Posted on 10/13/2006 3:46:10 PM PDT by Shermy
Nobody has been arrested for the anthrax mailings of 2001, but many people have paid for the crime.
Five died and at least 17 others got sick.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been frustrated. Careers have crumbled. Taxpayers have gotten socked for billions of dollars to shore up bioterror defenses that some experts say still fall short.
Now, an analysis from the FBI itself, buried in a microbiology journal, is raising more questions about the investigation.
In the August issue of Applied and Environmental Microbiology, FBI scientist Douglas Beecher sought to set the record straight. Anthrax spores mailed to politicians and journalists in September and October 2001, Beecher wrote, were not prepared using advanced techniques and additives to make them more lethal, contrary to "a widely circulated misconception."
The notion the anthrax spores were "weaponized" had fueled conjecture that only a government insider could have carried out the operation.
Beecher's article suggested a much wider universe of potential suspects -- who showed they could kill without highly refined spores.
"A clever high school student" could make such a preparation, according to Ronald Atlas, former president of the American Society for Microbiology and co-director of the Center for Health Hazards Preparedness at the University of Louisville.
The Beecher paper has left Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J., wondering if the killings, which further shook a nation already reeling from the Sept. 11 terror attacks, will ever be solved. He blames the FBI for "botching" the case.
Agents spun their wheels chasing a small circle of weapons experts, Holt said.
In the anthrax attacks, Steven Hatfill, a virologist who had worked for the government, landed in the cross-hairs. Labeled a "person of interest" by officials but never charged, the scientist claims the public probe has made him unemployable. He is suing the government and media outlets.
Kenneth Berry's career also unraveled after the FBI searched a Dover Township, N.J., summer home he was visiting in 2004. Berry was a doctor from upstate New York who started an organization for training emergency workers to deal with biochemical attacks. He never was charged, either.
Holt also chides authorities for taking nearly a year to discover anthrax traces in a mailbox near Princeton University. That mailbox, where letters laced with anthrax bacteria may have begun their journey in 2001, is on a route that feeds the Hamilton Township postal center where anthrax letters were processed.
In a letter to Holt, FBI Assistant Director Eleni Kalisch declined to give a closed-door briefing to the House Intelligence Committee. Kalisch claimed sensitive information was leaked from classified briefings more than three years ago, and described the anthrax case as a criminal matter not subject to the committee's oversight.
Some cases take time to crack, Kalisch wrote. Seventeen FBI agents and 10 postal inspectors remain on the "Amerithrax" beat. The FBI said the anthrax investigation has spanned six continents and generated more than 9,100 interviews, 67 searches and 6,000 subpoenas.
Early on, the FBI hoped that analysis of the spores would point to the lab that prepared them. But Beecher's article underscores difficulties of such microscopic sleuthing. Particle sizes, for instance, may not yield as many clues as some expected.
Over time, after being handled and exposed to different conditions, particles "may not resemble the initial product," Beecher wrote.
Yet the FBI is confident, and has forged scientific ties and advances to help prevent future biological attacks, said Joseph Persichini Jr., acting assistant director in charge of the Washington field office, on the FBI's Web site.
Richard Ebright, a Rutgers University microbiologist, still thinks the anthrax attacks were an inside job because they used a virulent form of the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis, which only a few biodefense- or intelligence-related labs were thought to possess.
"Whoever did it is an insider," said Ayaad Assaad, a toxicologist with the Environmental Protection Agency, who formerly worked at an Army biodefense center at Fort Detrick, Md. "It started with anthrax. Now it's ricin, and God knows what's coming."
Ed Lake has tracked the case closely, self-publishing a book, "Analyzing the Anthrax Attacks, The First Three Years" and moderating a Web site. Lake is convinced the FBI knows the perpetrator but lacks evidence to prosecute. He believes the killer is a scientist from central New Jersey who wanted America to gird for an al-Qaida bioterror attack in the wake of Sept. 11.
"So he sent a warning to the media, saying this is next, there's a biological attack coming next, and be prepared: Take penicillin," said Lake, referring to hand-printed letters, bearing New Jersey postmarks, sent to NBC and the New York Post.
Leon Harris retired last year from the Hamilton Township postal center. He too suspects the bad guys are home-grown and will be caught.
"I don't care if it takes 10 years," the Air Force veteran said. "They're going to find them."
Ernesto Blanco agreed. He survived inhalational anthrax that killed his friend Bob Stevens, a colleague at a tabloid in Florida, five years ago this month. Blanco, now 79, returned to his mailroom job at American Media Inc. in 2002.
"I am positive they will catch them," Blanco said. "I have faith in what they are doing."
TIMELINE
Key dates in the 5-year-old investigation of the anthrax attacks:
2001:
Sept. 18: Postal facility in Hamilton Township, N.J., processes anthrax-laced letters to NBC News in New York and the New York Post.
Oct. 5: Bob Stevens, photo editor at Florida tabloid the Sun dies from inhalational anthrax.
Oct. 9: Hamilton Township facility processes anthrax letters to then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and Sen. Patrick Leahy. Both letters have return address of fictitious "Greendale School" in Franklin Park, N.J.
Oct. 16: U.S. Senate closes; employees are tested for exposure to anthrax microbes.
Oct. 17: The House shuts down.
Oct. 18: Hamilton Township facility is closed.
Oct. 21: Washington postal worker Thomas Morris Jr. dies from anthrax.
Oct. 22: Washington postal worker Joseph Curseen dies from anthrax.
Oct. 31: Kathy Nguyen, who worked in a New York City hospital supply room, dies from anthrax.
Nov. 21: Ottilie Lundgren, 94, of Oxford, Conn., dies from anthrax. Authorities suspect her mail was contaminated by other mail.
[snip - more at link]
Dr Beecher provided ZERO evidence to back up his assertion - apart from a reference to a paper on wet preparations creating measureable aerosols.
He failed to cite the study of secondary aerosolization of the spores in the Hart building.
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/288/22/2853.pdf
He failed to cite the 1996 Army study that demonstrated spores do NOT easily form secondary aerosols.
Chinn KS. Reaerosolization Hazard Assessment for Biological Agent Contaminated Hardstand Areas. Dugway Proving Ground, Utah: US Dept of the Army; 1996.
But, hey, he works in the FBI labs, so he MUST be right, even altough he didn't provide a shred of data.
Look at what his illustrious co-workers have achieved:
http://www.amazon.com/Tainting-Evidence-Inside-Scandals-Crime/dp/0743236416
Two crusading journalists investigate the FBI's forensic crime lab and deliver a strong indictment against what goes on there. Federal agents regularly dupe the public into accepting "scientific" findings that aren't based upon science at all, they charge, and the lab is infected with a troubling culture where truth plays second fiddle to prosecutorial interests, with information potentially useful to defendants withheld. The book's hero is FBI-scientist-turned-whistle-blower Frederic Whitehurst, and most of the chapters focus on the crime lab's controversial role in high-profile cases involving O.J. Simpson, the World Trade Center bombing, the Unabomber, and others. The authors at times appear to have a pro-prosecution bias of their own, but their conclusions shouldn't be ignored. They probably won't be; as one attorney tells the authors, "No defense lawyer in the country is going to take what the FBI lab says at face value anymore."
Actually, it is your belief that AFIP is infallable that "borders on religious fanaticism." You simply ignore or ridicule anything which does not support your beliefs.
There are signs that AFIP might soon be forced to explain why they wrote what they wrote. If and when it happens, it could be interesting.
But, I assume that if they say it was just an assumption, you'll argue that they were forced to say that by all those people involved in the grand conspiracy in which you so fanatically believe.
I'm done for today. Signing off.
Ed
There are signs that AFIP might soon be forced to explain why they wrote what they wrote.
really? something else you made up? Your opinion presented as fact?
Please note that the ONLY other periodical they attacked was the Post, and it's a tabloid just like the AMI publications.
Throughout the world the premier publications in virtually every non Western country are TABLOID format.
These guys did the same thing you're doing ~ judging the situation in terms of your own experience.
BTW, I spent several years working on a degree in Middle Eastern studies, and I personally know more Moslems than you've ever seen, even in a large mob.
The weather the day I suggest they used to fill the envelopes had a steady 12 MPH breeze. That was enough to blow loose silica particles into their envelope loading operation, particularly if they used Sugar Sand Park or another park similarly dressed. BTW, that one is advertised as ALCOHOL FREE.
Southie, silica can just blow in if there's lots of finely ground loose silica around. The fact that silica was found can be used to suggest something much more useful like where the envelopes were filled.
He has pretty good credentials for saying that.
True, if silica was the only mitigating factor. However, the anthrax attacks were revealed to aerosolize readily, which indicates professional mixxing, preparation, etc., rather than just random contamination (which would give you some significant percentage of anthrax spore clumps).
It would also be rare for contamination to be only one compound (e.g. silica). You'd expect contamination to celebrate a bit more diversity (e.g. pollen, human skin, dirt, and other common non-clean-room substances that are ubiquitous).
So there are *multiple* factors that evidence professional weaponization of the anthrax in a clean room, followed by reasonably clean packaging of the anthrax into the letters.
You don't need good credentials to say that...because it can be easily tested.
But what you have to ask yourself is why the FBI hasn't published the results of such a test.
That facility in New Jersey is very modern and had the best stuff.
That's fine, but it should be *tested* to see if pure anthrax spores, with silica contamination dumped on top, suddenly aerosolize readily after going through mail processing.
My own opinion is that weaponization of anthrax takes a bit more thorough mixing (at an entirely different molecular level) than that, but why guess when we could test and KNOW?!
Also, keep in mind that it is highly unusual for contamination to be from only one compound/element. Your clothes will have more than one natural element on them after a day of wear outside, after all.
After the anthrax attack they retrofited to use vacuum systems. Most of the aerosolization occurred when anthrax contamination on surfaces was hit with blasts of air at high pressure.
You would not believe......
BTW, I strongly suspect Ken had, in fact, "tested" everything you mention. But that was back, that was back, that was back in the USSR.
There may be some confusion over terms. "Aerosolization" in terms of WMDs is not about just blowing spores with compressed air.
You can blow pure anthrax with compressed air and you'll still be seeing large clumps of spores moving around.
Moreover, the Senate anthrax letters weren't being blown with compressed air when opened, yet their anthrax samples readily aerosolized.
There's no reason to "suspect" or guess. This is a claim that can be verified true or false with a readily repeatable test.
Without such a test being made public, there is no reason to believe it, however. It's just too easy to test to see if true or not. I question any such claim that isn't backed by such a simple, public test.
How big do you want your "clumps" to be? 1 spore, 2 spores, 3 maybe?
The opening unit at the Senate office building uses a high degree of negative pressure so that any contaminant is sucked away from the people opening the mail. This operation has been relocated to a different building with much more elaborate equipment. I would not be surprised to find them equipped with ultraviolet sanitizers.
Yes, that's all true but it doesn't change the fact that the mailed anthrax was prepared so as to aerosolize readily.
Let's put it this way ~ the anthrax appears to aerosolize readily ~ that does not necessary demonstrate the preparer's intent or capability.
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