Posted on 02/20/2006 7:28:25 AM PST by standingfirm
WASHINGTON Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff is defending the Bush administration's review of an international shipping deal two days after one company in the Port of Miami sued to prevent an Arab-owned firm from taking over port operations.
Meanwhile, lawmakers also are considering legislation to stop foreign-owned companies from running U.S. ports.
Chertoff on Sunday said the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, had carefully reviewed the Dubai Ports World purchase of London-based Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., which runs commercial operations in New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami and Philadelphia.
"We make sure there are assurances in place, in general, sufficient to satisfy us that the deal is appropriate from a national security standpoint," Chertoff told ABC's "This Week."
That doesn't sit well with Miami firm Continental Stevedoring & Terminals Inc., a subsidiary of Ellery & Company Inc. Representatives from that company asked a judge to block the takeover of P&O,
(Excerpt) Read more at foxnews.com ...
"They" already "own" most of them
____________________________________________________________
Which US ports ("most of them") do they already own?
Don't say it if you can't prove it.
And no, it's all about our national security. And so we are clear, I could give a rats a$$ regarding your nationalism for Italy. I am an American American.
"So we're back to closing down the ports completely"
ridiculous. There are many other companies that could compete on a bid for the buy out. The one based in Miami that brought the suite is one among many others.
My questions is to do with port security. I understand that DHS is responsible to inspect cargo, i.e. containers. I also understand very few containers are actually inspected, much to the chagrin and many of us.
I also understand that the port management (UAE) provides port security. Who can explain what security exactly the UAE port manager provides? Is it securing the actual physical port?
Definitely a bit used. The votes of conservatives are taken for granted as they only want us around during election time. There is nothing conservative whatsoever about this sham deal or in leaving our borders wide open despite the clear dangers that poses.
I'm with you on that one brother.
Two programs in particular will involve rather extensive port and terminal operator cooperation, both domestically and overseas. The "Container Seal Verification Regime" and the "Transportation Worker Identification Credential" (TWIC), a uniform personal credential that will vet the identity and background of individuals with access to cargo and secure areas of a marine cargo handling facility.
The TWIC program will be in connection with the requirements under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 that marine cargo handling facility operators submit facility security plans that designate "secure" areas of the facility, which accordingly controls the ability of vessels, vehicles and individuals to gain access to a terminal or facility.
I didn't say "free from .. security". I said cargo screening.
The only type of security breach that a Port Operator is going to be able to assist in is "jumping over the fence" kind.
So what's easier:
- Coordinate the sale of a major shippign corporation to an Arab country and transfer "ownership" of an American port, so that you can cut a hole in the fence so that hopefully at 3 AM no one will see you stealing out of a container
- Bribe a guard so that you can cut a hole in the fence so that hopefully at 3 AM no one will see you stealing out of a container
The bulk of your post doesn't pertain to the Port Operator's specific day to day functions.
Reporting to Customs is done by the Ocean Carriers. Authorization to release cargo is controlled by Customs and the Ocean Carriers. The Port Operator facilitates the yard management required to stage containers.
In all this hyseria no one has put forth a plausible scenerio of specific wrongdoing. No one has stated what exactly can happen that can't happen now.
You guys are saying "Oh they're Arabs can't trust them" but no one has yet to put forth a credible story on what exactly is going to change. And how today's arrangement is somehow preventing whatever the Arabs are feared to be able to do from being done now.
"They" meant foreigners. I was mocking you.
Port operators have access to the seals and can break them, tamper with the cargo, and reseal them. They can facilitate smuggling. They can falsify personnel files.
Amen, brother.
Firm sues to block foreign port takeover
UAE Co. Poised to Oversee Six U.S. Ports
The committee earlier agreed to consider concerns about the deal as expressed by a Miami-based company, Eller & Co., according to Eller's lawyer, Michael Kreitzer. Eller is a business partner with the British shipping giant but was not in the running to buy the ports company.
If that means you have decleared yourself immune to facts and logic, so be it.
Some people come to FR to learn and discuss. Some people already know everything and it is a total waste of time to engage them.
Lou Dobbs was just having a fit about this on CNN.
No doubt he is. He is always preaching gloom and doom. Now wonder he is in last place in his time slot for the 24 cable news channels.
And as long as we kow-tow to the unprecedented greed of big business, it's all downhill for the "American Dream", tragic to say. Third world, here we come. :o(
"You bet, it's those longshoremen, our sworn enemies who fly planes into buildings and vow to either convert or kill the non-union infidels."
Considering that the union killed my brother and his wife because he wouldn't do their bidding (namely, look the other way while the union boss and his friends stole cargo), that's a fairly accurate description of what they do.
In short, more members of my family have been killed by your union-thug buddies than have been killed by DP World employees, but you're valiantly defending the union thugs.
"There are many other companies that could compete on a bid for the buy out."
No, there's Peninsula & Orient, just as there's Halliburton for oilfield operations, and a bunch of second-rate slackers that don't have the technical ability to perform.
They're not my buddies so vent your anger somewhere else regarding your personal tragedy. In this case I happen to believe allowing any Middle Eastern country to get control of our ports is a far bigger national disaster and threat to our national security than the local problems of union thugs.
That's how it looks to me too with Washington politicians cheering it on every step of the way. Bush must be itching for a democratic Congress and impeachment because that's exactly what he's going to get if he continues down the present course.
Your "jumping the fence" comment is cute, but it overlooks current policing proposals that integrate operators into security functions on a much greater scale than previously.
The "Container Seal Verification Regime" will require extensive foreign and domestic operator cooperation. And the fact that foreign cargo originating from a DP World foreign-facility will require the cooperation of DP World originating-port personnel in carrying out this Regime does not obviate concerns about DP World as a domestic operator and receiver.
DP World originations headed to the US are already under greater scrutiny because of the UAE's terrorism ties, and it is an unneccesary weak link to have DP World responsible for both origination and receiver operator-verification procedures.
The UAE has been unable (or, more likely, unwilling) to police its domestic companies and financial institutions, which have an ignoble history of providing terrorism funding, transit, and logistics. There is no good reason to believe that a state owned company of the UAE will be somehow free from the same manipulations.
Futhermore, the "Transportation Worker Identification Credential" (TWIC) is a little more than a "jumping the fence" program. The same is true of the enabling legislation, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
Both provide essential site security procedures and mandates imposed on the operator. Properly vetted personnel at domestic facilities, and secure rail and land connections with terminals, is nothing to be sneered at or lightly dismissed.
The more difficult it is to smuggle or deliver devices, materials, or fungibles to an end destination, including a port itself (which is, after all, a perfect target in many instances due to immediate proximity to chemical and petroleum storage and refining), the better off we are. That's the whole point of efforts to assure container, site, personnel, and land transfer security, and the whole point behind integrating domestic, trustworthy operators into these security procedures.
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