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U.S. SECURITY IN IRAQ: AN OUTLINE FOR VICTORY
BY B-CHAN
2006.12.12

I. OBJECTIVES

A. Original Objectives
• Destroy Iraqi WMDs and WMD production capability: partial success
• Destroy and disrupt Jihadi currently operating in Iraq: success
• Attract outside Jihadi to Iraq and destroy them: partial success
• Establish a secure forward base in Southwest Asia: not yet a success
• Secure Iraqi oil supplies: not yet a success
• Kill or capture Saddam Hussein and destroy Ba'athist regime in Iraq: success
• Establish a stable multi-ethnic Iraqi government: not yet a success
• Establish, train and equip effective multi-ethnic Iraqi military and police forces: not yet a success

B. Actual Consequences
• WMDs gone missing
• Jihadi no longer major threat in Iraq
• Outside Jihadi now wary
• No security for U.S. Forces in Iraq
• Oil supplies less secure
• Iraq now vulnerable to foreign forces
• Outbreak of virulent Balkans-style ethnic/sectarian warfare
• Quasi-independent Kurdistan created
• Natives resent foreign interference in domestic affairs

C. Status Quo
• Iraq's military forces destroyed by U.S. main force
• Ba'athist government destroyed
• Saddam and other war criminals captured
• Power vacuum created
• Yugoslavia-like eruption of simmering ethnic/religious warfare
• Iraq now in a Balkans-style civil war

D. Revised Objectives
• Locate and neutralize missing WMDs, if any
• Destroy and disrupt remaining Jihadi forces currently operating in Iraq
• Establish a secure forward base for U.S. Forces in Southwest Asia
• Secure Iraqi oil supplies
• Maintain territorial integrity of Iraq
• Contain Iraqi sectarian violence within national borders
• Guarantee security of Kurdistan as bastion of order in region
• Allow Iraqis to settle their own affairs

II. ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE REVISED OBJECTIVES

A. STRATEGY: IRAQIZATION

1. Introduction

a. As in Vietnam, U.S. Forces cannot win a civil war in a foreign country. Conventional tactics will not stop civil war. In Vietnam, Westmoreland's operational concept emphasized the attrition of North Vietnamese forces in a "war of the big battalions": multi-battalion, and sometimes even multi-division, sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy the enemy. Such "search and destroy" operations were usually unsuccessful, since the enemy could usually avoid battle unless it was advantageous for him to accept it. But they were also costly to the American soldiers who conducted them, and to the Vietnamese civilians who were in the area.

b. Given strong U.S. support, the South Vietnamese fought well, blunted the Communist thrust, and recaptured territory that had been lost to Hanoi. Given strong U.S. support the Iraqi army can blunt the sectarian militias and gradually bring the country under control.

c. Attempts to fight an American War doomed to fail. Iraq must solve its own problems. U.S. Goal should be to manage civil war, allowing Iraqis to settle their own differences without compromising regional security or U.S, interests. This is Iraqization.

2.The Abrams Option

a. Make Iraq an Iraqi Responsibility: In Vietnam post-Tet, Gen Creighton Abrams placed emphasis on improving the South Vietnamese army, beginning the process of its recovery from the effects of long-term neglect that had prevailed under Westmoreland, who had pushed it aside so he could pursue an American war. Likewise, U.S. Forces should be focused on improving the Iraqi army, beginning the process of its recovery from the effects of collapse of civil order.

b. Play To Our Strengths. U.S. Is best at naval warfare, special operations, and massive destruction delivered by air. The United States provided massive air and naval support to South Vietnamese forces from secure bases, both in Vietnam and offshore. Likewise, the U.S. should withdraw from the bulk of Iraq and establish secure and defensible power projection bases both ashore and afloat.

B. TACTICS: FORT AND FLEET

1. Kurdistan: Fort Saladin
A permanent military installation occupied by U.S. Army, Air Force and SOCOM forces should be established within Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Kurdistan should be offered guarantees of its borders in exchange for long-term basing rights in Kurdistan (Fort Saladin), from which the northern half of Iraq can be managed. This facility would also serve as an airborne/airmobile/air strike power projection base for the region. Kurdistan is stable and peaceful. Once their security was guaranteed by the establishment of the northern No-Fly Zone, the Kurds set up their own civil democratic structures and developed their judiciary, police and security forces. Over the next thirteen years Kurdistan became a relative oasis of law and order, winning the reputation of being the safest region in all of Iraq. Fewer than two hundred coalition troops are currently stationed in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region. Not a single coalition soldier has lost his life on Kurdish soil.

2. Persian Gulf: Strike Force
A standing naval Strike Force Persian Gulf (SFPG) consisting of two Carrier Battle Groups, Coast Guard units, and an associated Marine Corps amphibious fleet should be stationed in the Gulf to manage the southern half of Iraq and project power throughout the region.

C. METHODOLOGY: AIR ASSAULT

1. Focused Power From Secure Bases
In Vietnam, Abrams's approach focused not on the destruction of enemy forces per se but on protection of the South Vietnamese population by controlling key areas. North Vietnamese offensive timetables were disrupted by preemptive allied attacks, buying more time for Vietnamization. In Iraq, U.S. tactics would focus not on pacifying all of Iraq but on the protection of Iraqi population centers from Jihadis, foreign forces, and sectarian militas. Militia and Jihadi offensive timetables would be disrupted by preemptive U.S. attacks, buying more time for Iraqization. Attempts at ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other crimes against humanity would be shattered by focused application of U.S. power.

2. Air Assault
Staging from Fort Saladin, U.S. Army Air Assault teams, SOCOM commandos, and USAF attack aircraft would surgically strike religious and ethnic militias, capture or kill warlords, suppress Jihadis, and prevent acts of genocide, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing in the northern half of Iraq.

3. Forward From The Sea
Staging from SFPG ships, U.S. Marine Corps/Navy SOCOM helicopter/tiltrotor strike teams and U.S. Navy/Marie Corps attack aircraft would surgically strike religious and ethnic militias, capture or kill warlords, suppress Jihadis, and prevent acts of genocide, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing in the southern half of Iraq.

III. ENDGAME
Over time, the Baghdad government would gain enough strength to establish firm control over the entire country. Whatever solution the Iraqis came to regarding their religious and ethnic differences (partition, etc.), it would be their own solution, not one imposed by the U.S., and thus would eventually achieve a natural stability.

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