On Iraq: Listen carefully to General Abizaid

As the debate in the United States is still raging on the Iraq War – and as many believe that the last legislative elections were a message from the American public to change the course in that conflict – the question remains, how.

American politicians and their academic and activist advisors are rushing in all directions to search for that magic answer with most of the debaters parroting basically two main theses advanced by very few authors. One militant doctrine – connecting the radical left and the isolationist right, to (ironically) the Jihadists around the world – calls for immediate withdrawal from Iraq, let alone from the War on Terror. The radical ideologues do not discuss a rational policy in the region they essentially want no U.S. policy at all. So, we'll discount their position.

The other quasi doctrine says, we need to win the war in Iraq so that we can pull the troops back home. Apparently, this projected equation is becoming the rallying cry for legislators and diplomats from both parties in the U.S. Congress: In short, feeling what they believe is a pressure from the voters, the winners and losers in the last elections agree that it is going to take one more deep push before beginning the big gradual withdrawal. While the backbone of this consensus is very logical by itself, and should have been applied to the entire War on Terror to begin with (we will come back to this issue in January), most politicians seem not to capture the very essence of the "turning point" in Iraq, let alone in the region as a whole. I would strongly recommend they listen carefully to the analysis of General John Abizaid, particularly his last testimony to the Senate.

In classical military teaching, you win the war if you destroy the enemy in a particular geographical space. Examples abound in world history. But in the War on Terror, the enemy is not identifiable within a particular space. The supreme commander of U.S. forces in the region often stated that the global foes are the complex networks of Salafi Jihadists on the one hand and the operatives of the Khumeinist regime in Iraq on the other. Hence, may I add, the measurement of success against them is the enabling of the region's peoples to resist them.

Unfortunately, the debaters in America and the West have been deprived (by their own academic elites) from the understanding of that enemy. Huge efforts are underway in Europe and North America to convince legislators and media that this is not an ideological war but rather a foreign policy matter. This leads decision-makers to measure in statistics not in concepts, hence the failures in design and policies.

General Abizaid was asked by a panel of well informed Senators last week, how to "measure" the need to send in additional U.S. forces or to begin withdrawal from Iraq.

In short military sentences, the CENTCOM boss told them it will all depend on the ability of U.S. forces to train, support and direct Iraqi units in their confrontation with the terrorists. The Senators didn't seem the get Abizaid's very accurate point. Both Republican and Democrat legislators wanted a quantitative answer:

"How many additional troops do you need so that we can pull out lots of troops after," they repetitively asked with hints at past and future electoral promises to end the conflict.

Sticking with his analysis, Abizaid (who speaks the language of the region and has studied its ideologies) said the question is not to bring in more troops to Iraq, but to have Iraqi forces begin to win their war. This was the first key in the whole hearing. The man was trying to tell the Senators that more important than bringing in additional 20,000 Marines and soldiers, was to train an additional 50,000 Iraqi troops.

Indeed, the ultimate objective in this war (at least the counter-terrorist part of it) is to help the Iraqis help themselves. Surely with half a million boots on the ground you can saturate the whole country, but from what? There is no standing army the U.S. is fighting against.

The fight is against a factory that is producing Jihadists, both external and internal. The answer is to build the counter-factory: i.e. an Iraqi military and intelligence force. And to do so, you have to allow it to fight the battle, with all the sacrifices and setbacks that come with it. U.S. forces cannot keep fighting instead of the Iraqis, and win the war for them.

Aware of this reality, General Abizaid (along with his colleagues) was trying to explain to Congress that – in the historical context of it – the war against terrorism in Iraq is one of the centers of the global conflict. Even the seasoned U.S. diplomat David Satterfield, who was also testifying on behalf of the State Department, asserted the inescapable reality: it is about the Iraqis' political will. And in addition to the General and the diplomat, may I stress as an academic, that the matter at the end is psychological.

If Iraqi citizens "see" their army engaging the terrorists and winning, the tide will turn. It is not about how many new troops or about the statistics of death. It is between al Jazeera convincing Iraqis that the U.S. is defeated and that former Secretary of State Jim Baker (co-chair of the Iraq Study Group) is supposedly negotiating the terms of the surrender, and between al Hurra TV showing Iraqi commanders fraternizing with Shia and Sunni villagers after encounters with terrorists and sectarian militias. It boils down to this: who would the Iraqis send their sons to fight with: The Jihadists of all types or the multiethnic Army?

Without this understanding of the conflict, advocated by Abizaid, decision-makers are left with mostly political calculations: how to cut deals, how to get out, how not to suffer more losses, and how to be reelected or super-elected in 2008. General Abizaid instead recommended moves that make sense only if we can see the bigger picture:

Insert U.S. forces within Iraqi units: Reduce the presence of American (and Coalition) military in the "Jihadi zones" and instead deploy more Iraqi-American solidified forces. Call on U.S. units to strategically support Iraqis when the Jihadists are rebuilding other "Fallujahs." Let the sons and daughters of Iraq take the fight to the terrorists, should they be Salafists or Khumeinists. This is their time to face off with their enemy (who happens to be our enemy). Let them engage and test their will and the will of the people they are protecting and liberating. Let al Jazeera and al Hurra (their media and ours) and the Iraqiya TV (Iraqi national TV) show the panache or the setback of their own forces. It is fine if we don't take all the credit for all the battles. It is fine if the Iraqi military takes the front row for the good and the bad. Let their generals, commanders, soldiers be in the media and lash out against the Jihadists. And at the core of each unit, let's place the best of our U.S. support. The bottom line, Iraqis needs victories in Arabic language (and also in Kurdish, Assyrian and Turkic). Audiences in Baghdad need to hear Iraqi commentators evaluating the conflict, not talking heads from New York to Los Angeles. This is not our exclusive war in Mesopotamia; this is also Iraq's war against terror and fascism, whether our intellectual elites like it or not.

U.S. and Coalition forces should redeploy inside Iraq not away from it at this point in time. The actual need for ground, sea, and air forces should be designed by those who are waging the war in the realm of reality; not by those who are managing domestic politics at home. For lovers of debates, televised war-rooms and partisan labyrinths we suggest another arena of talents: engage the Iraqi people, politicians, youth, women, and mobilize them. Visit Iraq and meet with them or invite them to your cities, towns and campuses back at home. Be a part of the international mobilization, not the global demobilization. Strategically, large chunks of the expeditionary force should be deploying on or about the Iraqi-Iranian and Iraqi-Syrian borders. Use the weight of American might to deter the two regimes who are at real war with Iraq's emerging democracy. Don't let the agents of Damascus and Tehran killing the guys and gals in convoys and patrols inside urban areas. Fulfill the strategy of liberation with smarter moves instead of self-collapsing.

One good question at that hearing, though, was the ability of the Iraqi government to fulfill its obligations of grooming its own army and disarming the various militias. That indeed is a legitimate question. Why isn't Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki moving fast enough to clamp down on the Shia militias? Why isn't his government supporting the Iraqi army with enough energy? Plenty of relevant questions can be asked. The answer resides in the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Remember, politicians are politicians, from Montana to Basra: They all want to see their interests as a part of the global interest. When the U.S. shows leadership in the region, Iraq's leaders will function better. Let's take our gloves off: If we send the units to deploy on the Iraqi Iranian borders, Iraqi Shiite politicians will become bolder in rooting out Iranian operatives from Sadr City. This is how it works. But if in response to a full month of Iranian military maneuvers, we send former diplomats to "negotiate a role for Ahmedinijad" in Najaf's security, don't expect Maliki or even Sistani to stop Muqtada al Sadr. One massive mistake the U.S. government and the political establishment has committed and continues to practice is to squeeze too many cooks into the Iraq kitchen.

Last but not least, I was stupefied that instead of asking General Abizaid to comment on books and literature produced by the enemy, he was grilled on paragraphs from a best-seller by an American journalist. With all my respect to Mr. Bob Woodward and his many journalistic achievements, State of Denial is not a military manual or a book on Jihadism, Baathism, insurgencies, or the memoirs of Bin Laden and Khomeini. It is a chilling reminder of American domestic politics, but not an analysis of al Muhajer and al Sadr strategies in Iraq. What we need to have in the center of our debate is a state of strategy not just gossip thrillers.

In the end, and as the nation is looking desperately for ways to "solve" Iraq, it is crucial that we dissipate the foggy vision of that conflict: Concentrate on reading the enemy, understand your allies and focus on the big plan; the rest is cacophony. In Iraq, it means analyze the speeches of the Jihadists and Ahmedinijad, listen to the Iraqis and talk with them, and let them have victories over their enemies. This is the recipe of the centurions and their chief, John Abizaid. I hope the new Rome's Senate will hear.

******** Dr Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and director of the Future Terrorism Project of the FDD. He is a visiting fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. His most recent book is Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West.

Look at the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) that was sent to France in WW1. It was basically a mass of slightly trained infantry troops. Willing to fight, but untrained in the realities of (then) modern warfare.

It was the French Army that trained & equipped our artillery, air corps, & so forth. It was only by late 1918 that the AEF was able to operate as an independent force with responsibility for a sector of the line. Prior to that, US infantry divisions were parcelled out in packets to fill gaps in the French battle line.

Consider also that WW1 was a standup fight while this is a difficult insurgency where Iraqi units might be shot through with informers meaning that unit effectiveness is hampered by a basic lack of trust. The best units are reportedly the Kurdish Peshmerga units because they don't have these problems.

And why do they make terrible troops? It's the Islamic culture.

The height of success in that culture is to use connections and relations to attain a position where you tell others what to do (explaining why one might brag about being the fourth cousin of some arab prince), and do as little as possible yourself. (Note that several nations in the region have work-forces comprised of more than 40% foreign labor!) Everyone wants to be an officer, but as officers, they rarely wants to get involved in the field.

Once in a position of authority, Muslims rarely share information, since it is a part of what makes them special. If others know what they know, they are no longer as special. As a result, officers will rarely tell their troops what their overall objectives really are until the last moment... if at all... and once the officer is gone (even just by cut communications), there is nobody left in position to achieve those goals. The troops, having no leadership and no idea what to do or where to go, are helpless, and far better off surrendering than trying to improvise. (While Islam does help make them obedient, it goes too far. Improvision in the field, a hallmark of the best Western troops, is virtually non-existent in Muslim soldiers.)

Training Iraqi troops to combat terorist cells and suicide bombers disguised as civilians (and hiding behind children) requires TONS of improvisation skills and effective communcation. Even our troops are still learning on a daily basis. The Iraqis, with far, far less experience with individual initiative (once again, thank you Lord for our precious Freedom!!!!), must take far longer to prepare for this kind of asymmetrical, confusing, cowardly, and evil brand of warfare/mass murder.

Can someone explain to me why it is taking so long to train Iraqi troops?

I'll answer your question, if you can answer mine. Why did it take 13 years to beat the British and then create our own country. After that, why did it take 76 years for us to eliminate slavery in our country. After that why did it take another 100 years for us to able to guarantee that all citizens in our country were treated equally despite their skin color? One would think that if we were so enlightened, all of those things would haven taken just a few years to accomplish, but instead it took almost two centuries and cost us literally hundreds of thousands of American lives.

So given that it took us 189 years to get our act together, maybe you might consider cutting the Iraqi's a little slack in the time department. In helping them, we have suffered historically low casualties, while at the same time they have been standing up and fighting and have been suffering greater casualties that we have in the fight to preserve their constitution, which it should be noted they passed in 2 and 1/2 years versus the 13 years it took us.

Wow, were are you getting your information from?

"Pershing insisted that American soldiers be trained before going to Europe. As a result, few troops would arrive before 1918. In addition, Pershing insisted that the American force would not be used merely to fill gaps in the French and British armies and in particular resisted European efforts to have U.S. troops used as individual replacements in decimated Allied units. This attitude was resented by the Allied leaders who were short on troops...

Pershing wanted an American force that could operate independently of the other Allies, but his vision could not be realized until adequately trained troops with sufficient supplies reached Europe. Training schools in America sent their best men to the front, and Pershing also established facilities in France to train new arrivals for combat.

Throughout 1917 and into 1918, American divisions were usually employed to augment French and British units in defending their lines and in staging attacks on German positions. Beginning in May 1918, with the first United States victory at Cantigny, AEF commanders increasingly assumed sole control of American forces in combat. By July 1918, French forces often were assigned to support AEF operations. During the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, beginning September 12, 1918, Pershing commanded the American First Army, comprising seven divisions and more than 500,000 men, in the largest offensive operation ever undertaken by United States armed forces. This successful offensive was followed by the Meuse-Argonne offensive, lasting from September 26 to November 11, 1918, during which Pershing commanded more than one million American and French soldiers. In these two military operations, Allied forces recovered more than two hundred square miles (520 km²) of French territory from the German army. By the time the Armistice ended combat on November 11, 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces had evolved into a modern, combat-tested army."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Expeditionary_Force

In less than two years US forces had gone from a dead start to the leading military force in the field.

Compare British Colonial America with Iraq and there are some striking similiarities:

1. Hotbeds of "insurgency", Virginia, Philidelphia, Massachusetts.

2. "Fat", loyal population centers, Manhattan, Sections of NJ, Southern Colonies

3. Outside forces, whether mercenary or nations with an interest.

4. Ideological allies relocating to the scenes of the war.

5. Effective propaganda from the "insurgents", less effective propaganda from the major power.

6. Insurgent on civilian attacks.

Wow, were are you getting your information from?

The AEF soldiers had basic training, that's it. The AEF 'divisions' were cobbled together by jamming 4 infantry regiments together -- that's not a division capable of independent operation. (The 2nd Infantry Division was a composite division that had the 6th Marine Brigade as a key maneuver element). The French Army set up a school to teach the AEF advanced infantry & artillery tactics. Anecdotally, the way you became an NCO in the US Army in those days was having the loudest voice.

Does any of this sound like a combat ready force? Fact is if Pershing had been given his way earlier, it would have been a disaster. I think he knew it because unlike most of his officers, he had combat experience & was a professional. I think he used the delay caused by British & French intransigence to get his army trained. He made good use of the delay.

We can argue, I suppose, on the extent and impact of French training on American troops in WWI, but I would think we would agree that it was American policy to build their own training system as quickly as possible. If anything Pershing had disdain for the Allied tactics that had led them into the stalemate of trench warfare.

Regardless, the analogy of the AEF to current Iraqi forces is a poor one, as they was not the corruption and sectarian struggle within US forces in 1918 that exist in the Iraqi army in 2006.

Regardless, the analogy of the AEF to current Iraqi forces is a poor one, as they was not the corruption and sectarian struggle within US forces in 1918 that exist in the Iraqi army in 2006.

That's exactly the point! It took the US Forces from 1916 to late 1918 (basically 2 years) to become capable of independent operations and we had none of the obstacles that you just cited. Peshmerga aside, the Iraqi Army barely been in existance for a comparable length of time.

BTW, the priority for the AEF was a quickie basic training, clothe 'em & ship 'em. Shake 'n Bake soldiers. It was assumed all along that the real training would take place in France & the rest was OJT. The French & Imperial Russian Armies were at the breaking point, so there wasn't a lot of time spent on the frills.

What the US soldiers had in abundance was the elan that the Brits & French had lost after over 2 years of trench warfare. They thought we were nuts.

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