The United States's long war

The message from General Peter Pace, the chairperson of the United States joint chiefs of staff, was apocalyptic. "We are at a critical time in the history of this great country and find ourselves challenged in ways we did not expect. We face a ruthless enemy intent on destroying our way of life and an uncertain future."

Pace was endorsing the Pentagon's four-yearly strategy review, presented to Congress last week. The report sets out a plan for prosecuting what the the Pentagon describes in the preface as "The Long War", which replaces the "war on terror". The long war represents more than just a linguistic shift: it reflects the ongoing development of US strategic thinking since the September 11 attacks.

Looking beyond the Iraq and Afghan battlefields, US commanders envisage a war unlimited in time and space against global Islamist extremism. "The struggle ... may well be fought in dozens of other countries simultaneously and for many years to come," the report says. The emphasis switches from large-scale, conventional military operations, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, towards a rapid deployment of highly mobile, often covert, counter-terrorist forces.

Among specific measures proposed are: an increase in special operations forces by 15%; an extra 3 000 personnel in psychological operations and civil affairs units -- an increase of 33%; nearly double the number of unmanned aerial drones; the conversion of submarine-launched Trident nuclear missiles for use in conventional strikes; new close-to-shore, high-speed naval capabilities; special teams trained to detect and render safe nuclear weapons quickly anywhere in the world; and a new long-range bomber force.

The Pentagon does not pinpoint the countries it sees as future areas of operations but they will stretch beyond the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Central and South-East Asia and the northern Caucasus.

The Cold War dominated the world from 1946 to 1991: the long war could determine the shape of the world for decades to come. The plan rests heavily on a much higher level of cooperation and integration with Britain and other Nato allies, and the increased recruitment of regional governments through the use of economic, political, military and security means. It calls on allies to build their capacity "to share the risks and responsibilities of today's complex challenges".

The Pentagon must become adept at working with interior ministries as well as defence ministries, the report says. It describes this as "a substantial shift in emphasis that demands broader and more flexible legal authorities and cooperative mechanisms ... Bringing all the elements of US power to bear to win the long war requires overhauling traditional foreign assistance and export control activities and laws."

Unconventional approach The report, whose consequences are still being assessed in European capitals, states: "This war requires the US military to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches." It adds: "We have been adjusting the US global force posture, making long overdue adjustments to US basing by moving away from a static defence in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to troublespots across the globe."

The strategy mirrors in some respects a recent readjustment in British strategic thinking but it is on a vastly greater scale, funded by an overall 2007 US defence spending request of more than $513-billion.

As well as big expenditure projects, the report calls for: investments in signals and human intelligence gathering -- spies on the ground; funding for the Nato intelligence fusion centre; increased space radar capability; the expansion of the global information grid (a protected information network); and an information-sharing strategy "to guide operations with federal, state, local and coalition partners". A push will also be made to improve forces' linguistic skills, with an emphasis on Arabic, Chinese and Farsi.

The US plan, developed by military and civilian staff at the Pentagon in concert with other branches of the US government, will raise concerns about exacerbating the "clash of civilisations" and about the respect accorded to international law and human rights. To wage the long war, the report urges Congress to grant the Pentagon and its agencies expanded permanent legal authority of the kind used in Iraq, which may give US commanders greatly extended powers.

"Long duration, complex operations involving the US military, other government agencies and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries round the world, relying on a combination of direct [visible] and indirect [clandestine] approaches," the report says. "Above all they will require persistent surveillance and vastly better intelligence to locate enemy capabilities and personnel. They will also require global mobility, rapid strike, sustained unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities. Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where US forces do not traditionally operate will be required."

The report exposes the sheer ambition of the US attempt to mastermind global security. "The US will work to ensure that all major and emerging powers are integrated as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system. It will also seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security.

Building partnerships "It will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the US and friendly countries."

Briefing reporters in Washington, Ryan Henry, a Pentagon policy official, said: "When we refer to the long war, that is the war against terrorist extremists and the ideology that feeds it, and that is something that we do see going on for decades." He added that the strategy was aimed at responding to the "uncertainty and unpredictability" of this conflict. "We in the defence department feel fairly confident that our forces will be called on to be engaged somewhere in the world in the next decade where they're currently not engaged, but we have no idea whatsoever where that might be, when that might be or in what circumstances that they might be engaged.

"We realise that almost in all circumstances others will be able to do the job less expensively than we can because we tend to have a very cost-intensive force. But many times they'll be able to do it more effectively too because they'll understand the local language, the local customs, they'll be culturally adept and be able to get things accomplished that we can't do. So building a partnership capability is a critical lesson learned.

"The operational realm for that will not necessarily be Afghanistan and Iraq; rather, that there are large swaths of the world that that's involved in and we are engaged today. We are engaged in things in the Philippines, in the Horn of Africa. There are issues in the pan-Sahel region of North Africa.

"There's a number of different places where there are activities where terrorist elements are out there and that we need to counter them, we need to be able to attack and disrupt their networks."

Priorities The report identifies four priority areas: Defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction

Lawrence's legacy The Pentagon planners who drew up the long war strategy had a host of experts to draw on for inspiration. But they credit only one in the report: Lawrence of Arabia.

The authors anticipate US forces being engaged in irregular warfare around the world. They advocate "an indirect approach", building and working with others, and seeking "to unbalance adversaries physically and psychologically, rather than attacking them where they are strongest or in the manner they expect to be attacked.

They write: "One historical example that illustrates both concepts comes from the Arab revolt in 1917 in a distant theatre of the first world war, when British Colonel TE Lawrence and a group of lightly armed Bedouin tribesmen seized the Ottoman port city of Aqaba by attacking from an undefended desert side, rather than confronting the garrison's coastal artillery by attacking from the sea."

I now see where you and I may differ, and why our proposed plans (call my references to Saudi "phase one") reflect this.

1. Essentially, I would like to move on a faster time frame to take on the center of the ideology itself and to get what I see as an inevitable conflict going now rather than later…

From Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: To be certain to take what you attack, attack where the enemy cannot defend… To refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.

My objection to your strategy (timing) is that unless, and until, the Saudi government faces a debilitating, internal conflict, any external military offensive would take too long. Such a delay would allow Islamist forces outside of Saudi Arabia to counter attack via terroristic means as well as conventional military means in other regions as part of a “global” jihad. Additionally, other international, military confrontation calculus must be factored into this equation as well. Furthermore, as I have noted earlier the negative impact on the global economy may be greater than either the US or our allies can tolerate.

Your position that it is better to “bite the bullet” now rather than later is valid only if there is no better alternative. Among our allies, Europe and Japan, probably would not share the view that there is no better alternative and would, most likely, react accordingly. Additionally, and, perhaps more importantly from an international strategy perspective, a world economic calamity would involve our non-Islamic strategic competitors, such as China and our enemies such as North Korea. These potential negatives must be accounted for and potentially neutralized, either politically or militarily, in advance. Your strategy has not dealt with these potentialities.

2. The very real possibility of the KSA and Saud rule imploding due to it's own "deal with the devil" getting out of hand together with it's rapidly changing demographics (my #108) needs to be addressed and planned for.

No argument. However, planning for the eventuality and moving to effect it are two different things. Again, as I have noted earlier, I do not think that the US has the capability to clandestinely orchestrate such an effort for several reasons.

Now that this thread is slipping under the radar, I'd like to ask you two for your knowledge and opinions on Russian involvement in the Middle East.

The Soviets had many of these countries as client states, and the Russian Federation has continued to supply arms to Middle Eastern countries.

Putin seems to have thrown his hand in with Syria and Iran. Certain evidence point to Primakov (covert in civilian mode) taking the WMD out of Iraq into Syria and Lebanon and some out the back door to be dumped in the Indian Ocean just before our invasion in 2003.

At the conference on the Saddam tapes this past weekend, Jack Straw said the Bush administration does not want the knowledge of what happened to the WMD to be followed up or "proven." He felt there was some greater issue involved that led the administration to undermine efforts to get the story out on this issue.

Russia allied with the Caspian oil and Middle Eastern oil against the United States is a formidable opponent. Russia disassembling her nukes under treaty with the U.S. yet keeping caches in Middle East countries is a formidable player. The situation with Iran getting nukes is mind bogglingly serious. IMO, because of these issues the United States in not in any position now or the near future to call out the Russians on their support of Syria and Iran, and their attempts to forge alliances in the Middle East against us. And thus we are not in a position to confront Syria and Iran in a meaningful way right now (with the Russian shadow protecting them), and we'll be in a worse position when Iran becomes armed with nukes that can be delivered to U.S. soil, if they aren't already, leaving our only hope in an internal revolution by the young against the Mullahs.

I have conjectured that in joining forces with Islamic radicals the Russians are riding a tiger that will consume them, too.

Others I talked with have said Russia and China even are not real players in future history, which seems to me to be an incredibly naive view.

I'd appreciate discussion by both of you about the strategy and role of Russia concerning the threat to us in the Middle East from Islam.

I'd appreciate discussion by both of you about the strategy and role of Russia concerning the threat to us in the Middle East from Islam.

The Mid East is truly important on the world stage for only two reasons: its petroleum resources and Islamic terrorism. Were it not for the petroleum, the terrorism could potentially be handled in manner similar to Haiti.

Since the days of the Czars, Russia’s interest in the Mideast has been primarily for a warm water port. Without a warm water port, the Russians know they could never truly be a world naval power or commercial sea power. Strategically, that element has not changed. However, with the breakup of the Soviet empire Russia has probably given up on a warm water port in the foreseeable future, but perhaps not in the long term.

However, the calculus has changed somewhat since Russia has become a petroleum exporter. As the petroleum exports from the Mideast are restricted, Russia’s fortunes rise. Consequently, it is in Russia’s economic interest to foment instability (up to a point) in the region to keep the petro-dollar income ever increasing. However, Russia’s interest in keeping the Mideast “pot stirred” has limits. Restricting the supply benefits them, but completely interrupting it creates the potential for a world economic collapse… something that would cut off their source of wealth. Consequently, Russia is willing to support certain elements for a while and then oppose them for a while purely in the interest of keeping oil prices high.

Russia’s opposition, if you will, to the US directly is of a different cast. Russia views the US as more of a “strategic competitor” than the type of enemy the Soviets saw. Additionally, Russia is acutely aware of the US is the sole remaining super power and does not wish to be at any more of a disadvantage on the international stage because this status differential than is absolutely necessary. Consequently, Russia sees it to its own advantage for them to supply, train and support “proxies” to tie up both, US military, and economic resources. Consequently, beyond the economic advantage that Russia can gain from fomenting instability in the Mideast, there is also an international political advantage as Russia sees it.

As a result, Russia will continue oppose the US both clandestinely and openly for as long as they perceive that the international situation has not reached a “tipping point.” Russia knows that if the situation goes beyond that “tipping point,” its own national prosperity or even survival could be jeopardized. Consequently, they are going to continually try to play both ends against the middle as close to that “tipping point” for as long as they can.

There is much similarity of what you say about warning them, giving them time, allies etc.. to the pre-invasioon scenario of Iraq.

I simply don't think we can ignore the threat of ever expanding islamic expansion and ideology emanating from the KSA.... not even for the next two decades for the multitudes of reason given.

Bite the bullet

Good summary. Stop them ASAP, by any of the above means, rather than put it off and letting them increase their influence and power.

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