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Re: Post 109

Philippines Cell

Al Qaeda: A Philippine jihadi Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, a leader of the 400 Filipino mujiheddin, befriended bin Laden in Pakistan in the late-1980s. Janjalani who was committed to waging jihad back in the southern Philippines, established the Al Harakatul Islamiya, commonly known as the Abu Sayyaf, with some $6 million in Bin LadenÂ’s and Libyan support in 1991. Both Janajalani and bin Laden were angered at the largest Islamic group, the MNLFÂ’s ongoing peace talks with the government, which they considered a betrayal of the Muslim community Bin Laden looked to the Abu Sayyaf as Al QaedaÂ’s regional constituent group.

Bin Laden then developed an independent Al Qaeda presence. In 1988 he dispatched his brother-in-law Mohammad Jammal Kalifa to the Philippines to recruit fighters for the war in Afghanistan. In 1991 he returned to establish a permanent Al Qaeda network. he was officially the regional director for the Saudi-based charity, the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO), responsible not just for projects in the Philippines but also in Indonesia, Thailand and Taiwan.

Khalifa set out to establish a thorough network. He married a local woman, Jameela (Alice) Yabo, who was the sister of a young Islamic student at Mindanao State University, Abu Omar. Omar and Khalifa met at an IIRO-sponsored conference in 1988. This marriage helped get Khalifa established and able to penetrate the Muslim community. Khalifa also established a rattan furniture import-export company as a front. He purchased products from Muslim regions. Though this company was not profitable, it was sustaining. More importantly, though, it was a good cover for Khalifa to transfer funds into the country and broaden his network in Mindanao.

KhalifaÂ’s charities did do some good work. He established the DawÂ’l Immam Al Shafee Center, a Muslim charity organization. He established Al-Maktum University in Zamboanga using funds from the IIRO. He also established a branch office of the IIRO in Zamboanga. According to the IIROÂ’s office in Saudi Arabia, its activities include an orphanage and dispensary in Cotabato City, dispensaries and pharmacies in Zamboanga. It provided food and clothing to internally displaced people who fled war zones. In addition IIRO funding went to schools and scholarships. And it asserts that it always does this if not in cooperation with the government, with at least official approval.

Yet the IIRO quickly caught the interest of the Philippine police and military intelligence who saw it as a front organization for insurgent activities. Â“The IIRO which claims to be a relief institution is being utilized by foreign extremists as a pipeline through which funding for the local extremists are being coursed through,Â” a Philippine intelligence report noted. An Abu Sayyaf defector acknowledged that Â“The IIRO was behind the construction of mosques, school buildings and other livelihood projectsÂ” but only Â“in areas penetrated, highly influenced and controlled by the Abu Sayyaf.Â” Scholarships, likewise, were given to students to become Islamic scholars. The defector said the IIRO was used by Bin Laden and Khalifa to distribute funds for the purchase of arms and other logistical requirements of the Abu Sayyaf and MILF: Â“Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to terrorist operations.Â”

Anzar, an Abu Sayyaf defector, said Bin Laden and Khalifa financed the urban warfare and terrorism training in both Libya and in the Philippines of their recruits to the Abu Sayyaf, including Edwin Angeles, the founding Abu Sayyaf vice commander and intelligence chief. During this time, Khalifa served as an adviser to the Abu Sayyaf, but was primarily a conduit for money. Â“In the case of Bin Laden and Khalifa, they are not combatants, so they give material support. Money. Lots of money.Â” The more they engaged in terrorism, the more financial support poured in from Bin Laden and Khalifa.

Khalifa established several other charities and Islamic organizations in the Philippines ostensibly for charity and religious work, which channeled money to extremist groups. Perhaps the most important one was the International Relations and Information Center. Abu Omar, his brother-in-law, started working at the IRIC in 1993, first as a Â“volunteer,Â” and becoming its director in 1994. The Chair of the IRIC was Dr. Zubair. The IRIC engaged in numerous activities, for the most part philanthropic: job training, orphanages, Islamic schools and other social work.

According to the Philippine National Security Advisor, Roilo Golez, Khalifa Â“built up the good will of the community through charity and then turned segments of the population into agents.Â” He also used the Philippines as a base for Al QaedaÂ’s other international operations. The South China Morning Post reported that Â“In 1994 a Jordanian religious teacher, Adballah Hashakie, told Jordanian police. . . . he received U.S. $50,000 from Khalifa to finance bombings and assassinations in Jordan.Â”

Khalifa began to provide covert assistance to the Muslim rebel group the MILF in two ways: financially and through training. In addition, he provided overt assistance to them by funding development projects in zones under their control or to areas that constituted core constituencies of supporters, such as the dispensary in Campo Muslim. In an 1998 interview, Al Haj Murad, the MILF Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs, admitted that Bin Laden and Khalifa provided Â“help and assistanceÂ” to MILF cadres who volunteered in the 1980s to help the Taliban struggle against the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government. Following PakistanÂ’s crackdown on foreign jihadiÂ’s, Al Qaeda began to dispatch trainers from the Middle East to MILF and ASG camps.

But the primary Al Qaeda operation in Southeast Asia was OPLAN Bojinka. In 1994, Ramzi Yousef, the terrorist mastermind of the December 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, came to the Philippines. He spent a short period of time in the southern island of Basilan where he trained approximately 20 Abu Sayyaf militants in the art of bomb-making, then moved to Manila in September, to begin planning a second round of attacks on American targets. In December 1994, a very suspicious fire razed a house in Paranaque belonging to Tareq Kaved Rana, a Pakistani, whom the PNP believed to be closely associated with international terrorists. The place was cleaned out, but forensic tests indicated that the fire was caused by combustible chemicals; the chemicals that were the hallmark of Ramzi YousefÂ’s bombs.

In Manila Yousef established a fairly compartmentalized cell of approximately 20 people. Only a few of them had knowledge of the entire operation. Many others in this cell had very specific functions, and in many cases, once that function was completed, they left. In addition to Khalifa and Ramzi Yousef, key cell members included: Wali Khan Amin Shah, Abdul Hakim Ali Hasmid Murad, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Abu Omar and Munir Ibrahim, Amein Mohammed, Salem Ali and over a dozen of other individuals who played limited support roles- for the most part unwittingly.

On 10 December 1994, a Philippines Airlines 747-200 flight 434, carrying 273 passengers and 20 crew, en route from Cebu to Tokyo was forced to make an emergency landing after a bomb went off in the cabin, killing a Japanese businessman. Later Ramzi Yousef called and claimed responsibility for the bombing in the name of the Abu Sayyaf Group, a dry run for Â“48 hours of terror.Â”

Five individuals, including Yousef, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Abdul Hakim Murad and Adel Anon, and Khalid Al-Shaikh (thought to be Ramzi YousefÂ’s uncle) were to all depart different Asian cities, placing a timed bomb on a flight, during its first leg of a trans-pacific flight. They would then transfer to another flight and arming a second bomb. The bombs were to detonate simultaneously over the Pacific. If successful, some 4,000 people would have been killed.

On the evening of 6 January 1995, a fire broke out in Ramzi YousefÂ’s apartment as he and Murad were mixing chemicals to make bombs. As the air filled with poisonous gas they had to flee the apartment. The police were suspicious and surreptitiously entered the apartment. They were aghast at what they found: an apartment filled with highly volatile chemicals, 4 large timing devices, a pipe bomb, books and manuals on the manufacture of bombs. They also found a lap-top computer that had the plans for the terrorist attacks, 12 fake passports and a business card belonging to bin LadenÂ’s brother-in-law, Khalifa. In the aftermath of the fire, Yousef immediately fled the scene. Murad, was arrested and extradited to the US. Under interrogation Murad, who was a trained pilot, admitted to a plan of crashing a hijacked jetliner into CIA headquarters. Wali Khan Amin Shah was later arrested in Malaysia and rendered to the United States. Sheik Mohammed fled and immediately was placed on the FBIÂ’s most wanted terrorist list; he was later named as a top suspect in the September 11 hijackings.

After 9 years in the Philippines, bin LadenÂ’s brother-in-law Khalifa was arrested on 26 December 1994 in California when he was discovered to be on a Jordanian terrorist watch list. He was held without bail and charged with visa fraud and providing false information. But America was never able to convict him on a more serious charge. He was deported to Lebanon where he was already tried, convicted and sentenced to death in absentia Â“for conspiracy to carryout terrorist acts.Â” He was retried and acquitted of terrorism charges, and allowed to move to Saudi Arabia. Though Khalifa has denied involvement in Bin LadenÂ’s recent activities, he had admitted Â“very close ties in the past.Â” Yet, during a post-11 September crackdown by the Saudi Arabian government on known bin Laden associates, Khalifa was arrested but later released. He is believed to still manage bin LadenÂ’s investments in Southeast Asia. The Philippine government asserts that all of the charities run by Khalifa in the Philippines, that were used to funnel money to the Abu Sayyaf group and the MILF, have been shut down. The linkages between Khalifa and Yousef, and the fact that Wali Khan Amin Shah was supposedly an employee of the IIRO was too much for the Philippine authorities to countenance. Yet, complained one senior intelligence official to me, Â“we could not touch the IIRO.Â” It took the Philippine government almost 6 years to shut their office in the Philippines, from 2000 until September 2001, the IIRO still funded projects in the country through its representative offices in Malaysia and Indonesia.

The extent of the Ramzi Yousef cell terrified Philippine security officials who began to understand the degree to which their country was penetrated by terrorist groups. They increased their monitoring and intelligence capabilities, which led to a few results.

Following further investigations into the plot to assassinate the Pope, police broke up another Al Qaeda cell in Caloocon in late-March 1995. Those arrested had served in Afghanistan with the Mujiheddin, and were all thought to be followers of the radical Egyptian cleric the blind Sheik Abdulrahman. Unfortunately, all 14 of the suspects were later released because of a lack of evidence. Some fled the Philippines while others stayed- but all jumped bail. Several of this cell were put under heightened surveillance. In December 1995 police arrested Adel Annon, a member of the Ramzi Yousef cell still at large. During the raid, police discovered grenades, dynamite, rockets, bomb-making components and travel documents in his position.

General Jose Almonte, at the time the National Security Advisor to President Ramos told me that they were in complete and utter shock over the scope of Â“Oplan Bojinka.Â” They could not believe it, because it was Â“too fantastical. So out of you know, so anti-God. You do not think that even a man with a diabolical mind could do that.Â” If there was one positive outcome, it was a growing consciousness of the fact that the Philippines was thoroughly penetrated by terrorist cells. Increased surveillance of radical groups also led the PNP to breakup a 9-man cell of the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in May 1995. Yet General Almonte also said that the Philippines raised the alarm to the international community, and in 1996 even hosted a major international conference on counter-terrorism, but was unhappy to find that states were not taking the issue seriously. The US in particular, thought the matter with Youssef and the othersÂ’ arrests was resolved. No one, as a senior military intelligence official said to me, thought that Oplan Bojinka was simply part of a greater plot. Almonte believes that the US did not take the international scope of the Al Qaeda network as seriously as it should have.

The Ramzi Yousef Al Qaeda cell was broken up by accident and then by good police work, but not through penetration by an intelligence agency. When it was discovered, it was in the final stages of a number of spectacular attacks: the bombing of eleven commercial jetliners, the assassination of the Pope and the aerial attack on the CIA headquarters. The planning and scope of the Yousef cell was staggering. Bin Laden proved that he could establish an autonomous cell impervious to detection that could plan and execute deadly attacks.

The second point is that despite some links between the Abu Sayyaf Group and Al Qaeda, Yousef really did not trust them or think them capable enough to carry out serious terrorist acts. He used his own men, all flown in from the Middle East. Yousef and Wali Khan were willing to train members of the ASG, but they did not rely on them to the degree that observers have indicated. At most, members of the ASG provided logistical services and assisted Yousef and Wali Khan in ex-filtrating the country.

The breakup of the Ramzi Yousef cell in Manila, had far reaching consequences for the Abu Sayyaf group. Abu Sayyaf members played important supporting roles, if not leadership roles in the cell. Most importantly, the Yousef-bin Laden connection was the major source of their funding. The Abu Sayyaf fell into decline, riddled with factionalism and in recent years it has become more of a criminal nuisance with no apparent linkages to international terrorist organizations.

Philippine police killed Janjalani in a shootout on 18 December 1998. His lieutenant, Edwin Angeles was arrested in January 1999, and became a government informer.

Since then, the Abu Sayyaf has split into two or three factions and their commitment to establishing an Islamic state now seems secondary at best. As one US diplomat said to me, Â“TheyÂ’re wannabes.Â”

JanjalaniÂ’s younger brother Khadaffy, who seems more engrossed with kidnapping and hostage taking, heads one faction. He is based on the island of Basilan. Another Janjalani brother, Hector was captured by the Philippine government and arrested for masterminding a string of bombings in Manila in December 2000. He was arraigned on 6 December 2001. Another, but small faction on Jolo island is headed by Galib Andang, known as Â“Commander Robot,Â” who broke away from the Moro National Liberation Front. Robot was a former Nur Misuari bodyguard who has been running a kidnapping racket for years. Abu Sabaya, the nom de guerre of Ahmad Salayudi, heads the largest faction that continues to fight the Philippine army with considerable success. He was reportedly killed in June 2002.

One only has to look at a chronology of ASG operations to chart the loss of international funding. From 1996 to 2000, the ASG engaged in some 266 terrorist activities. One Abu Sayyaf defector said that he quit the movement Â“because the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were not for Islam but for personal gratification. We abducted people not any more for the cause of Islam but for money.Â” In addition to kidnapping, the ASG engages in extortion, taxes from peasants, fishermen, coconut growers, and businessmen. The ASG also engages in marijuana cultivation, and on 24 July 1999 PNP forces destroyed some 70,000 marijuana plants worth P20 million ($10 million). According to a Basilan politician, Â“It was easier to deal with them when they had a single leaderÂ—and an ideology. Now, these guys are in it for the money, and thereÂ’s no stopping them.Â” The demands for $1 million ransoms per hostage have led many to consider the Abu Sayyaf as nothing more than a criminal menace rather than a secessionist insurgency with legitimate grievances. As the Philippine National Security Advisor Roilo Golez said, Â“We have no evidence that Abu Sayyaf has gotten financing from bin Laden recently. Otherwise they would not have to resort to kidnapping.Â” According to the Philippine Presidential spokesman, Rigoberto Tiglao,

Since the death of Janjalani, believed to the [Abu Sayyaf] ideologue, the band has degenerated into a criminal kidnap for ransom group using Islamic militancy as a ruse to gain the support of a few Muslim villages in Basilan island where they take refuge. The Abu Sayyaf Group has split into two groups because of their squabbles over ransom money.

Finally, it seems that at this point, bin Laden had put the Philippines behind him and was determined to take his jihad to the Holy Land, from where he would both drive out the Americans and their secular puppet regimes. Bin LadenÂ’s operation had moved to Khartoum, Sudan, where he became truly intent on creating an international network and a business empire to fund it. It was at this time that hhis attacks of the House of Saud led to his being stripped of his Saudi citizenship. Cells lingered on in the Philippines, which will be discussed below. But for the most part, Al Qaeda no longer saw the Philippines as an important logistical hub or base of operations. By that point they had Sudan and after the Taliban came to power in 1996, Afghanistan.

1. Mohammed Sadiq Odeh lived in Davao City where he participated in terrorist activities. He was a suspect in a 1993 bombing of a cathedral and in 1995 he was arrested for possession of explosive devices. He is one of the people who were captured, tried and convicted in the United States for the 7 August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

Mamdouh Mahmud Salim who was also convicted in the embassy bombings lived in the Philippines between 1996-1998. In addition to the bombing of the cathedral, intelligence officials believe that Odeh was an important financial officer for Al Qaeda.

Philippine military intelligence analysts believe there was one other member of this cell, but they acknowledge having little information about it. It is believed to be no longer in operation as Salim and Odeh were dispatched to East Africa to prepare the attacks on the US embassies.

2. Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi two of the leaders of the 11 September hijackings spent a few days north of Manila where they trained at a flying school near the former Clark Airforce Base, run by a former USAF officer. The two were positively identified by local officials. It is not known if Atta and al-Shehhi met with anyone while in the Philippines.

3. Metro Manila Cell
Three individuals, 2 Palestinians and 1 Jordanian were arrested in December 2001 in a suburb of Manila. All three were classmates in Kuwait and all have connections to Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. Mohammed Sabri Selamah, a Palestinian arrived in the Philippines in 1986. He ran a local branch of KhalifaÂ’s IIRO and was thought by Philippine intelligence to be the point man in the Southern Philippines for Al Qaeda.

Hasan Ali, a Jordanian, came to the Philippines in 1985.

Masrie Ahma Abed, a Palestinian, lived with Ramzi Yousef when he first came to the Philippines in 1990.

4. Hadi Yousef Alghoul
On 27 December 2001, a Jordanian man was arrested in his home west of Manila. Police seized 281 sticks of dynamite, 3 cell phones (thought to be detonators for the explosives), dry cell batteries and wires, and Islamic poems in Arabic, as well as anti-American documents. Hadi Yousef Alghoul, who is in his 50s, was arrested by PNP in March 1995 for his links to other Al Qaeda operatives arrested in the Bojinka plot, during the break up of the Caloocan cell. Alghoul was later released for lack of evidence. A PNP colonel informed me that he has been under surveillance since his release. Alghoul has lived in the Philippines for almost two decades, though he has no documentation, married a Filipina, and established a small womenÂ‘s clothing stall. He has Â“suspected links with Middle Eastern terrorists.Â” His arrest came one year after the ASG staged a string of bombings in Manila. According to a senior police officer, Â“Alghoul is a member of one of the terrorist cells in the Philippines assigned to carry out next week a string of bombings in Metro Manila.Â” He was under intense intelligence scrutiny for links with Muslim terrorists, as every Thursday, Alghoul Â“withdrew a huge amount of money from a local bank.Â” Police investigations however did not reveal the source of the funding.

Alghoul was released from prison after posting bail on 12 January 2002, but within hours he was taken into custody by immigration agents. He claims that he was framed by the police.

Investigators believe that there was a link between Al Ghoul and Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, the former being a pay master for the Jemaah Islamiya network (discussed below).

5. Rahah Saliaman Movement
This small cell of Muslim radicals, includes no more than 25 individuals, but attracted police attention beginning in November 2001 for two reasons. First, the organization has links to some of the institutions established by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa in support of Rami Yousef, the ASG and the MILF. Funding and support for this organization came from an NGO, the Islamic Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG) led by Humoud Mohammad Abdulaziz Al-Lahem, a 67-year old Saudi National, is thought to be a key conduit of money to terrorist and separatist groups in the Philippines. Beneath the ISCAG are three smaller NGOs, the Darul Hijrah Foundation (DHF), Islamic Information Center and the Islamic Wisdom Worldwide Mission. The DHF was founded by several MILF members including Abdul Nasser Nooh (the MILF liaison officer in Manila) and MILF Finance Committee Chairman Yusop Alongan. The Islamic Wisdom Worldwide Mission (IWWM), run by Mohammad Amin Soloman Al Ghafari. This organization took over Mohammed Jamal KhalifaÂ’s IRIC in 1995, when the Philippine government shut it down. IRIC staff were hired by the IWWM and much of its philanthropic network was taken over by Al Gahafari.

The second cause for alarm was the organizationÂ’s direct links to both the MILF and the ASG. One of the RSM central committee members, Sheikh Omar Lavilla, was a classmate of ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani at Mindanao State University. In November 2001, Lavilla traveled to the Mindanao region where he received P10 million in support from Janjalani. Several of the RSM leaders traveled to MILF camps where they received training, between August 1999 to December 2001. Philippine intelligence sources believe that the RSM, which was based not in Mindanao but in Luzon, was supported by the MILF and ASG to open up a second front on the government

Malaysia

The loss of Khalifa was a blow to the Al Qaeda network in the region. He had spent years here establishing a network. And in the mid-1990s there seemed to be a lull in Al Qaeda operations in the region. But in the mid to late-1990s, Al Qaeda appointed Ahmad Fauzi, aka Abdul al Hakim, to coordinate Al Qaeda operations in Southeast Asia. Fauzi based his operations in Malaysia. In a familiar pattern, Fauzi set about establishing independent Al Qaeda cells, while at the same time grafting onto existing radical movements and fringe groups. Malaysia became a key center for Al Qaeda front companies, and between 1993-1996 one a year was established, that we know about. To this day he lives openly in Malaysia. Malaysia has become an important center for bin Laden investments and the establishment of front companies for Al Qaeda, in addition to Konsojaya. It has also been one of the banking centers utilized by the network. Operationally and logistically, Malaysia is very important to Al Qaeda.

Interestingly in 1998-1999, top aides to two of the most senior Algerian terrorists, Antar Zouabri, a GIA leader and Hassan Hattab, both moved to Malaysia. By this point, most intelligence analysts believe that Al Qaeda had already co-opted the GIA network in Europe and Hattab was a known associate of bin Laden.

The KMM and Terrorist Linkages

The Kampulan Mujiheddin was founded on 12 October 1995 by Zainon Ismail. Since 1999, this group is allegedly led by Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the son of PASÂ’ spiritual leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat, but that might be simply the governmentÂ’s spin to discredit Nik Aziz and the main opposition party PAS. This militant cell [sometimes called the Malaysian Mujiheddin Group], has clear links to Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda network. 45 of the estimated 68 members were trained in camps in Afghanistan. Nik Adli spent time in Afghanistan between 1990-1996 fighting with the Mujiheddin as did the KMMÂ’s founder Zainon Ismail.

Nik Adli Nik Aziz, clearly understood the ramifications of cooperation and trans-national linkages. In 1999 he reportedly purchased a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including 24 pounds of explosives. That same year he studied bomb-making with the MILF in the southern Philippines. He began to link up with exiled Indonesian radials, such as Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Riduan Isamuddin and Abu Jibril Abdurrahman (who will be discussed in detail below).

PAS suffered a serious blow to its reputation when Nik Adli and 9 other members of the Kampulan Mujiheddin (7 of whom were also PAS members) were detained on 4 August 2001 for attempting to violently overthrow the Malaysian government and establish an Islamic state. Most of the members arrested spent time in Pakistan. The police reported finding stockpiled assault rifles and grenades, and linked the Kampulan Mujiheddin to several recent crimes including a botched bank robbery of the Southern Bank, the assassination of a state assemblyman, the killing of a Christian state assemblyman Joe Fernandez, and several bombings of Christian churches and Hindu temples.

By the end of 2001, there were 23 KMM members being detained under the ISA. Several are also senior party functionaries or provincial religious leaders within PAS. Hazmi Ishak, for example is a member of PAS, a former student in Pakistan between 1990-1995 who underwent military training with the Mujiheddin. He is said to be a close aid of Nik Adli Abdul Aziz. Other KMM members detained under the ISA included two PAS youth chiefs. In early 2002, two additional KMM members were detained, bringing the total to 25. Malaysian police are searching for some 200 other members.

One thing that is of particular interest is that the KMMÂ’s goals were not limited to just turning Malaysia into an Islamic state. The KMM had a pan-Islamic agenda for Southeast Asia and it talks about reviving the notion of a single Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. And though the likelihood of this ever happening is low, it is alarming for two inter-connected reasons. First, this has resonance with other Islamicists in the region who share this goal and they may begin to link up, coordinate their activities, in pursuit of this goal. Second, it gave the KMM the justification it needed to operate outside of Malaysia, such as in Ambon or Poso. In these places, away from the reach of the Malaysian government, they were far fewer constraints on their activities.

Jemaah Islamiya Network

There were very close relations between the KMM and another radical group, the Jemaah Islamiya, which had cells in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Indeed Malaysian authorities believed the JIN network was really a second cell of the KMM. Even today there is some confusion owing to the fact that both organizations share several leaders. The Jemaah Islamiya network is a perfect example of how Al Qaeda has penetrate the region, and why any one country cannot deal with terrorism alone.

Jemaah Islamiya

The origins of the Jemaah Islamiya network are found in Indonesia, dating back to the 1960s. In the 1960s, a radical cleric Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir (Bashir) established a pirate radio station that advocated the imposition of sharia, which got him into trouble with the Soeharto regime. In 1972, he and Abdullah Sungkar, a fellow cleric, established an Islamic boarding school in Solo, Al Mukmin. The school which opened with 30 students grew rapidly and in 1976 they moved to a 4 hectare compound outside of the city; it now has 1,900 students. The school continued to attract more pupils, one of whom was Fathur Rohman al Ghozi, who like many other graduates, went on to study in EgyptÂ’s Al Azhar University or Pakistani or Saudi Arabian madrassas. The school taught a hardline and littoral interpretation of Islam based on Wahabism and the philosophies of the 19th century Islamic cleric Mohammed Abdu Rahid Rida. In 1978, BaÂ’asyir and Sungkar were arrested and sentenced them to nine years for violating a 1963 subversion law. A second court upheld the conviction but lessened the sentence to 4 years, and they were released in 1982. In 1985, the Supreme Court overturned the appeals courtÂ’s conviction and re-imposed the original 9 year sentence; both immediately fled to Malaysia. Their pesentren remained open.

The two, Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir and Sungkar, found a safe haven Malaysia where they lived and preached openly for several decades and built up a large following of radical Indonesians who had fled the Soeharto regime and of radical Malays. They lived in a small town on the Malacca Straight, that had ferry service to Indonesia and heavy flows of traffic between the two states. The two served as a way station for Indonesians and Malaysians who were on their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan to study and fight the soviets or train in one of the 40 Al Qaeda camps that were established in the late 1990s. They were revered figures with large and devoted followers. Their speeches attacking the New Order regime and demanding the implementation of sharia won them a hardcore following.

One of their disciples was Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, a young Indonesian from central Java who fought the Russians in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s and was unable to return to Indonesia. Hambali- as the reader will recall- was an associate of Wali Khan Amin Shah, and a board member of Konsojaya.

They also linked up with a radical Indonesian cleric, Mohammad Iqbal Rahman- aka Abu Jibril-, also trained in Afghanistan, was imprisoned in Indonesia in the early 1980s and went into self-exile in Malaysia upon his release. He became a spiritual leader to the KMM and a key recruiter for Malaysians to fight in Ambon. Jibril, was a trainer in Afghan camps, and many see him as Â“head of trainingÂ” for Al Qaeda in all of Southeast Asia. Jibril was detained by Malaysian authorities under the ISA for militant activities in the summer of 2001.

All four of the individuals were itinerant preachers, unaffiliated with any Mosque, whose Imams are employees and regulated by the Malaysian government. Instead, they preached jihad in private settings before groups of hard core followers whom they slowly cultivates across Malaysia and in Singapore. They were paid MR200-300 for a 2 hour sermon. They began to espouse the doctrine of Nusantara Raya, the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic incorporating Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines.

Sungkar and BaÂ’asyir returned to their pesentren in Solo Indonesia in 1999 once the Soeharto regime collapsed and democracy was restored, though Sungkar died shortly thereafter.

In mid-2000, BaÂ’asyir established the Majelis Mujiheddin of Indonesia (MMI) based in Yogyakarta. The group ostensibly is civil society organization that tries to implement sharia peacefully and through the democratic process. Yet the MMI is thought to be a front for Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyirÂ’s more militant activities, and BaÂ’asyir recruited hundreds of followers to fight the Americans in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 (they were unable to leave Pakistan). The MMI was clearly part of a regional network and one of the MMIÂ’s board members is Mohammad Iqbal Rahman. The name of the group is an interesting one. Jemaah Islamiya was a concept of pan-Islamicism in southeast Asia that was first espoused by the Darul Islam - literally the house of Islam - movement in Indonesia in the 1940s to early-1960s.

The Network

BaÂ’asyir and Sungkar charged their deputies Hambali and Abu Jibril with establishing a network of militant cells throughout the region beginning in 1993.

Hambali has long been an Al Qaeda operative in the region and he was a close associate of Ramzi Yousef and Wali Khan Amin Shah. On 2 June 1994, he and Wali Khan established Konsojaya SDN BHD, a front company that provided logistical services - especially the procurement of bomb-making materials - for Ramzi Yousef. Hambali was one of 8 directors of the firm, along with Wali Khan. Hambali married a Malaysian-Chinese convert to Islam, Noral Wizah Lee, who was also on the Konsojaya board of directors.

It is unclear at what point he was formally recruited into Al Qaeda. One of the most troubling aspects in this to me is trying to understand how individuals went from being parochial jihadis to internationalists. What explains the transformation? What was the actual process? At any rate, Hambali became a key Al Qaeda operative in the region, and was according to one regional intelligence official, Â“operationally more important than Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir.Â”

Hambali launched an active recruiting campaign. In Malaysia, recruitment focused on two key groups: Indonesian migrants and exiles, and University of Technology of Malaysia students. UTM, located across from Singapore in Johor, has traditionally been a hotbed of Islamic radicalism. In Singapore, recruitment focused on older, more established middle class individuals, which is what has been so hard for Singapore authorities to grapple with: these were well educated individuals with good jobs, products of state schools, not stereotypical Islamic radicals.

Yet membership into Jemaah Islamiya is highly selective and comprised three phases over many years. Â“We are not a mass organization,Â” said one senior Jemaah Islamiya official. Â“We want people who will be loyal to the aims of the group.Â” The first phase included screening individuals, including their family background and knowledge of Islam. Once selected, Hambali enrolled the students at pesentrens and madrassas to study Islam. Many young radicals were sent to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The third phase of the training/recruitment regimen was physical and military training. Abu Jibril was probably in charge of training for the JIN. Some 50 individuals (19 of the 23 arrested in Malaysia, and at least 8 Singaporeans) were sent to Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. More (at least 5 Singaporeans) were sent to MILF camps in the southern Philippines.

There they learned bomb-making, weapons training, surveillance, sabotage, communication and cell formation. Several of these individuals claim to have been met by Mohammed Attef. Other Jemaah Islamiya recruits, were trained in two MILF camps in Mindanao, Camp Abu Bakar and Camp Obaida. Others were trained at a Jemah Islamiya camp in southern Malaysia.

Unlike the KMM which recruited anyone, the Jemaah Islamiya network tended to recruit more middle class individuals, and even the poorer members were not desperately dispossessed. Mohammed Sobri, for example, was a private in the Malaysian army who began attending sermons by Sungkar, BaÂ’asyir, Iqbal and Hambali, recruiting more members. Â“We stopped believing in the democratic process,Â” Sobri said. Â“So we felt that jihad was the only way to change the government.Â”

Hambali returned to Indonesia in October 2000 and began to recruit people to conduct a wave of bombings across Indonesia (20 bombs in 9 cities) in Christmas 2000. He then returned to Malaysia, now wanted by Indonesian authorities. Abu Jibril returned to Indonesia in January 2000 and traveled to the sectarian strife-torn Malukus to organize Muslim militias. According to Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir, Abu Jibril Â“could really motivate people to jihad.Â” BaÂ’asyir noted that Jibril was primarily involved in fundraising for the jihad in the Malukus, though he sometimes went there himself. Â“He gave them spirit to fight for there right to defend themselves.Â” In the Malukus, Jibril Â“introduced a centralized command structureÂ” and led attacks on Christian communities, by high-speed boats. In one massacre, 250 Christians in the town of Galela, on 19 July 2000, were killed. He returned to Malaysia in late 2000, and resumed his support of the KMM. He was arrested by Malaysian authorities in the June 2001.

Organizational Structure

The Jemaah Islamiya network (JIN) as formally established sometime in 1994-1995. Hambali became the chairman of the 5-member Â“Regional Advisory CouncilÂ” [See table 3]. Other members include Mohammed Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), Abu Hanifah and Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana. Bafana, a Malaysian businessman and former Singaporean, was a key aid to Hambali. He ran a large construction firm in Malaysia, Marebina, and was an important financial backer of the JIN. In addition to the 5-member Regional Advisory Council, was the JI Secretary, Fikri Sugondo, the elementary school master at BaÂ’asyirÂ’s Al Mukmin pesentren, and a close personal aid of Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir.

Beneath the Regional Advisory Council (syurah), Hambali appointed several lieutenants to establish cells in their respective countries. Fathur Rohman al Ghozi established a cell in the Philippines; Ibrahim bin Maidin setup the Singapore cell; Abdussalam bin Abu Thalib ran the Malaysian cell; and Irfan Suryahadi Anwwas, the younger brother of Abu Jibril, organized the Indonesian cell. Each cell, in turn had several sub-cells, or fiah.

The JIN cell in each of the four states, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, were fairly independent from each other and clearly had very specific functions. Each took advantage of a certain aspect of their host state.

According to Malaysian and Singapore intelligence reports, the JIN received some RP1.35 billion from Al Qaeda since 1996. That year, JIN received RP250 million, RP400 million in 1997 and RP700 million in 2000.

Malaysian Cell

With an estimated 200 members, the Malaysian cell is the largest cell in the JIN. At least 13 members were trained in Afghanistan, others were trained at an MILF camp in Mindanao. The Malaysian cell had three discernable functions. First, liaison with the KMM in Malaysia, but it also served as a major conduit between the JIN and Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In addition, it was thought to be responsible for establishing a cell in Australia.

Second, the Malaysian cell was responsible for procuring large quantities of ammonium nitrate, a chemical fertilizer that is used in bombs. The cell had already procured in October 2000 and transferred 4 tons of this substance to the cell in Singapore where it planned to target US interests; 17 more tons were to be delivered. To date the 4 tons of ammonium nitrate has not been recovered. The Malaysian cell procured the ammonium nitrate through the establishment of front companies, one of which, Green Laboratory Medicine, a medical testing facility, was incorporated by Yazid Sufaat, the individual who had previously established Infocus Technology. Sufaat was a retired captain in the Malaysian army. It was at Yazid SufaatÂ’s apartment that the key meeting between the 5 bin Laden lieutenants met in January 2001. Sufaat was detained by Malaysian authorities in November 2001upon his return from Afghanistan. It was in his name, as managing director of Green Laboratories Medicine, that the ammonium nitrate was purchased.

The third function of the Malaysian cell was to run a camp in Negri Sembilan, in southern Malaysia, that was used by both the Malaysian cell and the Singapore cell for training new recruits. No targeting/militant activities appear to have been planned by this cell.

The 22 suspects who have been arrested are well educated; 12 have university degrees- five from institutions in the United States, Great Britain and Indonesia, the remainder from Malaysian universities.

Philippines Cell

The Philippine cell was a major logistics cell for the network responsible for acquiring explosives, guns and other equipment. Its leader was an Indonesian, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, aka Mike, who as a child had studied at Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyirÂ’s pesentren, Al Mukmin, before going on to study in a Pakistani madrasah for 6 years, when he was recruited into Al Qaeda by a Malaysian businessman, and a member of the JIN Regional Advisory Council Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana. He trained in Afghanistan in 1993-94 and was dispatched to the Philippines in late-1995 to early-1996. Al Ghozi carefully established the cell, opening bank accounts, networking and recruiting. He also learnt the local language well enough that a Philippine police official said Â“he could pass himself off completely as a Filipino.Â”

Al Ghozi was also responsible for liaising with the MILF who trained Malaysia and Singaporean members in bomb-making. Al Ghozi was in contact with Muklis Yunos, an MILF urban warfare operative and the head of the MILFÂ’s Special Operations Group, who trained with Al Ghozi in Afghanistan. Al Ghozi spent one month in the MILF headquarters, Camp Abu Bakar in 1996.

Over the next three years, Al Ghozi was in and out of the Philippines. He was sent back to the Philippines in March 1998 for three months before returning to Indonesia, though he applied for a Philippine Passport in the name of Randy Andam Alib. He returned again in March 1999. In one meeting in Kuta Kinbalo, Bafana ordered him to purchase 5-7 tons of explosives, and wired him $18,000 for a down payment from a Singapore bank. The contact for the explosives came through Muklis Yunos, and in exchange for the contact, Al Ghozi was recruited to assist and finance Muklis in a series of bombings in metro Manila on 30 December 2000 that killed 22 people. Al Ghozi withdrew 250,000 pesos ($4850) from a bank in November 2000 and transferred it to the MILF to purchase 70 kilos of explosives. The attack was Â“in retaliation: for the Â“all-out warÂ” launched by the Estrada administration against the MILF in 2000.

The explosives were to be transferred to Bintam Indonesia, an island off Singapore, via Poso, the port city where the Al Qaeda training camp was located. Al Ghozi was also responsible for procuring firearms that were either destined for the Poso training camp or possibly the Laskar Jihad. The Philippine cell may also have been a conduit for financial transfers to the JIN. The Philippine cell was also instrumental in arranging the training of JIN/KMM members in MILF camps.

In addition to explosives, Al Ghozi was responsible for the purchase of light arms and assault rifles. These were shipped to Poso, for Agus DwikarnaÂ’s Laskar Jundullah and for Abu JibrilÂ’s jihad in Ambon. The Malaysian coast Guard, in mid-2001, intercepted a huge cache of mainly M-16s en route from Zamboanga to Ambon.

Indonesian Cell

The least is known about this cell, which is connected to BaÂ’asyirÂ’s overt organization, the MMI, which is a large umbrella organization for small radical and militant groups from across the archipelago. The MMI is the key liaison between BaÂ’asyir and the network. BaÂ’asyir is the Amir, the spiritual leader. In addition to its spiritual and leadership role, it has other functions: First, senior Al Qaeda leaders have traveled to Indonesia, and have likely liaised with BaÂ’asyirÂ’s men. The MMI also serves as a financial conduit. Finally, the MMI is an important recruitment channel for the JIN: Al Ghozi and three of those arrested in Malaysia were Indonesian members of the MMI.

In October 2001, Indonesian intelligence officials discovered a document in Solo entitles Â“Operation Jibril.Â” The 15-page document was signed by JIN chairman Abu Hanafiah and JIN secretary Fikri Sugundo, and called for the simultaneous bombings of the US embassies in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Indonesian intelligence officials later decided that the document was probably a fabrication.

Singapore Cell

The Singapore cell was the major operational unit of the network, which was planning and coordinating the attacks. The Singapore cell was first headed by Ibrahim bin Maidin, a 51-year old superintendent of an apartment building, known as Qoaid Wakalah. He had no formal religious training but was trained by BaÂ’asyir, Hambali, Sungkar and Iqbal, who frequently visited Singapore to preach in private sessions. He had trained in Afghanistan in 1993. Maidin recruited members through a religious class that he taught. He was the only member of the cell to wear a beard or Islamic gowns and skullcap.

The cell had an estimated 60-80 members, though no more than 25 operatives. 13 operatives were arrested. MaidinÂ’s successor, Mas Salamat Kastari, and four others fled to Indonesia. In addition to these 5, Singapore intelligence officials believe 7-8 others escaped; roughly half the cell was broken up.

There are a few important characteristics of the members: most were well educated, middle-class men, with no apparent leanings to radical Islam. They were not seen in the local mosques, instead preferring to congregate together- as the local mosques did not espouse Wahibism. The network was extremely secretive and was not discovered until late 2001. Members were seemingly average citizens, a chauffer, electrician, contractor, engineer, and printer. One, Riduan bin Abdullah, was a Roman Catholic convert to Islam and an aerospace technician. Six of them had completed their military service in Singapore. According to the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, Â“Several of those arrested had been to Afghanistan where they received short periods of training in Al Qaeda terrorist camps.Â” At least 5 were trained in MILF camps. Most took time off from their jobs in Singapore stating that they were going to Mecca on haj.

The cell had five functional units: operations, security, missionary work, fundraising, and communications

Beneath the operations unit, there were three sub-cells- fiah - each tasked with surveilling different targets: Fiah Ayub, Fiah Musa, and Fiah Ismail.

Fiah Ayub was led by Mohammed Khalim Jaffar, a 39 year-old printer. It was developing two seperate attacks: a bombing of the Yishun MRT station where a shuttle bus picked up US naval personnel and brought them to the Sembawang wharf. The second plan, was a USS-Cole-styled suicide attack of a US naval vessel in the northeastern waters between Changi and Pulau Tekong. Jaffar also had a listing of over 200 US firms operating in Singapore, and had marked 3 as potential targets. A video-tape narrated by one cell member Hashim bin Abas of the Yishun surveillance was found in the rubble of Mohammed AttefÂ’s house in Kabul.

Fiah Musa was led by Mohammed Ellias, a 29 year-old manager, and Mohammed Nazir Mohammed, a 27 year-old ship traffic assistant. This Fiah was responsible for the bombing of the US Embassy. This Fiah had also instructed member, Andrew Gerard, a 34-year old aerospace technician at Singapore Technologies, to photograph and find suitable targets at Paya Lebar airbase, which is used by the US Airforce. This Fiah was also assisted by Fathur Rohman al Ghozi, and a Canadian Arab (we do not know his identity)Â….

EC: Mohamed Mansour Jabarah aka Sammy

Â….to surveil different targets in Singapore in October. They were instructed to procure 21 tons of ammonium nitrate and secure warehouse space that could be used to make truck bombs.

Fiah Ismail was the smallest and newest cell, formed after 11 September. It was led by Galim Hussain, a 41 year-old supervisor, and was told to identify suitable US commercial targets.

Other intelligence: What is alarming is that the attacks were almost in the operational stage. A report in JaneÂ’s Intelligence Review stated that Osama bin Laden had personally called off the attacks. According to the MHA-ISD, each of the fiah Â“see their role as mainly providing logistical and other support to foreign terrorist elements who would determine when and what to attack.Â”

There was some contact with the JIN cells in other countries, though one member of the Singapore cell was the brother of a cell member in Malaysia. Clearly, the Malaysian cell was responsible for procuring the ammonium nitrate, while Philippine cell leader, al Ghozi not only procured explosives, but also came to Singapore to assist in surveillance and target selection.

Breaking Up the Cell

Between 9 December 2001 to the beginning of July 2002, some 23 people in Malaysia, 13 people in Singapore and 9 people in the Philippines were arrested. The cell, founded in 1994, went un-noticed until after the 11 September attacks. Starting in April 2001, they increased their surveillance of American targets. Malaysian and Singaporean officials, who were on heightened alert after 11 September, had a few breaks.

First, Singaporean officials received word from the Northern Alliance, that they had captured a Singaporean, Muhammad Aslam Yar Ali Khan, a Singaporean from Pakistan, who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and come to know Osama bin Laden. In October 2001, a member of the Singapore Cell, Mohammed Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan, told an acquaintance that he was going to Afghanistan; this individual tipped off the police who began to monitor Khan and his acquaintances. Ali Khan suddenly left Singapore on 4 October for Pakistan. The interrogation of Ali Khan confirmed the existence of the JIN. On 3 December, the media announced Ali KhanÂ’s arrest by the Northern Alliance.

But in the course of the surveillance, Singaporean authorities were aghast to discover what an extensive bombing campaign was being planned against US commercial, military and diplomatic assets, as well as the British High Commission, the Sustralian High Commission and the Israeli Embassy. They were aghast to discover that their plot to build truck bombs was nearing completion.

Singaporean officials received a report from Indonesian officials of a 28 September meeting of JIN leaders who were planning a synchronized attack on US Embassies in the region.

The Malaysian government arrested Yazid Sufaat as he returned from Afghanistan in October 2001. He had left Malaysia to Â“study theologyÂ” in June 2001. He was already under police surveillance, having come to their attention at the January 2001 lieutenants meeting with Hambali and other Al Qaeda operatives held in his apartment. Already the Malaysians were on heightened alert following the 18 May 2001 botched robbery of Southern Bank in Petaling Jaya. Although two KMM members were killed, one survived and his interrogation led to the arrest of 9 others. Hambali, went on the run after 18 May 2001.

That month, two foreigners a Canadian Arab (Â“SammyÂ”) and Fathur Rohman al Ghozi, (Â“MikeÂ” who was traveling with a fake Canadian passport), arrived in Singapore to help in the finally planning of a series of attacks on US, British, Australian and Israeli diplomatic, military and commercial interests. They left Singapore before they could be arrested.

After the 1 August bombing of a Jakarta mall by a Malaysian, Taufik Abdul Halim Â“DanyÂ”(who happens to be the brother in law of Zulkifli Hir, one of the KMM members who fled after the Southern Bank robbery), the Malaysian government came to the conclusion that there was a second KMM cell that they had not known about and began to increase surveillance of suspected members. The interrogation of Yazid Sufaat, seemed to confirm the presence of a second cell. (It was not until January 2002, that the Malaysian authorities finally concluded that it was not the KMM but the Jemaah Islamiya).

Fearful that the news that Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan was arrested by the Northern Alliance would send his cell members into hiding, the MHA-ISD decided to arrest cell members on 8 December. On 9 December, the first six people were detained in Singapore and 15 were detained in Malaysia. By the end of the month 15 were detained, though 2 were later released. On 14 December, Singapore intelligence officials learned of the surveillance video-tape taken by a JIN member of potential US military, commercial and diplomatic targets in Singapore, which was found in the rubble of Mohammed AttefÂ’s house in Kabul Afghanistan by US intelligence agents. They did not receive a copy of the video from the US until 28 December. Â“The tapes offered useful corroborationÂ” said a Minister of Home Affairs spokesman. Â“But by then we had wrapped it up.Â” Indeed, the individual who took and narrated the video, Hashim Abas admitted his role to the Internal Security Department (ISD) on 26 December. Also turned over by the US were digital photographs and maps of the naval facility that is frequently used by US naval warships.

On 19 January 2002, an additional 7 Malaysians were arrested and 9 more members of the Jemaah Islamiya cell were arrested in Singapore, though two were later released. The Singapore cell attempted to procure 17 more tons of ammonium nitrate to produce truck bombs. It had already purchased 4 tons- which has never been recovered. Ammonium nitrate, which is a common ingredient in chemical fertilizers, and is thus not commonly found in Singapore, though it is readily available in Malaysia. There, 1 ton costs approximately S$400-500. They were also found with 2 tampered Singaporean passports and 15 forged Philippine and Malaysian immigration stamps. Also found were night vision goggles, literature on bomb-making, maps and photos of the Paya Lebar airbase used by US forces. An additional surveillance videotape was found in the office of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana. One of the ringleaders was found with a Canadian passport in the name of Jabarah Mohamed Mansur. The were also engaged in fundraising for other radical Islamic groups.

From Malaysia and Singapore, the investigation turned to the other states in the region. Acting on a tip from Singapore intelligence (and in conjunction with three of their officers), Philippine National Police agents arrested the Indonesian national who had been in Singapore in October, on 15 January 2002 as he was about to leave for Bangkok. Police believed that Fathur Rohman al Ghozi was storing the weapons for the Jemaah Islamiya and was a logistics officer for the cell.

After several days of interrogation, Fathur Rohman al Ghozi tipped-off police to a cache of weapons, and the PNP raided a house in General Santos City, on 18 January 2002. The police recovered 50 boxes, or 1 ton of TNT, manufactured in Cebu, Philippines which was to be shipped to Singapore. In addition they recovered 17 M-16 rifles, 300 detonators, 6 roles of detonating cords and other bomb-making materials. The light weapons were destined to JIN forces who were fighting in the Malukus and Poso. Police arrested three Filipinos, two brothers, Almuctar Malagat and Mualidin Malagat and Mohammad Malagad in raids on two other houses in General Santos City. PNP investigators are now trying to track down Mukhlis Yunus - whom al Ghozi named as the financier for the cell. Yunus was head of the MILFÂ’s special operations group, and, along with Al Ghozi, was said to be responsible for the December 2000 bombings in metro Manila. Al Ghozi also named an assistant Mohammed Kiram, 31, who was arrested on 21 January in Marawi.

On 15 March 2002, three more Indonesian nationals, believed to be affiliated with al Ghozi, were arrested in Manila as they attempted to leave the country, based on intelligence from Singapore and Malaysia. Though they were found with C4 explosives and a role of detonating cable, all three denied any connection to Al Ghozi. Two of the suspects, Abdulla Jamal Belfas and Tamsil Linrung were released by orders from President Arroyo who was under intense diplomatic pressure from Indonesian president Megawati. Megawati reacted forceful for domestic political reasons. Tamsil Linrung was the treasurer of the National Mandate Party (PAN), the second largest Muslim political party whom Megawati needs the support of in the 2004 election. PAN officials, for their part, believe that the Indonesian intelligence service (BIN) set up Linrung for political purposes. They were not alone in looking for conspiracy theories. Agus Dwikarna stated Â“We strongly assume the existence of direct intelligence involvement. . . In this case BIN was involved in our arrest.Â” Even the respected news weekly Tempo asserted that the three were set up simply because they were all members of Islamic groups and that Indonesian and Philippine intelligence services were simply trying to pressure Indonesian political leaders to get serious about terrorism.

Agus Dwikarna was more troubling because he tied together many loose ends. Dwikarna was already on BINÂ’s terrorist watch list and had already been under surveillance. He was a member of three different militant groups: he was a member of the MMIÂ’s Organizing Committee; the leader of the Laskar Jundullah which conducted Â“sweepsÂ” in Solo and militant anti-Christian activities in Sulawesi; and the vice-chairman on the Preparation Committee for the Application of Islamic Law in South Sulawesi (KPPSI). Though Dwikarna acknowledged that he aided groups in the Malukus and Poso Sulawesi, he claims he simply provided relief assistance through his charity, the Committee to Overcome Crisis. He was active in Poso, the heart of the sectarian strife, where the militant Laskar Jihad was also active. He is also thought to have assisted Parlindingan Siregar establish a camp for militants in Poso.

On 18 April 2002, Malaysian authorities conducted another sweep of suspected militants, detaining 14 JIN/KMM suspects, including Yazid SufaatÂ’s wife, Sejahratul Dursina. In their possession was a map of Port Klang, the Malaysian naval facility where US warships make frequent port calls.

On 9 July 2002, Philippine authorities arrested Hussain Ramos (aka Ali Ramos and Abu Ali), a 35 year old native of Marawi, who had procured over one ton of explosives for Al Ghozi, and was also affiliated with the MILF.

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There were several successes: First and foremost, this cell was broken up and the terrorist acts that were nearly at operational status were thwarted before any more violent acts could have be perpetrated. Major JIN figures such as Abu Jibril, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, and Agus Dwikarna were all arrested.

Second, Fathur Rohman al GhoziÂ’s admission that he participated in the 30 December 2000 bombings in Manila that killed 22 people, gives the Philippine authorities the smoking gun they needed to link the MILF to Al Qaeda, which puts them in a stronger position when it comes to peace talks. Authorities were also able to conclude that al Ghozi was responsible for the August 2000 bombing of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia; again tying in the MILF.

Third, officials in Singapore and Malaysia seem very confident that they have eradicated much of the Jemaah Islamiya network in their own countries. And the Philippines has made steady progress. Indeed much of the senior leadership of the JIN has been arrested in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. But Singapore and Malaysia have both expressed tremendous frustration about the lack of cooperation that they have received from Indonesian authorities. And both states acknowledged that they only arrested half of the known JIN leaders in their borders.

Although Abu Bakar BaÂ’asyir has been named by both Malaysia and Singapore as a prime suspect and a leader of the Jemaah Islamiya network, he continues to live and preach openly. Although BaÂ’asyir was brought in for questioning, on 24 January, he was released. A high-level Indonesian police delegation to Singapore and Malaysia was likewise not convinced of the evidence against BaÂ’asyir and refused to arrest him. He has acknowledged teaching 13 of those detained in Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. BaÂ’asyir denied being a member of Al Qaeda: Â“I am not a member of Al Qaeda, but I really respect the struggle of Osama bin Laden, who has bravely represented the worldÂ’s Muslims in their fight against the arrogant United States of America and their allies.Â” BaÂ’asyir launched a multi-million dollar libel suit against the Singapore government, though the courts rejected the suit. In April 2002, the Indonesian Supreme Court announced that it may arrest BaÂ’asyir on the grounds that he never finished serving the second half of his 9 year sentence, though they later through the case out.

In addition to BaÂ’asyir, there are several other JIN leaders who remain at large: namely, (Â“SammyÂ”),

(Philippines authorities were continuing to search for two Indonesian-born accomplices of al Ghozi - including a Canadian codenamed "Sammy" - both of whom were still believed to be hiding in the country.)

Â…Hambali, Mas Salamat Kestari and at least 10 others from Singapore. Both are thought to be in Pakistan, though there are also reports that Hambali is in Indonesia. Philippine authorities believe that one other Indonesian cell member in the country escaped.

The four tons of ammonium nitrate purchased by Yazid Sufaat was never found. Likewise, the explosives that Al Ghozi shipped to Singapore were never recovered. Upon further investigation of the firm that sold explosives to Muklis and Al Ghozi, an inventory audit revealed that some, 4 tons, of explosives are missing. It is unclear if Al Ghozi had previously shipped the explosives- and simply has not revealed that to the police. As one investigator complained:

ItÂ’s clear that al GhoziÂ’s role in the Philippines was the large scale export, transportation and delivery of explosives to end users. In this case it was Singapore, and the plans were already hatched to bomb US embassies there. But we donÂ’t know who all the end users are.