Posted on 01/17/2007 8:08:36 AM PST by Valin
The transcript of Part 2 of my eight part interview with Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon's New Map, is now posted, as is the audio.
The transcript of Part 1 is here and the audio here, and the transcript of our short introductory interview is here, and the audio here.
One teaser from yesterday's exchange:
HH: Dr. Barnett, when we went to break, we were talking about China and the American Navy. We have these 10 Nimitz-class carriers out there, which are really our force projection power. If China develops the ability to attack from land via cruise missiles, could that not vanish overnight, though?
TB: Well, you know, frankly, my gut reaction is that, to that scenario, is to say the age of the carriers is really gone, because of cruise missiles, and because of other capabilities. I think we’ve held onto the myth that carriers are the sine qua non of our ability to project power, simply because nobody’s building them. And it seems like such an obvious advantage, and because we have control of the seas, park our airports right next door to something and fly at will. But with long range…the ability to refuel, and with the fact that we don’t seem to have any trouble finding bases around the world…we worry about a lot, but when we lose one, we get another. And it’s usually one closer to the fight we’re interested in. The truth is, we don’t need carriers in the way that the Navy will tell you that we do. And so the perceived threat of could the Chinese blow them up with cruise missiles? Sure, I think they could. But would it make a difference? No.
HH: Well, that’s consistent with what you wrote. That’s what I was getting at. So basically, we’re oversized with carriers and we’re oversized with submarines. Do we need…what do we need for a navy, Dr. Barnett?
TB: Well, I wouldn’t get rid of carriers, because they’re so cool, and because they’re so versatile, and they last for almost ever. I would have fewer submarines, I would keep an eye on the Chinese submarine development, but I could go…and it’s hard to go much less than we have now. What we need to get, though, is to understand that we need to, and you see the current chief of naval operations making this argument for a thousand ship navy, we need to think the many and the cheap, instead of the few and the absurdly expensive, and I would argue, the absurdly vulnerable.
The point of this series is to try and do some heavy lifting for the audience on the strategic context in which the war in Iraq is unfolding. Dr. Barnett is not an Administration spokesman by any means (quite the opposite, in fact), but he is a serious and very competent national security professional whose book is widely read and debated throughout the Pentagon. Powerline's John Hinderaker is generous when he states that it is a "great pleasure to listen to such high-level discussion of military and strategic matters. You won't get this kind of quality in any other medium." What I think he is saying that no voice is allowed an extended opportunity to persuade the public of anything. Even most C-Span programs are panels chopped into four minute presentations, and most speeches are instantly under attack or turned off. Most long reports in newspapers go unread, and even crucial books are not read by the same people at the same time. The attraction of the Barnett interviews is not only the intelligence of the guest, but the sustained nature of the opportunity he has to explain his worldview, an opportunity almost never seen in present day media. (It isn't the questions --these are the obvious and basic questions that any serious interviewer would pose if he or she had actually read the book.)
One of the byproducts of a close reading of the Barnett book is the recognition that one of the few places where sustained, high level policy debate goes on in Washington is within the Pentagon, where daily arguments over the nature of the world and the threats and opportunities it poses are going on. My long-ago time at the Department of Justice and the White House did not include any such forums, and the nature of most agencies preclude them as well. The forums organized by think tanks rarely approach this level of seriousness because they are staffed, for all their brains, by outsiders looking in. If State holds these exercises, I am unaware of them, and the same is true about the CIA.
So, if you want a glimpse of the unique debates underway within the government, go back and read (or listen) to parts 1 and 2, and then tune in next Tuesday for Part 3.
or go here
Thomas P.M. Barnett on Chapter 2 of The Pentagon's New Map. (transcript of on-air interview)
The Hugh Hewitt Show ^ | 1/17/07 | Hugh Hewitt / Thomas P.M. Barnett
http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1768867/posts
No one uses common carriers anymore. This is the age of email, Fedex and UPS.
Go to your room! :-)
i kinda agree with this. with the coming f-35 and the vtol features it has, a smaller, destroyer size ship could be equipped with elevators, and carry 4 f-35's. a squadron of 4 of these ships could deliver a hell of a punch anywhere in the world..
I like the X-ship concept. Fast, smaller, stealthy ships that are modulized, allowing different weapons modules to be switched out depending on the mission.
The coming War with Iran will show otherwise.
Carriers are still needed and will be needed in future for power projection and for offensive capabilities against enemy states. China is problem on its own. Just because they apparantly have capabilites, which can't be countered by carriers, doesn't mean we don't need them at all.
Could our Nimitz class carriers be on the same course as the Dreadnaught class battleships? In the early 20th century, Great Britain and Germany both spent fortunes on building bigger and better dreadnaughts. When World War I broke out, both nations were reluctant to commit them to battle out of fear of losing such expensive investments. The one significant engagement between the dreadnaughts, the Jutland, occurred as the two fleets stumbled into each other. Meanwhile the U-boats, smaller and much cheaper, proved to have a much bigger impact than the big battlewagons.
"we need to think the many and the cheap, instead of the few and the absurdly expensive"
Nope. Given you also have to house the (very large) maintenence crew needed for those 4 F-35s, VAST VAST VAST amounts of avgas, and munitions for those AC if you want them to actually fly sorties, you're going to end up with a pretty large cruiser size ship, larger than an Aegis cruiser, inefficiently carrying 4 F-35s. Just doesn't make sense.
There are serious problems with "small" ships in terms of range, ability to function in heavy seas, ability to stay on station a long time - I'd resist the siren call on this. And the cost of naval vessels now really isn't "steel" - hull size - it's the electronics and weapons.
How so?
I worry that without the carriers we would lack military options other than going nuclear. Let's face it, with China our only option would be to go nuclear to blunt them in Asia, but for much of the rest of the world we can hit pretty hard under our carrier-projected air power.
"One of the byproducts of a close reading of the Barnett book is the recognition that one of the few places where sustained, high level policy debate goes on in Washington is within the Pentagon, where daily arguments over the nature of the world and the threats and opportunities it poses are going on."
I may be biased, but I think this may be the most important overarching observation to take away from this interview. Joe sixpack and the MSM don't understand that the people who are charged with the task of killing people and blowing up their stuff are the ones who have serious, intellectual, long-range discussion of the state of the world, current and potential threats, and how to defend our country both at home and abroad. No, we're just a bunch of bloodthirsty cretins in love with their gee-whiz killing gadgetry.
Colonel, USAFR
Oh sure, just like during Vietnam when they quit equipping our jet fighters with machine guns and cannon, thinking that all that was needed were missles. Well, our fighter pilots sure got them back on track about that misconception. I sure agree that our carriers "are cool" and they sure send a huge psychological message when they appear off the coastal areas.
And I rather like the idea of LOTS of submarines lurking around the globe ready to vaporize some lunatic for launching an attack on us, just keep reminding them that we're "out there"--and we're ready. Until this very dangerous period of time is over, keep building, keep sailing and keep sending the message out.
When they can invent a cruise missile that can provide air superiority and close air support, then I'll believe this guy.
Worse, Mr. Barnett seems to have missed the fact that several thousand cruise missiles failed to cause much discernable damage to the Serb military, back in the Kosovo days.
As for "other capabilities," he seems to be saying that long missions are sufficient replacements for short sorties. Which is silly -- now you need more planes to drop the same number of bombs.
Moreover, he simply assumes that we'll always be able to find nearby bases. Stupid, dangerous assumption.
Is this guy Barnett 12 years old? "They last for almost ever"???
That was the thinking behind the fiery death-trap known as the Sherman tank.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.