Posted on 05/30/2006 3:17:27 PM PDT by naturalman1975
Australia's intervention in East Timor is not just military, it has deep political consequences
THE true nature of Australia's intervention in East Timor has become apparent: this intervention is both military and political. Its primary purpose was to respond to East Timor's security crisis, accept the invitation from its Government and restore law and order. But this is not just a military intervention.
It is a highly political intervention in its impact, atmospherics and consequences. It transcends the domain of law and order and penetrates to East Timor's political crisis.
In this sense Australia is operating as a regional power or a potential hegemon that shapes security and political outcomes.
This language is unpalatable to many. Yet it is the reality. It is new experimental territory for Australia. We are evolving as a regional power and discovering the risks and dividends in the exercise of that power. We have taken complete charge of law and order in East Timor and its domestic power struggle is conducted against the backdrop of our unstated pressure.
By the end of last week senior ministers in the Howard Government knew that East Timor's political crisis was coming to a climax. President Xanana Gusmao wanted to force the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, correctly seen as the architect of much of the present troubles.
During the past two days East Timor has been locked in a version of Australia's 1975 political and constitutional crisis, accentuated by the collapse of order and the institutions of the state. With Alkatiri refusing to resign, Gusmao took legal advice on his power under the constitution to dismiss the Government.
Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta told his Australian counterpart Alexander Downer last week that Alkatiri was unlikely to survive as Prime Minister. Downer is not the only senior Australian to be given this message by Ramos Horta. On the ABC's 7.30 Report on Monday night Ramos Horta publicly dumped on Alkatiri, saying the Government in Dili was "barely functioning" and that "so many people are wanting the PM [Alkatiri] to step down". Alkatiri initially opposed Australia's military intervention and agreed only reluctantly to the foreign troops.
Although Australia's troops are neutral among the conflicting parties on the ground, the Howard Government is far from neutral among the conflicting politicians in the capital. Australia's intervention has deep political consequences for East Timor's politics. As the crisis comes to a head Australia's obvious preference is for the removal of Alkatiri as Prime Minister and a political victory for Gusmao and Ramos Horta.
From the start of Australia's intervention John Howard has publicly criticised the quality of East Timor's governance. Howard has repeated this criticism on virtually every occasion. Last Sunday he told the ABC Insiders program that the country had not been well governed and the "important thing" was how its senior politicians "relate to each other in the days and weeks ahead". Although Howard's critique is collective, it applies, in particular, to Alkatiri as the Government's leader.
Alkatiri has been an inept and disastrous Prime Minister. Beyond East Timor's economic, social and governance problems, Alkatiri, along with his Defence Minister Roque Rodrigues, was responsible for sacking one-third of the army, thereby precipitating the crisis. He dislikes Australia intensely and has never bothered as PM to visit this country, despite Australia's pivotal role in East Timor's birth and future.
One of the founders of Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor), Alkatiri spent the Indonesian occupation in exile in Mozambique. His experience has been far removed from that of Gusmao, who operated as a resistance commander before being captured and imprisoned by Indonesia in 1992.
In the factionalised East Timorese Government, Gusmao and Ramos Horta are pro-Australian and cognisant of working with Canberra. By contrast, the Howard Government sees Alkatiri as a 1970s-style pro-Marxist anti-capitalist suspicious of democratic practice.
The initial Australian decision on pre-deployment was taken by Howard, Downer, Defence Minister Brendan Nelson and Deputy Prime Minister Mark Vaile on May 11. That was based on a recommendation from Defence Force Chief Angus Houston and was dictated solely by security issues. But as events unfolded, security on the ground in East Timor became a function of its political crisis.
The Howard Government was told before the Fretilin congress 10 days ago that Dili's ambassador to the US, Jose Luis Guterres, had the numbers to depose Alkatiri. But such predictions were dashed, with Alkatiri easily outsmarting his opponents by ruling out a secret ballot.
From this moment Downer correctly judged the security situation in East Timor would deteriorate.
When Ramos Horta told Downer last week that Australia must intervene, Downer replied that Australia needed the letter of request to be signed by the President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the parliament. Australia could not tolerate its intervention being authorised by only one side and the legitimacy of the entire exercise being compromised.
Yet while Alkatiri had to acquiesce in Australia's intervention, he has survived, so far, the collective pressure against him to resign. Gusmao baulked at the dismissal option. East Timor's constitution (like many of that nation's governing follies) is based on the Portuguese model. Gusmao's legal adviser doubted he had the constitutional power.
Section 112 of East Timor's constitution says the president can dismiss the prime minister if it is necessary "to ensure the regular functioning of the democratic institutions". There are conflicting interpretations of this section. Gusmao was aware of a precedent in Portugal's history when its president may have used the dismissal power in such a situation. But the signals from Dili yesterday suggested that Gusmao would probably avoid resort to dismissal.
The final political outcome defies prediction. But a possible compromise involves Alkatiri's survival (again), the resignation of two of his ministerial loyalists, Rodrigues and Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato, with Gusmao taking responsibility for the army and police. This would be an advance. But the political poison within East Timor's politics would only intensify with Alkatiri sure to take an even greater set against Australia.
Meanwhile, the Howard Government is devising a dual strategy, military and civil, for East Timor's future. The military strategy is for the Australia-led coalition to remain in place. Australia doesn't want to outsource the military role to the UN or any other nation. For the police role, however, Australia wants to see East Timor's police reinforced from within, from other nations or by a new UN police force.
On the civil side, Australia seeks a new UN resolution that vests a greater responsibility within the UN for East Timor's civil infrastructure.
Aussies ROCK!
BUA HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!
Go Aussies go, and restore law and order in Timor , even if you must permanantly occupy the place! You need your own Puero Rico, before the rest of the South Pacific archipelago turns communist!
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