He was both, but more than anything he studied the sciences and the Bible very critically. He believed that science trumped Biblical writings in that the writings in the Bible were considered by him to be metaphors when they conflicted with science, and should not be taken literally, something many here might think about. As a student of science, and a critical thinker, he was decades ahead of anyone else. His determination of the timing of ensoulment was based on studies of fetal development at the time.
As for the mid 19th Century, what exactly would the Pope have learned that would have caused him to reject both Aquinas and Augustine?
Let me say that I agree with you that slave had inalienable rights that were simply ignored and abrogated. The operative word, though, is citizen, not person. Slaves were not considered non-persons legally; they were considered as non-citizens.
The 5th Amendment does not refer to citizens, but rather to persons.
Well, for census purposes they were not considered entire persons, they only counted for 3/5ths of a person.
Exactly my point. But did a slave have any rights under the Constitution or even state constitutions? Even 3/5 of a right? That's why the definition of "person" simply has many meanings, and cannot be definitive for settling the abortion issues.
That words have to be twisted beyond recognition to achieve certain desired ends should tell people something about the nature of what is being plotted. It's like the present attempts to redefine marriage.
The marriage issue notwithstanding, I'm merely establishing, and with your help, that the word "person" has so many meanings as to be almost irrelevant to the abortion issue. That doesn't mean that either at some stage we cannot make a legal construct of "person" sufficient to guarantee certain rights, nor that the concept of natural rights per se can't be used. I think both of those are the central issues trumping privacy rights, but they will carry much more weight I believe when the issue of stages of development are considered.
The whole reason that people like Harry Blackmun want to invent an irrational dichotomy between human and person when it comes to certain other human beings is that the former want to get rid othe latter by killing them, and the only way they can try to justify it is by imagining a non-existent category of being; a sub-human.
Casting one side of this issue...or the other as evil, one wanting simply to kill as many fetuses as they can and the other wanting to deny a woman control of her body are nothing but smokescreens for both sides. I seriously doubt that anyone involved in this issue simply wants to kill, nor do I believe that most on the pro-life side want to control a woman's body. But until we get past those silly extreme views of the opposition, we get nowhere.
I note your whole argument centered on the capability issue. But while a potential for rational thought exists, it is not present at the early stages. Nor are any of the tools to translate that into all of the characteristics we recognize as a human being, a central nervous system, a brain, a heart, form, ability to feel pain or any other sensory perceptions. Later, yes. Your whole argument is based on the fact that it could develop into a human as we know it. This is where we part company. Once I purchased a new home with only a foundation. I was disappointed because that home was not what I had envisioned. Never again. A concrete slab is not a home.
2. I demonstrated from your own existence that it is ontologically necessary that all humans are persons.
But you failed to convince me that they are de facto persons in the eyes of the law and the Constitution. That is the issue, and not medical or etymological usages through the ages.
Well, we may meet again. Take care.
Exactly my point. But did a slave have any rights under the Constitution or even state constitutions? Even 3/5 of a right? That's why the definition of "person" simply has many meanings, and cannot be definitive for settling the abortion issues.
Would it be correct to say that since a slave's rights were not recognized by Constitutions, and that because "the definition of 'person' has many meanings", and "cannot be definitive for settling the abortion issue", that you are also thereby unable to make a moral distinction between slavery and non-slavery?
I note your whole argument centered on the capability issue. But while a potential for rational thought exists, it is not present at the early stages. Nor are any of the tools to translate that into all of the characteristics we recognize as a human being, a central nervous system, a brain, a heart, form, ability to feel pain or any other sensory perceptions. Later, yes. Your whole argument is based on the fact that it could develop into a human as we know it.
No. No. No. My whole argument all along has been that there is no such thing ontologically as something "developing into a human". The idea is not connected to reality. It is a categorical error on the level of asserting that the color blue has taste.
The whole premise of your argument against fetal personhood is the notion that non-persons can change into persons. You are saying that a living being can undergo a essential change in its nature during its lifetime.
Such a proposition is completely illogical because if the alleged change was biologically inevitable from conception (as we know it is) then it is incontrovertible that this alleged change is not a change in essential nature because if the being naturally initiated the change then it must have already been in its nature from the beginning to do so.
Once again, there is no such thing as a potential being. There is no such thing as a potential person. All beings are actual as all persons are actual.
I leave you with a quote from
A reply to Peter Singer
It is true that an embryo or fetus (or infant) lacks the immediately exercisable capacity for self-awareness, rationality, or free choice. Yet, the embryo or fetus does have the basic, natural capacity for such actions as consequent to its nature, that is, as entailed by the kind of entity it is. The embryo or fetus, precisely in virtue of the kind of entity he or she is, has the capacity to develop himself or herself to the point where he will perform such actions. And no one has been able to give an intelligible reason why we should base full moral rights on immediately exercisable capacities — which can come and go — rather than on the basic, natural capacities that a human being at any stage of development has in virtue of the kind of entity it is. (Of course, the full development of these capacities can be impeded from an early stage, as in the case of persons afflicted by certain severe congenital forms of retardation or impeded later in life by senility or other forms of dementia, none of which transforms human beings into subhuman creatures."
[emphasis mine]
Cordially,