I know this to be 180° contrary to the Rudman report which identified ports, for example, and the threat of nuclear weapons in containers to be virtually wide open.
So I googled and came up with a speech by David Obie, yes I know he's a left-wing Democrat out to undermine the administration, but let's read what he has to say in his speech given to the Commonwealth club on June 2 of 2004, and determine if any of it is true:
Last year, the White House reversed themselves and finally requested a portion of the funds that were needed for container security. Their position changed from, “we can’t afford it” to “we needed to wait.” That is a turnaround and I suppose we should welcome it. But the $126 million that the President has proposed for fiscal year 2005 will not adequately fund the program. It will not even allow us to fully staff the 45 foreign ports where DHS had planned to inspect all manifest documents. It will not permit our current foreign inspection programs to become permanent. We are currently in only 17 ports. We currently have no container security presence in China, the biggest U.S. trading partner in terms of cargo containers. The number of cargo containers arriving to the U.S. from China is more than three times those arriving from Hong Kong.
More troubling than the mere question of resources is the lack of political or bureaucratic clout behind this critical initiative. If having inspection agents working with foreign customs officials is to be a truly effective means of understanding what is in foreign ships before they leave for U.S. ports, it requires developing long term relationships between our agents and those who control the foreign ports we wish to monitor.
This involves a new level of training and expertise for our customs agents. It involves establishing continuity in the relationship we have with host governments in terms of what we expect to get and what incentives we can provide to those who cooperate. Nothing could be more destructive to this effort than to rotate in and out of foreign ports agents with only a few months of experience based on a deliberate system of staffing through temporary assignment. But that is precisely what we have done. In the few foreign ports where we do have a presence, that presence is a U.S. customs officer detailed there on a six-month temporary duty assignment. Those agents don’t even know what the problems were between the U.S. and the host government when the program was initiated. They are certainly not people that officials of the host government would want to invest much time in getting to know — they will be gone before there is any pay off from developing a relationship.
If the overseas effort to identify the contents of cargo containers is the outer perimeter for protecting our ports, the ability of the Coast Guard to interdict, board and inspect U.S. bound shipping at sea is the next perimeter. Yet the Coast Guard’s capacity to perform that function has also been restrained by lack of resources. The Administration frequently states that the Coast Guard is now boarding all vessels that are deemed to be “high interest.” That means 80 percent of all other vessels are not boarded.
Observing, tracking, and controlling ships as they approach and enter into American waters is the next perimeter in securing our ports. Systems have been developed that are very similar to the systems by which air traffic control directs airplanes entering into U.S. airspace and approaching U.S. airports. These systems, however, are available in only nine ports, leaving 45 major ports without such a system. Again, this is penny wise and pound foolish. It is also a bad decision in terms of long-term cost effectiveness. More automated systems permit more rapid detection of ships that are not following control directives; they can be operated by fewer people and are long-term cost savers.
And, inside our ports, there are numerous critical issues. One is preventing unauthorized persons from having access to ships, containers, or port storage areas. A second is protecting hazardous chemicals and materials from attack. The Coast Guard estimated that the 185 commercial seaports in the United States would need about $7 billion to assess vulnerabilities and take necessary action to correct those vulnerabilities. These port authorities do not, in most instances, have the revenue raising authority to pay any significant portion of these costs. This year was the first time the Administration requested any money whatsoever for this purpose, and it only requested $46 million. The Congress has been able to appropriate only $587 million or less than 10 percent of the money needed to do the job
Do you have any citations for your assertions?
What really is "rubbish" is to distort someone's words and so they imply exactly the opposite of what was intended. I don't say we are supposed to kill 1.3 billion Muslims but I do say that you cannot wage asymmetrical war of attrition in places like Iraq and hope thereby to forestall 19 terrorists, recruited out of 1.3 billion Muslims, attacking America.
You have not convinced me that our borders are secure against viruses, chemicals, or even small atomic bombs-and these are civilization shattering attacks, not to mention the catastrophic economic consequences.
I ask again, do you have citations?
