Victor Davis Hanson: The Wonders of Hindsight. Looking back is a sure way to stumble

Most of the blame game being played over the Iraqi occupation — and always with the wisdom of hindsight — is now irrelevant.

That’s basically settled: There will be no sizable increases in our troop presence, but gradual downsizing, as more provinces must come under Iraqi control and we seek to avert Iraqi perpetual dependence. Debating how many soldiers should have been deployed in the three-week war of 2003 and its aftermath is about as helpful in the present as fighting over culpability for the surprise at the Bulge.

It doesn’t matter now — the new army is nearing 300,000 strong and growing. It will either rise to the occasion or fail. The decision of 2003 to leave it scattered is ancient history.

Perhaps, but three years later that’s not an issue any more either, now that former Hussein government officials have long been welcomed back into the military and civilian bureaucracy.

Absolutely, but now, after three elections, Iraq is autonomous, and American proconsuls are not on television hogging the news of someone else’s future.

Wasn’t it terrible that Tommy Franks left in the middle of a long theater campaign, as if he sensed that Centcom’s three-week victory might well devolve into his three-year messy aftermath?

It used to be blood sport to blame the supposed flawed architects and implementers of the Iraqi war and occupation — neocon advisers to President Bush, the proconsul Paul Bremer (whose blazers were emblematic of his out-of-touch, unrealistically optimistic, rather than workable and good enough, solutions), or the nice, but deer-in-the-headlights Gen. Sanchez.

Even if these purported scapegoats have been accurately portrayed, and their mistakes account for the current pessimistic Iraqi prognosis — neither of which I grant — what are we to say about those currently in charge? Even critics of the war have praised the Middle Eastern Ambassador Khalizad, the savvy Gen. Petraeus, the Arab-speaking Gen. Abizaid, and the best and the brightest fighters in the field, such as a Lt. Col. Kurilla or a Col. McMaster. All of these players are not only in, or about to be back in, Iraq, but are pivotal in crafting and adapting American tactics and strategy there.

Many wars metamorphize into something they were not supposed to be. Few imagined that the Poland war of 1939 would within two years evolve into a war of annihilation involving the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy. So too with the third Iraqi war of 2003 (following the first 1991 Gulf War, and the second, subsequent 12-year no-fly zone stand-off) that has now become a fight against jihadists for the future course of the entire Middle East.

What matters now is not so much what the war was or should have been, but only what it is — and whether we have learned from our mistakes and can still win. The answer to both questions is yes. We have the right strategy — birthing (through three elections already) an autonomous democracy; training an army subject to a civil government; and pledging support until it can protect its own constitutional government.

Few American officers are talking about perpetual occupation or even the need for more troops, but rather about the need for a lighter footprint, bolstered by teams of Special Forces and air support, to ensure Iraqi responsibility for their own future,. And the key to success — a diplomatic squeeze on the Sunnis to suppress terrorists in Nineveh and Anbar provinces in exchange for Shiite guarantees of more government inclusion — is now the acknowledged goal of both the Iraqi and American governments.

Thousands in Iraq accept that they have crossed the Rubicon, and they must either make their own democracy work or suffer a fate worse than that of the boat people and the butchered in Southeast Asia when the Americans left.

As for how to ensure against this disastrous outcome, multilateral talks are no magic bullet, as we see from the failed EU3 efforts with Iran and the stalled six-party negotiations over the North Korean problem. The “more rubble/less trouble” solution that the Russians employed against the Chechnyans in Grozny is out of the question for a humane United States. The U.N. is no answer as we have seen from serial genocides from Rwanda to the present killing in Darfur.

No, only the United States, and its superb military, can stabilize Iraq and give the Iraqis enough time and confidence to do what has not been done before, and what apparently no one any longer thinks will be done: a surviving, viable democratic government in the heart of the dictatorial Middle East. Though the necessary aims are clear, they are not quickly and easily attained. Everyone understands that there is no single military answer to Iraq, but rather that the political solution depends on soldiers providing enough security long enough for free commerce and expression to become established. So rather than agonize endlessly over past perceived errors, we must realize that such lapses are not unprecedented in our military experience and focus on whether they are still correctable.

By the standards of Grenada, Panama, and Serbia — where few American died and some sort of tenuous consensual government emerged fairly quickly — Iraq is indeed messy. But if we grant that the effort to replace Saddam with democracy in the heart of the ancient caliphate is a far formidable enterprise, and thus akin to the challenge, and cost, of taking an Okinawa or saving a Korea, then our losses and heartbreak so far are not extraordinary.

For all the Democrats loud criticism, if they do regain Congress, they would probably rely on the present expertise of a Khalizad, Abizaid, or Petraeus, and not the often quoted wisdom of three years past of a Gen. Shinseki or Zinni. I doubt they will bring back Gen. Wesley Clark to fix the “mess.” They will either have to cut off funds, ensure a pull out before the end of the year, and then watch real blood sport as reformers are butchered; or they will have to trust that our present military and civilian leadership has learned the hard lessons of three years in Iraq, and can find a way to stabilize the nascent democracy.

How do we define success in Iraq, in the context of a dysfunctional Middle East where elections in Lebanon and Palestine bring turmoil, the “correct” multilateral NATO war in Afghanistan is still raging, and we still can’t do much to find bin Laden in a “friendly,” but nuclear and Islamic, Pakistan? No mention is necessary about an Algeria still reeling from a horrendous bloodbath in the 1990s, the nightmare that was Qadhafi’s Libya, perennial Syrian roguery, the theocratic disaster in Iran, or all the other butchery that passes for the norm in the Middle East.

We can only ask: Are the tribal leaders of the troubled Anbar province now more likely to join the government or the insurgents? Are the old controversial barometers of Iraqi wartime electrical production, GDP, and oil output currently falling or stable? Is the successful Kurdistan seceding or in fact still part of Iraq? Is the Shiite leadership now de facto a pawn of Iran, or still confident about its role in a democratic and autonomous Iraq? Do the communiqués and private correspondence of al Qaeda in Iraq reflect cocky triumphalism or worry over losing? Do Iraqi elected leaders praise us or damn us and ask us to leave? In a global war against Islamic jihadists, who have killed thousands of Americans here at home, should we lament that we are now fighting and killing them as they flock to distant Iraq?

As we head for the November elections, most politicians have renounced their paternity of the now-orphaned American effort in Iraq. And pundits of summer 2003 have not just had second thoughts about Iraq in the autumn of our discontent in 2006 — but very public third thoughts about whether they ever really had their enthusiastic first ones.

The odd thing is that, for all the gloom and furor, and real blunders, nevertheless, by the historical standards of most wars, we have done well enough to win in Iraq, and still have a good shot of doing the impossible in seeing this government survive. More importantly still, worldwide we are beating the Islamic fundamentalists and their autocratic supporters. Iranian-style theocracy has not spread. For all the talk of losing Afghanistan, the Taliban are still dispersed or in hiding — so is al Qaeda. Europe is galvanizing against Islamism in a way unimaginable just three years ago. The world is finally focusing on Iran. Hezbollah did not win the last war, but lost both prestige and billions of dollars in infrastructure, despite a lackluster effort by Israel. Elections have embarrassed a Hamas that, the global community sees, destroys most of what it touches and now must publicly confess that it will never recognize Israel. Countries like Libya are turning, and Syria is more isolated. If we keep the pressure up in Iraq and Afghanistan and work with our allies, Islamism and its facilitators will be proven bankrupt.

In contrast, if we should withdraw from Iraq right now, there will be an industry in the next decade of hindsight exposés — but they won’t be the gotcha ones like State of Denial or Fiasco. Instead we will revisit the 1974-5 Vietnam genre of hindsight — of why after such heartbreak and sacrifice the United States gave up when it was so close to succeeding.

You may be right, or you may be wrong. I read very persuasive arguments for and against your point. It is very interesting.

But from the practical point of view, our President has to deal with here and now with the world we know. He has to make decisions in this real world, not how it would have come out if you were right.

And even if isolationism had standing 90 years ago, in today's world with international trading, easy travel and even easier communications, miniaturized weapons and weapons black market when you don't have to be an industrial power like Germany or Japan to inflict untold damage on your enemy, it does not work. The world became too small and too inter-vined to cut ourselves out of it.

And, btw, there are some accidents of history where we had no say at all. If there was no oil in the Mideast, wahhabism would remain totally irrelevant fringe and had no money to spread and indulge in its fantasies that metastasizing in the world now.

--Retreat to our borders and roll the drawbridge up? We tried that(ignoring the terrorists - thanks Clinton). It got us 911.--

Bollocks! Clinton was as interventionist as the rest. Remeber Bosnia? Remeber Kosovo? We left our drawbridge DOWN under Clinton; no border security, an intelligence apparatus with its head up its butt (couldn't spot young Arab muslim men taking airliner flight lessons?!), a "Chinese Wall" between intelligence and law enforcement etc. In fact, we scarely had a drawbridge at all. It's not a question of "ignorning" as you falsely put it; it's a question of protecting! I guess you are against a missile defense program, since all we are doing in that case is "ignoring" ballistic missiles. Sheer sophistry.

--miniaturized weapons and weapons black market when you don't have to be an industrial power like Germany or Japan to inflict untold damage on your enemy, it does not work.-- "Suitcase nukes"? Flash Gordon stuff. And if some enemy by chance did have some fantastic weapon like this, whether or not we have troops in Ramadi dodging IEDs wouldn't make much difference anyhow. --The world became too small and too inter-vined to cut ourselves out of it.-- Defeatist talk. We can do anything we set our minds to, if only we have the will. If we don't have the will, we don't deserve success. --If there was no oil in the Mideast, wahhabism would remain totally irrelevant fringe-- If every spot in the USA including ANWR, and the coasts was fully exploited for oil and gas, and if a synthetic fuels progam involving coal (worked great for Germany using 60 year old technology) was instituted, the USA would be fully self-sufficient in energy. We wouldn't need the "rag's" oil. Maybe, much like a clueless mule, the US, sadly, needs a few more raps in the head before it gets the message.

"They accept the terms of the debate imposed on them by the Leftists. "
BINGO!
Until we find leadership that challenges and destroys the absolutist statements made by the Left (Bush lied. Iraq is a failure??? How do you 'debate' those statements???) we will continue to lose focus on the objectives. We will flounder and never achieve our goal.
The leadership must 'frame' a real debate and get real solutions.

I guess I will have to admit I am surprised to find you so dismissive of VDH. Having read a number of his books and a great many columns, I have found him very clear in his opinions and how they are based. Certainly, he sees 'barbarians at the gate' as his world view, but with my sons return from Korea, I think he will go to the middle east somewhere next year and I think there are some guys there that I would use blunt terms to describe, myself.

As I consider you nothing but sincere, let's have a little more of a detailed opinion if you would, please. I am truely interested.

For one thing, Hanson defends the idiotic term "islamofascism," a hideous barbarism which ensures we keep trying to cram bin Laden and Islamic radicals into the Hitler box(even though fascism was properly speaking the property of Mussolini and his thugs). This focus on WWII is reminiscent of the "it's always Vietnam!" rhetoric of the Left. If we do not expand our conceptual and rhetorical categories to encompass new phenomena, we have willingly blinded ourselves for the sake of fighting the last war, or rather a war some fifty years removed from the present.

For more polemical detail, check out Daniel Larison's commentaries on Hanson. Larison is a Byzantinist of the Orthodox Christian faith, and hence more aquainted with Western-Islamic history than Hanson the Classics professor, who I admit has done some good work on ancient vineyards and the decline of classical studies in the modern academy.

...a direct result of the US deciding it was, somehow, an "Asian" nation; this put this US straight in the path of Japanese expansion....

I think your history's a little weak there.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a result of our beginning to crimp their access to oil as a result of their development of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", including, among other barbarisms the "Rape of Nanking".

Perhaps you've heard of it.

If our Pacific Fleet hadn't been based in Hawaii, the Japanese would ultimately have had to go after it wherever it was, which would have likely been somewhere on the US West Coast.

We did not get involved in a war with Japan because we decided we were an "Asian" nation, we got involved in a war with Japan because we decided (rightly at the time) that the Japanese were a "barbarian" nation.

--Perhaps you've heard of it.--

Um, yeah, I have as a matter of fact. I've heard of lots of unpleasant episodes which have happened over time. Doesn't mean the US should get its knickers in a knot every time one happens. From your point of view, the Slick One was right to intervene in Kosovo, since Muzzies were being abused by those naughty Serbs. If that's how you feel, I very strongly disagree.

--If our Pacific Fleet hadn't been based in Hawaii, the Japanese would ultimately have had to go after it wherever it was, which would have likely been somewhere on the US West Coast--

Logistics, old boy, logistics. A suprise attack from Japan on San Diego would have been virtually impossible. For one thing, the distance between the US mainland and Japan was too great. Even if such a task force was somehow able to be replenished and defended at such a greaat distance from Japanese home waters, the odds of it being able to maintain a suprise factor within striking distance of San Diego are terribly small. Even the Pearl Harbor attack was something of a Hail Mary for the Japanese; a successful strike on San Diego would be like winning Powerball.

--We did not get involved in a war with Japan because we decided we were an "Asian" nation, we got involved in a war with Japan because we decided (rightly at the time) that the Japanese were a "barbarian" nation--

No, we got involved because our interests were far enough in the Western Pacific that they were vulnerable to Japanese attack. The world is full of "barbarian" nations; maybe you should put together your own little army and go off to fight the Janjaweed in Sudan. After all, they're doing terrible things in Sudan.

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