Posted on 07/30/2006 7:14:42 AM PDT by Valin
This article is part of a paper originally written for a project and conference on "Stability, Crises, and Democratization: The Arab World's Direction and the European Interests," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.
This article considers the prospects for Islamist groups gaining power in Middle Eastern countries. It begins with a brief glance at the past quarter century since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, examining why--despite predictions to the contrary--Islamists throughout the region have had only very limited success in taking power so far. It then goes on to identify the various strategies Islamists have employed so far in their quest for power, considering the likelihood that these strategies will succeed in the future in accomplishing their goals. The article also appraises the chance that success in one country will ignite an avalanche of Islamist takeovers.
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Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the world has been waiting for the other shoe to drop. Over 25 years later, however, the world is still waiting, trying to figure out where, when, and how it will happen: Where will the next Islamist takeover occur? Equally as important: Will that lead to a chain reaction of Islamist takeovers throughout the region?
The 1950s and 1960s trained the world to expect violent and sudden coups in the Middle East. In addition to numerous failed attempts (like the PLO's attempt to overthrow Jordan's King Hussein in 1970), Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran, and Yemen saw regimes successfully overthrown, some countries experiencing several such takeovers before a strongman established himself well enough to maintain power. In 1960, 1971 and 1980, Turkey also experienced military takeovers, though each time power was eventually restored to civilian governments.
With this experience as background, what surprised so many people about the 1979 Iranian Revolution was not that the Shah's government was unable to maintain power. What was novel was that unlike all previous takeovers and coups, the ideology purported by those assuming power was no longer focused on nationalist themes with Third Worldist undertones. Even if many groups, often with totally divergent agendas, took part in the Iranian Revolution, it was the Islamists--headed by Ruhollah Khomeini--who symbolized the revolution and eventually monopolized its outcome. Moreover, while some Arab nationalists upon coming to power had declared their desire to unite the various Arab states into one larger Arab nation, the Islamists' declared goals were much more threatening. By proclaiming a goal of exporting Islamic revolutions around the world, Khomeini and his followers openly threatened the entire global order.
THE NOT-SO-INEVITABLE REVOLUTION
So, over 25 years later, why is the world still waiting for the next revolution? The answer is certainly not because the Islamists were uninspired by events in Iran. The years immediately following the Iranian Revolution were filled with serious Islamist attempts to overthrow the regimes in power. Indeed, Islamists did enjoy one minor victory, as they succeeded in taking power in Sudan; a temporary one, with the Taliban taking over most of Afghanistan; and a partial victory, as Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006 (but because Fatah's Abu Mazen remains President of the Palestinian Authority, their takeover remains limited). More crucial than these minor successes, Islamist parties have become the primary opposition group in every Arab country.
Still, in every other country, the regimes in power managed to thwart the Islamists' efforts. For example:
In Syria, Islamists attacked the regime several times--including an attempt on Hafiz al-Asad's life in 1980 and a full-fledged coup attempt in 1982--before the Syrian army flattened the city of al-Hama, killing 20,000 of its inhabitants in the process.[1]
In Egypt, Islamists assassinated President Sadat in 1981, and attempted to do the same to Mubarak in 1995. The regime instituted a harsh crackdown of the Islamists, and by the late 1990s, had managed to reign in their challenge.
Islamists had strong showings in Algeria's national elections and were poised to win a second round in 1992, but were prevented from taking power by the army.
In Turkey, the army allowed an Islamist party to come to power via elections (Refah Party in 1996), but the Islamists were unable to co-opt the army. When they crossed certain policy redlines, the army instigated their resignation.
In Saudi Arabia, Islamists have been staging a full-fledged insurgency since May 2003. While the country's security forces are infiltrated by Islamist sympathizers, recent counter-insurgency operations have begun to turn the tide in the Kingdom.[2]
Looking at the experience of the past quarter century, one can conclude that in each country the regimes learned their lesson from the Iranian Revolution: A ruler must be willing to do whatever is necessary in order to maintain power.
For all regional rulers, the use of brute force--mass detentions, imprisonment, executions, torture--is only one tool they use to defeat their Islamist opponents. No less critical for these regimes' efforts to keep Islamists at bay has been their ability to co-opt them.[3] One effective tactic of many leaders has been to co-opt the Islamists by giving them limited power. In Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, and Kuwait, this has meant allowing Islamists to run openly for parliament and, on occasion, hold the portfolio for a minor, non-security oriented ministry. In order to contain the Islamists, however, the kings or presidents have neutered their various parliaments, leaving them with only limited constitutional and legislative powers. The final say in all critical matters is usually left with the sovereign.
The third major strategy leaders have employed has been to drape themselves in the cloak of Islamic legitimacy, thus undermining the Islamists' main claim. Leaders in many countries have put on pious appearances and practices in attempt to steal back the religious card. In addition to his frequent public displays of his knowledge of Islamic sources, the late King Hassan II of Morocco claimed to be a direct descendent of Muhammad himself, and took on the title Amir al-Mu'minin ("Commander of the Faithful"). The Hashemite Dynasty of Jordan has made a similar claim to direct descent. After Shi'a Islamists attacked the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, Saudi Arabia's King Faud took on the title "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques," a title borrowed from the Islamic Caliphate. Many regional leaders are often photographed leading prayers (which in the West would almost be taboo, even in the relatively religious United States). Finally, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have leaned on their official religious institutions to issue rulings and give sermons in support of the regime and its various policies.
That leaders today struggle to illustrate their Islamic credentials tells us much about the state of the region; particularly how successful Islamists have been in framing the basic debate in the Middle East. In most other developing regions, populist rhetoric is usually focused on other messages, such as development, progress, improving the plight of the poor, etc. It is rare to find a South American, Eastern European, or East Asian politician trying to use his religiosity as a central election issue.
Indeed, while they have been routed by the regimes in their attempts to gain political power, it is essential to note that Islamists have been terribly successful in winning "the war of ideas." As Emanuel Sivan has written:
Radical Islam has made tremendous inroads into the hearts and minds of Arabic-speaking Muslims. In the socio-cultural realm, militant Islamic discourse maintains a hegemony in the public debate among Arabs, replacing Pan-Arabism and Marxism. Islamism has a profound impact on gender roles, fertility, consumption habits, as well as on the marginalization of local Christians and the censorship of movies, plays and books.[4]
Indeed, in Cairo, Istanbul, or any other major metropolis in the region, the number of women covering their heads is far greater than it was a generation or two ago. While such an observation is not a perfect measure, it does serve as a rough barometer of political attitudes.
This strategy of da'wa (literally, the call to adopt Islam, but often used to refer to proselytizing activities) has two purposes. First, it is an attempt to transform Middle Eastern societies through non-political, grassroots social change. At the same time, this grassroots approach is a long-term strategy for achieving the goal that has otherwise eluded the Islamists: seizing political power. By slowly convincing ever-growing numbers of people that Islam is the answer for all of society's problems, they hope to set the groundwork for their future rise to power.
(snip)
SFL
SFL?
You know, I used to say that drugs are God's way of showing you that you have too much money.
We've been sending bucketloads of money, thanks to the Dummo ecoterrorists, to Arabia for way too many years.
Instead of elicit medication, they want the most exotic drug, power.
They could provide for every one of their people with a high standard of living, if they would share their oildollars. But noooo, they would rather buy weapons and kill anyone that does not submit to their "religion" of hatred.
They think that they can buy enough weaponry, UN members and Congressmen to rule the world. I THINK it's time to open our long neglected oilfields and stop sending our gas dollars to the Arabs.
The interesting thing is they can onlly come to power in the "dark disconnected corners" of the world.
Something I've noticed over the years since 9-11 is many people in the Islamic world shout their support of OBL and his ilk, until they strike at home. Then it's a different song being sung.
Something Tom Friedman said about the Saudis is we should let OBL take over Saudi Arabia. Let them try and really run a country, let the people of Saudi Arabia see what it's like to live under OBL. See reply 6
The folks who have the shakiest provenance are the House of Saud, to whom the Brits gave Mecca and Medina, and Western Arabia. In exchange they gave the Hashemites Jordan and you guessed it ... Iraq. Ironically, the Hashemites were far better allies of the west in WWI.
I'm even looking at this as a positive. (No I'm not insane....at least I don't think so, but there are those with a different opinion). Set aside for the moment that there's not a dimes worth of difference between the two, they both live to kill Jews, the thing is the Palestinian made a choice of who was going to rule them. And that's a 1st.
Well, given the hatred the educated population of Iran (especially the young people) have for their theocracy, I think the shelf life of an Islamist government may be a lot shorter than OBL and his ilk would like to think. I do not think you can govern as if it's the dark ages and expect people to support you for very long.
By some accounts, the mullahs currently enjoy the support of about 20-30% of the Iranian people . It may be a race to see who topples the Iranian regime first, Israel, America or the Iranian people.
And to a lesser extent... the same holds true for Lebanon. They had elections that put some of this vermin in their government... and they allow this vermin to hide in their homes after they launch their stinkin' Kaytusha's.
Bottom line: When a westerner is beheaded, they ALL do... the tremolo.
A better question would be "Whither Islam?"
Many top Imams are shocked by how many people are leaving their religion in disgust. In fact, in such disgust that just "not being religious" is not enough. They want to say, "I am not a Moslem, I am a Christian".
This is not because of any magnetic attraction they have to Christianity, but because they don't even want to be numbered as Moslems by others. A sense of revulsion that deep.
The greatest losses are in Africa, where huge numbers of people are converting to Anglicanism, and Islam is even generally losing geographical territory (with the exception of Somalia, which may not last.)
But losses are significant in any country not ruthlessly under the thumb of Sharia Law, where people are imprisoned, tortured and murdered for renouncing Islam. And it goes without saying that any movement that can keep its followers only under threat of death is not in the ascention.
Even in the Islamic nations, people are willing to risk terrible abuse to divorce themselves from Islam. And it does not strengthen their cause when the Moslems abuse them horribly for doing this. It reeks of fear and weakness.
Ok I'm not that bright (please feel free to disagree :-) )
they ALL do... the tremolo?
As I've said before "Islam WILL change and come to grips with the world as it really is, or it will end up on the ash heap of history." There are those inside Islam who understand this. One way of looking at the the GWOT is a civil war inside Islam and we (the west) are colateral damage.
Many top Imams are shocked by how many people are leaving their religion in disgust.
Do you have a link? Thanks.
Ah! The light bulb goes on.
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