World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World #6 Disinformation, Inc.

VEVAK learned its methodology from the Soviet KGB and many of the Islamist revolutionaries who supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actually studied at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, the Oxford of terrorism. Documented Iranian alumni include the current Supreme Leader (the faqih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, under whose Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent) apparatus it has traditionally operated. Its current head is Cabinet Minister Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ezhei, a graduate of Qom's Haqqani School, noted for its extremist position advocating violence against enemies and strict clerical control of society and government. The Ministry is very well funded and its charge, like that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the Pasdaran) is to guard the revolutionary Islamic Iranian regime at all costs and under all contingencies.

From the KGB playbook, VEVAK learned the art of disinformation. It's not so difficult to learn: tell the truth 80% of the time and lie 20%. Depending on how well a VEVAK agent wants to cover his/her tracks, the ratio may go up to 90/10, but it never drops below the 80/20 mark as such would risk suspicion and possible detection. The regime in Teheran has gone to great lengths to place its agents in locations around the world. Many of these operatives have been educated in the West, including the U.K. and the United States. Iranian government agencies such as embassies, consulates, Islamic cultural centers, and airline offices regularly provide cover for the work of VEVAK agents who dress well and are clean shaven, and move comfortably within our society. In this country, because of the severance of diplomatic relations, the principal site of VEVAK activities begins at the offices of Iran's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.

Teheran has worked diligently to place its operatives in important think tanks and government agencies in the West. Some of its personnel have been recruited while in prison through torture or more often through bribery, or a combination of both. Others are Islamist revolutionaries that have been set up to look like dissidents - often having been arrested and imprisoned, but released for “medical reasons”. The clue to detecting the fake “dissident” is to read carefully what he/she writes, and to ask why this vocal “dissident” was released from prison when other real dissidents have not been released, indeed have been grievously tortured and executed. Other agents have been placed in this country for over twenty-five years to slowly go through the system and rise to positions of academic prominence due to their knowledge of Farsi and Shia Islam or Islamist fundamentalism.

One of the usual tactics of VEVAK is to co-opt academia to its purposes. Using various forms of bribery, academics are bought to defend the Islamic Republic or slander its enemies. Another method is to assign bright students to train for academic posts as specialists in Iranian or Middle East affairs. Once established, such individuals are often consulted by our government as it tries to get a better idea of how it should deal with Iran. These academics then are in a position to skew the information, suggesting the utility of extended dialogue and negotiation, or the danger and futility of confronting a strong Iran or its proxies such as Hizballah (Hezbollah). These academics serve to shield the regime from an aggressive American or Western policy, and thereby buy more time for the regime to attain its goals, especially in regards to its nuclear weaponry and missile programs.

MOIS likes to use the media, especially electronic media, to its advantage. One of VEVAK's favorite tricks is setting up web sites that look like they are opposition sites but which are actually controlled by the regime. These sites often will be multilingual, including Farsi, German, Arabic French, and English. Some are crafted carefully and are very subtle in how they skew their information (e.g., Iran-Interlink, set up and run by Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife Ann Singleton from Leeds, England); others are less subtle, simply providing the regime's point of view on facts and events in the news (e.g., www.mujahedeen.com or www.mojahedin.ws). This latter group is aimed at the more gullible in our open society and unfortunately such a market exists. However, if one begins to do one's homework, asking careful questions, the material on these fake sites generally does not add up.

Let's examine a few examples of VEVAK's work in the United States. In late October, 2005, VEVAK sent three of its agents to Washington to stage a press event in which the principal Iranian resistance movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), was to be slandered. Veteran VEVAK agent Karim Haqi flew from Amsterdam to Canada where he was joined by VEVAK's Ottawa agents Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami and Mahin (Parvin-Mahrokh) Haji, and the three flew from Toronto to Washington. Fortunately the resistance had been tracking these three, informed the FBI of their presence in Washington, and when the three tried to hold a press conference, the resistance had people assigned to ask pointed questions of them so that they ended the interview prematurely and fled back to Canada.

Abolghasem Bayyenet is a member of the Iranian government. He serves as a trade expert for the Ministry of Commerce. But his background of study and service in the Foreign Ministry indicates that Bayyenet is more than just an economist or a suave and savvy businessman. In an article published in Global Politician on April 23, 2006, entitled “Is Regime Change Possible in Iran?”, Bayyenet leads his audience to think that he is a neutral observer, concerned lest the United States make an error in its assessment of Iran similar to the errors of intelligence and judgment that led to our 2003 invasion of Iraq, with its less than successful outcome. However, his carefully crafted bottom line is that the people of Iran are not going to support regime change and that hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad actually has achieved greater popularity than his predecessors because of his concern for the problems of the poor and his fight for economic and social justice. To the naive, Bayyenet makes Ahmadinejad sound positively saintly. Conveniently overlooked is the occurrence of over four thousand acts of protest, strikes, anti-regime rallies, riots, and even political assassinations by the people of Iran against the government in the year since Ahmadinejad assumed office. So too, the following facts are ignored: the sizeable flight of capital, the increase in unemployment, and the rising two-figure rate of inflation, all within this last year. Bayyenet is a regime apologist, and when one is familiar with the facts, his arguments ring very hollow. However, his English skills are excellent, and so the naОve might be beguiled by his commentary.

Mohsen Sazegara is VEVAK's “reformed revolutionary”. A student supporter of Khomeini before the 1979 revolution, Sazegara joined the “imam” on his return from exile and served in the government for a decade before supposedly growing disillusioned.

He formed several reformist newspapers but ran afoul of the hardliners in 2003 and was arrested and imprisoned by VEVAK. Following “hunger strikes”, Sazegara was released for health reasons and permitted to seek treatment abroad. Although critical of the government and particularly of Ahmadinejad and KhameneМ, Sazegara is yet more critical of opposition groups, leaving the impression that he favors internal regime change but sees no one to lead such a movement for the foreseeable future. His bottom line: no one is capable of doing what needs to be done, so we must bide our time. Very slick, but his shadow shows his likely remaining ties to the MOIS.

From http://www.federalpost.ru/russia/issue_4049.html

Truth and untruth about how they saved hostages in the hospital

2002-11-26 20:46:04, Federal Post.ru

Physicians from City Hospital #1 did not know what kind of casaulties to expect from the theater center. They were ready for gunshot wounds, but a number of the freed hostages had simply suffocated during transport.

Russian Health Minister Shevchenko yesterday revealed at a press conference that, while using gas in the hostage rescue operation at the theater center, "specialists were warned about the gas, including myself. Even though the operation was of an urgently necessary character, we had prepared more than 1000 doses of antidote." Let us leave these words on the conscience of the minister, and those who forced him to utter them.

And, without further commentary, we will describe the first hours after the storming of the Dubrovka center, and what actually went on in the emergency room of Moscow City Hospital #1. In the words of the physicians, nurses, and other witnesses.

What little the workers in the emergency department knew about the assault on the theater, they found out only from brief announcements on the news. The intensive care unit had but 12 beds, and 10 were already in use by the usual victims of automobile accidents. None of the physicians expected the delivery of mass casualties to their department. They were more worried about colleagues whom they knew would face this disaster, which they guessed would consist of many gunshot wounds.

No one paid attention to the khaki-colored UAZ van, a box-like vehicle that pulled up to the side doors of the ER at about 9 am. The driver did not know that the doors on the other side were always open, but instead he banged against the locked personnel entrance for several minutes.

When the door was finally answred, the UAZ crew opened the sliding door of their vehicle. The hair on the ER workers' head stood on end. Inside the 12-seat UAZ van were stacked - in the literal sense of the word - 30 (THIRTY) victims. Motionless. Without gunshot wounds. The UAZ crew could not say a word about the character of the victims' injuries.

The first mission of the emergency personnel was to simply unload the vehicle. Luckily, it was good timing - shift change - and their were twice the number of medics in the department. A newspaperman who found himself on the scene at first tried to work as a reporter, but under the withering stares of the emergency personnel, he was soon helping the medics transport the victims into the ER.

It immediately became clear that several of the victims were already dead in the vehicle. Not from the gas, but from being suffocated under the weight of other bodies. At the very bottom of the pile was a 13-year-old girl. Diagnosis: crushed to death.

Physicians in the course of their duties often work with Fentanyl, and they understood what they were dealing with from the smell. The characteristic semi-sweet, almond smell was so strong on the victims' clothes that several nurses complained of dizziness and nausea.

The victims were dragged into the ER and quickly filled all free space in the department. Even the floor. The secret 'antidote' for Fentanyl was very simple, and the ER had a lot of it. They began injecting it. In the confusion of dragging bodies to and fro - no one was prepared for such a number of casaulties - some patients were overlooked, and some received multiple injections. Later they started marking the arms of those who had received the antidote.

All, who were not crushed during transport, were saved.

The physicians had but one regret - if only they had known that these victims were being brought in, they would brought gurneys from the hospital's upper floors down to the ER, instead of dragging critically-ill patients around on the floor. And another thing - the doctors wished they could have warned other hospitals. City Hospital #13 , for instance, did not know what it was dealing with, and had no emergency department, either.

Later in the day the chief physician strayed into the ER, and began shouting that some hospital personnel were not wearing their surgery caps. It was unsanitary, you see. He asked one doctor: "Why are you wearing torn slippers?" The physician: "I have no others." To which the head doctor replied: "Fine, I'll send you a pair in lieu of a bonus."

Yevgeniy Simonov

From Human Rights Organization of Russia

The Actions of the Authorities

On October 23rd, 2002, several dozen terrorists seized the Dubrovka theatrical center in Moscow during a jubilee showing of the musical 'Nord-Ost'. More than 800 spectators and members of the production were taken hostage. The crisis lasted two days and three nights. According to the terrorists, the building had been wired with explosives, and if they set off their bombs everyone inside the building would be killed. The main demand of the terrorists was the cessation of military operations in Chechnya, and the removal of Russian forces from the Chechen Republic. A number of public and political figures attempted to negotiate with the terrorists, and 98 hostages - mainly women, children, and foreigners - were released. On the morning of October 26th, special units of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) carried out an assault on the building, using a special chemical substance (gas). According to official data, 129 hostages perished (five at the hands of the terrorists), and all hostages were accounted for¹. All 41 terrorists were killed. Two hundred special operations soldiers from the FSB anti-terrorism group took part in the assault, and none of these were seriously injured.

In spite of the loss of a significant number of hostages, the Russian authorities characterized the operation as a success, calling the losses inevitable, and brushing off all doubts about the effectiveness of the special operations group and other government agencies.

The Russian interior minister, Boris Gryzlov, stated that the operation was "coordinated and effective."

Soon after the assault, Deputy Interior Minister Vladimir Vasilev declared the following: "There was information that many died from the effects of the special substance used in the operation. This is not so." As proof of this, Mr. Vasilev reported that of the 104 victims who had been admitted to War Veteran's Hospital #1, not one had been diagnosed as being "poisoned".

FSB director Nikolai Patrushev spoke at length about the "coordinated and well-planned work of the agencies."

Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov declared that the hostage rescue operation was conducted "brilliantly", while the head of the Chechen administration, Achmad Karyrov, asserted that "nowhere in the world has there been an operation conducted as competently and successfully."

Against the background of these statements, the Russian media has also circulated information that makes it difficult to doubt that the operation was anything but well planned and coordinated, as well as beyond reproach. The assertion that the gas had in no way caused the deaths of a large number of hostages, however, now appears to be completely false.

By October 27th, the chief physician of Moscow, Andrey Seltsovsky, confirmed that almost all the hostages who perished had died from an intoxication with the "special gas". He noted that before the assault began, none of the medical personnel had been informed about the character of the special chemicals used in the course of the operation². The gas was not a toxic substance in of itself, but its side effects produced "cardiac, respiratory, and circulatory insufficiencies", which were the direct causes of death in all but 5 cases.

It is interesting that, even before the operation was carried out, on October 24th (2 days before the assault), the former head of the KGB's 3rd Directorate (military counter-intelligence), Vice Admiral Aleksandr Zhardetskiy, in an interview with Interfax stated that if gas were used on children, as well as those with chronic diseases of the respiratory or heart and circulatory systems, then they would practically be sentenced to death. It would seem that if a retired employee of the security services had this information, then members of the operational headquarters had no reason to be surprised by the condition of the hostage. In this situation, the numerous errors made in evacuating and providing first aid to the rescued hostages is inexplicable. After studying interviews with a number of soldiers from the special operations group, and physicians from the Emergency and Disaster Relief Ministry, we have established the following:

Special operations soldiers received no first aid training, especially with regards to positioning people under the influence of the "special gas". A number of hostages died after being carried from the building and placed flat on their backs, instead of on their sides. This led to suffocation.

Following the completion of the military operation, rescue workers were not allowed to participate in the evacuation of the hostages and, as a result, the operation was carried out much more slowly and less competently than it could have been performed.

Rescue workers, in turn, were not warned about the use of the gas, and did not have on hand the equipment and medications needed to provide first aid.

The same can be stated about the emergency physicians on duty at the theatrical center during the hostage rescue operation, especially with regards to the so-called antidotes. Irina Nazarova, chief physician at the All-Russian Center for Medical Catastrophes, commented: "We didn't know what special substance was used during the assault. That a gas was used, we figured that out on the spot³." One of the medics who took part in the rescue of the hostages said: "We got ready for traumas from explosives. As far as I know, there were no special recommendations made to procure any kind of medicines⁴."

Even the participants in the assault did not receive important information and equipment. Some soldiers from SOBR MVD (interior ministry special operations group) found themselves overcome by the gas (though to much less an extent than the hostages), when they entered the theater hall.

Some physicians assert that a significant number of hostages were lost due to an insufficient number of medical vehicles, and that the transport of most hostages took place in everyday city buses, which did not allow for rendering aid to patients en route. Others stated that there were enough ambulances, but that "the traffic was difficult - many various and sundry vehicles got in they way, and blocked one another."

There were errors as well in the organization and sorting of victims by the gravity of their condition (triage). Some of the living were transported with corpses, and scantily-clad hostages were laid out on the cold asphalt at zero degrees.

Nevertheless, at the official level there is neither criticism nor a call to find out the reasons for the errors and lack of coordination between the various agencies. Moreover, the authorities do not find it necessary to conduct an open investigation of the events with public participation. For its part, the Russian parliament voted against a motion by the SPS party to conduct an official investigation.

The SPS, after receiving the consent of the Russian president, conducted its own investigation anyway. Since the inquiry did not carry an official status, the SPS was unable to subpoena all necessary officials. Nevertheless, the commission's findings concerning the medical rescue operation as a whole agree with the situation described above. With respect to the special operations soldiers, the commission was extremely complementary. From the commission's point of view, fault lay with the ministries and departments responsible for "social and medical aid to citizens⁵."

We cannot but agree that government agencies must be ready to deal with the effects of terrorist attacks, but in this specific case it is obvious that one of the basic reasons for the loss of life was due to a lack of coordination between the military and civilian agencies, specifically because the military did not share information necessary for organizing adequate first aid to the victims.

In any event, despite the disconcerting findings of the commission, the authorities have continued to overestimate the success of the hostage rescue operation. It cannot be because they were unaware of the commission's findings: on November 14th, 2002, Vladimir Putin met with SPS leader Boris Nemtsov and received a summation of the investigation. In reply, the president stated: "What you have said is very close that what I already know⁶."

The above leads us to believe that the operation had but one goal - the destruction of the terrorists and prevention of an explosion. Therefore, in spite of the government's statements about the priority of rescuing the hostages, in reality their safety was a secondary consideration⁷. Without attempting to make recommendations as to how to effectively combat terrorism, we are still forced to state that during the course of the terrorist attack in Moscow on October 23-26, 2002, a violation of the right to life took place.

Knowing that many operational errors have come to light thanks to the work of the media, which continuously reported on the events, and through statements by many official and non-official sources, including participants in the operation and negotiators, the authorities now wish to protect themselves from such uncomplimentary reports in the future. Immediately after the terrorist attack, the pro-government factions in the Russian parliament have introduced anti-terrorism legislation that reigns in the media and limits the freedom of speech in situations connected with anti-terrorism operations. The law proposes enlarging a prohibition against broadcasting or publishing anything that can be considered terrorist propaganda or justification for extremist activity in the media during an anti-terrorism operation. The effect of such a rule is greater than it would appear at first glance. Remember that the war in Chechnya is formally designated an anti-terrorism operation, which is covered by the anti-terrorism laws. If this rule were to come into force, then any attempt to organize a public discussion in the media regarding the Chechen problem would become illegal. The parliament and federation council affirmed the amendments to the anti-terror laws with record speed. After realizing that such legislation would be too offensive to free speech, the president responded to a call by the media (including his own government information agencies) to veto the bill as presented. The amendments, however, did not disappear, but were sent to a coordinating commission, and at the present it is impossible to say with certainty if they will be accepted in a weaker form or remain to hang like a Sword of Damocles over the media. In any case, journalists have promised the Russian president that they will work out a mechanism of self-regulation with regards to reporting on acts of terror. One must note that although we greet attempts at journalistic self-regulation, in this case the media's consensus was obtained through blackmail.

Being incapable of preventing a large terrorist attack in the center of the capital, the law enforcement agencies in Moscow have proven by their usual methods that the ends justifies the means. Following the Moscow apartment blasts in the fall of 1999, there was a wave of "checks" conducted by the authorities on Moscow residents from the Caucasus. After 'Nord-Ost', the traditional ID checks on the city streets were supplemented with visits to apartment buildings, where searches and detention of suspicious citizens were carried out. Naturally, the victims of such tactics were mostly Chechens, and the human rights group "Civil Assistance" recorded 40 cases of police abuse of authority. According to the organization's head, Svetlana Gannushkina, there were six instances where criminal cases were brought to court based on fake evidence, usually involving narcotics. Furthermore, there were several cases of Chechens being fired from work, and Chechen children being expelled from school⁸.

One of the most scandalous cases was the arrest of Yaha Neserhaeva, a Moscow resident from Chechnya. She was one of the hostages at the theatrical center, but never revealed her ethnicity to the Chechen terrorists out of solidarity with her Russian girlfriend, with whom she had gone to the musical⁹. After the assault, she was taken straight from the city hospital to two days detention in Prison Hospital #20, and from there to protective custody. Yaha Neserhaeva was fingerprinted, and later photographed and forced to make recordings of her voice. For ten days she was held - the maximum allowed by law unless charges are brought. She was not questioned, and finally released without explanation. There is reason to believe that Yaha Neserhaeva was only released thanks interest in her case by a number of human rights groups and attorneys.

It is also necessary to mention the arbitrary detention of Alihan Gelagoev, which took place on October 25th, a day before the assault on the theatrical center. According to his testimony, while in the police car after his arrest, Alihan had a bag thrown over his head and he was beaten savagely. During this time they shouted at him: "You hate us, and we hate you! We'll destroy you!" At the central police station in Moscow, for several hours the police tried to force Gelagoev to sign a previous prepared confession acknowledging that he was the "ideological organizer of the terrorist attack". After having no success, the guards were ordered to release Gelagoev, but only after he had signed a statement that he had voluntarily appeared at the police station and had no complaints against any of the police.

According to data from the Russian polling agency VTsIOM, 30% of Russians believe that "the expulsion of Chechens from Moscow and other regions of Russia" is the most effective means to provide for the "security of the citizenry¹⁰." From the point of view of Russian human rights organizations, the authorities have not undertaken adequate measures to provide for the safety of ethnic groups. Following a large-scale terrorist attack, Russian and international experience is that there is inevitably a surge in inter-ethnic tension. Certain public statements by government officials are clearly not helpful in preventing possible excesses. Especially when they suffer from ambiguity, such as Moscow Mayor Luzhkov did when he stated: "We in Moscow aren't going to give any nationality special privileges, but at the same time we will not allow a negative relationship with people from the Caucasus."

¹ There is information that there is an alternative official list that shows that more than 70 victims disappeared without a trace. In this case the authorities have not ventured to clear up the situation, and have limited their replies to the official data.
² News.ru. 2002. October 27th.
³ News.ru. 2002. October 28th.
⁴ Ye. Vrantseva. Sorting according to the principle of living versus dead // Gazeta.ru. 2002. October 29th.
⁵ Never let such mistakes happen again // www.sps.ru. 2002. October 28th.
⁶ S. Parhomenko & A. Ryklin. Amendment to a terrorist attack. // YOZH (Hedgehog), 2002. #46.
⁷ As indirect confirmation of this conclusion, the events following the assault, when in the interests of the official investigators, data concerning the fates of the hostages was classified, causing panic among relatives. Stress in the community led to the appearance of lists of victims, which were of unproven authenticity.
⁸ Oppressions of Chechens in Moscow // Prima. 2002. November 5th.
⁹ The terrorists originally expressed an interest in releasing all Chechens, Georgians, and Abhazians from the theater.
¹⁰ VTSIOM. Muscovites on the seizure of hostages at 'Nord-Ost' / www.wciom.ru. 2002. November 1st.

Index of the report

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.