Exactly my point. But did a slave have any rights under the Constitution or even state constitutions? Even 3/5 of a right? That's why the definition of "person" simply has many meanings, and cannot be definitive for settling the abortion issues.
Would it be correct to say that since a slave's rights were not recognized by Constitutions, and that because "the definition of 'person' has many meanings", and "cannot be definitive for settling the abortion issue", that you are also thereby unable to make a moral distinction between slavery and non-slavery?
I note your whole argument centered on the capability issue. But while a potential for rational thought exists, it is not present at the early stages. Nor are any of the tools to translate that into all of the characteristics we recognize as a human being, a central nervous system, a brain, a heart, form, ability to feel pain or any other sensory perceptions. Later, yes. Your whole argument is based on the fact that it could develop into a human as we know it.
No. No. No. My whole argument all along has been that there is no such thing ontologically as something "developing into a human". The idea is not connected to reality. It is a categorical error on the level of asserting that the color blue has taste.
The whole premise of your argument against fetal personhood is the notion that non-persons can change into persons. You are saying that a living being can undergo a essential change in its nature during its lifetime.
Such a proposition is completely illogical because if the alleged change was biologically inevitable from conception (as we know it is) then it is incontrovertible that this alleged change is not a change in essential nature because if the being naturally initiated the change then it must have already been in its nature from the beginning to do so.
Once again, there is no such thing as a potential being. There is no such thing as a potential person. All beings are actual as all persons are actual.
I leave you with a quote from
A reply to Peter Singer
It is true that an embryo or fetus (or infant) lacks the immediately exercisable capacity for self-awareness, rationality, or free choice. Yet, the embryo or fetus does have the basic, natural capacity for such actions as consequent to its nature, that is, as entailed by the kind of entity it is. The embryo or fetus, precisely in virtue of the kind of entity he or she is, has the capacity to develop himself or herself to the point where he will perform such actions. And no one has been able to give an intelligible reason why we should base full moral rights on immediately exercisable capacities — which can come and go — rather than on the basic, natural capacities that a human being at any stage of development has in virtue of the kind of entity it is. (Of course, the full development of these capacities can be impeded from an early stage, as in the case of persons afflicted by certain severe congenital forms of retardation or impeded later in life by senility or other forms of dementia, none of which transforms human beings into subhuman creatures."
[emphasis mine]
Cordially,
No, I have no problem distinguishing the two. I was responding to your posts which referred to a person by using the dictionary. I simply said that, dictionaries notwithstanding, the Constitution does not necessarily consider a fetus a person, at least not for purposes of the 5th Amendment. And clearly it doesn't with respect to the 14th, which refers to citizens as either born here or naturalized here as the only ones to whom the 14th Amendment applies. My determination considers that the concept of person...or citizen must be expanded legally in order to get some relief under the rights amendments, that's all.
No. No. No. My whole argument all along has been that there is no such thing ontologically as something "developing into a human". The idea is not connected to reality. It is a categorical error on the level of asserting that the color blue has taste.
That of course depends on whether the courts, in deciding to expand the accepted use of either person or citizen looks to development stages to make such a determination. Simply telling the high court that no abortion should be allowed at all, ever, because a human being is growing, does not give them anything more than the original arguments.
The whole premise of your argument against fetal personhood is the notion that non-persons can change into persons. You are saying that a living being can undergo a essential change in its nature during its lifetime.
What I'm saying is there is a distinction between a fully formed fetus, with a developed brain, central nervous system, sensory abilities and bodily formation that does not exist at the moment of conception, and that it is not out of the realm of reason to consider those issues.
Well, I simply wanted to ensure you didn't mistake my position, and I pretty much believe I understand yours.
Take care.