If the professor is claiming that the attacks on us are because of our presence on the soil of the Arabian Peninsula, beginning with the Gulf War in 1991, how does he explain the very first attack on America by Islamic radicals, the takeover of the American Embassy in Beirut in 1979?
TAC: What do you think the chances are of a weapon of mass destruction being used in an American city?
RP: I think it depends not exclusively, but heavily, on how long our combat forces remain in the Persian Gulf. The central motive for anti-American terrorism, suicide terrorism, and catastrophic terrorism is response to foreign occupation, the presence of our troops. The longer our forces stay on the ground in the Arabian Peninsula, the greater the risk of the next 9/11, whether that is a suicide attack, a nuclear attack, or a biological attack.
I am of the opinion, which is shared by one of the panelists who I think is named Flint Loverett, that we have been spared another attack on the homeland only because it is not in the game plan of the enemy and not because we are tying them up in Iraq. To believe that the terrorists of the Arab world cannot find another 19 suicidal individuals to attack America because they are engaged in Iraq is utter nonsense and so stupid as to be unworthy of comment.
Somehow we must work our way through this dilemma and find a strategy that works before these crazies blowup Pittsburgh. I leave you with these remarks from Dr. Pape's:
RP: Al-Qaeda appears to have made a deliberate decision not to attack the United States in the short term. We know this not only from the pattern of their attacks but because we have an actual al-Qaeda planning document found by Norwegian intelligence. The document says that al-Qaeda should not try to attack the continent of the United States in the short term but instead should focus its energies on hitting Americas allies in order to try to split the coalition.
I'll explain that one.
The Muslim fanatics in Iran were able to capitalize on what should have been a purely nationalistic resistance to the Shah (who we installed), and convert it into a fundamentalist uprising. Iranians were very upset with us, because we basically didn't care what happened to them so long as the Shah kept a hard line in opposing the Soviets.
Once the Ayatollah and his crew took over, and rose to power and influence, the fundamentalist whackjobs got in what they saw as payback. They didn't want the Shah, or us, around, and resented the influence of both, although it was only the added nuttiness of Islamic exremism that made the Embassy crisis possible. That was totally uncivilized behavior, andpar for the course with that crowd. Still, they were only able to ascend to power by leeching off of what the vast majority of Iranians considered a legitimate grievance: opposition to the Shah.
All politics is local, even with jihad.