I have heard #1 and don't know if it's true or false - but living in "contractor world" I do know many complex jobs only have a few qualified competitors. This could be the case here, I don't know.
#2 is essentially true - if we're talking about security of the containers (which is what most are hyperventilating about). That will still be handled by Customs/DHS. DP World does have some physical security tasks - but even that is still overseen by the U.S. government.
I don't know, but I can believe #3, at least as far as first announcing an intent to acquire another firm. Some of those acquisitions take forever and a year. But it's safe to say it did not come to Congress' attention until very recently.
Regarding number (1) -- there are no domestic terminal operators who can take over P&O's allegedly enormous North American operations -- P&O is not, contrary to the impression being spread, some kind of US ports behemouth.
P&O Ports (from whom DP World is acquiring its US terminal interests), operates approximately 31 container, general cargo, and passenger terminals in New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, New Orleans, and Vancouver.
P&O has (now "had") no operations at all at the Port of South Louisiana or Houston (the two largest domestic ports in terms of tonnage by a very wide margin), nor at the ports at Bayport, Beaumont, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Huntington Tri-State, Baton Rouge, Corpus Christie, Texas City, etc., etc.
These other terminals, including the massive container, ro-ro, general cargo, hydrocarbon, and chemical terminals at South Louisiana and Houston, are operated by a rather wide variety of both foreign and domestic terminal companies. Here's a partial list:
Charleston Heavy Lift, LLC
East Coast Terminal
EMESCO Marine Services, Corp.
Federal Marine Terminals
Gateway Terminal Services
Gulf Elevator and Transfer
Hyde Shipping Corp.
ITO Baltimore
INBESCA America, Inc.
Industrial Terminals, L.P.
J.P.S. Express, Inc.
Kinder Morgan/Pinney Dock & Transport LLC
L&L Fleeting, Inc.
Levin Richmond Terminal Corp.
Maher Terminals, Inc.
Manchester Terminal
Maritime Terminal of Pennsylvania, Inc.
Mid-Atlantic Terminal, LLC
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
North Atlantic Distribution, Inc.
Pacific Delaware, Inc.
Penn Terminals, Inc.
Pacorini USA, Inc.
Rota Terminal & Transfer
Ruckert Terminals Corp.
Saipan Stevedore
Samson Tug And Barge Co., Inc.
Sun Terminal Inc.
SSA Marine
AP Moeller-Maersk
Texas Terminals LTD.
Transocean Terminal Operators, Inc.
etc., etc. -- Not to mention dedicated terminal operations by Exxon/Mobil, Chevron/Texaco, BP, Shell, etc.
Finding an acceptable operator to pick up P&O's former interests in the 31 terminals at issue really presents little or no problem. Which, in my view, makes this sale and securtity lapse even more unneccesary, perplexing, and boneheaded. Why open the door at all for a company that is owned and operated by a state with a demonstrated history of terrorist funding, transit, and facilitation?
As for (2) -- DP World won't have any responsibility for security -- I cannot agree with your suggestion that DP World's security responsibilities will be neglible.
Operator cooperation is integral to effective port security. The Canadian PIP program, the US Customs CIS program, the proposed Container Seal Verification Regime (CSVR), and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), are just a few of the security regimes that require operator initiative, cooperation, and reporting.
The CSVR regime will necessarily involve operator cooperation, reporting, content inspection, and seal and re-seal responsibilities. As described:
1. Obligation To Seal: The party that physically performs the stuffing of the container is responsible for sealing the container immediately upon the conclusion of a secure stuffing process. Each seal has a unique number, which must be provided to the carrier by the shipper.
2. Seal Standards: All seals should meet the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard for high security seals.1 The government should establish a specific date by which all containerized shipments must be affixed with such seals by the party that physically performs the stuffing of the container.
3. Recording Seal Changes: When persons having custody2 of a container, including U.S., state and local government officials, break the seal, they must immediately affix a new seal meeting the ISO standard, and provide the carrier (e.g., trucker, railroad, ocean carrier) or terminal operator in possession of the container with written or electronic confirmation of the event. The carrier or terminal operator must record the new seal number on the relevant shipping documents.
4. Modal Changes: Ideally, at each modal interchange3 in custody, the party receiving the container (e.g., trucker, railroad) must verify and record4 the seal, its number and its condition upon its receipt. If there is a seal discrepancy or anomaly, the receiving party shall inform the shipper, the party tendering the container, and the party to whom it delivers the container of such discrepancy or anomaly, and shall note it on the shipping documents.
As a further example of operator involvement in security, TWIC is a uniform personal credential procedure, and will vet the identity and background of individuals with access to cargo and to secure areas of a marine cargo handling facility. It is to be implemented by the operator pursuant to explicit operator duties under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The duties under the 2002 Act include requirements that marine cargo handling facility operators submit facility security plans designating "secure" areas of the facility for control of access by vessels, vehicles and individuals.
These procedures (PIP, CIS, CSVR, TWIC) are designed with the intention of operator participation, and include essential site security procedures and mandates directly imposed on the operator. Properly vetted personnel at domestic facilities, secure rail and land connections with terminals, container content verifications, etc. are nothing to be sneered at or lightly dismissed.
Heck, even DP World stated explicitly that "We intend to maintain and, where appropriate, enhance current security arrangements," (very reassuring, eh?) making the general claim that DP World will have no responsibility for security a truly odd little piece of spin.
The UAE and Dubai have been unable (or, more likely, unwilling) to police their domestic companies and financial institutions, which have an ignoble history of providing terrorism funding, transit, and logistics. There is no good reason to believe that a state owned company of the UAE will be somehow free from the same manipulations.
The more difficult it is to smuggle or deliver devices, materials, or fungibles to an end destination, including a port itself (which is, after all, a perfect target in many instances due to immediate proximity to chemical and petroleum storage and refining), the better off we are. That's the whole point of efforts to assure container, site, personnel, and land transfer security, and the whole point behind integrating domestic, trustworthy operators into these security procedures.
As for (3) -- this deal was made public more than two years ago and nobody complained -- I am thorougly perplexed by it.
DP World didn’t even proffer the high bid on P&O Group until January 26 of this year, and the deal wasn’t approved by P&O shareholders until February 13, 2006.
Jan. 27 (Bloomberg) -- Dubai agreed to pay 3.88 billion pounds ($6.9 billion) for Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 68 percent more than the company was valued at in October, to top Singapore's bid for Britain's largest port operator.``It's a generous offer,'' Sultan bin Sulayem, chairman of DP World, Dubai's port company, said in a phone interview yesterday after the agreement was announced. ``We want to finish this deal very quickly and don't want it to drag on.'' . . .
DP World, Dubai's port company, yesterday agreed to pay 520 pence a share for P&O, beating a bid of 470 pence made earlier in the day by PSA International PTE, Singapore's largest port company. P&O switched support to DP World from PSA in less than 12 hours. . . .
Furthermore, P&O didn’t even acquire the lion’s share of its North American terminal operations until 1999, when it bought out ITO’s interests.
How is it that this deal was miraculously "made public over 2 years ago"?
Sometimes, the deal itself doesn't bother me as much as the purposefully misleading defenses of the deal do.
This company is based in Seattle and is not loved by the labor unions. The point is moot anyway, because this wasn't a new bid for the contract. DP World acquired the contracts (assets) as part of the takeover.
#2 Correct. Container security is considered more important at the point of departure. DHS controls security at US ports
#3 The bidding war of P&O began 3 months ago. Forbes Article. Congress held hearings in October raising concerns about CFIUS. Maybe they should have taken notice of this, but apparently, only President Bush is suppose to be all knowing, all seeing.