Essentially admits the first year in Iraq was a mistake as far as our program concerned. Saying have changed tactics in response to conditions on the ground in Iraq. Originally planned large scale reconstruction, but insurgents blew them up. Now working with local officals who will have a stake in their success.
The Coalition displayed considerable adaptability once it became clear that insurgency was not simply gangs of stay-behinds but a broad and well-organized threat. Critics of the Coalition’s performance in Iraq rarely mention that U.S. forces switched with no preparation or warning from a maneuver warfare campaign to a urban combat scenario (known by the unlovely acronym MOUT—Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain), and in truth one of the most difficult – battling an insurrection hiding among a friendly civilian population. The credit for this generally smooth transition goes to outstanding training and excellent commanders – the success of Gen. David Petraeus of the 101st Airborne in pacifying Mosul and that of Col. H.R. McMaster’s 3rd Armored Combat Regiment in Tal Afar will be studied for years to come.