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Thanks for the transcript.

From it;

Hunter:

even while we had an American agent standing on the dock asking the customs director of Dubai not to let this shipment go

(My Underline)

How does Hunter come to the conclusion that the above underlined statement of his is true?

I nominate Cboldt for #1 just on the posting of this transcript alone..

LOL!

and no- just because I am voicing a nomination does NOT mean I EVER want to be the top ten judge! LOL!

WAY too many great FReepers here!

He's chairman of the oversight committee, I think.

How does Hunter come to the conclusion that the above underlined statement of his is true?

####

I think Hunter's middle name is Hyperbole.

Hunter:The Dubai government in 2003 shipped 66 nuclear triggers, high-speed switches that can be used to detonate nuclear weapons -- allowed that shipment to go to Islamabad, even while we had an American agent standing on the dock asking the customs director of Dubai not to let this shipment go.
How does Hunter come to the conclusion that the above underlined statement of his is true?
Link posted elsewhere above, link and some contents reproduced here ...

A U.S. OEE [Office of Export Enforcement] special agent based in Dubai learned of the shipment's arrival in that city's customs shed and tried to stop it from going to Pakistan, but was reportedly rebuffed by the country's customs director.
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/asherkarni.html

And some additional stuff, I don't think was linked elsewhere in this thread.
Notice that in one version, the conviction of Karni is reported to be for sale of an oscilloscope? The specific model sold is also a restricted export item, controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons. I haven't bothered to seek or read the papers filed in the case to see if his convicion is also based on transfer of krytrons, but Karni admits to being a middleman in that transaction. Could be like Padilla, publicly accused of "conspiring to dirty bomb," but charged with providing material support to terrorist organizations.

Trading With The Enemy
Matthew Swibel, 04.19.04
On Oct. 3 U.S. investigators got a tip from a South African source. The shipment was headed for Islamabad via a DHL freight-forwarding service on Emirates Airlines--Dubai's government carrier. Hours after the Emirates Airbus jet landed at Dubai International Airport on Oct. 20, a U.S. special agent there tracked down the spark gaps to the airline's cargo shed, contacted its director of security and demanded to inspect the box. The response? Not a chance, according to the U.A.E.'s director of customs. The next day the goods, valued at $30,000, arrived in Pakistan aboard another Emirates flight.
http://www.forbes.com/business/global/2004/0419/041.html
October 2003: 66 triggered spark gaps, which can be used to detonate nuclear weapons, are shipped without the required license from the United States to Top-Cape Technology in South Africa. They are subsequently transshipped via Dubai to AJMC Lithographic Aid Society in Pakistan. In 2004 Asher Karni, an Israeli living in South Africa, pleads guilty to conspiring to export controlled commodities to Pakistan without validated export licenses. In 2005 the U.S. indicts Humayun Khan of the Pakistani company Pakland PME for violating export restrictions and being the ultimate purchaser.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/.../transshipment-milestones.html
30 November 2005
Article by Leigh Hansson
Asher Karni, a South African national, was sentenced to 36 months in prison on August 4, 2005 by a Washington, D.C. federal court after pleading guilty to illegally exporting restricted electronic items that can be used in nuclear weapons and missile systems. Karni admitted that in March 2003 he obtained a Tektronix oscilloscope from an unnamed company in Plainview, N.Y., and had the company send it to South Africa. When the shipment arrived at Top-Cape, Karni forwarded it to Pakistan. Karni did not obtain the requisite export license before shipping the item from the United States.
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=36346&shownav=0
October 2005 - Fact Sheet
ICE ARMS & STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY INVESTIGATIONS
Components with Nuclear Weapons Applications to Pakistan & India - On April 8, 2005, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia unsealed an indictment against Humayun Khan, 47, of Pakistan, charging him with illegally exporting oscilloscopes with nuclear weapons applications to Pakistan. Kahn was also charged with plotting to illegally export 66 nuclear detonator devices from the U.S. to Pakistan, via South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. On the same day, prosecutors announced that Asher Karni, 51, an Israeli national who resided in South Africa, pleaded guilty to charges that he worked with Khan to illegally export the oscilloscopes and nuclear triggers to Pakistan. Karni also pleaded guilty to charges that he illegally exported sensitive U.S. electronics to facilities in India that are involved in that nations nuclear and missile development program. The indictment of Khan and the guilty plea by Karni resulted from an extensive investigation by Commerce Department and ICE agents in Boston, Denver, and South Africa. Khan, who operated Pakland PME Corporation in Pakistan, remains at large. Karni, who owned Top-Cape Technology in South Africa, was recently sentenced to 36 months incarceration. The investigation is ongoing.
http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/factsheets/ICEarmsstrategic.htm