this op ed is a good read
They won the war in the American media.
That is the real lesson of Vietnam, and it is a lesson the American people have failed to learn: the press is the enemy.
the press is not the Ameerican people's friend - it is America's sworn enemy.
In the end, many of people died to fuel the cause of the communists. Will that happen in Iraq, or the middle east? The answer is unknown at this point, but the left loves communist, hell they love themselves, they leave lip smears on their mirrors at home, and in the workplace.
Insurgencies often just screw things up for everyone, forever evidently. Look at Colombia. A beautiful country with immense natural resources..150 years+ of insurgencies.
In theory, the headline is true. In actual practice, the leftists will (and do) work too hard to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, thereby belying the premise in the headline.
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to America, 1969! Everything old is new again. The Democrats are successfully resurrecting their "glorious" yesteryear. IOW, they are back in their comfort zone, the past.
The op-ed is a good read, yes, but I'm afraid the gentleman paints entirely too rosey a picture.
The insurgencies which fail, which he claims are more numerous, are against entrenched (not just "stable") native power structures.
As far as my memory serves, the _only_ time a foreign power has been able to put down a local insurgency since WWII was the British during the Malayan Emergency. As the author points out, the key to achieving that was cutting off the rebels' supply lines. Also key (but unmentioned) was their success in cutting off and alienating local support for the guerrillas.
It's an open question whether it is feasible to cut off the Iraqi insurgents' supplies when they're sitting smack dab in the middle of the oldest smuggling route known to man in a neighborhood filled with our enemies. My gut feeling is it's dubious, at best.
On the more important (and unaddressed in this article) question of alienating the insurgents from local support, it does not look good. Every poll seems to indicate that a large number, in some cases a majority, of Iraqis believe attacks on the "occupiers" (that would be us) are entirely justified.
The President has many powerful tools in the propaganda war, but unless he is willing to use them they are worthless. Too many times he has tried to move the discussion on to something else when he should have been countering the steady stream of defeatist propaganda meant to scuttle the war effort. According to these estimates, we need to remain in Iraq until 2011-2014 in order to win. The President should have made the effort to prepare the people for a long hard slog. Instead he seriously misjudged the public mood, now his job is considerably harder.
Here are two letters to the editor I sent on the subject last week. Have not seen them in any papers I sent to yet.
Supporting Iraqis committed to national leadership requires recognizing al Qaeda terrorists and Baathist remnants cannot win, but Coalition partners and Iraq can loose. Rival death squads attack only unarmed civilians. Al-Sadrs militia crumples in military operations. Al-Muhajir, al Qaedas leader in Iraq, boasts 22,000 followers, but conducts only terrorist operations, and those within limited areas. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap would reject such pathetic allies, when compared to the VC main force units, which ARVN forces still obliterated in the militarily ill-timed Tet offensive. Loss for Iraq and the Coalition occurs through inconsistent application of classic counter-insurgency measures.
The President describing future actions referred to accrediting people and tactics for that winning strategy. Providing security precedes hearts and minds initiatives, because without that priority people align themselves to whichever violent faction accepts them each day. Selected areas are saturated with Coalition forces, and Iraqi forces imbedded with Coalition advisors. Once neighborhoods are cleared of terrorists and insurgents, military units remain, political/sectarian influence is not tolerated, and police, civil units and sheiks assume authority as they demonstrate commitment to national objectives.
Prime Minister Maliki may now understand viable national government requires harsh emergency rules impartially, and transparently administered. Informal alliances with parties such al-Sadr applies to traditional authoritarian oriental rule, and not representative government.
People will choose national identity and representative government, if national institutions provide security and then contribute to economic well-being. Resolving this situation requires application of will, not extraordinary intellect.
Each day Iraqis in al Anbar province and Baghdad choose whether a militia, death squad, terrorist cell or national government can protect them. How ironic their life and death choices depend upon whether people safe at home, half a world away, abide mental distractions and discomforts.
However, a Newsweek poll indicates two thirds of those existing in this country seem too fragile to undergo such stresses. Supposedly the country is headed in the wrong direction when job growth covers over 95% of those wanting employment, inflation is controlled at 20 year lows, the stock market surmounts all time highs fueling 401ks, home ownership reaches all time highs and oil prices keep falling. Somehow malaise overcomes people, while they absent-mindedly feed garbage disposals sufficient food to enrich Darfur. As people exercise their 911 divine right to summon public safety professionals, they regularly castigate Presidential efforts to bring a fraction of that security to Iraqi citizens.
Media images provide these people more action in a week, than a Marine sees in a deployment. People then legitimize decisions with brain stem reactions to visuals, without evaluation that 3,000 dead is less than half the Union army experienced in 15 minutes at Cold Harbor during the previous war for our countrys survival.
Zawahiri and bin Laden assert victory for Wahabbi/Salafi jihadism first demands conquering Iraq to establish Baghdad The Capital of the Caliphate, and to access infrastructure enabling sophisticated terrorist attacks against the U.S. Iraqi security through national government thwarts primary terrorist objectives.
Very nice essay. The information on Afghanistan was new to me, too. Thanks for posting this.