Gallion, 56; Shirley A. Cunningham, Jr, 52.; and Melbourne Mills, Jr, 76, filed a civil action in Boone County Circuit Court on behalf of approximately 440 plaintiffs they represented against American Home Products (AHP), Bariatics, Inc., and Dr. Rex Duff.
As part of their representation, all three entered into contractual fee agreements with each of their clients. Gallion agreed to a fee of 33% of the total sum recovered by his clients before expenses; Cunningham agreed to 33 and 1/3 % of the total sum recovered by his clients before expenses; and Mills agreed to a fee of no more than 30% of his clients net recovery afer expenses.
In May 2001, the case was settled through mediation. AHP agreed to pay the plaintiffs $200 million. The indictment alleges that the three lawyers ignored both mandatory court rules and their contractual fee agreements, fraudulently convinced each plaintiff to accept a settlement without full disclosure, and defrauded the plaintiffs of approximately $65 million.
According to the contractual fee agreements, the plaintiffs should have received approximately two thirds of the amount, with the attorneys entitled to the remainder. Instead, by the end of 2001, the plaintiffs received a total of $45, 460,250. Of the remaining $154, 989,750, about $7.5 million was set aside as part of the settlement agreement and the rest went to the attorneys.
In February 2002, the Kentucky Bar Association Inquiry Commission conducted a hearing investigating the manner in which the civil settlement had been handled. During the hearing, the Commission applied for a subpoena for the Escrow Account used for the settlement. It is alleged that after this request was made, money that had already been diverted to the defendants’ personal accounts was used to pay a second distribution to the plaintiffs.
This second distribution was still below that to which the plaintiffs were entitled. During this second distribution, the plaintiffs were told that if there were any additional monies left over, they may seek to have those additional amounts donated to a trust for charity.
Subsequently, Gallion, Cunningham and Mills misrepresented to the court that the plaintiffs had approved this trust and were aware that they intended to fund it with $20 million dollars from the settlement. Thereafter the defendants became paid directors of the trust.
The indictment alleges that the wires were used to further this scheme to defraud the plaintiffs. The indictment further seeks restitution from the defendants in the amount of approximately $65 million.
If convicted, each face up to 20 years in prison, a maximum fine of $250,000, and up to three years supervised release. Any sentence following conviction will be imposed by the Court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and applicable federal statutes.
Appearances before United States District Court have been scheduled for June 22, 2007 at 10:30 a.m. in Covington, Ky. The United States was represented in the case by Assistant United States Attorneys Laura K. Voorhees and E.J. Walbourn. The investigation preceding the Indictment was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The indictment of a person by a grand jury is an accusation only, that person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty.
Spotlight on Trinidad and Tobago’s Jamaat al-Muslimeen
By Chris Zambelis
John F. Kennedy International Airport
The recent allegations of a foiled plot to attack New York City’s John F. Kennedy International Airport by suspected Islamist extremists with ties to the Caribbean have raised concerns about the spread of radical Islam among the region’s sizeable Muslim community. Early reports link the suspects to Trinidad and Tobago’s Jamaat al-Muslimeen (Muslim Association, JAM), a radical Islamist group with a history of political militancy and violence.
The Suspects
Russell M. Defreitas, 63, a U.S. citizen and resident of New York City who was born in Guyana, was once employed at the airport as an airline cargo handler. He is a Sunni Muslim convert of Afro-Guyanese descent. As the alleged mastermind behind the conspiracy, Defreitas has not held a steady job since 1995 and relied on social security payments and working odd jobs to survive. He had only $50.70 in his name at the time of his arrest (Trinidad & Tobago Newsday, June 7).
His alleged accomplices included Afro-Guyanese Muslim convert Abdel Kadir, 55, born Michael Seaforth. Kadir converted to Sunni and later Shiite Islam and served as an imam in Guyana. A civil engineer by training, he once served as a member of Guyana’s parliament and the mayor of the town of Linden. Kadir also studied theology in Iran in the 1990s, where he met and befriended Muhammed Hassan Abrahemi, an Iranian Shiite cleric who would later head Guyana’s International Islamic College of Advanced Studies. Abrahemi made headlines in Guyana when he was abducted and murdered in 2004 (Terrorism Monitor, July 27, 2006). Kadir was reportedly preparing to attend an Islamic conference in Iran at the time of his arrest (Stabroek, June 3).
Abdel Nur, 57, born Compton Eversley, is a Sunni Muslim convert of Afro-Guyanese descent who worked odd jobs and battled drug addiction. He was deported from Canada in 1982 after serving time for drug trafficking. Nur was also deported from the United States based on similar charges in the late 1980s (Stabroek, June 5; Stabroek, June 8). The fourth suspect, Afro-Trinidadian Kareem Ibrahim, also known as Winston Kingston and Amir Kareem, is a native of Trinidad and Tobago and a Shiite imam. Ibrahim, 56, was initially a convert to Sunni Islam, but later adopted Shiite Islam in the 1970s. He also operated an Islamic bookstore (Trinidad & Tobago Express, June 3). He is reported to suffer from severe claustrophobia, a condition that has prevented him from flying since 1979 (Guyana Chronicle, June 17).
By all accounts, the suspected plotters, whose ages range in the 50s and 60s and include Sunnis and Shiites, do not fit the typical profile of capable terrorist operatives. For example, those who know Defreitas and Nur describe them as “ganja smoking” loners who were often unkempt, unstable and lacked the means to support themselves, let alone create a plot of this magnitude (Trinidad & Tobago Express, June 6). The alleged plan was also nowhere near operational or technically feasible. In ridiculing the suspects, one Trinidadian commentator dubbed them the “jokey foursome” (Trinidad & Tobago Express, June 10).
The Jamaat al-Muslimeen Connection
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that Defreitas harbored resentment toward the United States stemming from his opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, indicating some intent on his part to act. The suspected plotters did not look to associates in the Middle East or South Asia for support. Instead, they are alleged to have sought financial assistance from the obscure Trinidad-based radical Sunni Islamist group known as Jamaat al-Muslimeen.
Observers who have followed JAM’s activities over the years were surprised to hear that the group was implicated in the plot. Reports that the suspects intended to reach out to JAM’s leadership to include a meeting with the group’s leader, Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, who is currently awaiting the start of his high-profile trial in Port of Spain for charges of sedition, terrorism and other crimes, also baffled regional observers and authorities. Trinidadian Police Commissioner Trevor Paul announced that there was no information linking JAM to the alleged plot, although there is evidence that some of the suspects passed through JAM circles at one point (Trinidad & Tobago Express, June 6).
Despite the recent charges and the group’s track record of political militancy and violence, which includes terrorist attacks in Trinidad, there is no evidence to suggest that JAM has ever attempted an attack outside of Trinidad, let alone an attack against the United States. JAM, however, has been known to maintain a presence outside of Trinidad, including in the United States, in what appears to be an effort to facilitate its criminal activities (Trinidad & Tobago Newsday, June 10). There is also no evidence linking JAM to al-Qaeda or other international terrorist organizations. The involvement of Shiite Muslims among the suspects has raised questions about a possible Iranian link but, again, there is no evidence of an Iranian connection as well.
The outspoken JAM Social and Welfare Officer Kala Akii Bua strongly denied any links to the alleged terror plan, calling it an international conspiracy hatched by the FBI and the Trinidadian government to tarnish the image of his organization. In an apparent reference to the group’s violent reputation, he stated that “Japan and America were enemies…We have moved on. We turned a new corner.” Akii Bua acknowledged that suspect Abdel Nur prayed at a JAM-led mosque and stayed at the home of a JAM member (Trinidad Guardian, June 7). He denied, however, that Nur ever met with senior JAM leaders: “Some people will say they meet Santa Claus.” He added that JAM does not “believe it is proper to strike at the United States” (Trinidad & Tobago Express, June 7). Akii Bua additionally acknowledged knowing Kareem Ibrahim, who previously associated with JAM before adopting Shiite Islam (Trinidad & Tobago Newsday, June 7).
In another curious twist in the case, Kadir and Abu Bakr are reported to know each other from their time studying together at the University of the West Indies. They have been accused of being business associates, but no further evidence has surfaced confirming this claim (Trinidad & Tobago Express, June 6).
Background
JAM was founded in the 1980s by Yasin Abu Bakr, an Afro-Trinidadian Muslim convert born Lenox Philip and a former police officer. The organization has traditionally been comprised primarily of Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts to Sunni Islam. Its ideology and discourse combine a mix of the most extreme fringes of pan-African nationalism and black identity politics with Islamist rhetoric and symbolism. JAM has portrayed itself through the years as an advocate for all Afro-Trinidadians, including non-Muslims. Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts in Trinidad represent only a tiny fraction of the larger Muslim minority community, which is dominated by East Indians, a frequent target of JAM’s ire over the years. Understanding the nuances of Trinidad’s complex ethnic and racially-divided society and political arena is crucial to understanding the emergence of JAM and its allure among its narrow following (Terrorism Monitor, March 9, 2006).
In 1990, the 65 year-old Abu Bakr ordered more than 100 of his followers to raid Trinidad’s Red House (National Parliament) in an attempt to overthrow the government in a violent coup over grievances related to a property dispute, social justice, poverty and state corruption. JAM took hostage Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson, who was shot and wounded amid the ensuing chaos, and most of his cabinet. The group also took over Trinidad’s then sole national television station and one of two radio stations. The crisis lasted for five days, plunging the capital Port of Spain into violence and disarray. The coup attempt led to scores of deaths and casualties and tens of millions of dollars in damages. JAM surrendered to authorities after a period of negotiations led to a settlement that resulted in an amnesty for the organization. The details of the amnesty remain a point of contention to this day, as subsequent governments have pursued legal action against Abu Bakr and JAM members for their role in committing violence and destroying public property.
Since the coup attempt, Abu Bakr and other prominent JAM members have been implicated in an array of crimes, including narcotics and arms smuggling, extortion, murder and kidnapping for ransom. JAM has also been linked to crime in the United States. JAM member Louis Akhtab Haneef, a former resident of Pompano Beach, Florida who is also known as Louis Sinclair Coleman, purchased most of the weapons used by his associates during the 1990 coup attempt at gun shows and shops in southern Florida and exported them to Trinidad [1]. JAM member Olive Enyahooma El, also known as Clive Lancelot Small, was convicted in Miami in 2004 on charges that he attempted to smuggle automatic weapons and silencers from Florida to Trinidad in 2001. JAM member Keith Andre Glaude was arrested during a sting operation in Fort Lauderdale in 2001 for attempting to purchase automatic weapons and silencers for export to JAM in Trinidad (Trinidad & Tobago Newsday, June 10).
Although JAM has maintained a lower profile during the last few years due to increased government pressure and a series of high-profile arrests of its members, the group has remained a vocal player in Trinidadian politics. Trinidadians, however, continue to characterize JAM as a criminal organization more than a religious or political one.
Conclusion
Authorities in the United States and Caribbean need to remain vigilant regarding the threat of terrorism in the region. There is, however, little evidence to indicate that radical Islamist ideologies are resonating among Muslims in the Caribbean. The alleged JFK plot appears to be an isolated incident concocted by a group of aging amateurs who may have harbored some aspirations to act out their grievances through violence, but boasted little in terms of operational capabilities and resources. While many observers point to the presence of JAM in Trinidad as proof of an emerging terrorist threat to the United States in the region, these assessments fail to take into account JAM’s history of acting almost exclusively in the Trinidadian context.
To date, the most pressing security concerns in the Caribbean remain drug and arms smuggling, organized and financial crime and human trafficking, not radical Islam. Nevertheless, the institutional weakness, endemic corruption, poverty and lawlessness characteristic of much of the Caribbean can, in theory, make the region susceptible to terrorist infiltration.
Notes
1. Loren Berger and Denis Henigan, “Guns and Terror,” Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 2001.
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Trafficking and the Role of the Sinai Bedouin
By Joshua Gleis
On the evening of October 7, 2004, three trucks laden with explosives were driven to resorts in the northern Sinai where they were detonated, killing more than 30 people and wounding hundreds more. The targets were Israelis vacationing during their High Holidays at the usually tranquil desert oases of Taba, Ras al-Sultan and Tarabeen. At least three previously unknown terrorist organizations claimed responsibility for the terrorist incident; however, the leading suspect and group named by the Egyptian government was al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (”Monotheism and Struggle”), comprised of Bedouin tribesmen from the Sinai Peninsula (al-Ahram Weekly, September 14-20, 2006). The Taba attacks marked the first time that Bedouins from the Sinai were implicated in acts of terrorism on Egyptian soil. This trend continued with the bombings at Sharm el-Sheikh, as well as various shootings of police and other security forces (Daily Star [Egypt], May 10, 2006). Analysts attribute this development to the fact that northern Bedouin tribesmen have not benefited economically as much as their southern brethren by the high level of tourism available in that part of the peninsula. Deep-seeded ideological, political and cultural differences between the Bedouin and the Egyptian government also explain the rise in terrorist activity.
While certainly a minority within the Bedouin population, the majority of illegal trafficking among Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Territories is conducted by Bedouin smugglers. Bedouin tradition reaches back thousands of years; they are fiercely independent, principled and tribal. Bedouin smugglers tend to be involved in illegal activities namely for the financial benefits and historically negligible risks that such actions entail. Activities targeting Israel have sometimes been ignored by the Egyptians, unlike the scenes of mass arrests and shootouts between Egyptian security forces and Bedouin tribesmen that have plagued the region since the attacks in the Sinai Peninsula [1]. Since the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, this problem has intensified.
While narco-terrorism has been well documented in counter-terrorism and intelligence circles, not enough progress has been made in finding the nexus between terrorism and the many other forms of illegal activity practiced today. An increasingly popular illegal activity that uses the same delivery methods as narcotics, terrorism and weapons smuggling is that of human trafficking. In Israel and Egypt, the Bedouin have played a key role in these smuggling activities as well. Human trafficking of women and underage girls, namely from Eastern Europe and other former Soviet Union states, is a multi-million dollar business in Israel and Egypt, which is operated almost exclusively by the Russian mafia in Israel and Eastern Europe (IsraelInsider, August 18, 2004) [2]. A few years ago, Israel implemented a number of reforms to curtail the activity of human smugglers, including tightening immigration controls at Ben-Gurion International Airport and the Haifa and Ashdod seaports (Fox News, August 18, 2004). Since Israeli officials have made it more difficult to transfer women into Israel through more conventional routes, the Russian mafia has turned to Bedouin tribesmen to accomplish the task.
As the original purveyor of smuggled goods between Israel and the Arab world, the Bedouin were the natural choice for the mafia when it came to human smuggling. As Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, former head of research for Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Military Intelligence, has explained, “The smuggling is occurring across large areas, all of which are supposed to be under Egyptian control. Until recently, the Egyptians did not see any risk to themselves from these smuggling [operations]. However, since the terror [attacks] in the Sinai, especially along the shoreline, they are realizing that there is a possible connection between the smuggling into Israel and the terrorist operatives [in Egypt], and therefore maybe they will start to act against the smugglers” [3].
Bedouins are known for their excellent tracking ability. They can detect infiltrators and explosives and lead forces unscathed through harm’s way. While military service in the IDF for Bedouin is not compulsory, a sizeable number choose to volunteer, and the vast majority is known for their outstanding service, notably in special tracking units. Yet, these skills can also be used against the state, and a small number of Bedouin soldiers in the IDF have been found guilty of smuggling and even spying against the state (Naharnet, November 9, 2004; Haaretz, November 9, 2004).
The 70-mile border between Israel and Egypt that separates the Negev desert from the Sinai Peninsula is Israel’s least secure boundary. For a country known for its sophisticated security perimeters, Israel’s southern border does not have even a chain-link fence in many areas. Some have justified this fact by arguing that a barrier would be useless since the shifting winds in the desert would bury it in sand in just a few years’ time. To construct and maintain a more effective barrier would take many years and incredible resources—time and resources that the country does not presently possess, as it is embroiled in conflicts with Hezbollah and the Palestinians.
Smuggling of women (known as the “white slave” trade), along with drugs, weapons and terrorist operatives is achieved by a number of methods: on foot, by all-terrain vehicles and SUVs, through tunnels and even by camel. Having entered Israel, the smuggled goods are transferred to Israeli Bedouin, usually of the same tribe, and transported to larger metropolises like Tel Aviv and Haifa. While there are multiple tribes in both the Sinai and Negev deserts, the most important for purposes of this study are those that span the Egyptian-Israeli and Egyptian-Gaza borders. These include the Sawarka and the Rumaylat tribes in northeast Sinai, the Tarabin, Ahayw’at and the ‘Azazma tribes that span from the Sinai into the West Bank and Israel’s “Green Line” as well as the Tayaha and Hanajra tribes in the Gaza Strip and Israel [4]. Smuggled weapons are usually concealed in various hiding places, including the areas surrounding Mount Harif and the Ramon Crater, and are later acquired by other Bedouins and smuggled to Palestinian militant groups.
Israel has re-shuffled its military units in an attempt to better monitor, intercept and prevent infiltrators and gun-runners from passing through the Sinai into the Negev desert. Due to its successes in thwarting smuggling operations out of the Gaza Strip, the IDF’s Gaza Division has been allocated the additional task of patrolling approximately 40 kilometers of the Sinai border, from the city of Rafah in Gaza eastward, where many smuggling operations have occurred (Haaretz, November 27, 2005). For years, these units largely ignored smuggling activities not directly related to terrorism, such as those of drugs and women. Although Israel and Egypt have made more concrete efforts to capture and prosecute these smugglers, both have fallen short. While Bedouin are often involved in more than one type of illegal activity at a time, military and police units are still targeting smuggling rings individually.
Statements by captured Bedouin involved in the Sharm el-Sheikh attacks illuminate the multidimensional aspects of the problem. One captive admitted to Egyptian interrogators that he sold explosives that he had smuggled to the terrorists who used them in the attacks (IsraelInsider, October 10, 2004). Yet, “the explosives were sold on the assumption that they were going to the Palestinians,” explained an Egyptian official on condition of anonymity (Haaretz, November 27, 2005). This lends credibility to the complaint that the Egyptians do not do enough to stop terrorism being perpetrated outside of its borders. Lately, however, Egyptian security forces have been engaged in a rigorous hunt for Bedouin implicated in terrorist attacks. These security operations have resulted in the arrest of thousands of innocent Bedouin—leading to an even greater level of Bedouin hostility and resentment toward the Egyptian government.
For years, Egypt has been under pressure from U.S. and Israeli sources to secure its border with the Gaza Strip, known as the “Philadelphi Corridor.” To help facilitate this process, immediately prior to the 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel agreed to a new protocol, allowing Egypt to boost its border forces in the hopes of stopping the flow of weapons and terrorists into the Palestinian Territories (BBC News, August 1, 2005). Despite these arrangements, however, the smuggling continues. Hamas and other groups took advantage of this lax environment to smuggle fighters, weapons and drugs into the Gaza Strip (Haaretz, October 16, 2006). Palestinian and Israeli officials are concerned that Iranian agents, members of Hezbollah, Iranian-trained members of Hamas and perhaps even elements of al-Qaeda were smuggled into the territory since Israel’s withdrawal (Associated Press, September 15, 2005). Additionally, large numbers of high-grade explosives, mortars, RPGs and anti-tank weapons have appeared during recent internal clashes between Fatah and Hamas (YNetNews, February 5; Jerusalem Post, February 2). Attempts to smuggle weapons from the Sinai continue; the most recent seizure was of approximately 1.5 tons of explosives in central Sinai destined for the Gaza Strip (Reuters, June 4).
As a minority in both states, the Bedouin are singled out both by the Israelis and Egyptians for roles that only a few of their people have participated in, thus exacerbating the resentment within the Bedouin community. This antipathy continues to linger and augment, leading to further conflict and an increase in the number of participants and sympathizers of illegal actions. In recent years, Israel and Egypt have compounded the problem by providing Bedouin with a disproportionately small amount of state resources. In Israel, this has led to Bedouin building towns illegally, which are later ordered destroyed by the Israeli government (The Independent, November 29, 2005; Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 2002). The Egyptian government has faired even worse, with tactics going beyond discrimination to include government crackdowns, mass arrests and shootouts in an atmosphere increasingly tense following the Sinai bombings. Both governments have been criticized by human rights groups for their behavior. As stated by a Bedouin elder regarding the construction of the Sharm el-Sheikh fence in southern Sinai, “They want to keep Sinai Bedouins out of Sharm el-Sheikh, which will only add to our community’s feelings of alienation…Rather than preventing terrorism, that will only increase it” (al-Ahram Weekly, November 2-9, 2006).
Similar sentiment has been voiced regarding the situation in northern Sinai. As Bashir Abdel Fattah, a historian and expert on Sinai society, explains, “Police from Egypt have always been suspicious of north Sinai and, in turn, the people are suspicious of them. Loyalty to the state is low…The question is how to avoid war in the Sinai. But the crackdown only makes people more resentful” (Washington Post, October 2, 2005). Overall, the role of the Bedouin in Egyptian and Israeli society must be carefully monitored since they pose a problematic security threat to both states.
Notes
1. As discussed in multiple interviews and correspondences with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaacov Amidror between April 2005 to December 2006.
2. The Russian mafia operating in Israel is a relatively new phenomenon for the state. The Russian mafia is predominantly comprised of Russians who immigrated to Israel following the breakup of the Soviet Union. While Israel did have its own homegrown, organized crime for decades, the Russian mafia introduced to Israeli society more sophistication as well as an increase in violence. At time of publication, the Israeli police and government are still at odds over how to deal effectively with this relatively new phenomenon.
3. Mentioned in an interview Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaacov Amidror in May 2005.
4. This information was gleamed from an interview with a security official in Israel in the summer of 2006 who asked not to be identified. For more information on the tribes, see the report “Egypt’s Sinai Question” (January 2007) by the International Crisis Group.
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Battleground Somalia: America’s Uncertain Front in the War on Terror
By Andrew McGregor
On June 14, Somalia’s National Reconciliation Conference (NRC) was postponed for the second time. It is now possible that the conference will never be held. The NRC has been long viewed by the United States, the European Union and others as Somalia’s last chance for peace and security, but the postponement will compel the United States to re-examine its long-term policy in Somalia. For external consumption, Somalia’s new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) describes the Somali conflict as a struggle against international terrorism; in reality, much of the fighting is due to historic animosity between some of Somalia’s largest clans. In Mogadishu, the Darod-dominated TFG is engaged in a running battle against the Hawiye clan, which were the largest backers of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Islamist government expelled from power by last December’s Ethiopian invasion.
The United States has released funding for the reconciliation conference while urging the TFG to reach out to the banned Islamists to encourage their participation. The TFG offered the Islamists a chance to register as elected clan representatives, but with no assurances of security. Islamist leaders, who claim the true aim of the conference is to “legalize the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia,” responded with demands for a neutral venue and the full withdrawal of Ethiopian troops (Goobjoog, May 24). In the meantime, roadside bombs explode daily and an intensive campaign of assassinations is taking a heavy toll on Somali leaders. Former ICU leaders are attempting to unite various opposition factions in a national movement for the liberation of Somalia from “foreign occupation” (The East African [Nairobi], June 18). The insurgency is also placing great pressure on formerly peaceful Somali territories like Puntland and Somaliland.
U.S. Assault in Puntland
The TFG has given U.S. forces the “green light” to carry out counter-terrorist operations inside Somalia, such as the recent attack on Islamists in Puntland (a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Somalia). Set up in 1998 as a self-governing refuge from the chaos prevailing in the rest of Somalia, Puntland’s single-party government has become increasingly authoritarian in recent years as it tries to prevent political Islam from taking hold. Public unrest is growing as the national treasury grows mysteriously dry, services are curtailed and soldiers and civil servants go unpaid. The administration recently signed several natural resource exploration deals with Western and Arab companies without public consultation.
In the last days of May, the Puntland regional administration announced that two speedboats carrying 30 to 35 al-Qaeda “terrorists” had arrived in Baargaal district. Puntland officials claimed the foreign extremists came from the Ras Kamboni region of south Somalia, close to the Kenyan border. One of the men was said to be a suspect in the 1998 U.S. Embassy attacks, while insurgents from the United States, Sweden, Yemen, Morocco and Pakistan were allegedly part of the group. Six insurgents were reported killed by local troops, while the rest fled to the mountains near the Baargaal district where they were bombed on June 1 by U.S. warplanes and shelled by the five-inch gun of the U.S. destroyer Chafee (a now rare example of a ship-to-shore bombardment). There were reports of civilian casualties in a group of nomads, but no evidence that the militants sustained any damage from the bombardment (Puntland Post, June 2).
Religious elders from Baargaal gathered later to announce that no foreigners were part of a group of local fighters attacked by the United States and Puntland regional government forces, describing any assertion to the contrary as a “fabrication” (Somaaljecel, June 5). The assault on Baargaal came five months after similarly unsuccessful attacks near the Kenyan border by U.S. AC-130 gunships. Somali sources continue to report U.S. troop movements along the Somali side of the Kenyan border (Shabelle Media Network, May 22).
Al-Qaeda: Here, There and Nowhere
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer claims that U.S. intelligence has confirmation of 30 al-Qaeda members active in Somalia and neighboring areas (ANGOP [Luanda], June 5). The U.S. special envoy for Somalia, John Yates, also sees an al-Qaeda hand behind the violence: “Because of the kind of fighting going on in Somalia, we suspect that there are still al-Qaeda related individuals in Somalia” (Shabelle Media Network, June 1). Perhaps appealing for continued U.S. support, TFG Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Gedi described a threatening future for Somalia in which al-Qaeda will pursue its “satanic plan of turning the country into a breeding ground for terrorists from all over the world and a safe haven for all outlaws and violators of international legitimacy” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 5).
In early June, a car bomb set off by a suicide attacker nearly killed Gedi at his home in Mogadishu. It was the fourth attempt in recent months to kill the prime minister. Gedi described the attack (which killed seven guards) as the work of al-Qaeda: “The suicide bombing is a new and alien culture in Somalia…They collaborated with terrorist groups abroad and used technologies that the Somalis do not know” (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 5). Likewise, U.S. special envoy John Yates observed that the tactics used in the May roadside bombing that killed four Ugandan soldiers “were very much like the tactics that al-Qaeda and other terrorist movements have used in the past.” A Ugandan government investigation, however, later concluded that al-Qaeda played no part in the attack (Shabelle Media Network, May 18; Shabelle Media Network, May 21).
Not all TFG officials agree on the al-Qaeda threat. On June 6, Mogadishu’s mayor, former warlord Mohamed Dheere, declared that “the Hawiye are now to blame for the bomb explosions in Mogadishu” (Shabelle Media Network, June 6). On the same day, TFG troops arrested the chairman of the Hawiye Committee, Haji ‘Abdi Iman Umar, during a series of raids and arrests. Haji ‘Abdi has denied any involvement of the Hawiye elders in the attacks (Radio HornAfrik, June 7). Bombings and assassinations of regional administration heads in Banadir district were attributed to Hawiye activity in a meeting of the regional council on June 3. In the Gedo region in southwest Somalia, local officials recently held talks with Ethiopian officials to refute allegations that al-Qaeda operatives were concentrating there for attacks on Ethiopia (HornAfrik, June 6).
Exit Ethiopia
The regime of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has realized that talk of an impending Ethiopian withdrawal only emboldened the insurgents while doing nothing to hasten the arrival of the balance of the African Union peacekeeping mission, known as AMISOM. According to Zenawi, “Our defense forces will remain until they accomplish their mission…However, this does not mean that we want or can stay in Mogadishu or in Somalia indefinitely” (Ethiopian TV, June 10). A day later, Zenawi appealed to the Security Council to fund the cash-short AU mission, referring to the “financial burden Ethiopia is shouldering” (Shabelle Media Network, June 11). The Ethiopian army is preparing new operations against ethnic Somali rebels and their Oromo allies in the Ogaden region, where oil exploration efforts are already underway (Terrorism Focus, June 5). Zenawi describes these groups as tools of the Eritreans in their efforts to destabilize the Ethiopian regime. In response to retaliatory strikes on ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has promised to “become more vicious” in its attacks. There is always the possibility that Ethiopia may decide the best way to keep a lid on the resistance is to continue occupying Somalia until the Ogaden and its natural resources are secured, but Ethiopian troops targeted daily by roadside bombs and grenade attacks will have little appetite to stay put.
Lately, Zenawi seems to be suggesting that the eradication of terrorism in Somalia is not the objective of the Ethiopian occupation force. “It can be asked whether there exists a city where there are no terrorists,” he explained. “There can be terrorists hiding in other cities, let alone Mogadishu. So it is impossible to confidently say Mogadishu will be 100% free of terrorists. You cannot also be sure about Addis Ababa or New York, let alone Mogadishu…Even now the situation in the city is not that bad” (Ethiopian TV, June 10).
The assassinations and grenade attacks on Ethiopian troops have spread from the capital to Hawiye-dominated Beledweyn in central Somalia. In Somalia, there are many motivations for violence: the southern port of Kismayo is being fought over by TFG troops divided along clan lines; clan fighting in Mudug region erupted over a pool of rainwater during drought conditions; in Baidoa there have been horrific and unclaimed grenade attacks on a bank and a crowded cinema.
The Peacekeepers
On June 15, NATO offered to provide airlift services to AMISOM member nations to speed up deployment (Shabelle Media Network, June 15). Thus far, however, only a Ugandan Battle Group of 1,500 men has arrived from a projected AU force of 8,000. Burundi announced that it will send 1,820 troops to Somalia by French airlift in July, but Ghana appears to be waiting for a cease-fire in Somalia before it deploys, although it has also cited a lack of equipment and logistical support from the AU. The mission comes just as the AU mission in Darfur is on the verge of collapse, with Rwanda and Senegal threatening to withdraw their troops. UN Undersecretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe recently stated that the UN was considering taking over Somalia’s political direction and reconciliation efforts while seeking to reinvigorate the AU’s peacekeeping mission (Radio Simba, June 9). The Security Council also agreed there was an urgent need to prepare plans for a possible UN peacekeeping force. The TFG is now stating its preference for a UN force (Shabelle Media Network, June 15).
Conclusion
The U.S. hunt for largely inactive al-Qaeda suspects in Somalia is proceeding at great risk to its reputation in the area. Its open alliance with Ethiopia and support for the Ethiopian occupation force have created an atmosphere of mistrust in fiercely independent Somalia. Despite enormous material and political costs, not one of the three foreign al-Qaeda suspects alleged to be taking refuge in Somalia (and wanted by Washington for their roles in the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania) has been killed or captured.
In a May 23 webchat, Michael Ranneberger, the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, seemed to be backing off from the “ICU equals al-Qaeda” equation that has dominated recent U.S. policy in the region and is impeding reconciliation efforts. “I recognize that the Islamic Courts did manage to establish a degree of order in Mogadishu,” he said. “However, the Islamic Courts never had broad support among the Somali people and, importantly, the Islamic Courts were moving in a very radical direction, which would not have been to the benefit of the Somali people” (USINFO, May 23).
If Ethiopia withdraws, there is no guarantee that Islamist forces may not return to power, especially if there is a return to political chaos and street violence. The AU peacekeeping intervention is largely a failure (despite the efforts of the Ugandans) with only a small chance of revival. The Islamists will be quick to remind Mogadishu’s beleaguered civilians of the security that prevailed under the administration of the Islamic Courts. The Islamist leadership is nearly intact and has found safe harbors in Eritrea, Yemen and some Gulf states. There are a number of options available to the United States in its relations with Somalia that may be followed singularly or in combination:
1. Use of the U.S. military’s four bases in the region (Camp Lemonier, Djibouti; Manda Bay, Kenya; Bilate and Hurso, Ethiopia) to conduct pre-emptive military operations designed to collect local intelligence and to seize or assassinate individuals deemed threats to national security.
2. Containment through continued naval operations and surveillance over-flights, while rebuilding the Somali navy to undertake coastal security duties.
3. Consolidation of the Ethiopian military presence with U.S. funding.
4. De-emphasis of the military option in favor of promoting inclusive national reconciliation and U.S. engagement in reconstruction efforts.
5. Turning the problem over to the UN by encouraging and funding a UN peacekeeping mission to replace the faltering AU effort.
6. Military occupation by U.S. forces (the most unlikely option).
Inclusive national reconciliation, support for AMISOM, increased development assistance and training for local security forces are the new cornerstones of a shifting U.S. policy in Somalia. The United States hopes for a transition to a democratically-elected government by 2009. In the meantime, the international community is waiting to see the results of the reconciliation conference before forming solid assistance plans. Anxious Somalis also wait to see if their country is destined for peace or to serve as the latest battleground in the war on terrorism.
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Islamist Terrorism and Energy Sector Security in Algeria
By Geoff D. Porter
Despite the fact that its oil production is leveling off and serious questions surround projected increases in gas production, exogenous developments and domestic efforts are serving to make Algeria an increasingly important oil and gas supplier to European and U.S. markets. Simultaneously, the risks posed by Islamist terrorism seem to be escalating and reversing the diminishing trend that characterized the last four years. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the resurgence in terrorist activity during the last six months and the growing significance of the Algerian energy sector, there have only been three attacks on the energy sector itself—two on employees of foreign firms and one on a domestic gas pipeline. Considering the thousands of kilometers of pipelines and more than a dozen foreign oil and gas firms operating in the country, it is surprising that Islamist terrorists have not targeted Algeria’s energy sector more aggressively.
For the past six years, it appeared that Algeria’s security situation was improving and that the European Union’s and the United States’ growing reliance on Algerian oil and gas would not be jeopardized by the country’s Islamist insurgency. Building on his passage of the popular Civil Concord general amnesty in 1999, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika had seemingly gained the upper hand by 2002 against the Islamist insurgency that destabilized the country throughout the 1990s, and he had begun to push out of politics the members of the military who were suspected of manipulating Islamist violence. His re-election in 2004 was largely due to the perception that he was personally responsible for bringing an end to the Islamist threat in Algeria. In fact, a member of the Movement for a Peaceful Society, the government-sanctioned Islamist party, said in a private conversation with this author in November 2004, “Thank God, Bouteflika brought peace to Algeria.”
The struggle against Islamist insurgents has continued, but only one group—the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—remains active, and its numbers are severely depleted, with estimates ranging from 250 to 500 members in contrast with the thousands of fighters distributed across at least three groups during the height of the conflict between 1994-1996. According to a high-ranking police official during an interview with the author on May 20, the police and the military have, in addition to reducing their numbers, confined the terrorists to the mountainous areas in Boumerdes province “where even the French couldn’t go when they were fighting the Algerian mujahideen” during the War of Independence. The official also said that the gendarmerie and the military have currently adopted new counter-terrorism methods, including deploying units to live in the mountains for extended periods in order to combat AQIM rather than trying to launch forays from regional military bases.
Nevertheless, since October 2006, terrorism in Algeria, and around Algiers in particular, has become more prevalent. On October 30, 2006, bombs exploded in front of police stations in the Algiers suburbs. This was followed by a December 2006 attack on a van carrying employees of Brown and Root-Condor—a Kellogg, Brown and Root-Sonatrach joint venture. More bombs exploded in Algeria’s Kabylia region in February this year, followed by coordinated attacks on the Algerian military on February 28. Throughout the winter and spring of 2007, Algerian soldiers clashed with Islamist terrorists, causing the highest number of casualities on both sides in recent years. On April 11, violence reached a new level with the simultaneous attacks on a police station in an Algiers suburb and the prime minister’s office in the center of the city. The last attack received international attention and raised questions about the extent to which the security situation in Algeria is deteriorating. At the same time, Algeria’s increasing centrality as a European and U.S. energy supplier makes the threat of a continued increase in terrorism all the more worrisome.
While global oil markets correctly anticipated that Algerian crude production is not likely to increase significantly in the next three years—with 2010 crude production targets scaled back from two million barrels per day (bpd) to 1.4-1.6 million bpd, or only slightly higher than the current 1.37 million bpd average—the country is unlikely to become any less important to EU oil markets. In fact, supply disruptions in the Niger Delta have actually increased the importance of Algerian production because traders are increasingly turning to Algerian Saharan blend (45° API and 0.1% sulfur) as a more reliable alternative to Nigerian Bonny Light (37º API and less than 0.1% sulfur). Algerian gas is also becoming more important to EU markets as they look to Algeria as an alternative to Russian gas and to British and U.S. markets as they expand the use of LNG in power generation. Algeria-piped gas supplies 30% of the EU’s gas needs, which is only 10% shy of Russian gas and 5% more than Norwegian; however, within certain countries Algerian supply exceeds Russian imports. For example, Italy currently imports 37% of its gas from Algeria and it is expected to import as much as 60% from Algeria by 2010. Algerian LNG supply to the UK’s Isle of Grain began in 2005 and is expected to grow during the next three or four years to meet 20% of the UK’s gas needs. Although Algeria only supplies 3.6% of the U.S. LNG imports, this figure could increase in coming years if the United States moves away from coal-powered electricity generation.
Energy Pipelines Largely Secure
Despite the increase in terrorist activity, however, Algeria’s energy sector is largely secure. The state has long recognized that the sector is the country’s economic lifeline and has taken steps to protect it. Pipelines are regularly monitored and key hydrocarbons and petrochemical facilities are heavily policed. Algeria’s geography further mitigates the likelihood of an attack on wellheads. Unlike southern Iraq or Nigeria’s delta states where insurgents attack those countries’ important oil sectors in order to call attention to their grievances and advance their political agenda, the key oil and gas producing areas in Algeria are in the south of the country and are far from population centers. The Interior Ministry requires a special permit to travel throughout oil and gas producing areas. Furthermore, any effort to carry out an attack on oil and gas producing facilities would likely result in the deaths of the assailants. Most facilities are in remote areas and any attack would prompt an immediate government riposte that would likely kill the attackers before they were able to retreat to safe territory. According to an employee of a privately-owned aviation company that runs charter flights from Algiers to Hassi Messaoud (Algeria’s southern energy hub), the Algerian military would likely launch helicopter gun ships within half an hour of an attack, and they would likely be able to track down invaders in Algeria’s southern deserts before they could escape.
In addition, foreign energy firms operating in Algeria have instituted rigorous security protocols in order to reduce exposure to a possible attack. An employee of an independent international oil, gas and mining company with assets in Algeria, who asked to remain anonymous because he is not permitted to speak with outside analysts, remarked that although Algeria has lost “five years of security improvements” in recent months, he did not see the deterioration of security as curtailing his company’s activities. Instead, his and other foreign firms have minimized their staff and prohibited non-essential personnel from residing in-country. Many foreign firms are taking the additional precaution of minimizing travel to Algiers and are flying directly to the southern energy hub of Hassi Messaoud. The head of a Canadian oil firm recently flew directly from London to Hassi Messaoud in order to evaluate the status of his company’s assets and bypassed Algiers entirely. When foreign firm employees are required to travel to Algiers to meet with the Energy Ministry or Sonatrach, they stay in fortified compounds and travel through the city in two-car convoys.
Vulnerabilities Remain
Despite these precautions, Algeria’s energy sector is still vulnerable. In particular, oil and LNG must eventually be lifted at Algeria’s ports. Algeria has plans to rehabilitate and upgrade its ports, but with the exception of Bejaia, most Algerian ports are still closely linked to their surrounding urban environments, which make securing their perimeters difficult. This is particularly true in Algiers, Oran, Arzew and Skikda. Complicating port security is the fact that Algiers and Skikda are notoriously home to supporters of Islamist terrorists, and the current head of the ex-GSPC, Abdelmalek Droudkal, has historic ties to Skikda—where Algeria’s main gas liquefaction installation is located.
The previously mentioned police official acknowledged that he does not understand why the Islamists have not tried more rigorously to target energy sector installations. He surmised that his forces’ efforts to disrupt the Islamists’ bomb-making capabilities have limited attacks in general, but admitted that he did not entirely comprehend the Islamists’ rationale for staying away from coastal energy installations. According to the official, police operations have undermined bomb-making capabilities, both through seizing bomb materials and killing or arresting technicians. The official asserted that the Islamists are able to make numerous small bombs but have limited “large” bomb resources. In his estimation, the Islamists are likely trying to conserve their resources for sensational operations similar to the April 11 attack on the prime minister’s office.
A possible split within the former GSPC between members who want to bring the group’s objectives into line with the broader global al-Qaeda movement and those who want to retain the group’s “Algerianist” orientation may also be complicating the Islamists’ planning capabilities. The previously mentioned police official suggested that the GSPC’s January 28 announcement that it was to be called AQIM reflected a schism within the group. Apparently, Droudkal is pushing for a closer alliance with al-Qaeda and an expansion of the group’s activities beyond Algeria. Other members, however, are insisting that the organization continue its struggle specifically against the Algerian government in response to the government’s cancellation of the 1991 legislative elections that the Islamic Salvation Front was slated to win. While the al-Qaeda elements within the organization would likely prefer to attack energy installations and foreigners, the “Algerianist” elements likely prioritize targeting government institutions. To the degree that the different factions within the group cooperate, they likely focus their limited resources on targets that will satisfy the demands of each faction, which more often than not means government personnel and institutions.
Nevertheless, an Algerian reporter employed by an international news agency in Algiers said in a discussion on May 22 that he believes that Islamists unquestionably intend to target the energy sector and that it is only a matter of time before they do so. If the Islamists are able to reconstitute their bomb-making capabilities to the point where they can satisfy both the interests of the al-Qaeda supporters and the “Algerianist” fighters, then both the government and the energy sector will be at risk. For the moment, however, the police and military efforts to counter terrorist activity seem likely to succeed in limiting the Islamists’ ability to attack the energy sector. This, in conjunction with strict energy company security protocols, ensures Algeria’s ongoing ability to be a key energy supplier and minimizes the likelihood of supply disruption.
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The Hidden Hand of Iran in the Resurgence of Ansar al-Islam
By Lydia Khalil
Ansar al-Islam, an Islamic militant group based in the Kurdish mountains that briefly housed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was at the height of its power in 2002-2003. They controlled the areas of Bayarah and Tawilah along the Iranian border and operated with impunity. Yet, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Ansar al-Islam was driven out of the areas it had occupied for the past year in only five days. Operations by U.S. and Kurdish forces virtually annihilated it as an organized force, yet it is unclear to where its members fled. Some postulate that they were appropriated by other emerging insurgent groups such as Ansar al-Sunnah and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. A number of their members either retired from insurgent activity or fled to Iran and Europe to work in logistics and financing networks. Ansar al-Islam did not, however, disappear entirely. Many of its members went into hiding across the border. With the recent increase in insurgency activity in the Kurdish areas, Ansar al-Islam has reemerged as an organized force, likely as part of a new arm of al-Qaeda, the Kurdistan Brigades. The “Ansar al-Islam” title has been mentioned consistently in Kurdish and regional reports regarding recent violent attacks in the Kurdish region. It appears that Ansar al-Islam elements are not solely operating as part of the Kurdistan Brigades, but also as a viable, independent group once again. Newspapers and analysts from the region postulate that Ansar al-Islam and associated al-Qaeda elements are operating, as they had before, along the Iran-Iraq border and possibly with the acquiescence of Iran.
Iran’s Potential Role
During the past month, Kurdish leaders have made frequent trips to Iran. Both Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) officials have summoned Iranian consuls to the Kurdish region to discuss Ansar al-Islam’s border activity (Awena, May 1). Kurdish officials, like many others who reside along the border areas, express concern that Iran has perhaps played a role in Ansar al-Islam’s resurgence. Various regional newspapers have reported on Iran’s involvement with Ansar al-Islam, and some have leveled this accusation since 2004. One of Kurdistan’s weekly independent papers, Hawlati, issued a series of reports on the matter. In a July 2004 article, Hawlati wrote that that “Italaat,” the Iranian Secret Service, and al-Qaeda elements are training Ansar al-Islam along the eastern border of Kurdistan (Hawlati, July 2004). The Hawlati report posits that Iran is supporting Ansar al-Islam elements against the Iraqi Kurdish parties in order to separate Iraqi and Iranian Kurds and stave off any potential cooperation. In more recent news coverage, an anonymous Kurdish source said, “In fact, there is an organized campaign to recruit young Iranian Kurds in ideological and military training courses during which the recruit is paid a salary…Along with these training courses, the recruit goes through other military activities most of which are of a terrorist nature. These courses are held in Iranian camps spread in various regions of Iran” (Elaph, April 27).
Not only has Iran been indicted with recruiting Iranian Kurds, it has also been accused of offering training and support to al-Qaeda-affiliated elements harbored in the Hamrin Mountains. Reports suggest that al-Qaeda is training in a camp near the city of Marivan in Iran and elsewhere along the vast border area (Elaph, April 27). Several anonymous sources have claimed that Iran offers a monthly stipend of $1,500 to each recruit, although this has not been independently verified.
Kurdish journalists have speculated that Iran allows Ansar al-Islam to operate along its borders as a way to reinforce and advance its influence in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Iran has been a long-standing benefactor and player in Iraqi Kurdish politics when the KDP and PUK administered Kurdistan under the No Fly Zone. Iran wielded an enormous amount of influence and the two main Kurdish parties were largely at the mercy of Iran’s benevolence. In response to the intrusion of the United States, Iran has seen its influence wane, although it is still a factor in the region. The Sulaymaniyah paper Aso states, “In light of a number of changes following the war, Iran no longer has an economic [and political] impact as before. That is why now Iran, through using Ansar al-Islam, wishes to create security problems for the Kurdistan region the same as it tried to impose its own political agenda on Kurdistan through using the majority of the Islamist parties of Kurdistan prior to the Iraqi war” (al-Sulaymaniyah Aso, April 24). This refers to groups such as the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan that were the precursors of Ansar al-Islam.
Offering an alternative perspective, Sulaymaniyah’s new security director, Hassan Nuri, recently said in an interview: “I do not think that Iran will allow them to be active on the border” (Awene, May 15). By “them,” Nuri referred to militant Islamists. Iranian representatives stated in a paper circulated during a conference in Sharm el-Sheikh that fighting al-Qaeda, and Ansar al-Islam specifically, was a priority. A major goal in the Iranian working paper was to cooperate with Sunni and Kurdish elements to “draw up a plan to control the activity of groups that are close to al-Qaeda…specifically Ansar al-Islam” (al-Hayat, May 5).
Reports, nevertheless, continue to suggest an Iran and Ansar al-Islam connection. One report states that Ansar al-Islam and other associated al-Qaeda groups have taken over abandoned garrisons of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, an Iranian dissident group that had been supported by Saddam Hussein against the Islamic Republic of Iran. These former garrisons lie only 25 kilometers from the Kurdish controlled areas. Two Ansar al-Islam leaders, Aso Kirkuki and Rahwan Sabir, are reportedly in charge of the fighters in this area. They are allegedly working with a previous Ansar al-Islam leader, Hiwa Kwer, who was arrested but later released as part of a prisoner exchange (Awene, April 10, 2007).
Ansar al-Islam has extended its operations outside of traditionally PUK controlled areas along the Iranian border into the heart of Kurdish territory in Irbil. According to PUK sources, an Ansar al-Islam squad appeared in the city of Taqtaq in Irbil before the attack on the Ministry of Interior on May 9. A shepherd spotted the strangers moving between the villages of Homar Gomt and Smaqah (PUKMedia, May 11). It is possible that Ansar al-Islam elements were responsible for the Kurdistan Brigades attack. According to Sulaymaniyah’s new security director, al-Qaeda appoints an amir to all of their areas of operation. The amir of Sulaymaniyah, Irbil and Dohuk is a man by the name of Swara who was first a member of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and then of Ansar al-Islam, like many of his counterparts (Awene, May 15). Ansar al-Islam has also conducted sophisticated attacks against KRG border guards. In April, they planted a roadside bomb and detonated it via remote control. Insurgents opened fire after the initial blast (Kurdsat TV, April 15). Kurdish authorities have become extremely concerned about insurgent infiltration along the Iranian border and have closed six checkpoints (Hawlati, April 27). Prior to the April attack, Ansar al-Islam forces ambushed a customs check point and a cell phone tower in the city of Bashmagh. The insurgents were wearing traditional Kurdish garb and attacked with light and heavy weapons (Awene, March 27).
Ansar al-Islam is using its bases along the borders to conduct attacks in the Iraqi province of Diyala as well. Diyala residents are fearful that the border area will turn into a “new Kandahar” (al-Mustaqbal, April 30). Ansar al-Islam and other al-Qaeda elements are setting up recruitment and training camps and are trying to impose a strict Sharia code in the province. Iraqi security services confirmed the reports of Diyala residents and said that there are Afghan, Arab and even Western foreign fighters present along the border area.
Although Ansar al-Islam is recently resurgent, they have been present in the Hamrin Mountains since 2004, when they were ousted from Kurdish controlled areas. Not only were they active around the city of Marivan, but also near the Iranian cities of Sanadaj, Dezli and Orumiyah, among others (Hawlati, July 15, 2004). Since the recent surge in Baghdad and the resistance from the Anbar Salvation Council in its traditional stronghold, however, al-Qaeda and its associates have shifted their operations elsewhere—namely in Diyala and in KRG territory (Terrorism Focus, June 5).
Contradictions Remain
It may seem counter-intuitive for Iran to associate with Kurdish Islamic extremists such as Ansar al-Islam and militant Salafi groups like al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is deeply opposed to Iranian involvement in Iraq, and Iran has had problems with its own Kurdish autonomy movements. Iran, furthermore, has traditionally supported the KDP and PUK, first against Saddam and afterwards when they set up their own administration under the No Fly Zone. Is Iran willing to jeopardize its relatively good relationship with Kurdish authorities by either actively supporting Ansar al-Islam or by failing to crack down on these elements operating along its border area?
It appears that Iran is primarily concerned with maintaining its influence over its neighbors, no matter how counter-intuitive the mechanisms. Destabilizing the Kurdish region would serve as a way for Iran to reassert its influence. The United States has replaced Iran as the Kurds’ primary benefactor. Dabbling with insurgent groups while also maintaining ties with Kurdish authorities is a complicated method of maintaining its influence. Iran has concerns over its own Kurdish population, which it hopes will not attempt to mimic the Iraqi Kurds’ successful autonomy framework. Iran’s foreign policy principle, especially with its Kurdish neighbors, can perhaps best be described as “one hand gives, while the other hand takes away.”
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AQIM’s Threat to Morocco’s Tourism Sector
By Matthew Chebatoris
As with most North African countries, Morocco’s tourism sector is vulnerable to fluctuations as a result of terrorism and political developments. Recent incidents such as the panicked detonation of a suicide bomber’s vest in an internet cafe in April and the subsequent, albeit possibly unrelated, occurrences involving individuals with suicide belts, including the detonations near the U.S. Consulate and cultural center in Casablanca, reinforce the unfortunate reality that, despite modest economic progress, the underlying root causes for terrorism in Morocco persist (MAP, April 12; MAP, April 14). The number of foreign tourists visiting the kingdom dipped after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and remained relatively stagnant through 2003. These numbers have been bolstered as of late, however, due to an increase in the number of Moroccans living abroad who regularly return home. In 2005, tourism comprised roughly 10% of the country’s GDP, with commerce and import duties, a related sector, making up the largest figure at 22.1% (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). Additionally, 2005 saw the implementation of the “Open Skies” agreement between Morocco and the European Union, which opened Morocco’s airline industry to competition from low-cost European carriers. The proliferation of Europe-based discount airlines such as Ryan Air and Easy Jet has made travel to Morocco increasingly cost effective for European holiday travelers. Furthermore, the search for new markets has pushed developing countries such as Morocco to the forefront of Western tourism markets and made them fashionable travel destinations.
The Effect on Tourism
Morocco’s close geographic proximity to Europe, abundance of sunshine and rich cultural heritage has made the kingdom an increasingly popular holiday destination for European travelers. This is particularly true among French citizens who share a common language and maintain historic ties to the Maghreb. In marked contrast to neighboring Algeria, Morocco’s tourism industry is thriving and is regularly cited as one of the hallmarks of the kingdom’s openness. In January 2001, King Mohammad VI of Morocco embarked on “Vision 2010,” a national plan to increase Morocco’s infrastructure to accommodate 10 million tourists by the end of the decade. As an indication of its commitment to this endeavor, the government recently allocated more than $2.2 billion toward the development of seaside resorts (MAP, May 11). The underlying goal of these development initiatives is to increase the percentage of the tourism sector’s contribution to the national GDP to 20% by 2010 (MAP, May 11). Understandably, terrorism ranks at the top of political risks to Morocco’s desire to attract foreign investment in order to fuel the country’s economic development. Even in the absence of attacks, the mere perception of the threat of terrorism can be enough to deter travelers, thus starving local merchants of income and, as a result, challenging the resilience of related sectors such as transportation and commerce.
While Western venues have been targeted in the past, attacks have not struck major hubs for the Moroccan tourism industry such as the seaside resort of Agadir or the cultural centers of Fez and Marrakech. In fact, Morocco’s tourism industry actually grew by 17% in 2003—the year of the Casablanca bombings [1]. Nor does travel to Morocco appear to be affected by the tenacity of the political violence in neighboring Algeria, as the sector has enjoyed sustainable growth during the first decade of the 21st century. Indeed, according to figures provided by the Moroccan Ministry of Tourism, the tourism sector continues to experience growth, posting a 16% increase in the number of visitors to the country in the first trimester of 2007 during the same period in 2006 (Moroccan Ministry of Tourism, 2007). Therefore, absent a sustained terror campaign or a catastrophe along the lines of the 1997 massacre of German tourists outside of Luxor by Gammat al-Islamiyya, the number of tourists visiting the kingdom will likely increase in the near future.
Mitigating the Threat
Physical security is the most effective deterrent employed to directly mitigate the risk of terrorism to both hard and soft targets, including venues frequented by tourists. Throughout popular tourist locations in Morocco, the security presence is visible but not overbearing. In order to reduce the threat of car bombings, most resort hotel complexes primarily catering to European visitors have constructed natural barriers such as large steps leading up to the hotel lobby or palm groves throughout the complex. Most are also encompassed by high walls and gate guards to provide an added level of comfort and security [2]. Moreover, in an effort to manage tourist concerns about the risks of using local transportation (i.e. kidnapping, overcharging and general vagaries of the local system), many hotels and riad (traditional Moroccan Bed and Breakfast) operators arrange taxis both to and from popular tourist sites, as well as direct couriers to the local airport. Importantly, terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists alike have not benefited from a level of grassroots support among the Moroccan populous [3].
While clamping down on Islamists, particularly those deemed to share affiliation with the Salafi-Jihad, Moroccan authorities are striving to strike a balance between the legitimate need for security and the more oppressive policies of the past. In this regard, it is essential for the Moroccan government to avoid coming across as too heavy-handed as it cracks down on domestic Islamist militants. Overly intensive efforts to eradicate the roots of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, if left unchecked, could lead to a return to the previous era of political persecution and human rights abuses in Morocco. A successful domestic security policy will recognize the nuances within Islamic thought and not apply a blanket approach to dealing with the kingdom’s opponents. Social inequalities, such as the income gap, are exceedingly stark in Morocco and are considered a symbol of the government’s neglect of its people. This was undoubtedly one of the motivating factors for the individuals who conducted the Casablanca bombings, and it is cited by at least one government opposition group as a factor in the incidents this spring (El-Khabar, April 11). Fatallah Arslane, a spokesperson for al-Adl wal-Ihsane (Justice and Charity)—a political party banned from participating in elections—cited the Moroccan government’s failure to adequately address the needs of its people as a contributor to the recent spate of suicide bombings in Casablanca (El-Khabar, April 11). Arslane stated that, “Overcoming the phenomenon of violence requires a comprehensive remedy which is not restricted to security measures. This remedy has to go beyond security measures to include lifting injustice and improving people’s economic, political and social conditions” (El-Khabar, April 11).
As a result of these inequalities, the need to address social issues like unemployment and the income gap is seen as a critical front in Morocco’s war on terrorism. Embarking on this path, Morocco has set out to mitigate the economic and social factors contributing to terrorism by undertaking a series of social welfare programs. For example, in October 2003, the government initiated an education campaign aimed at tackling the high illiteracy rate in the country. Conscious of the growing disparity between the rich and poor, the government recognizes that with increased education its citizens will become more able to gain employment and move out of the slums and their cycle of poverty.
Acting on the assumption that domestic issues contribute to acts of terrorism, Morocco submitted a proposal for a $150 million housing sector development loan to the World Bank in June 2005. Morocco hopes that a judicious implementation of the World Bank’s loan will contribute toward eradicating the bidonvilles successfully, viewed increasingly as simmering pots of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, and improve the overall living conditions for the poor by increasing the availability of low-cost urban housing. The loan, approved on June 31, 2005, will also result in an increase in construction and development, thus creating some forms of temporary employment.
Conclusion
The makeover of the tourism industry is but one part in the process of broader democratic and economic reform being undertaken by the kingdom in which the Moroccan government must tread carefully given the present atmosphere of increased popular resentment with the West and prescient concerns surrounding the intentions of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to export terror beyond Algeria. Success will largely hinge on how the government proceeds on the path of democratic reform. To date, the incidents in Casablanca, Morocco’s economic center, have not altered the flow of tourists to the country, and no cancellations of foreign tourist or business delegations have been noted (al-Hayat, April 27). Violent Salafism, nevertheless, remains a key ideological underpinning where al-Qaeda and related movements continue to draw additional followers by mobilizing Moroccan residents through a process in which local grievances are increasingly viewed through the prism of the Global Salafi-Jihad. The government’s continued success in disrupting terror plots, as well as the vigilance and bravery exhibited by ordinary Moroccans in the face of terrorism, i.e. the actions of the Casablanca internet cafe owner, indicates that the risk environment, for now, remains secure.
Notes
1. Dermot Davitt, “The War on Tourism,” Travel Retailer International, Dec 2004/Jan 2005, p. 8-9.
2. Observations by the author from November 2006 travel to Marrakesh, Ouarzazate and Zagora.
3. Ibid.
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The Role of Foreign Trainers in Southern Thailand’s Insurgency
By Zachary Abuza
The first five months of 2007 have seen a dramatic increase in both the lethality and brutality of the Thai insurgency, prompting numerous Thai military officials to suspect the growing presence of foreign trainers. The arrest of an Indonesian on May 19 further raised suspicions. Nevertheless, Thai political leaders, including former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, head of the National Reconciliation Commission Khun Anand Panyarachun and current Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, along with the diplomatic community, have all insisted that the insurgency is a purely domestic affair with no foreign linkages. This view is being challenged by a growing body of evidence that shows that Thai officials have begun to speak more openly about the influence of foreigners on the Thai insurgents.
After three years of insurgency that has left some 2,200 people dead, militants have dramatically increased the tempo of attacks in 2007. The insurgents are clearly buoyed by their own successes, as well as the lackluster performance of the Thai security services. Moreover, the attacks this year have been far more provocative in various ways. At the political level, there have been three attacks on the Thai royal family or their entourage. At a more local level, beheadings, machete attacks and desecration of corpses have become more frequent. There have been 10 beheadings in 2007, one-third of the total number. Nearly as many people have been killed by machete attacks or have been bludgeoned to death. In dozens of cases, the bodies have been set on fire, and in one instance a female victim was burnt alive.
Targeting has also been more brutal—women, children and monks, people who would never have been targeted in earlier iterations of the Thai insurgency, are now systematically gunned down. In a shocking case that occurred in mid-March and was reminiscent of the carnage of Algeria or Kashmir, a minivan was disabled by an IED and all 10 passengers, including three women and a girl, were shot execution style (Terrorism Focus, April 24). IEDs have also grown in size and complexity. It took insurgents almost two years to develop IEDs larger than five kilograms. This year has already witnessed 15 and 20 kilogram devices used several times a week, causing much higher casualty rates, especially among police and soldiers. Many of the devices are similar to the one found and defused on May 28: a 20 kilogram ammonium nitrate bomb constructed in a fire extinguisher, stuffed with bolts, nuts and pieces of rebar and hidden on the side of the road awaiting an army convoy (Bernama, May 28). The bomb was command detonated, but cell phone detonators are still currently used. Casio watches, which have been used routinely in Iraq, are now also regularly employed in southern Thailand.
There is a possibility that exogenous factors are at play. As a Thai army spokesman simplistically put it, videos of beheadings in the Middle East have been recovered in insurgent safe-houses and training camps. He reported, “You really need to know certain bones of the neck to behead someone, and Thais don’t really know how. You need someone to be trained overseas or foreign trainers to teach them how.” While beheadings were not commonplace in the sectarian bloodletting in the outer Islands of Indonesia in 1998-2001, numerous people were hacked to death with machetes, an ordeal that was captured on video by an al-Qaeda documentary filmmaker whose videos are readily available in Malaysia and Southern Thailand. Yet, Thai military intelligence officials interviewed by this author believe that there are Middle Eastern trainers involved in the insurgency, based on the fact that the IED technology has improved so rapidly. They tend to dismiss the notion that such technology was available through the internet.
While there is frequently a diplomatic salvo of allegations and responding denials from Bangkok to Kuala Lumpur alleging that militants are being trained in Malaysia, there is little evidence to prove that this is indeed the case. The militants enjoy logistical and rear-services support in Malaysia’s Kelantan Province, and Malaysian authorities have made several crucial arrests of Thai insurgents (Terrorism Monitor, March 15). It is probable that Indonesia holds the most responsibility for militant training activity.
Press reports constantly mention the insurgent group Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK). The RKK is not an independent group, but refers to members of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi (BRN-C) who have received small-arms training in Indonesia (Terrorism Monitor, September 8, 2006). Thai police previously identified an Indonesian known as Mudeh, who had worked with the BRN-C’s Sapaeing Basoe, the former principal of the Thammawithaya Foundation School (Bangkok Post, September 20, 2005). Thai police arrested Indonesian national Sabri Amiruddin (aka Zablee Hamaeruding) on June 16, 2006, following the four-day wave of bombings. He was arrested in Narathiwat province with 10 kilograms of urea fertilizer and three kilograms of nails and spikes in his possession (The Nation, June 19, 2006). It remains unclear whether Sabri Amiruddin is Mudeh, or whether he has connections with Jemaah Islamiya (JI) or Acehnese militants (he is a native of Sumatra). Thai authorities have never provided follow-up evidence. In May of this year, another Indonesian man, Sulaiman, and his Thai wife were arrested in Yala for firearms possession and drug trafficking (Bangkok Post, May 20). He was suspected of being a trainer for the militants, and was at least the sixth Indonesian arrested in southern Thailand. Another Indonesian arrested was an employee of the JI-linked charity, MERC, in November 2004.
The Thai government is increasingly examining the large community of Pattani students in Indonesia as both a base of support and pool of recruits for the insurgency. According to documents recovered by Thai security officials, Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) di Patani (PMIPTI), an association of Thai students in Indonesia, active on six campuses, has been active in fundraising and recruiting (Bangkok Post, April 7). Thai intelligence documents suggest that the PMIPTI is a BRN-C front organization. One of the top insurgent leaders, Jaekumae Kuteh, is believed to be in Indonesia. Originally arrested by Malaysia, he was sent to Indonesia despite Thai appeals for his extradition. It has been speculated that he is in Bandung, home of the largest concentration of Pattani students.
The Connection Between MILF and JI
Concern has grown regarding the connection between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and JI cells in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. From March to April 2006, Malaysian authorities arrested members of a 12-man logistical cell comprised of Indonesians, Malaysians and two Filipinos that were responsible for getting jihadis in and out of Mindanao where they were being trained in MILF camps. The two Filipinos told the Philippine National Police who were sent to question them that they were bringing militants to Pattani for training. An undated Thai intelligence report names a Pattani Muslim, Ruli (aka Ahmed), who had studied at IAIN in Jakarta before joining the MILF. He went to Afghanistan in 1998, and upon returning to Indonesia he engaged in the sectarian fighting in Ambon and the Malukus following the fall of Suharto. He is believed to be running training for Pattani militants in Indonesia. This corresponds with the increased small-arms training JI was conducting for itself in 2006.
Foreign trainers could also portend a shift in tactics to softer Western targets out of area. A small surveillance team was caught in Bangkok in November 2005, while a much larger group was arrested in Phuket in September 2006. “Although possible, attacking soft targets will not be employed as a new tactic since they are winning with their old tactics,” one security official told this author. For now, the major commercial center of the south, Hat Yai, will continue to be the main target outside of the three southernmost provinces. A series of six coordinated bombings, which killed the first and only Westerner, precipitated last September’s coup. In the evening of May 27, seven bombs detonated across downtown Hat Yai (Bangkok Post, May 28; Terrorism Focus, May 29).
In the consciousness of the ummah, the plight of the Thai Muslims remains an inconsequential item on the list of grievances. Jihadi websites and articles rarely mention the conflict, although it is by far the most lethal in Southeast Asia. The focus remains centered on Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States is leading the so-called Zionist-Crusader charge. After these countries, attention is turned to places of conflict involving U.S. surrogates, such as Israel. The U.S. presence or even support for the Thai government is, nevertheless, minimal, even when compared to the presence of a small number of U.S. forces in Mindanao.
There are, however, indications that this is changing. The veteran Middle East journalist Amir Taheri wrote in a March 2006 article in Asharq al-Awsat that “international jihadist circles” on the internet and across the Muslim world were discussing the possibility of waging a broader jihad in southern Thailand. He stated, “The buzz in Islamist circles is that well-funded jihadist organizations may be preparing a takeover bid for the southern Thailand insurgency.” There exists a potential for bleed-out from Iraq. As the Thai insurgency drags on (and it shows no signs of slowing), its profile will be raised in the consciousness of Muslims around the world, and it may attract more attention and funding.
Find this article at:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373451
Catalonia: Europe’s New Center of Global Jihad
By Kathryn Haahr
The strengthening of Islamist groups, combined with an increase in jihadi networks and activities in and around Barcelona, underscores Catalonia’s status as a European center for al-Qaeda-associated terrorism operations. Statements by al-Qaeda leaders that emphasize Spain’s unique “status” within the Global Salafi-Jihad, coupled with recently disclosed terrorism trends for Spain, reveal that the culture of global jihad has consolidated in Spain’s northern autonomous region. Once seemingly disparate Salafi Islamist groups and neophyte militant Muslim grassroots networks have coalesced into radicalized Islamist collectives throughout Catalonia to pose a national threat to Spain, as well as to Western interests in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.
Current Perspective of Islamist Activities in Catalonia
According to Spanish counter-terrorism officials, the Spanish Confederation of Police and various terrorism experts, Catalonia has become the “principle focus” of the development of jihadi terrorism in Spain and, more specifically, the largest jihadi recruitment center in Europe (La Vanguardia, June 3). “The study about the imprisoned terrorists in Spain—more than 300 since the end of the 1990s—shows that Catalonia is unquestionably the epicenter of jihadi activities in our country,” stated Fernando Reinares, the main researcher and director of the Global Terrorism Program of Elcano Royal Institute and the adviser for anti-terrorism policies in the Interior Ministry between 2004 and 2006. Reinares believes that the analysis about Muslim extremism shows Catalonia as the meeting point for jihadis, and he clarifies that if the study had been made on the basis of the number of detentions instead of imprisonments, the percentage would be even higher. According to officials and various studies, the majority of Islamist terrorists in Spain now regard Muslim communities throughout Catalonia as “safe-havens” for building their Islamist ideological support bases, logistical and terrorism financing and recruitment of suicide jihadis for the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as for potential targets in Spain and elsewhere in Europe.
According to the Catalonian Advisor of the Interior Joan Saura, the three cities of Badalona, Santa Coloma de Gramenet and Sant Adria de Besos form the “most important triangle of jihadi recruitment in Europe” (El Pais, May 30). Every month, approximately three to five Muslim residents of Catalonia travel to Iraq, Chechnya and Afghanistan for terrorism training (El Periodico de Catalunya, September 9, 2006). Spanish counter-terrorism officials observe that many recruits come out of Catalonia due to the strong influence of Salafi Islamism and the susceptibility of young, marginalized and predominantly foreign-born Moroccan men. Many of the jihadi recruiters are foreign-born, typically from France and Belgium, and they reportedly travel throughout Spain on recruitment missions. After Catalonia, the other recruitment mills for militant Islamists are in Madrid and the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla (Terrorism Monitor, May 4, 2006; Terrorism Monitor, February 15).
A March 31 news report from Informativos Telecinco recently filmed the apartment of a detained jihadi recruiter in the city of Reus, where police found tapes of Osama bin Laden as well as training videos. According to the security services, Moroccan Mbark El Jaafari had trained an estimated 32 jihadi suicide bombers. National Police sources noted that the new recruitment strategy that El Jaafari employed was to “Westernize” his young recruits in order to better integrate them into Catalonian society; he encouraged them to wear jeans and modern dress and to refrain from growing long beards. The next step was to remove them from their cultural and sociological context by sending the trainees to smaller towns (places where they were not recruited), where a “sponsor” would find them employment. Eventually, the “trainees” would travel to Iraq, Algeria or Afghanistan. The favored “trainees” are apparently those who serve in the Moroccan or Algerian military services.
Synopsis of Counter-Terrorism Operations in Catalonia
Since 2001, an estimated 31% of the imprisoned Islamist terrorists in Spain have been captured in Catalonia, and most are Moroccans. Catalonia is home to around 300,000 Muslims, of which 100,000 are Moroccan immigrants. Officials estimate that the real number of Maghrebi immigrants is likely more than one million. Major counter-terrorism operations have taken place almost every year since 2001. In Operacion Tigris right after the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, the national police detained around 20 Islamist terrorists in Catalonia, Madrid and other regions of Spain. As a result of information obtained in this operation, police in 2005 arrested five Islamists in Catalonia, all of whom were connected to the March 11 bombings. In 2006, the Guardia Civil detained two dozen North African Muslims, primarily in Vilanova I la Beltru, who had been working as part of a recruitment ring to send “kamikazes” to Iraq; one of these suicide bombers, Algerian Belgacem Bellil, killed 28 people by targeting the Italian base in Nasiriya in November 2003 (El Periodico de Catalunya, May 29).
In May of this year, Spanish counter-terrorism officials detained 15 Islamists—13 Moroccans and two Algerians—involved in recruiting jihadis for insurgencies in Iraq, North Africa and Afghanistan; 13 of them were detained in Catalonia alone. The raid was a result of two counter-terrorism operations in 2006—”Chacal” and “Camaleon” (EuropaPress.es, May 28; La Vanguardia, May 31). The Spanish government believes that these individuals formed part of al-Qaeda’s Maghreb branch in Spain. One of the 13 Catalonian Islamists, Taoufik Cheddadi, is the imam of the Santa Coloma de Gramenet y Mollet mosque. Judge Baltazar Garzon is in the process of determining if there is enough proof to incarcerate the 13 Catalans (La Vanguardia, May 31).
Salafi Islamist Groups and Networks in Catalonia
Since September 11 and the ongoing revelations emerging from terrorism trials in Madrid, Spanish security officials observe an increase in the number of cells and networks associated with al-Qaeda and other Salafi organizations, notably: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM; formerly known as the GSPC), GICM, Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami al-Magrebi (Party of Islamic Liberation of Morocco, HUT), Takfir wal-Hijra, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), al-Adl wal-Ihsane (Justice and Charity), and the Jama’at al-Da’wa wal-Tabligh (La Vanguardia, January 29; La Vanguardia, May 31; La Vanguardia, June 3; El Pais, November 3, 2006; El Periodico, June 3; El Mundo, June 22, 2006). State security officials are particularly concerned with two Moroccan Islamist groups, which in the last year have been preaching radicalized messages in their sermons: al-Adl wal-Ihsane and HUT. Both groups have been detected in dozens of mosques and oratory sites, and officials worry that their sermons will have an impact in radicalizing young Muslims. HUT proves to be a useful case study of a group that denounces radicalization but in practice proselytizes subversion—many of their statements are anti-government. HUT came to the attention of security agents in 2003 in the town of Salt, when they discovered a concentration of jihadis who espoused al-Qaeda’s ideology. According to Moroccan specialist Abdala Rami, HUT divides its international territories into wilayas (provinces), of which Spain pertains to the European province [1].
Catalonian Jihadi Models
The predominant Catalonian “jihadi model” follows a similar pattern to that observed in Madrid, Valencia and Andalusia (La Vanguardia, June 3). According to this jihadi model, radical Sunni terrorist groups (such as al-Qaeda and AQIM) establish regional operational cells and networks for the purpose of recruiting jihadis and to support other terrorism activities, such as organizing criminal activities in support of terrorism financing. These Islamists tend to be predominately foreign-born, from North Africa or other parts of Europe, and undertake specific terrorism missions, such as the establishment of jihadi recruitment rings. These groups recruit recent immigrants to Spain. Spanish police sources believe that jihadis recruited in Catalonia are training in al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Mali, Mauritania and Niger. According to a senior official of the Guardia Civil, al-Qaeda’s new base in the Sahel represents a threat to Spanish interests (El Pais, February 11).
An emerging characteristic of the jihadi model is that of informal, Salafi-inspired groups that are not formally linked to any one terrorist organization. Rather, these individuals tend to organize themselves around a commonly shared ideology of global jihad, one in which the religion of Islam is molded to serve their violent objectives. At times, small groups of “independently” inspired radical Muslims appear in villages and towns throughout Spain, especially in agricultural areas, to troll for recruits. Spanish terrorism expert Dr. Javier Jordan calls this phenomenon “grassroots jihadist networks,” which are groups that are not formally linked to al-Qaeda but share its ideology. These individuals tend not to come from overseas, but operate exclusively within Spain; some are converts, hence the concern about home-grown terrorists. These groups recruit young Muslims into jihad after they have settled in Spain, as opposed to relying on foreign jihadis (El Periodico, September 9, 2006) [2].
The presence of a multitude of Maghrebi Islamist groups operating in Catalonia demonstrates the appeal that the Salafi agenda has with the North African immigrant community, especially with Moroccans. While these distinct terrorist groups and Islamist political parties are not formally associated with one another, they all share al-Qaeda’s message of global jihad and preach the five commandments in mosques and other prayer sites. Groups such as AQIM ask their believers to not only sacrifice their lives for the jihad, but to proselytize; security officials worry that these Salafi messages are already radicalizing Muslims in Catalonia, as well as in other regions of Spain. AQIM, for example, recently urged the Moroccan government to clean the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla of impurities (this follows Ayman al-Zawahiri’s December 2006 proclamation that al-Qaeda should liberate them) (El Pais, May 21; El Pais, July 27, 2006). This type of rhetoric certainly appeals to Muslims all over Spain to coalesce and become one active body of jihadis striving to fight infidels.
Trends
Catalonia is emblematic of other regions of Spain, notably the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Alicante and Castille, wherein grassroots jihadi communities (as in a systems-of-systems model) exist, operate and become stronger. AQIM’s new name and mission of international jihad will appeal to an increased number of Muslims (foreign and Spanish citizens) in grassroots communities desiring a vehicle through which to legitimize their political, religious and social grievances. The appeal of Islamist ideologies (espoused by various political parties and other Islamist entities) has the potential to marginalize in a significant way the already existing divergences between multi-ethnic and moderate Muslims who have lived in the Catalonia territory for decades and the militant Islamists now increasing their religious and social footprint in the region. A study by Islamic specialist Jordi Moreras on the Catalan town Ciutat Vella in 1999 documents the re-orientation of the main mosque and various sites of prayer to Pakistani influences (such as imams of Pakistani origin). What is noteworthy about this study is that the congregations tend to be fundamentally Maghrebi. Counter-terrorism experts should consider exploring the ethno-cultural dynamics and their subtle overt and non-overt manifestation as a way of mapping the developments in Catalonian Islam.
Terrorism experts concur that Barcelona is a possible target for terrorist groups. Based on a study of recent al-Qaeda threats and attacks perpetrated by jihadis, the country’s high-speed train (AVE), the national high court in Madrid and many tall, singular buildings in Barcelona are probable targets. Several Interpol reports also mention this possibility (La Vanguardia, May 9). The absence of threat information from terrorists complicates counter-terrorism efforts. According to Spanish police sources, the difficulty in recruiting moles to penetrate Islamist cells makes it extremely difficult to conduct surveillance and implement other counter-terrorism measures. Sources note that one of the main problems is the scarcity of speakers of key Islamist languages—Arabic, Berber and Urdi. Another factor is the lack of a deep understanding of the cultural variables that characterize distinct ethnic Muslim communities. Without collaboration from the Muslim community, security agents will remain challenged in not only preventing terrorist operations from occurring, but in engaging in predictive intelligence operations such as identifying the members of terrorist groups and their networks.
Notes
1. HUT is principally active in Barcelona and its surroundings Its leaders tend to be Libyan and its militants Moroccan. For an in-depth assessment of HUT, please refer to, “Movimientos Musulmanes y Prevencion del Yihadismo en Espana Hizb ut-Tahrir,” Javier Jordan and Sol Tarres, Jihad Monitor Occasional Paper No 9, April 21, 2007.
2. Fernando Reinares and Javier Jordan have conducted extensive sociological work on studying the profiles of Spanish jihadis.
Find this article at:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373450
THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Special Dispatch Series - No. 1631
http://www.memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD163107
June 22, 2007
No.1631
Palestinian MP From Hamas Dr. Yunis Al-Astal on Women’s Participation
in
Jihad - From Islam’s Beginnings To Modern Female Suicide Bombers
The following are excerpts from an interview with Dr. Yunis Al-Astal, a
Palestinian MP representing Hamas, which aired on Al-Rafidein TV on
June 17,
2007.
TO VIEW THIS CLIP VISIT: http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1491
http://www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1491
“When Jihad Becomes an Individual Duty, It Applies to Women Too”
Yunis Al-Astal: “The most exalted form of jihad is fighting for the
sake of
Allah, which means sacrificing one’s soul by fighting the enemies
head-on,
even if it leads to martyrdom. Martyrdom means life next to Allah.”
[...]
“When jihad becomes an individual duty, it applies to women too,
because
women do not differ from men when it comes to individual duties.”
[...]
Interviewer: “What are the purposes behind women’s participation in the
jihad of conquest and invasions?”
Yunis Al-Astal: “I have mentioned some of these purposes. [Women]
prepare
food, they bring water, they tend to the wounded and convey them from
the
battlefield, they protect the [soldiers’] possessions, and so on. But
in
many cases, women participated in combat, especially if the Islamic
army was
weakening, and you could see that the enemy was about to gain the upper
hand. In such cases, a woman would draw out her sword, or pull out a
pole
from her tent, and would resist to the best of her ability.”
[...]
“Let’s take another example. Safiyya, the aunt of the Prophet Muhammad,
used
a pole to kill a Jew in the Battle of the Trench. Likewise, in the
Battle of
Hunayn, Umm Sulaym had a dagger, and when asked about it, she said: ‘If
an
enemy of Allah comes near me, I shall stab him with this dagger.’
History
has recorded, in shining letters, the fact that Al-Khansaa sacrificed
her
four children at the battle of Al-Qadisiyya. She inflamed their
emotions and
she herself incited them to fight until they attained their martyrdom,
and
then she thanked Allah for honoring her with the killing of them all.”
[...]
Umm Ibrahim “Praised Allah for Accepting Her Sacrifice - Her Only Son”
“I would like to tell you a wonderful story which took place in later
times.
There was a woman called Umm Ibrahim Al-Hashimiya, and Ibrahim was her
only
child. She prepared 10,000 dinars, to hold him a wedding the likes of
which
had never been seen. All the girls of the neighborhood were hoping to
become
his wife. One day, she attended a sermon about jihad, the virtues of
the
mujahideen, and about the black-eyed virgins of Paradise. She
immediately
decided that her son would marry the black-eyed virgins. She went to
the
preacher and paid him the 10,000 dinars, on the condition that her son
would
marry the black-eyed virgins, about whom she heard things that
encouraged
her to act the way she did.
“Her son did indeed wage jihad for the sake of Allah, and she awaited
news
of his martyrdom with bated breath. When the army returned, she
hastened to
ask: ‘Should I be congratulated because my gift was accepted, or should
I be
offered condolences because it was returned?’ The army commander said
to
her: ‘The gift was accepted, and the bride has been brought to the
groom.’
She praised Allah for accepting her sacrifice - her only son, who was
about
to be married. She believed that his wedding was his martyrdom for the
sake
of Allah.”
[...]
“In the second Al-Aqsa Intifada, females martyrdom-seekers emerged.
These
are young women, in the prime of their life, at a time when girls like
these
think only about jewelry and preparing for marriage. Nevertheless, they
went
to their martyrdom, advancing head-on with a great fighting spirit.
This
Intifada of ours has recorded more than 15 exemplary cases of girls who
were
martyred for the sake of Allah. But not before making the Jews - the
brothers of apes and pigs - taste the bitterness of death, and not
before
avenging the blood of the martyrs, the wounded, the bereaved, the
prisoners,
the displaced, those whose homes were destroyed, those whose lands were
bulldozed, and all those who were affected by the earthquake of the
sons of
Zion.”
The Female Martyrdom-Seekers’ Message to the Enemies is to Go Back
Whence
They Came - “Or Else our Jihad will Continue Until this Land Regains
its
Holiness”
Interviewer: “Dr. Al-Astal, we have seen that some of the female
martyrdom-seekers set out on their martyrdom operation without a veil.
To
what extent does our religion allow women, when they embark upon jihad
for
the sake of Allah, to use means of camouflage such as removing the
veil?”
Yunis Al-Astal: “When jihad becomes an individual duty, the husband’s
permission or consent is not required, because jihad becomes like
prayer.
Just like a woman does not have to ask for permission to pray, to fast
during Ramadhan, or to give charity, she does not need to ask for
permission
when jihad becomes an individual duty. In my opinion, in places invaded
by
the enemy, jihad becomes an individual duty.
“With regard to your question about the veil, especially when it comes
to
martyrdom-seekers who had to go into the Zionist cities deep in
Palestine -
jihad is a duty, and so is wearing a veil, but the duty of jihad is ten
times great than the duty of wearing a veil.”
[...]
“The most important message is that our enemies should know that there
is no
place for them on the land of Palestine. Each and every boy and man,
and
each and every girl and woman, is a potential martyrdom-seeker. The
enemy
should know that we are prepared to wear explosive belts, and to throw
ourselves in the midst of the enemy, in order to make them taste the
evil
consequences of their deeds. They should know that they have no other
choice
- either they leave or they will die, even if it takes a long time.”
[...]
“The message of the female martyrdom-seekers to the enemies is that
they
should go back to where they came from, or else our jihad will continue
until this land regains its holiness - from the [Mediterranean] Sea to
the
[Jordan] River.”
[...]
“The women of Islam, especially in regions of tension - and I emphasize
Iraq
and Afghanistan, where the Americans run rampant... If we are capable -
and,
Allah willing we are indeed capable - of shattering America’s might and
rubbing its nose in the dirt, we will deliver the world from this
global
American bully, from the European Crusader hypocrisy, and the hateful
paganism worldwide. What is required of the men and women of these
peoples -
but especially the women - is that they take [an example] from Rim
Al-Riyashi, from Fatima Al-Najjar, and from the long list of women, and
especially from Umm Nidhal, the mother of Muhammad Farhat, who
sacrificed
three children as martyrs, and who threatens the enemy that her
remaining
children will become martyrdom-seekers, and will make the Jews taste
the
evil consequences of their deeds.”
Below are recent excerpts from the IRIS Blog. For the
full stories and links to other articles as well please
visit:
http://www.iris.org.il/blog.html
http://www.iris.org.il/blog.html
* ‘How Ironic Israel is Rescuing
us from our Muslim Brothers’ *
Most of the stories of Hamas brutality are not reported
by cowed Gaza journalists, but the ones who make it to
Israel do get to speak freely:
In Israel, Palestinians Tell of Hamas Butchery
Fatan al-Hinawi, 9, was hospitalized in the children’s
ward of Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv after being
wounded in Gaza. A bullet punctured her side, hit her
spine, bowels, a kidney and came out the other side,
hitting her arm.
Al-Hinawi is one of five Palestinians, three of them
children, who were caught in Hamas-Fatah cross fire and
taken to Ichilov. Some are in serious condition.
Shadi, a 23-year-old policemen, is one of them. He was
attacked by Hamas gunmen a week ago. “There were five
of them. They stood over me and shot my legs from the
knee down. One of them put his Kalashnikov to my head.
Instinctively I moved the barrel aside and the bullet
hit my hand,” Shadi told Haaretz yesterday. He arrived
at Ichilov with one leg amputated and the other leg
crushed.
Later yesterday, Zecharia Alrai, 39, an officer in
Fatah’s elite Force 17 commando unit, arrived. He had
been abducted by four Hamas gunmen a week ago. They
loaded him into a jeep and drove him to an isolated
spot, where they shot three bullets into his leg and
dumped him.
“That’s not Islam. That’s evil and hypocrisy. How
ironic that Israel is rescuing us from our Muslim
‘brothers,’” he said.
* Fatah-Hamas War was a Fraud *
No mainstream news source has reported the clear truth
about the Fatah-Hamas ‘war’—there wasn’t any. Fatah
never fought.
Whether the cause was conspiracy or not, two facts are
certain:
1) The enormous resources provided to Fatah to fight
Hamas in Gaza were essentially unused and are now in
the hands of Hamas to attack Israel.
2) Enormous resources are now being provided to Fatah
to fight Hamas in the West Bank.
It has been common knowledge that journalists in
Palestinian areas do not report on stories that gunmen
do not want to publicize, either because of
intimidation or ideological affinity. However, one
brave blogger wrote up his interviews with Fatah gunmen
who were given orders not to fight:
Fatah never fought. Gaza was essentially handed over to
Hamas. Soldier after soldier said they felt betrayed
and abandoned by their leadership. There was a
seemingly willful lack of decision making by the senior
most political leadership. Up and down the Gaza Strip
from the first moments of fighting, the military
leadership disintegrated while the political leadership
remained eerily silent.
Ousted Fatah loyalists in Gaza widely suspect a
political decision was made early on in Ramallah to
surrender the Gaza Strip to Hamas in order to extricate
Abbas, Israel and the US from the seeming intractable
pickle they were facing as infighting spiraled, living
conditions worsened, and the peace process seemed
hopelessly stuck. With the Palestinian territories now
split, the US, Israel and Abbas suddenly have way
forward, without compromising to Hamas.
There are of course a dozen reasons why Fatah was so
ineffective. Fatah was unpopular and the vast majority
of the security forces were not really Fatah loyalists.
They were merely after a steady salary, not some
messianic belief in Fatah or the rightness of the
Palestinian Authority. They were doing it because it
was their job and they hadn’t been paid more than a
fraction of their salaries in 18 months. Fatah was also
divided into disparate bickering factions.
All that being said, the total surrender of the
security forces is striking.
For many first-hand accounts of the fighting, or
lack thereof, visit our blog at
http://www.iris.org.il/blog.html
http://www.iris.org.il/blog.html
The IRIS Staff
Information Regarding Israel’s Security (IRIS)
http://www.iris.org.il
Oil dependency is fueling Islamic terrorism: ex-CIA head
By JANICE ARNOLD
Staff Reporter
http://www.cjnews.com/viewarticle.asp?id=12061
Every time an American fills up his gas tank, he is helping to send an
eight-year-old boy to an Islamic religious school in the West Bank or
Pakistan where he will learn to grow up to be a suicide bomber, said
former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey.
Woolsey’s message at a recent fundraiser for the Canadian Institute for
Jewish Research, was that reducing dependency on oil imported from Arab
dictatorships may, in the long run, be the only effective means of
stemming Islamic totalitarianism and radicalism.
Woolsey, who headed the CIA from 1993-95 during the Clinton
administration, is co-chair of the Washington-based Committee on the Present
Danger, along with George Schultz, former president Ronald Reagan’s
secretary of state.
The committee seeks to fight global terrorism and spread democracy.
He warned that the war on Islamic terrorism will be a very long one,
probably lasting decades, because it is rooted in a centuries-old
religion that is not going to be abandoned like the secular totalitarian
movements of the 20th century, fascism and communism.
There is also little difference in the ultimate aim of the extremist
elements in Islam’s two main branches, Shi’a and Sunni, to defeat the
West and establish religious domination.
But he characterized the Saudi Arabia-based Wahabi movement, which is
closely linked ideologically to Al Qaida, as “one of the most fanatical
in world history. Its fatwas call for the genocide of Shiites, Jews,
homosexuals and apostates.”
And its reach is staggering. “With just over one per cent of the
Muslims in the world, Saudi Arabia dominates 90 per cent of the Muslim
institutions in the world,” he said.
The United States is paying Saudi Arabia $170-$180 billion a year for
oil, he noted.
The radicals are empowered by their massive oil wealth, he argued.
Two-thirds of the world’s known oil reserves are in the Middle East.
“The price of oil and the path to freedom move in opposite directions.
With two or three exceptions, the countries with the largest oil
reserves tend to be the most autocratic, while those that are consuming and
importing the most oil are democratic,” he said.
Woolsey warned against “lapsing into moral relativism” by accepting
fundamentalist Islamic practices that are contrary to Western values,
especially those that degrade women.
“Sharia (Islamic religious law) is the camel’s nose under the tent that
we need to oppose with every fibre in our being,” he said.
Woolsey said the West has to do more than simply defend itself against
the terrorists.
He urged development as soon as possible of oil alternatives, such as
electricity and other liquid fuels, for vehicles.
Women’s and human rights organizations also have to put the “absolutely
horrible treatment of women in much of the Arab and Muslim world front
and centre of their agendas,” he said.
“The West has been uncomfortable about confronting Muslims on this, or
has dismissed it as quaint customs...We need to make the abominable
treatment of women central in our public discourse.”
The totalitarian streak of Islam begins in the home with younger
brothers supervising their older sisters and may escalate into honour
killings, he said.
The inverse relationship between oil wealth and moderation is clear, he
argued. “Which Arab country’s oil is running out most quickly?
Bahrain’s. Which Arab country treats women the best and is making the most
progress toward democracy? Bahrain.”
As for dealing with radical Muslims living in the United States,
Woolsey suggested they be treated in a similar way as Communists were during
the Cold War.
Americans, he said, are reluctant to interfere with anything of a
religious nature, and there is a lot of difficulty in sorting out who is a
threat, he said.
Woolsey would classify any Muslim who seeks to establish religious
dictatorship as the enemy, in much the same way good socialists and bad
socialists were distinguished in the 1950s.
The U.S constitution prevented the outlawing of the American Communist
party, but “we caused it enough trouble that it stopped being a force,”
he said.
Woolsey spent over 30 years in Washington serving both Democratic and
Republican administrations in the areas of security and foreign policy,
including as a member of the National Commission on Terrorism,
ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and as
undersecretary of the navy. He is currently vice-president of the global
strategic security division of consultants Booz, Allen & Hamilton.
Administration Weighs Reaching Out to Muslim Brotherhood (back)
June 20, 2007
The Bush administration is quietly weighing the prospect of reaching out to the party that founded modern political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Still in its early stages and below the radar, the current American deliberations and diplomacy with the organization, known in Arabic as Ikhwan, take on new significance in light of Hamas’s successful coup in Gaza last week. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is widely reported to have helped create Hamas in 1982.
Today the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research will host a meeting with other representatives of the intelligence community to discuss opening more formal channels to the brothers. Earlier this year, the National Intelligence Council received a paper it had commissioned on the history of the Muslim Brotherhood by a scholar at the Nixon Center , Robert Leiken, who is invited to the State Department meeting today to present the case for engagement. On April 7, congressional leaders such as Rep. Steny Hoyer of Maryland , the Democratic whip, attended a reception where some representatives of the brothers were present. The reception was hosted at the residence in Cairo of the American ambassador to Egypt , Francis Ricciardone, a decision that indicates a change in policy.
The National Security Council and State Department already meet indirectly with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood through discussions with a new Syrian opposition group created in 2006 known as the National Salvation Front. Meanwhile, Iraq ‘s vice president, Tariq al-Hashemi, is a leader of Iraq ‘s chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood. His party, known as the Iraqi Islamic Party, has played a role in the Iraqi government since it was invited to join the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003.
These developments, in light of Hamas’s control of Gaza , suggest that President Bush — who has been careful to distinguish the war on terror from a war on Islam — has done more than any of his predecessors to accept the movement fighting for the merger of mosque and state in the Middle East .
Should Mr. Bush ask his diplomats to forge new channels to the Muslim Brotherhood it would also be a recognition of the gains their parties have made in elections in the last three years. In Egypt , Iraq , and the Palestinian territories, Islamist parties trounced their secular rivals. In part this was because these parties offered an uncorrupt alternative to the more secular parties in power, but some advocates inside the administration also say it reflects a tangible momentum for parties that seek to create Islamic republics. One State Department official yesterday said, ‘Our policy has to change from more democracy, fewer headscarves.’
Nonetheless, administration officials this week also stressed that no decisions have been made as to a new initiative. One leading European Islamist, Tariq Ramadan, who is the grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, is being denied a visa to assume a professorship he has been offered at Notre Dame University . The policy debate inside the administration is also contentious, with law enforcement agencies such as the FBI skeptical that the Muslim Brotherhood is not clandestinely more involved in supporting violent jihad than the organization’s emissaries let on.
A State Department spokesman for the Bureau of Near East Affairs, David Foley, confirmed the meeting Wednesday to discuss a new approach to the Muslim Brotherhood. ‘We do these seminars, they help inform the policy making process. I am not suggesting someone would decide on a new policy on the Muslim Brotherhood as a result of this,’ he said. ‘This is the kind of consultations we often do. When there are alternative views, let’s hear both sides. We are certainly willing to listen to voices from the outside.’
Making the case today for outreach is Mr. Leiken, who co-authored with Steve Brooke a paper for the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs titled, ‘The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.’ That paper argues that Ikhwan has drawn contempt from violent Islamists such as Al Qaeda for its general disavowal of armed struggle. Tracing its history to its founding, the paper says the group today, particularly in Egypt , is genuine in its desire to participate in democratic politics.
Mr. Leiken said yesterday that there are two reasons why America should begin to rethink its prohibition of meeting with the brothers. ‘A new policy begins to combat some of our isolation in the Muslim world. I see the Muslim brotherhood, particularly in Egypt , as having what the communists used to call a two-line struggle, between moderate and dogmatic factions. Our outreach would help the moderates. That would strengthen those forces who are most willing to recognize the fact of Israel ‘s existence and more democratic.’
Mr. Leiken is a Harvard graduate and longtime expert on Latin America who broke with the hard left in the 1980s to oppose the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and who became associated with Social Democrats such as Penn Kemble and Joshua Muravchick. He said he thinks diplomacy with Ikhwan could help us help them to moderate Hamas. ‘It is conceivable that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, aware Gaza could serve as an index, will try use its influence to get Hamas to be constructive,’ he said. The Egyptian government has used the Muslim Brothers for at least 10 years as a back channel to Hamas.
Mr. Leiken’s Foreign Affairs paper and classified study for the National Intelligence Council has gotten the attention of senior National Security Council officials and Secretary of State Rice, according to two administration officials.
‘The NIC asked me to provide an analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and I was happy to oblige,’ Mr. Leiken said.
Arguing against a new policy on the brothers today will be a Hudson Institute expert on Islam, Hillel Fradkin. Mr. Fradkin declined to comment on his presentation ahead of the meeting. A colleague of his at the institute who has also taken a skeptical view of the brothers, Zeyno Baran, did say she was worried about a new direction by the Bush administration.
‘The thinking is that to deal with terrorism, we need to deal with Muslims who will take care of their communities so there will not be people here and there doing terrorism,’ she said. ‘So we treat the brotherhood like an umbrella organization, like the Council on American Islamic Relations or the Islamic Society of North America. You make them partners. They might Islamize the Muslims, but it’s okay because they can think or do what they want as long as they are not violent. That is the misunderstanding and mistake.’
The issue of the Muslim Brotherhood has also come up in the presidential contest for 2008. At the May 3 debate of Republican contenders for the presidential nomination, a former Massachusetts governor, Mitt Romney, included the Muslim Brotherhood as a component of the ‘worldwide jihadist threat.’
‘This is about Shia and Sunni. This is about Hezbollah and Hamas and Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. This is the worldwide jihadist effort to try and cause the collapse of all moderate Islamic governments and replace them with a caliphate,’ he said in response to a question about what he would do to capture Osama bin Laden.
One of the more contentious issues with the Muslim Brotherhood is whether the group was connected to the 1981 assassination of an Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat. This reporter was told by leaders of the group last year that the ex-president’s killers were from a breakaway faction known as the Islamic Group and that his murder was not condoned by Ikhwan. Sadat softened the government policy against the brothers in the early 1970s, allowing them to organize in universities, a decision many of the Brotherhood leaders in Cairo credit with laying the foundation for their gains in the 2005 parliamentary elections.
Source: http://www.nysun.com/article/56899
Enemies of Islam Unhappy with Growing Iran-Saudi Ties (back)
June 19, 2007
Iran ‘s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Mohammad Hosseini said on Tuesday that enemies of Islam are not happy with growing trend of bilateral ties between the two countries.
Hosseini was speaking in a meeting with Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz as he pointed to conspiracies hatched by enemies.
‘There are hands at work to inculcate wrong and incorrect news to distress minds of regional states about the Islamic Republic of Iran.
‘Unfortunately, certain countries accept and spread such news.
We should act wisely vis-a-vis such plots,’ he said.
He added Iran and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed growing ties during recent months, saying, ‘The two countries have enormous cultural and historical potentials and commonalties which can lead to establishment of tranquility and strengthening of the Islamic world.’
Hosseini stated that a recent visit by the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Riyadh opened a new chapter in mutual relations, stressing, ‘Continued Iran-Saudi ties will be in the best interest of the Islamic world.’
The envoy pointed to misbehavior of a minor group in Saudi Arabia towards Iranian pilgrims and called on Saudi officials to take a severe action against such moves.
He also called on the Saudi interior minister to prevent publication of books which insult Shiism.
The Saudi minister, for his part, highlighted the significance of bolstering bilateral ties and said expansion of relations with Iran is among priorities of his country’s foreign policy.
Prince Abdul-Aziz said he, himself, would pursue the case f inappropriate behavior towards Iranian pilgrims.
He promised to firmly react to those who had a bad behavior towards Iranian pilgrims, saying such an attitude would undoubtedly damage dignity of the Saudi government.
As Riyadh proved last year, respect for pilgrims and an all-out cooperation with them are among its principles, he said.
Source: http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0706199321152214.htm
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