China’s Relationship with North Korea and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile Programs

Below are excerpts of this gentleman's Congressional Testimony. For the full transcript go to the source.

I think he's not telling all he should, and is protecting the so called 'interests' of US China Relations.

I speak to you as someone who spent a considerable amount of time in the first term of the Bush administration focused on North Korea and its relationship to the PRC, serving as the Senior Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, North Korea Working Group Coordinator at the State Department, and a participant in the Six Party talks. However, particularly for these reasons, I am mindful that my remarks should not in any way be interpreted as current administration policy or that I be seen as representing the views of the Department of State, Department of Defense or any other part of the government. These views are mine alone.

First, working closely with China obviously is a very important aspect of our strategy toward North Korea, but we need to be realistic about our differences. We all should appreciate the role that China has played as host of the Six Party Talks. I have no doubt that China’s leaders are sincerely interested in a diplomatic resolution of the core issues on the Korean peninsula. They have done a magnificent job bringing the different parties together and facilitating dialog on a critical issue. All of us involved should thank them.

At the same time, I am convinced that the Six Party Talks mean something very different for China than they do for the US or Japan. In fact, I sense that for many in the Chinese leadership the Six Party talks have always been more about managing the US and Japan – in order to temper the possibility of our taking actions that could disrupt North Korean stability – than about seriously promoting the denuclerization of North Korea. Despite its leading status in the talks, China has only on rare occasions been willing to put pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. Instead, the sporadic pressure it has applied has been more geared to trying to get the DPRK to act somewhat more civilized and less menacing, aiming to control, rather than trying to eliminate, the DPRK nuclear menace.

There even may be some in the Chinese military who feel that their North Korean ally, by possessing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, can serve as a proxy to intimidate Japan, impair our alliance with the ROK, and put pressure on the US. Perhaps they also reason that the US can be deterred by North Korea’s possession of a robust arsenal of weapons and missiles in a way that we would not be if the North had a much smaller capability. For example, the large-scale deployment of North Korean nuclear capable missiles over the last decade that can readily strike Japan never seems to have become a sufficient problem for the PLA to actively protest. Likewise, the development of a North Korean ICBM that could hit the US has not elicited any significant negative feedback, let alone serious pressure, from China. One would rationally expect that the Chinese might make these missile deployments make or break issues with the DPRK given the fact that their deployment might induce the US to make a unilateral strike, encourage Japan to develop its own offensive capabilities, potentially including IRBMs and nuclear weapons, and increase the urgency for the US and Japan to deploy missile defense systems that reduce the effectiveness of China’s deterrence against us. I am puzzled and disturbed by the PRC’s passivity regarding North Korea’s combined nuclear and missile build-up.

The bottom-line: as judged through its actions more than its words, China apparently believes it can live with a nuclear armed North Korea as long as the DPRK maintains its stability and is integrated gradually, both economically and politically, into the international community. I believe Beijing would find it especially easy to accommodate a nuclear armed North Korea if the North returned to the NPT and adopted some form of safeguards for its weapons and programs – in fact, this might represent the most the PRC would hope to get out of the Six Party Talks.

Second, China has long served as a safe harbor for North Korean proliferation and illicit trading networks and a transport hub for these networks via its airports and airspace, harbors and sea-space. Moreover, in the past decade there have been way too many incidents of Chinese companies actively fronting for North Korea in the procurement of key technologies for the DPRK nuclear program. Some of these incidents suggest lax enforcement of export controls, poor border controls, and a head-in-the-sand attitude of senior authorities. Others suggest active collusion and/or deliberately weak enforcement of international laws and agreements against WMD and missile proliferation. I can’t get into the details but there is a great body of information and the Chinese are well aware of our grave concerns.

For many years, China also has exhibited a remarkable tolerance of the DPRK’s deep relationship with Chinese organized crime and the use by Chinese OC groups of North Korea as a sort of criminal’s paradise to produce illegal items both for sale in China and export internationally. Ironically, China has long been the biggest victim of North Korean illicit activity, including the passage of counterfeit US currency, North Korean drug dealing, and the distribution of DPRK produced counterfeit cigarettes. There are even public reports that North Korea is counterfeiting the Renminbi, too. Given North Korea’s flagrant disregard of Chinese law, I always hoped China would want to be an active partner in the Illicit Activities Initiative. However, in my time at least, PRC authorities offered little cooperation, especially compared to those in other countries.

Still, every once in a while the DPRK crosses a line that Beijing can’t tolerate. For example, in the fall of 2002 a Chinese business tycoon with ties to organized crime named Yang Bin secured a contract from Kim Jong Il to set up and operate what amounted to a center for money laundering, gambling, and prostitution in Sinjuiju, just across from the Chinese border city of Dandong. Not long after North Korea formed this “free crime zone,” with Yang as “Governor,” Chinese authorities denied what the DPRK authorities has pledged would be Visa free access for a raft of Chinese and ROK tourists who had shown up wanting to be the first to enjoy the pleasures of Sinjuiju. They then lured Yang back across the border and arrested him. Another instance of unusual unilateralism occurred in the spring of 2004 when the Executive Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security publicly announced a crack down on North Korean drug dealing in Jilin Province which was portrayed as going out of control.

Third, we need to recognize that China has responded favorably only when its bottom-line is directly affected or felt under serious, but reasonable, pressure. American appeals based on China’s responsibility to uphold international laws and agreements as a “stakeholder” typically fall on deaf ears. If we want Chinese government officials to act we need to either present the specifics in a way that is beyond dispute or suggest that if they don’t get a grip on the facts and do something themselves there will be significant economic consequences. Appealing to their self-interest is more persuasive than appealing to their purported sense of global responsibility.

Fifth, and finally, we need to give credit to China for a key aspect of its strategy toward the DPRK. Even though China unfortunately may be willing to tolerate a nuclear North Korea, this does not mean it tolerates the status quo inside the DPRK regime. Chinese seem to fear that the biggest threat to instability in North Korea is its bankrupt economic system and North Korea’s unwillingness to adopt pro-capitalist policies ala Deng’s China. In the face of protracted North Korean resistance to calls for reform, China has managed to seed what could become a quiet revolution in the DPRK via a cross border trade boom, flooding the country with consumer goods – including cell phones, radios, pcs, and televisions – encouraging direct investment in light manufacturing and the minerals sector by Chinese businessmen, and making capital available to an emerging North Korean merchant class. Perhaps most importantly the renminbi seems to be supplanting the Won as the main currency inside North Korea. China, in essence, seems to have an economic regime change plan toward North Korea that over time may undermine the rule of the Kim dynasty inside out. In this regard, I believe that we can work with China to spread the sunshine of capitalism in North Korea, even as we compel it to crack down on the moonshine that satiates the North Korean elite and supports the DPRK’s WMD programs.

Statement of Professor Aaron L. Friedberg
Princeton University

(Former Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
2003-2005)

Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Hearing on “China’s Proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and Its Role in Addressing the Nuclear and Missile situations in Both Nations”
September 14, 2006

Introduction

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Commission.

In the time available, I would like to address three sets of questions:

First, where does the North Korean nuclear issue fit into the bigger picture of China’s policies for dealing with the Korean peninsula, East Asia, and the wider world?

Second, regarding the nuclear issue itself: what, exactly, is Beijing up to? What is its strategy and what are its objectives?

Third, to the extent that China’s goals and strategy in this confrontation deviate from our own, is there anything we can do to bring them more closely into alignment? Or, to put it more bluntly, what would we have to do to get China to be more helpful in compelling North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions?

The nuclear issue in strategic context

Since the mid-1990s, China has been pursuing an overall national strategy (or “grand strategy”) that can be summarized in three axioms:

“Avoid conflict” (especially with the United States)

“Build Comprehensive National Power (CNP)”

“Advance incrementally”

I believe (though I cannot prove) that China’s current leaders hope eventually to displace the United States as the preponderant power in East Asia – constricting its influence and presence while increasing their own. They see this as a gradual process, one that will likely take several decades to unfold.

Chinese strategists recognize that, while the United States is a Pacific power by virtue of geography, it is an Asian power largely by invitation. Its physical presence and, to a considerable degree, its ability to project and sustain military power into the region, are heavily dependent on a handful of political relationships, of which its alliances with Japan and South Korea are the most-long standing, and arguably the most important. If China is to emerge eventually as the dominant power in East Asia it is going to have to find some way of weakening, and possibly breaking, these alliances.

Instead of trying to woo Tokyo away from the Washington (which it might conceivably have been able to do in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War) Beijing has sought instead to bully and intimidate it. This has been counterproductive, to say the least, and has tended to drive Japan into even closer alignment with the U.S.

Having failed to make progress with Japan, Beijing has chosen instead to concentrate on South Korea. Here it has made considerable gains in the past decade, dramatically increasing the volume of PRC-ROK trade, investment and travel, bolstering high level diplomatic ties and establishing military-to-military contacts.

Since the late 1990s China has been trying to broaden and deepen its relations with South Korea, while at the same time working hard to remain close to its traditional, but often troublesome, allies in the North. The PRC has continued to supply enough aid to keep the DPRK afloat, even as it seeks to nudge Pyongyang down the path towards Chinese-style economic reform. Beijing’s longer-term goal appears to be to maneuver itself into a position where it can exert a decisive influence over the timing and terms of eventual Korean reunification. Chinese strategists may hope that they will be able one day to orchestrate the creation of a united Korea that is no longer allied with the U.S. and, preferably, “leans” toward China. For the time being, however, they want to insure that they retain a substantial physical barrier between their own border and the potential contaminating influence of a liberal democracy aligned with the United States.

The current stand-off

The eruption of the current nuclear crisis in 2002 presented real risks to China, but also some significant chances to advance toward its broader strategic objectives. To date Beijing has been remarkably successful at seizing the opportunities while avoiding potential dangers.

Early on in the crisis (especially in the period immediately preceding the American invasion of Iraq), Beijing may have feared that the U.S. would actually attack North Korea, thereby forcing China to choose between its desire to maintain good relations with Washington and its commitment to a traditional ally. This concern is probably what forced the PRC off the sidelines in the spring of 2003 and caused it to take an active role in facilitating and hosting three-way (later six-way) negotiations.

Aside from the possibility of direct military action, Beijing was (and is still) worried that sanctions and other external pressures might cause the Pyongyang regime to collapse, sending a flood of refugees across its northern border and leaving a massive mess, and a potential power vacuum, on China’s doorstep. To prevent this from happening Beijing has inserted itself as a buffer between North Korea and those (led by the U.S. and Japan) who seek to squeeze it even harder. Since the crisis began not only has China refused to ratchet up economic pressure, it has actually increased its assistance to the North.

A final risk for China is that the open acquisition by North Korea of nuclear weapons could encourage others in the region to follow suit, including Japan and Taiwan. Pyongyang’s provocative actions and bombastic claims have already increased this danger. The best that Beijing can do to keep things under control is to make sure that the North does not remove all doubt about its capabilities by conducting a weapons test. This is probably a “redline” that the Chinese have warned Kim Jong-Il not to cross.

On the positive side of the equation, Beijing has used the nuclear crisis to draw still closer to Seoul and to drive a wedge between South Korea, on the one hand, and the U.S. and Japan, on the other. Like the South (and in marked contrast to the allegedly reckless war-mongering of the Americans and Japanese) China prefers to handle the North with great delicacy and caution, using inducements rather than punishments to try to bring it to heel.

At the same time as it ingratiates itself with the South Koreans, Beijing has sought to earn maximum credit from the U.S. for agreeing to orchestrate the Six Party Talks. Chinese spokesmen are quick to point out how have helpful they been and to use their role in the nuclear crisis as evidence of their commitment to countering nuclear proliferation and becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system.

Finally, albeit thus far with few tangible results, Beijing appears to be using the present stand off, and its willingness to protect the North, as leverage to try to encourage Pyongyang to adopt meaningful economic reforms.

Beijing has managed the current crisis with skill and, provided that tensions do not rise precipitously, it may see little advantage in bringing it to a conclusion. If the stand off is to be resolved, China’s first priority will be to ensure that North Korea remains intact and that it continues to be ruled by a friendly regime. A settlement that brought in more outside aid and investment would have the added benefit of shifting the economic burdens for the North’s continued support onto other nations. With an eye on their longer-range objectives, Chinese strategists will doubtless prefer an outcome that further boosts their perceived influence while subtly reducing the status of the United States. China’s leaders probably hope that Washington will eventually agree to back away from its demands for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities and settle for an Agreed Framework-like “freeze” of indefinite duration, perhaps accompanied by security guarantees or a non-aggression pledge. Such an outcome, which would leave Pyongyang with a “recessed” nuclear deterrent and enhanced international standing, while at the same time being widely viewed as a setback for American “cowboy diplomacy” and a victory for China’s “sober-minded realism.”

Getting China to do more

Given Kim Jong-Il’s evident commitment to developing nuclear weapons, it is highly unlikely that he will ever agree to give them up unless the alternative to doing so is his own imminent demise. If it wanted to, China could certainly do a great deal more to confront Kim with such a choice, including suspending aid, restricting trade, controlling unauthorized movements of people and goods across the North Korean frontier, cracking down on illicit activities conducted through or from Chinese territory, and perhaps threatening to terminate the PRC-DPRK alliance. While there is no guarantee that Kim Jong-Il would capitulate if faced with such pressure, it is at least conceivable that he might, especially if he were offered face-saving economic and diplomatic rewards for doing so, and if the alternative was total isolation and the mounting likelihood of regime collapse.

What would it take to convince China’s leaders to apply real pressure to Pyongyang? Attempts at pure diplomatic persuasion have thus far produced few results. Nor have veiled threats of dire consequences been any more successful. Aware of American and South Korean fears of a possible conventional counterattack, Chinese strategists appear to have discounted the possibility of a U.S. strike on the North’s nuclear facilities and have likely come to regard statements that “all options are still on the table” as little more than bluff. Beijing also does not seem overly worried at this point by American suggestions that North Korea’s behavior may unleash a wave of proliferation across Northeast Asia. Nor does China seem to fear that failure to do all it can to bring the nuclear confrontation to a satisfactory conclusion could eventually jeopardize its overall relationship with the United States.

Recent U.S. moves against parts of North Korea’s illicit financial network appear to have gotten Pyongyang’s attention, but they have probably caused concern in Beijing as well. If the United States continues down this path, bringing legal action against more banks, businesses and individuals involved in funneling cash to Kim Jong-Il and his cronies, it could end up causing serious embarrassment, or worse, in China.

If the present stand off continues, and Pyongyang begins to accumulate a substantial stockpile of fissile material, the danger that it will be tempted to sell or transfer some of it to terrorists or other rogue states is likely to grow. In such circumstances, the U.S. may be forced to impose some kind of air and sea blockade on the North, even if, by doing so, it runs a heightened risk of direct confrontation and escalation.

Faced with either of these possibilities Beijing might prefer to take matters into its own hands, pressuring Pyongyang to back down rather than allowing it to drag China into a deepening crisis with the United States.

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