You obviously feel better informed than I.
Have both scenarios equally accounted for the 5000 feet you refer to?
Did folks on the ground have limited visability? I do not recall that they expressed that.
I just have a very uncomfortable “gut” feeling about accepting a theory that did not call for immediate repairs on the entire fleet. Was it not about 2 years and normal maintenance schedules that it was to be addressed? Can’t make peace with that. How many more crashes could have been averted? Were there any from this cause?
I have read lots of explanations in the past...none that I can quote today. I am just uneasy about this.
Shall we agree to wait and see? Is the Kansas City bombing probe to be re-opened too? WACO? It never ends.
Google makes it much easier to get uptodated now than it used to be.
"Have both scenarios equally accounted for the 5000 feet you refer to?"
It's actually more than the 5000 feet estimated by Faret & Wendell. Subtract the center of the 7700 foot cloud of smoke left by the huge fireball explosion from the 13,800 feet the 747 was flying at when the initial event started tearing it apart. Incidentallay, here is Faret & Wendell's own webpage: http://208.65.234.212/flight_800.shtml
"Did folks on the ground have limited visability? I do not recall that they expressed that."
No. The first thing unusual seen in the sky by anyone was the fiery streak. Scan as many witness reports as you wish and you'll see that the streak was very shortlived, most estimates ranging from 1 to 5 seconds, before reaching the place where the huge fireball exploded.
"I just have a very uncomfortable “gut” feeling about accepting a theory that did not call for immediate repairs on the entire fleet. Excerpt from http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2006/060629.htm "Equally important," Rosenker said, "is the prospect of substantially reducing fuel tank flammability exposure - something that was seen as impractical ten years ago but is now feasible, even in this difficult era when airline operators need to be extremely conscious of costs." But while applauding the FAA and industry for the progress that has been made, Rosenker cautioned that the process is moving much too slowly. "Ten years after the TWA accident, fuel tank inerting systems are not in place on our airliners, and flammability exposure is largely unchanged. And proposed rule changes do not include the majority of fuel tanks which are in the wings of transport airplanes, nor this country's large fleet of cargo aircraft." Consequently, he added, reduction in fuel tank flammability remains on the NTSB's Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements.
The most prominent issues raised by the TWA 800 accident concern protection against flammable fuel tank vapors and aging electrical systems. Rosenker noted that fleet-wide inspections and analytical reviews of fuel tank design have resulted in significant measures that have the potential to reduce the likelihood of an ignition event inside a tank, and that fuel pumps, fuel quantity indicating systems, in-tank wiring, co-routed wiring, and operational procedures have been modified to make fuel systems safer.