Within the last month Russian-Georgian relations have worsened sharply. A number of hostile actions and gestures from both sides of a political, military and economic nature have escalated the tension. The main objects of the conflict are the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, formally parts of Georgia but de facto independent. While Tbilisi has recently intensified its actions to regain control over both republics, Moscow has threatened Georgia with military intervention should Tbilisi begin an armed operation against the separatists. The situation in the region is so serious at the moment that outbreaks of fighting in both separatist republics cannot be ruled out. Moreover, Russian-Georgian relations may face a further rise in tension.

An analysis of the steps Russia and Georgia have taken since early July shows that both sides are almost equally responsible for the rise in tension in their bilateral relations. Military manoeuvres and training conducted both in Russia and Georgia were clearly intended to be provocative (Russian went so far as to admit that they were practising for possible interventions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). A comparable gesture was Moscow’s decision on 8 July to close the traffic through the only land checkpoint with Georgia. Georgia, for its part, announced on 14 July that it would withdraw its backing for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation, which had been included in a bilateral protocol. On the same day, Georgian police intercepted Russian diplomats who were en route to Tskhinvali (the capital of South Ossetia), which has brought about a diplomatic scandal. The Georgian parliament made an equally hostile gesture, passing a resolution on 18 July demanding that the Georgian government take immediate measures to secure the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping forces deployed on Abkhaz and South Ossetian territory. Relations were also worsened by the cancellation of Mikheil Saakashvili’s visit in Moscow after Russia refused to arrange a bilateral meeting of the two presidents (21 July).

Tbilisi also seriously escalated the conflict on 25 July by bringing Georgian troops (some 800 to 1,000 soldiers) into the Kodori Gorge, located on Abkhazian territory but controlled by the Georgian authorities. The action of the Georgian military was taken under the pretext of pacifying the local warlord Emzar Kvitsiani’s troops (Kvitsiani was formerly the Georgian president’s envoy to the Kodori Gorge, but later he rebelled against Tbilisi). The arrival of Georgian troops in this strategically important region (from the gorge it is very easy to launch an attack on the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi) has disturbed the fragile balance of power in the area, and brought about strong protests from both Russia and the separatist Abkhazian authorities.

All these events have been accompanied by mutual accusations that have only added to the tension. The accusations were raised on both the official (diplomatic notes and declarations by both sides’ representatives) and unofficial levels (provocative comments by expert analysts, especially on the Russian side). High-ranking Russian officials (including the minister of defence Sergei Ivanov and the minister of foreign affairs Sergei Lavrov) have openly warned of military intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian officials have also suggested Moscow might unilaterally recognise the two separatist republics’ independence. On the other hand, Georgian politicians have accused Russia of gradual annexation of these territories. Hostile propaganda in the media has also influenced the escalation of the conflict.

So far, the principal goal of the Russian policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been to maintain the status quo in the region, by strengthening both republics’ effective independence. This was equivalent to freezing the conflicts and maintaining the Russian military presence in the republics (the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia formally act under the auspices of the CIS but consist entirely of Russians; in South Ossetia, the peacekeeping forces consist of Russian, Ossetian and Georgian soldiers). This grants Russia an instrument of pressure over Georgia which it uses to keep Georgia within the Russian sphere of influence.

However, it cannot be ruled out that Tbilisi’s active endeavours to reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, together with the United States’ support for Georgia has forced Moscow to change its strategy. At the moment, Moscow may aim not so much at maintaining the status quo, but rather at provoking an open military conflict in South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia, bringing Russian troops into both republics to “protect Russian citizens” (about 90% of Abkhazians and Ossetians hold Russian passports) and supporting the Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in the republics. It cannot be ruled out that Russia is considering recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence.

Russian interests undeniably run counter to Georgian interests. Since Mikheil Saakashvili’s election as president (autumn 2003), Georgia has been determined to regain its territorial integrity and do away with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist movements. Both Georgian domestic policy (economic reforms, strengthening the army) and foreign policy (attempts to internationalise the conflicts and involve the US, the EU and the OSCE in their settlement) are subordinate to this higher goal.

The attempts to reintegrate the two rebel republics have been intensified in recent weeks. This is a result of the strengthening of the nationalistic and radically anti-Russian wing in the ruling elite (represented, among others, by the minister of defence Irakli Okruashvili and the interior minister Vano Merabshvili). The steps which Saakashvili’s government has recently taken (principally the operation in Kodori) can also be interpreted as a part

of a struggle for power on the Georgian political scene. The government, whose position has been undermined by the growing activity of the opposition parties and decreasing social support, are trying to distract the society’s attention by launching military actions. By demonstrating this determination, they are trying to enhance their image as the municipal elections scheduled for this autumn approach.

Within the next few days, a further escalation in the tense relations between Moscow and Tbilisi can be expected. The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia may also become even more complicated. At the moment, the situation is serious enough to expect a resumption of military action in both separatist republics. Should armed conflict break out, Russia will undoubtedly support the separatists. Open military intervention by Russia in Georgia cannot be ruled out either. This could be made easier by Washington’s involvement in other regions (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon) and, as a result, America’s declining interest in the recent events in Georgia. The fact that the Department of State has not yet reacted to Georgian events only proves this point. Further escalation of the tension could be prevented by greater involvement on the part of the international community (principally the US and the European Union) in the crisis, and their attempts to persuade both sides to refrain from taking any radical steps. This primarily concerns Georgia, for whom the resumption of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could bring disastrous results. Among other things, it could hinder internal reforms and make prospects of the country’s reintegration much more remote.

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This region has many nationalities, sub-nationalities and ethnic groups. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are complex problems, with different histories. Abkhazia includes a majority of Georgians and is a significant territoral part of Georgia. South Ossetia is a relatively small area with small population that does have more of an ethnic tie to Ossetians living in Russia.
It's tough to settle real estate disputes in this part of the world, almost as bad as Palestine and the Balkans.

Why can't we all get along?

A couple of years late, but this is starting to look like the plot for Tom Clancy's Ghost Recon.

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