Here are your gold glasses.
Posted on 09/22/2006 8:47:25 PM PDT by churchillbuff
In mid-2004, John and Karen Philbrook bought a home in Sacramento’s North Highlands neighborhood, when buying a house seemed like a sure ticket to security. They opted for an interest-only, adjustable-rate mortgage and counted on the value of their house continuing to rise as a way to build up equity. ...
[snip]
In 2004, Karen and John realized their dream by buying a house in the North Highlands section of Sacramento that’s situated several miles northeast of downtown. It’s a small, three-bedroom bungalow, with a brick chimney running down its wooden exterior. With John’s two jobs and Karen’s at Safeway, the Philbrooks believed they could manage the mortgage. They were on their way to building their own personal American Dream and creating a secure future for their young daughter, Nicole.
“We prayed and prayed and prayed to have a home,” recalled John, a large, suntanned man, his muscular arms highlighted by a sleeveless blue vest as he sat in his backyard. “This is perfect for us. I come out here, throw up my hammock and lay out here on a Sunday afternoon. It’s perfect. It’s like a park back here. We’ve got fruit trees: oranges, plums, a pear tree there. Those are pistachios.”
“I could own a dog now,” Karen said, recalling her sense of elation when they moved in. “Having a place we could call our own. Not having to worry about apartment rules. Total freedom. It felt really nice to have our own place--we’re achieving something in life.”
For John, it seemed a perfect story of redemption, perhaps even a quintessential American story of second chances and reinvented lives. Then, earlier this summer, a note from the Philbrooks’ mortgage broker arrived in the mail. Overnight, the note informed them, their monthly payment was increasing by close to $500. And the Philbrooks, who had about $900 saved up for their daughter’s future, a few hundred more for emergencies and nothing in reserve beyond that, realized their entire dream now stood ready to fall.
Over the past year, as interest rates have risen and for-sale houses have sat unsold for months, much has been written on various aspects of the housing market.
Journalists and analysts--not to mention homeowners or potential buyers--want to know: Is the current slowdown just a blip in an otherwise vibrant market, or is it the end of a decade-plus bubble? Will national trends be magnified in Sacramento’s suburbs, which have seen startling appreciation in house values in the recent past? Will the air in the bubble gradually leak out, giving people time to adjust their expectations and their financial planning, or will it burst spectacularly? Will interest rates continue edging upward? If so, will the real-estate market collapse, when it becomes impossible for new buyers to make offers that are acceptable to sellers who bought homes when rates were low and prices were high?
Much of the ink spilled on this has examined these issues as a series of isolated problems. It’s becoming clear, however, that the problems are interlocking. Indeed, there’s a fear voiced in real-estate circles that some parts of the country, including Sacramento, might be facing a perfect storm in which the true losers are families who borrowed cavalierly without adequately crunching the numbers. Families like the Philbrooks--who, at the urgings of sometimes-unscrupulous mortgage brokers, seriously over-extended themselves at the height of the housing boom--now will pay a high price for reaching toward the American Dream.
This summer, analysts delivered bad news for Sacramento. It’s now one of the five riskiest housing markets in the country, according to a report issued in June by PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. Factoring in home prices, wages in the local labor market, local unemployment rates and the percentage of families’ average monthly income now spent on covering home costs, PMI predicted that there was a 58.5-percent chance home prices would decline in the next two years. That number was up from 41.9 percent a year earlier, already a far higher risk rate than in much of the rest of the country. Sacramentans, the report warned, paid 30 percent more as a percentage of their monthly income toward housing in 2006 than they did in 1995 before housing prices spiraled so sharply upward.
Another blow came that same month, when National City Corp. estimated that the Sacramento housing market was severely overpriced--along with 39 percent of the 317 U.S. markets included in the survey--to the extent that it was at risk for a price correction.
How are Sacramentans paying for this?
“We think people are stretching by getting different kinds of mortgages, what Alan Greenspan called the 'exotic’ mortgages,” said PMI’s Beth Haiken. “We do know these mortgages have become much more popular in the last few years. They give you a lower payment in exchange for additional risk. They all work by transferring risk to the borrower--higher-interest balloon payments.”
“You’re seeing people who were living off the equity in their house. It worked real good for three or four years,” said attorney Scott Coben, a bankruptcy specialist who works out of an airy office, built around an inner, roofed atrium decorated with palms and tropical plants, in downtown Sacramento. Seeing their houses keep appreciating, Coben explained, homeowners borrowed against the increased paper value of their property, essentially living off the promise of an eternally rosy real-estate environment. “But now the gravy train is coming to an end. They’ve got the credit cards, crazy loans, 40-year mortgages, and they’ve done refinancing. A lot of them are going to lose their homes.
“People were just totally unrealistic about real estate--refinancing to sustain their lifestyles, or people who got in the game late took out horrible loans to get real estate,” Coben said. “They’re getting killed now.”
“There are a lot of properties on the market now where I see people in that position,” asserted Patti Priess, a local Dunnigan realty agent. “All of a sudden, in a market where foreclosures were not the norm, I’m seeing in the comments 'pending foreclosure.’”
By the early months of the summer, 1,352 Sacramento County homes had default notices filed against them in the second quarter of the year, the highest number in nine years, according to DataQuick Information Systems, a La Jolla company that tracks California’s real-estate market. Surrounding counties also saw significant increases in default activity. That represents an increase from the previous year of 109 percent, while across California foreclosures increased only 67 percent, according to Foreclosures.com. RealtyTrac Inc. ranks the capital region as the second-highest area in the state in terms of foreclosures.
John Philbrook relaxes in the park-like perfection of his own backyard. Photo By Larry Dalton
Some homeowners, while escaping foreclosure, are being driven out of the real-estate market entirely. One couple Priess represents moved to Palo Alto, put their Sacramento house up for sale and watched in horror as the market softened and the house remained unsold. “They’ve been in Palo Alto unable to purchase a new home, and their house here is empty. And we’ve reduced the price and reduced the price,” Priess said. Still, they have been unable to sell it.
The number of people looking to declare Chapter 13 bankruptcy as a way to avoid foreclosure is mushrooming, Coben said. While the filer’s credit goes into the toilet, bankruptcy allows some breathing room to set up payment schedules and avoid losing everything.
The attorney also says he’s seeing an increase in what are known in the real-estate business as “short sales.” In a short sale, the lender gets less than the amount owed on the loan. It’s a better-than-nothing alternative for the lender and often an only alternative for the homeowner or borrower. Short sales strive to avoid a situation like the following. Because most banks issue mortgages for only 80 percent of the home value, some cash-strapped buyers take out second loans to finance the entire cost of their homes. If buyers with these kinds of cobbled-together loans default on their mortgages, the home is sold under foreclosure, and the second lender typically forfeits its lien, losing everything. To avoid this situation, Coben explained, the second lender agrees to a “short sale.” The home is sold quickly at a low price, and the lender of the second mortgage accepts a discounted payment. It allows an escape for the borrower, but the price is temporarily wrecked credit, no money left over from the sale and a tax obligation of thousands of dollars, since the government counts the money not paid back to the second lender as income paid to the borrower.
Borrowing 100 percent of the cost of a home in a changing market may not be the most serious problem some homeowners currently face. A slew of “exotic” mortgage options add their force to the “perfect storm” some argue has hit Sacramento’s housing market. Many of the individuals most at risk took out Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages. These allow borrowers to make monthly payments for a temporary period of time that don’t even cover the interest accruing on their loan. The unpaid interest gets tacked onto the loan, and many buyers never notice the fine print stating that after a couple of years their interest rates will soar. Others bought a variety of loan products, including large loans against future appreciation in equity taken out by some longtime homeowners that are proving risky in a climate of market slowdowns and interest hikes. Still other borrowers, like John and Karen, agreed to interest-only mortgage payments on loans covering 100 percent of the cost of their homes but which don’t permit for the accumulation of any ownership capital in the property they are paying a mortgage on.
In the Philbrooks' case, John and Karen borrowed almost the entirety of the $244,000 cost of their modest North Highlands home: One loan was written for $195,000 at 6.375-percent interest; another financed the remainder of nearly $45,000 at 9.125 percent. The rate on the small loan was fixed. But on the large loan, the rate was fixed for only two years, and after that it was variable.
John said the Realtor who arranged the loan verbally assured him it would never go up by more than a quarter of 1 percent at any time. In fact, in the (very) small-print clauses attached to that loan were four poison-pill provisions.
Having not understood the small print of their contract, the Philbrooks were unaware that the loan’s rate would never be lower than its starting rate--meaning all the risk attached to the variable rate fell on them. Neither did they fully understand that the interest rate could never go up by more than 1 percent in a given month, except for the first increase, when it could leapfrog to 9.375 percent in one go, and from then on rise incrementally to a maximum of 12.375 percent. They weren’t aware that their variable rate was tied not to the prevailing mortgage rates but to a market index based out of London, which circulates money at a far higher rate of interest than does the fixed-rate-mortgage market. The final poison pill--a $7,300 penalty if they chose to seek new financing during the first three years--discouraged the Philbrooks from refinancing once high rates kicked in. Not understanding the first three provisions, the couple were not fully appreciative of the dangers of this refinancing clause.
What does all of this mean? When the contract is teased apart, it’s clear the Philbrooks signed a real-estate deal guaranteed to boomerang back on them two years later in a staggeringly unpleasant way. “Life’s a losing gamble without Jesus,” reads the decal on the bumper of the Philbrooks’ old pickup truck, part of a package of religious iconography that dots the family’s vehicles as well as the walls of its house. Quite possibly, the Philbrooks’ failure to read the fine print represents a similarly blind roll of the dice.
On the day of the couple’s 14th wedding anniversary, John said, “We got a notice saying the payment had increased from 6.375 percent to 9.375 percent in just one month.” Sitting at his small dining-room table, he recalled his startled reaction that day: “Oh my gosh. How am I going to pay the mortgage? What am I going to do with my family? I can’t afford this.”
Overnight, the monthly payment on the $195,000 loan went from $1,350 to $1,841. Factor in the payment on the smaller, second loan, and the Philbrooks now were paying $2,250 a month servicing their mortgage. Since Karen and John bring home a total of about $4,000 after taxes each month from their three jobs, this was a crushing burden. Add in two hefty car payments, utilities and insurance bills, and that didn’t leave much left over for such necessities as food.
“This was our first time purchasing a house,” Karen said. “When the interest rates went up, we were told it would go up just a little bit. When it went up more than that, it went up nearly $500. My husband had to get a third job, give up his Sundays. It made me feel like, 'Wow, you can’t trust anybody anymore.’”
Undoubtedly, John and Karen were staggeringly naive in signing such a contract. The problem is that the Philbrooks aren’t alone. During the heady days of this most recent real-estate boom, increasing numbers of people borrowed 100 percent of the costs of their homes. And since banks are reluctant to finance such risky mortgages, frequently these homebuyers ended up signing contracts with fly-by-night operators whose profits, while legal, were largely generated by convincing clients to sign dubious deals such as the one bought into by John and Karen. With today’s shifting real-estate sands, those contracts are starting to hurt, and badly.
“Loan officers, they’ve replaced car salesmen as the shadiest people you deal with,” John said, bitterly.
As the summer unfolded, staving off insurmountable bills and foreclosure on their home became the Philbrooks’ overriding priority. They wouldn’t, couldn’t, accept that a dream they’d adhered to so obstinately was rapidly becoming a nightmare.
“I told my wife, 'We’re not going to lose this place,’” John said in early August, with a determined, if somewhat hollow, optimism. “I’m not going to do anything illegal ever again, but I’m not going to lose this. I’ll get a third job. I don’t want this to be taken from us.”
John applied for yet more employment, eventually getting an offer to work another several nights a week as a security guard at a local country club. Ultimately, he wouldn’t have to start this job. If he had, though, he would have been working well over 80 hours a week, missing several nights’ sleep and hardly ever seeing his daughter. It was a steep price to pay, but for John and Karen it seemed the only way to keep their house.
“[The realty company we chose to sell our house] gave us a sign last week. But we haven’t put it up yet. I guess we’re embarrassed. My wife’s humiliated that our neighbors will see we’re selling our home. I don’t want to rent my whole life. As corny as it sounds, it’s the American Dream--it’s the dream for most people. I don’t think we’ll lose our house, because we’re praying for it. And I don’t think God would leave us like that.”
Reluctantly, the Philbrooks put their house up for sale, listing it at $279,000. At that price, they would be able to walk away from their venture into Sacramento’s housing with a few thousand dollars in their pocket. If it sold for less than the asking price, however, they’d start losing money on the whole deal. Worst case: They couldn’t sell at all, a not-unlikely scenario in a housing market glutted as of the end of June with more than 16,000 homes for sale in the surrounding region--a more than 60-percent increase since the start of the year. In that case, they’d lose their house to the mortgage company and go into bankruptcy in the process. That fear explains why they readily listed their house for $21,000 less than its appraised value of $300,000.
“Because there’re so many houses on the market right now,” John explained. “After we’d paid all the fees and stuff, we’d probably come out with $10,000.”
As it turned out, the Philbrooks were lucky. After working the phones and approaching several different brokers, they managed to get a new mortgage in August. They ditched their interest-only, variable-rate mortgage and locked in a 30-year, fixed-rate loan at a little over 6 percent.
But luck in this uncertain market is more a matter of not losing everything than of actually coming out ahead. In fact, the Philbrooks’ two-year venture into Sacramento real estate will, over the decades of their mortgage, cost them a huge amount more than they’d originally anticipated.
After two years of making monthly payments that covered only the interest on their $240,000 initial debt, they now had to borrow to pay the $7,300 opt-out provision and cover the debts they’d incurred during the chaotic summer of 2006. In the end, they borrowed $260,000--$16,000 more than the initial cost of the house--at a higher rate of interest than they were paying when they first bought the house in 2004.
Since they weren’t paying anything toward the principal of their mortgage between 2004 and 2006, they didn’t have any more equity when they refinanced in 2006 than when they moved in. For those 24 months, all John and Karen had done was pay close to $2,000 a month servicing their debt. This was a far higher monthly payment than if they had been renting during this time.
And to cap it off, instead of only having 28 years of mortgage payments left, they were back to square one, owing 30 years of payments at an additional $150 a month, making for an extra $54,000 in payments (spread over three decades) more than their first mortgage. By any measure, this wasn’t exactly a sound business proposition.
“I don’t feel secure,” Karen admitted. “I feel like I have to keep my house. I feel grateful, though, that we’ve come this far. But I don’t feel as secure as before. I feel I have to pay more attention, be more alert, watch the spending and everything now. I can’t relax.”
The only thing you give is rose-colored glasses.
Nighty night.......................
Yes, that was good detail on LIBOR and Prime.
Someone else mentioned COFI, cost of funds index. Now that jogs my memory that about 20 years ago I was told that my ARM was based on something called, and I may be wrong about the number, the 11th District Cost of Funds. Is this still used and did I remember it correctly, and what is it if it is still pertinent?
"The discrepancy rate [between rich and poor] was far greater at t he end of the 19th century..."
You have exactly made my point. Poverty was rampant, and the middle class very small. We are again moving in that direction.
Regarding health care costs. You make some valid points about overuse, misuse, and law suits, but the fact is that segments of the medical/drug industry make 20% annual profit, compared with from 2% to 7% profit by many other major corporations.
Another point was made that part of CEO compensation increases are from stock options. This is part of the problem. Remember how Enron executives sold off their stocks well in advance of the bad news that Enron was toast. If CEO's are to be issued stock, and if it is to be an incentive to run the company well, then there should be a provision that, let's say for example, that they can only sell 20% of their share in any one year. Thus they would at least have to plan for the next five years, instead of raiding the company for their own profit.
The poverty that you talk about, was far worse back then, than it is now. Living conditions were such, that it is almost unimaginable today, to OUR own poor.
Forget the drug industry! All of those super-dooper machines and tests and LAW SUITS are what has mostly increased the disastrously high costs of health care today. And the overuse and misuse has been of criminal proportions for the last 30 years.
You really have to drop your inclination to unadulterated MARXISM. This IS a CONSERVATIVE forum. All if this damned class warfare and replies filled by same, is just out of order here. And it REALLY would be of help to you if you did some actual research about stocks and stock options, before you start talking about them. It is patently and blatantly obvious that you have no knowledge of that area.
When CEOs are given stock options, they DO have a time limit ( usually of several years ) that they MUST be held, before the options can be exercised.
The poverty that you talk about, was far worse back then, than it is now. Living conditions were such, that it is almost unimaginable today, to OUR own poor.
Forget the drug industry! All of those super-dooper machines and tests and LAW SUITS are what has mostly increased the disastrously high costs of health care today. And the overuse and misuse has been of criminal proportions for the last 30 years.
You really have to drop your inclination to unadulterated MARXISM. This IS a CONSERVATIVE forum. All if this damned class warfare and replies filled by same, is just out of order here. And it REALLY would be of help to you if you did some actual research about stocks and stock options, before you start talking about them. It is patently and blatantly obvious that you have no knowledge of that area.
When CEOs are given stock options, they DO have a time limit ( usually of several years ) that they MUST be held, before the options can be exercised.
Wrong Grasshopper. We recently sold our house this spring, moved back to Alabama. We are in the house buying searching mode now. So, I am VERY familiar with what to do and not what to do. YOU STATED many different people putting pressure on him. Well, it is up to HIM to show a bit of back bone and not give into their pressures and made the decision on the house using his own mind, knowing his own means, and income and ability to PAY THE MORTGAGE!
Here are your gold glasses.
That's a big IF. Huge.
And what is the "situation?" Is it that the time has never been better to own gold? That the world is about to suffer the cataclysmic economic disaster, and should patronize a certain website to learn more?
FR standards require you ping freepers you mention by name.
And your point? What it tells me - driving home something I already believe - is that I have better political and moral judgment than Bill Gates. Gates is also big on planned parenthood. That doesn't speak well for his moral judgment, either. He's a genuis with technology and money-making, but that kind of genuis doesn't automatically come with intelligence on political and moral issues.
I see the same thing.
Thank you for the reasoned response.
No less then the Chairman Of the Federal Reserve Board also advised people to take out a ARM.
I agree with many folks here that these people were careless for getting into a situation like that. How ever many of these folks are self proclaimed christians (read their profiles and taglines) and all they do is belittle others and brag about how great they are. I see little compassion but I see plenty of "i am much to good to get myself in trouble"
Pride comes before the fall. I pray that all those who think they will be able to make payments on their homes no matter what will always be able to. I also pray for my neighborhood.
Really? Alan Greenspan said people should take out an ARM? Perhaps you could post the speech where he said that? Thanks.
Alan Greenspan said people should take out an ARM? Perhaps you could post the speech where he said that? Thanks.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2004/20040223/default.htm
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan
Understanding household debt obligations
At the Credit Union National Association 2004 Governmental Affairs Conference, Washington, D.C.
February 23, 2004
Introduction: Credit Unions and Consumer Lending
Credit unions have long focused on the needs of their members. Traditionally, the industry has specialized in personal and automobile loans, and the bulk of lending at many credit unions remains concentrated on these types of loans. In the past decade, however, many of you have become more involved in first- and second-lien mortgage loans. With lending efforts focused on consumer and residential mortgage loans, credit unions have a natural interest in the financial health of America's households.
We have a similar interest at the Federal Reserve. Consumer spending accounts for more than two-thirds of gross domestic product, and residential investment--the construction of new homes--makes up another 4 percent or so of GDP. In addition, households own more than $14 trillion in real estate assets, almost twice the amount they own in mutual funds and directly hold in stocks. Over the past two years, significant increases in the value of real estate assets have, for some households, mitigated stock market losses and supported consumption.
Measuring the Financial Health of Households
One concern of many lending institutions has been the increase in bankruptcy rates during the past several years to an unusually high level. Elevated bankruptcy rates are troubling because they highlight the difficulties some households experience during economic slowdowns. But bankruptcy rates are not a reliable measure of the overall health of the household sector because they do not tend to forecast general economic conditions, and they can be significantly influenced over time by changes in laws and lender practices.
In contrast to bankruptcy rates, delinquency rates may be a bit better measure of the overall health of the household sector. The recent experience with some delinquency rates has been encouraging, with rates falling for several measures of credit card and automobile debt. But, like bankruptcy rates, delinquency rates can reflect changes in underwriting and collection practices, and they may measure the financial health of a relatively narrow set of households.
A primary measure used by the Federal Reserve to assess the extent of American household indebtedness and to provide a view of the financial health of the overall consumer sector is the quarterly debt service ratio. The debt service ratio measures the share of income committed by households for paying interest and principal on their debt. When the debt service ratio is high, households have less money available to purchase goods or services. In addition, households with a high debt service ratio are more likely to default on their obligations when they suffer adversity, such as job loss or illness.
Of course, debt payments are not the only financial obligations of households and thus the Federal Reserve also calculates a more general financial obligations ratio. This measure incorporates households' other recurring expenses, such as rents, auto leases, homeowners' insurance and property taxes, that might be subtracting from the uncommitted income available to households. The Federal Reserve splits the aggregate financial obligations ratio into separate measures for homeowners and renters, measures that I will discuss in detail below.
Changes in the Debt Service and Financial Obligation Ratios over Time
Both the debt service ratio and the financial obligations ratio rose modestly over the 1990s. During the past two years, however, both ratios have been essentially flat. The debt service ratio has remained a touch above 13 percent, whereas the financial obligations ratio has hovered a bit above 18 percent.
These ratios move slowly because both the stock of debt and the interest rates associated with the stock change slowly. Another reason is the stability in the ratio for homeowners, who hold the bulk of all household debt. Despite annual mortgage debt growth that exceeded 12 percent a year over the past two years, the financial obligations of homeowners have stayed about constant because mortgage rates have remained at historically low levels. The homeowners' financial obligations ratio has also remained relatively constant despite this very rapid growth in mortgage debt, partly as a result of an enormous wave of refinancing of existing mortgages, which ended only in the fall of 2003. Refinancing has allowed homeowners both to take advantage of lower rates to reduce their monthly payments and, in many cases, to extract some of the built-up equity in their homes. These two effects seem to have roughly offset each other, suggesting that homeowners might set a target for their mortgage payments as a proportion of income and adjust their borrowing accordingly.
Indeed, the surge in mortgage refinancings likely improved rather than worsened the financial condition of the average homeowner. Some of the equity extracted through mortgage refinancing was used to pay down more expensive, non-tax-deductible consumer debt or used to make purchases that would otherwise have been financed by more expensive and less tax-favored credit. Indeed, the refinancing phenomenon has very likely been a supportive factor for the general economy. The precise effect is difficult to identify because it is hard to know how much of the spending financed by home equity extraction might have taken place anyway. Nonetheless, we know that increases in home values and the borrowing against home equity likely helped cushion the effects of a declining stock market during 2001 and 2002.
Rising Credit Card Debts for Homeowners and Renters
The rise in homeowners' debt service burdens over the 1990s, albeit small, is associated with increases in their nonmortgage debt and, in particular, with rising levels of credit card debt. The financial obligation associated with credit card debt is difficult to measure. On the one hand, households are obligated to pay only a minimum amount and thus, in times of financial stress, a household can forgo making more than this minimum payment. On the other hand, we know that many households make more than the minimum payment and indeed likely would be quite uncomfortable paying only the minimum amount. During financial difficulties, these households might even consume less to pay more than the minimum. Defining the point at which households feel they should pay down their credit card debt is difficult, and thus our measure of debt service relies on estimates of minimum payments required by credit card lenders.
There are several reasons that homeowners might carry more credit card debt than they did a decade ago, but these reasons generally do not indicate financial weakness among homeowning households. Indeed, as noted, delinquency rates on credit card payments have been falling during the past year, despite households' relatively larger holding of credit card debt.
One possible reason for the secular increase in credit card debt is rising U.S. homeownership rates. According to the Bureau of the Census, the share of U.S. households that own homes rose from about 64 percent in 1990 to almost 68 percent in 2003 even as the population grew substantially. Because of rising incomes, lower interest rates, and increased rates of household formation, more people have chosen to buy homes rather than to rent, increasing the value of mortgages outstanding. Although it does not show the relationship conclusively, the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances suggests that these newer homeowners who make smaller down payments tend to bring with them higher levels of nonmortgage debt and, in particular, credit card debt. The ability of lending institutions to manage the risks associated with mortgages that have high loan-to-value ratios seems to have improved markedly over the past decade, and thus the movement of renters into homeownership is generally to be applauded, even if it causes our measures of debt service of homeowners to rise somewhat.
Another possible reason for rising credit card debt ratios is the use of credit cards for a variety of new purposes. The rise in credit card debt in the latter half of the 1990s is mirrored by a fall in unsecured personal loans. Reflecting this general trend, the proportion of personal loans in credit union portfolios has been declining as well. The wider availability of credit cards and their ease of use have encouraged this substitution. The convenience of credit cards also has caused homeowners to shift the payment for a variety of expenditures to credit cards. In sum, credit card debt service ratios have risen to some extent because households prefer credit cards as a method of payment.
* * *
In contrast to the increase for homeowners, the rise in debt service ratios was steep for renters in the latter half of the 1990s. The rise for renters, as for homeowners, is concentrated in credit card lending and thus may reflect some of the same factors that have influenced homeowner debt service ratios. But unlike homeowners, renters in recent years have been using a higher fraction of their incomes for payments on student loans and used-car debt. Renters tend to be younger and have lower incomes than homeowners, so the fact that student loans and used-car payments are a larger share of their income is not surprising, although this trend might be worrisome if it indicates greater difficulties in becoming financially established.
In addition, some of the rise in the debt service ratios of renters, unlike that of homeowners, occurred during the most recent recession, a difference highlighting the fact that incomes of renters are generally more at risk during economic downturns. Renters' debt service ratios have stabilized during the past two years, a hopeful sign that is likely correlated with the overall improvement in the economy. However, the rise in the renter debt service ratio might indicate some trends among these households that may be of concern and that need to be investigated further.
Mitigating Homeowner Payment Shocks
Rising debt service ratios are a concern if they reflect household financial stress and presage a drop in consumption or a rise in losses by lenders. Most homeowners and renters are aware of the possible difficulties should they lock themselves into a high level of debt payment obligations. Financial institutions might be able to help some households in this regard by looking for ways that households--both renters and homeowners--can shield themselves from unexpected payment shocks.
One way homeowners attempt to manage their payment risk is to use fixed-rate mortgages, which typically allow homeowners to prepay their debt when interest rates fall but do not involve an increase in payments when interest rates rise. Homeowners pay a lot of money for the right to refinance and for the insurance against increasing mortgage payments. Calculations by market analysts of the "option adjusted spread" on mortgages suggest that the cost of these benefits conferred by fixed-rate mortgages can range from 0.5 percent to 1.2 percent, raising homeowners' annual after-tax mortgage payments by several thousand dollars. Indeed, recent research within the Federal Reserve suggests that many homeowners might have saved tens of thousands of dollars had they held adjustable-rate mortgages rather than fixed-rate mortgages during the past decade, though this would not have been the case, of course, had interest rates trended sharply upward.
American homeowners clearly like the certainty of fixed mortgage payments. This preference is in striking contrast to the situation in some other countries, where adjustable-rate mortgages are far more common and where efforts to introduce American-type fixed-rate mortgages generally have not been successful. Fixed-rate mortgages seem unduly expensive to households in other countries. One possible reason is that these mortgages effectively charge homeowners high fees for protection against rising interest rates and for the right to refinance.
American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage. To the degree that households are driven by fears of payment shocks but are willing to manage their own interest rate risks, the traditional fixed-rate mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a home.
Conclusion
In evaluating household debt burdens, one must remember that debt-to-income ratios have been rising for at least a half century. With household assets rising as well, the ratio of net worth to income is currently somewhat higher than its long-run average. So long as financial intermediation continues to expand, both household debt and assets are likely to rise faster than income. Without an examination of what is happening to both assets and liabilities, it is difficult to ascertain the true burden of debt service. Overall, the household sector seems to be in good shape, and much of the apparent increase in the household sector's debt ratios over the past decade reflects factors that do not suggest increasing household financial stress. And, in fact, during the past two years, debt service ratios have been stable.
Yes, Greenspan did recommend ARMs. It was about one year ago. It seemed quite odd.
... Indeed, recent research within the Federal Reserve suggests that many homeowners might have saved tens of thousands of dollars had they held adjustable-rate mortgages rather than fixed-rate mortgages during the past decade, though this would not have been the case, of course, had interest rates trended sharply upward.
American homeowners clearly like the certainty of fixed mortgage payments. This preference is in striking contrast to the situation in some other countries, where adjustable-rate mortgages are far more common and where efforts to introduce American-type fixed-rate mortgages generally have not been successful. Fixed-rate mortgages seem unduly expensive to households in other countries. One possible reason is that these mortgages effectively charge homeowners high fees for protection against rising interest rates and for the right to refinance.
American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage. To the degree that households are driven by fears of payment shocks but are willing to manage their own interest rate risks, the traditional fixed-rate mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a home.
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