Posted on 04/18/2006 8:14:59 AM PDT by Blogger
More Signs of a Future Hollow Force? The Air Force Cuts a Corner by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. WebMemo #1039
April 18, 2006 | |
The budget decisions derived from the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggest more and more that the military’s long-term preparedness is in doubt. The QDR is a mandatory assessment of resources, force structure, and programs that the Pentagon provides the President and Congress. It also outlines strategy for addressing issues such as budget and acquisition priorities. A recent Air Force decision to terminate the alternative engine program for its Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) raises questions regarding defense budget priorities. Congress needs to recognize the warning signs of trouble ahead, reverse some of the department’s worst decisions, and address the larger federal spending issues that are forcing the armed services to make poor choices.
Why Worry?
America’s national security is in peril when the armed forces look good on paper but cannot actually perform their missions. “Hollow force” describes what happens when military readiness declines because of a lack of adequate funding. A hollow force lacks the resources (1) to provide trained and ready forces, (2) to support ongoing operations, and (3) to modernize. Today’s military is not hollow, but it could become so in a decade or less if funding for the military isn’t adequate. When the armed forces make trade-offs to address short-term needs, they risk a hollow force in the long-term.
A Questionable Call
The JSF will be America’s newest fighter aircraft. Concerned that the program which would produce tens-of-billions of dollars in aircraft was overly dependent on a single contractor, Congress required the development of an alternate source for the plane’s most critical component, the engine. Now, the Air Force has recommended terminating the alternative engine program, a move that would save $1.8 billion in development costs. The Air Force would then use these funds to buy items for which there is an immediate need, such as unmanned aerial vehicles.
Cancelling the alternative development program, however, raises concerns. That decision means that the U.S. and its allies will have only one design for the engine that will power the majority of their future tactical fighter fleet. That’s risky proposition, especially since the primary engine design has not yet been fully tested.
While the Air Force may save money in the short-term by eliminating the alternative program, the long-term fiscal impact is less clear. Without competition, the sole-source engine will undoubtedly cost much more. Moreover, eliminating the alternative program wastes the $1.3 billion the Air Force has already spent developing it. Spending a lot of money in the long run in order to save a little today is a counterproductive strategy. When the Pentagon makes decisions as it did with the JSF program, it is getting cash by mortgaging the future, akin to paying off credit cards with credit cards.
Congress Can Do Better
Congress must address spending on defense and non-defense programs, particularly entitlement programs. Defense spending prospects a decade from now are bleak with mandatory federal outlays, such as Medicare and Social Security, consuming an increasingly large part of the federal budget. Congress needs to reverse the Pentagon’s short-term thinking and the growth of entitlements to prevent the hollow force from becoming a reality—sooner or later.
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
IIRC, the alternate engine for the JSF/F-35 was a Rolls-Royce engine. The announcement of the engine's termination came shortly after Britain began threatening to pull out of the JSF project because technical data (specifically, software code) would not be released to them as a "project partner".
It's my understanding that the RR engine program will be re-instated if Britain withdraws its complaints.
Inrtelligence, Sureveillance and Reconnaisance work on the other hand did very, very well in the QDR budget. This includes things like UAVs as well as manned ISR aircraft.
Actually, GB made its threat slightly after the Pentagon decision. Currently the LM/Pratt team is way over budget. They are hoping to offset the budget by having this tiny slice of the pie thrown out. In other words, we're overspending so lets penalize the guys who are on schedule and on cost. Makes sense. Not.
I believe it is fairly rare to have more than one engine for any given airframe - never heard of a fighter having multiple engine types, unless it was part of a modernization plan (ie the KC-135 R model - I realize that isn't a fighter aircraft, lol).
It doesn't necessarily mean that it won't drive up costs either. The Lockheed Martin and Pratt efforts are already overspent. The costs are expected to go up right now by 19 billion dollars. NONE of this is driven by the alternate engine team. With the alternate engine gone, what incentive is there for anyone to stay on cost? There is no longer anybody waiting in the wings to take over or provide competition for any future engines.
The JSF is a unique animal. It will have 3 variants. Also, there was a "great engine war" in past decades where based upon poor performance of one particular source's engine the government decided to have an alternative. The scenario is, this fighter will be THE fighter for all three branches of our military. If there is an engine design flaw that shows up with no alternative engine to fill in the gap- our entire fleet could be grounded. Not good.
Correction: I know there are more than three branches. But this is going to be THE fighter for 3 of them. It is a big deal.
Bingo.
After all of the other posts re JSF and us handing over tech to England, I still don't see that event happening, and I'm still skeptical about JSF even going mainstream at all.
The ball is in England's court, and we shall see how she goes.
I don't agree that not having a second source for engines on the JSF represents a "hollow force." Shoosh, look who is doing the real fighting, Marines and Army. The Air Force long ago decided it was strategic rather than tactical and put its money there. As a result both the Marines and Army developed their own tactical air force. A little history, the only reason we did not invade Cuba in 1963 was the Air Force said it could not provide 24 hour air cover for the Army. Too many Strat Bombers and not enough tactical aircraft. The Army got the message and developed their helicopter forces accordingly.
The Marines are a part of this deal.
Oh, I agree with you entirely.
I didn't mean to to propose that I agreed with any 'Hollow' force theory
From the JSF Website: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the Department of Defense's focal point for defining affordable next generation strike aircraft weapon systems for the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and our allies. The F-35 is the next generation strike fighter bringing cutting-edge technologies to the battlespace of the future. The JSFs advanced airframe, autonomic logistics, avionics, propulsion systems, stealth, and firepower will ensure that the F-35 is the most affordable, lethal, supportable and survivable aircraft ever to be used by so many warfighters across the globe.
Ping for later read...
So, given some staff sergeant in say Dayton Ohio sitting in an airconditioned room flying a drone in Southwest Asia on a ground support mission, exactly how important is the second engine program?
Sounds like the first steps down the path that Canada's military took decades ago.
a "hollow forse" needs a "hollow pilot" and I have just the man:
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0164052/
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