Posted on 08/26/2006 6:01:18 PM PDT by bruinbirdman
North Korea's July 4 missile tests and Hezbollah's Iranian-supplied rocket reign of terror against Israel underscore why the U.S. must quickly ramp up its missile defense efforts. Four years ago President Bush withdrew the U.S. from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because it severely hobbled our development efforts. Yet, since then, there has been a strange lack of urgency to rapidly develop a robust series of systems that can destroy missiles of any size at any phase of deployment. Yes, we are developing ground-based missile defense sites in California and Alaska, and we do have ship-based Aegis missile defense systems that theoretically could shoot down a North Korean missile. But given the growing threat of terrorist forces getting their hands on more and more sophisticated rockets, with greater ranges and the ability to carry chemical or biological warheads, and given that North Korea and Iran will in the not too distant future have ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. shores, a crash program should be of the highest priority.
The Independent Working Group (IWG) on Post-ABM Treaty Missile Defense & the Space Relationship, formed in 2002 to examine missile threats to the U.S. and its allies and what we should be doing to meet those threats, recently released a sobering report. IWG encompasses a dazzling and impressive group of experts.
While diplomatically worded, the report's bottom line is simple: We are not doing nearly enough. It lists a variety of recommendations, including reviving the early 1990s Brilliant Pebbles system, which entailed deploying an array of small, advanced kill satellites in space. It was to be a cheap, effective way to destroy ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
Naturally, the Clinton Administration put Brilliant Pebbles in the deep freeze for fear of being accused of "militarizing space." The Bush Administration should defrost, develop and upgrade this system immediately. We should, among other things, also fund a system to defend against shipborne SCUD missiles launched off our coasts at U.S. cities.
Democrats will howl about increased military spending. But the American people would overwhelmingly support such an accelerated effort. The nightly news reminds us that the day of our vulnerability to terrorist missiles is nigh.
I couldn't hit an ICBM in flight on 8-27-06, but I use technology every day of my life, including this computer and the world wide web it gives me access to.
If what can be done depended upon my wisdom making it possible, we would probably still be living in the Stone Age.
Just because I am unable to create miracles, doesn't mean that miracles never happen.
I'm a bit lost here ace. Can you be more specific?
If that lost you, you need to seek directions from someone smarter than me.
Shouldn't the background of that banner show the hammer and sickle instead of the stars and stripes?
Neither would the reactive armor on our tanks protect NY against ICBM's. Does that mean we should not put reactive armor on tanks?
This is such a silly argument. If we followed your logic to its conclusion, we would be allowed only one weapon system for defense (in total) for all threats (nuclear and otherwise) and that single weapon system would have to protect us against every known threat.
No. We should allocate our scarce resources based on the current threat assessment and priorities.
This is such a silly argument. If we followed your logic to its conclusion, we would be allowed only one weapon system for defense (in total) for all threats (nuclear and otherwise) and that single weapon system would have to protect us against every known threat.
The only thing silly is your conclusion. The resource pie is limited. We don't have the resources to counter every conceivable threat. How much will the brilliant pebbles solution cost to develop and deploy? Does it represent the best solution to the current threat? Crusie missiles launced from an Iranian submarine or cargo ship may be a bigger threat than a massive ICBM attack from Russia or China. It is not a matter of having just one solution to protect oursevles against every conceivable threat, but rather, the ability to differentiate and evaluate the threats so we can use our limited resources to best advantage. We already spend more on defense than the rest of the world combined.
Because the technology is immature, and may never yield satisfactory results.
I was thinking of that flying wing thingy, I guess. Interesting ABM thread, thanx.
yitbos
Anti satillite
There is another test coming up soon.
That could be done in 1965.
Eh, eh. One place we have them is Ft. Greeley, AK. I was stationed there '69-'71 when the big attraction was the nuke power plant, NWTC and Arctic Test Center.
yitbos
Usually the right thing to do is to balance defensive measures against all the different threats.
So long as we have some chance of stopping any threat, the enemy can not choose a positive method by which to positively attack. So long as there is uncertainty on the part of the enemy, he will normally (presume moderately rational actors) try to find a better method in the future, rather than accept the very high vulnerability associated with a failed (or even a successful) attempt.
The worst thing to do is the "Maginot Line" which invests a great deal of national treasure on one non-mobile defense again one enemy avenue of approach, but does not invest much at all on an alternative approach. Then publicize how wonderful that defense is, to reduce your nation's willingness to fund additional defenses, or their appreciation of the threat. That merely provides incentive for the enemy to select the alternative approach.
So, rather than attempt to creat a perfect defense against terrorists with knives, we should spend the same amount of money against terrorists with knives, explosives, sharp sticks, RPGs. Then have commensurate efforts against private aircraft, shipping containers, private yachts, ballistic rockets, ect.
The intent of a balanced defense (and concealed details, so the enemy is not quite sure of how effective your system is) is to reduce the ability of the enemy to make an informed decision of the best way to attack. No matter what the method, he still has a risk, but he has no way to make his probability of success higher.
Who would buy a lottery ticket is there was a death penalty attached to the purchase of a losing ticket? No rational actor would do such a thing. Non-rational actors have limited ability to make rational plans and gain the support or rational allies, and that makes them less of a threat.
This "game theory" approach was developed by Von Neumann, and was developed by Albert Wolhsetter when he worked for Rand Corporation. Unclassified papers by the latter are available free on the internet.
Because we elected Bill Clinton under the mistaken belief that there wasn't "a dimes worth of difference" between the GOP and the Dims.
In the case of national defense there is at least a couple of dollars worth of difference. Even if the funding had just stayed at GHWB level we would be five years ahead of where we are now.
No, you focus your scarce and limited resources on the most likely threats based on your knowledge of the enemy's capabilities. You can't defend against every conceivable threat nor do you have limitless resources. If you try to "balance" your allocation of resources without taking into consideration the probability of the threat and the capabilities of the enemy, you are wasting resources.
The worst thing to do is the "Maginot Line" which invests a great deal of national treasure on one non-mobile defense again one enemy avenue of approach, but does not invest much at all on an alternative approach.
I have never advocated such an approach, which is foolish on the face of it.
This is a joke right? You have read today's (August 27, 2006) "Day by Day" Cartoon?
http://www.daybydaycartoon.com/
The easy thing for an enemy to do is to provide false information as to his intentions.
Your suggested approach was followed by the French in 1940. They guarded the short route from Germany with fortifications AND all their mobile forces.
Germany lured the British mobile forces forward to Belgium with ruthless attacks on the neutral Belgium and the Netherlands.
Then the main attack went in through the Ardennes, cutting off the British from most of the French.
UK doctrine still teaches that an enemy "appreciation" should provide what the enemy will do. US doctrine teaches that the enemy situation should be provided, and some provision should be made for any enemy alternative.
Knowing the difficulty of providing ACCURATE enemy intentions, and knowing the ease with which deceptive information can be served up to enemy intelligence services, I strongly prefer the US doctrine.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.