Posted on 12/05/2005 12:55:30 AM PST by txradioguy
WASHINGTON -- U.S. Marines, while fighting valiantly in Iraq, are on the verge of serious defeat on Capitol Hill. A Senate-House conference on the Armed Services authorization bill convening this week is considering turning the Navy's last two battleships, the Iowa and Wisconsin, into museums. Marine officers fear that deprives them of vital fire support in an uncertain future.
Gen. Michael W. Hagee, the current commandant of the Marine Corps, testified on April 1, 2003, that loss of naval surface fire support from battleships would place his troops "at considerable risk." On July 29 this year, Hagee asserted: "Our aviation is really quite good, but it can, in fact, be weathered." Nevertheless, Marine leaders have given up a public fight for fear of alienating Navy colleagues.
The Navy high command is determined to get rid of the battleships, relying for support on an expensive new destroyer at least 10 years in the future. This is how Washington works. Defense contractors, Pentagon bureaucrats, congressional staffers and career-minded officers make this decision that may ultimately be paid for by Marine and Army infantrymen.
Marine desire to reactivate the Iowa and Wisconsin runs counter to the DD(X) destroyer of the future. It will not be ready before 2015, costing between $4.7 billion and $7 billion. Keeping the battleships in reserve costs only $250,000 a year, with reactivation estimated at $500 million (taking six months to a year) and full modernization more than $1.5 billion (less than two years).
On the modernized battleships, 18 big (16-inch) guns could fire 460 projectiles in nine minutes and take out hardened targets in North Korea. In contrast, the DD(X) will fire only 70 long-range attack projectiles at $1 million a minute. Therefore, the new destroyer will rely on conventional 155-millimeter rounds that Marines say cannot reach the shore. Former longtime National Security Council staffer William L. Stearman, now executive director of the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association, told me, "In short, this enormously expensive ship cannot fulfill its primary mission: provide naval surface fire support for the Marine Corps."
Read the rest here:
http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/robertnovak/2005/12/05/177720.html
That didn't happen at Samar. The Japanese heavies rolled over the U.S. destroyer-escort screen to pursue the "Jeep" carriers: Admiral Kurita unwisely (thank God) signalled a "general pursuit" which scattered his force. One of the American tin cans did manage to torpedo a big Japanese cruiser, but they didn't lay a glove on the BB's.
If Kurita had followed his orders and let the carriers go, to turn the corner and descend on the Leyte beaches, he'd have done us enormous hurt and could possibly have caught and killed General MacArthur, who was stubbornly clinging to his command post aboard a damaged light cruiser close to the beach. She'd have been duck soup under the Japanese heavy guns, and so would he, corncob pipe and all.
To use BB's for sea lane control you have to have a flotilla of smaller craft supporting them.
That's been recognized ever since torpedo boats took on and destroyed the heavy armored cruiser Blanco Encalada and killed the faction leader sheltering aboard her, during the Chilean Civil War of the 1890's. Big ships of whatever type have always been attended by screens ever since.
Actually, that's probably a pretty good idea. Who's better or more motivated at air-to-mud than the Corps?
When it comes to Klintoon, I am absolutely a "conspiracy kinda guy" -- I've got $50 right now that says Klintoon cut those barrels up at the direct request of Zhang Zemin.
What a scumbag Quisling traitor.
As for Cheney, I thought it might have been him, because he displayed a zest for bridge-burning to make his will into reality, when he ordered the F-14 patterns destroyed. That was a hallmark example of stupid egotism, of "teaching" Grumman not to mess with Big Dick. The public needed his smooth move like a migraine. I've been mad at him ever since I heard about it, because he put Naval Aviation in a jam and endangered the ability of the Fleet to defend itself against Soviet LRA and Chinese PLAAF assets, as well as forcing future Presidents to work with much less ability to project power with carrier air.
When the BB divisions stood in on their battleship raids during the Pacific War, their usual formation speed was 15-20 knots. The cruisers and destroyers went first to check for submarines and surface opposition, and then the BB's weighed in and destroyed the Japanese facilities.
No need to run with the carriers anymore, like they did in Adm. Willis A. "Ching" Lee's day, when the fast battleships were customarily used as glorified floating AA batteries.
Nowadays, they would typically accompany an embarked Marine Expeditionary Force anyway, so I don't see the problem.
And while we're on the subject, we might want to discuss whether any other of the old gun cruisers are still laid up. The Newport News and St. Paul did yeoman work during Vietnam, as did the Boston. Another new-class CA, the Oregon City, was laid up soon after completion and may have seen little if any service. There were also a couple of latterday CL's, the Worcester and Roanoke, which were basically 13,000-ton CLAA's armed with 12 6" guns in high-angle gun mounts. Obsolete as AA platforms as soon as the Pacific War was over, their high-angle guns could be useful in some GFS situations.
There was a move afoot in the 80's or 90's to sell the Worcester and Roanoke to one or two South American navies, but I don't know what ever came of that. Anyone know?
It wouldn't be the first time that Congress, or an Administration ordered the destruction of tooling. I wouldn't think that Grumman (and I'm speaking generally here) would be all that upset with the decision, since it would tend to indicate a desire to buy new aircraft rather than re-hab.
However, the F-14D "Bombcat" has capitalized on its size, speed & power to make an excellent long-range naval strike fighter. There's nothing on the horizon that can touch it in that role.
Frankly, NavAir has been in trouble since the A-12 Avenger program went belly up. The Navy has been patching things ever since.
Sounds like one hell of a plan you have there, with one small problem.
If the Navy ever gives the Marines The Battleships they want and need, We will no longer need the Navy to drive us around.
And we both know that will never happen.
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Battleship misinformationBy Dennis ReillyPublished July 14, 2005 James Zumwalt's July 7 Commentary "Dread not the DD(X)" could not have been more aptly named. As was stated in my June 21 Op-Ed, "Battling for battleships," the Navy's misguided effort to develop the DD(X) is effectively dead. Our purpose here is to correct misstatements regarding the battleship, presumably obtained from the Navy. Mr. Zumwalt appears unaware that his famed father was a proponent, not an opponent, of battleship reactivation during his tenure. Contrary to the Zumvalt article, Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton did not provide "an honest ... assessment of the DD(X) versus the battleship," as is clear from James O'Bryon's June 17 Op-Ed, "Distortions about ships." A document, now under review by the Government Accountability Office (www.usnfsa.org), presents a side-by-side comparison of official Navy claims with detailed rebuttal by U.S. Naval Fire Support Association. The article implies that the battleship would be vulnerable. The latest Rolling Airframe Missiles provide competent anti-air/anti-missile protection to our carriers, and even destroyers. Modernization of the battleships would surely include this protection. The battleship's deck and turret armor, not just the belt, as claimed in the article, were designed to and proven to take hits. Should a weapon get through, no other ship would have a greater chance of remaining operational. But, one has to ask why, in a high-threat environment, would not a battleship, like a carrier, be entitled to its own battlegroup with overlapping protections against threats from above and below the sea surface. After all, within the range of its guided projectiles (near-term 52 miles, midterm 115 miles, long-term 450 to 600 miles) the battleship has firepower comparable to that of a carrier. But unlike the carrier, the battleship's firepower is all-weather with tactical response times. Because its projectiles are immune to anti-aircraft defenses, the Hanoi Hilton problem disappears. The Navy has failed in its attempt to discredit the battleship's firepower potential, so it has turned its attention to the cost and availability of manpower. The rational way to discuss costs of any weapons system is in terms of costs per unit of firepower. It would take 19 DD(X)s to put the same number of pounds on target per minute (at the Marine Corps' near-term goal of 52 miles range) as can a single battleship. The 1,100-man battleship crew with a $1.5 billion modernization and reactivation cost will be doing the work of the 1,900 men manning 19 DD(X)s costing a whopping total of $32 billion to build (at the unrealizable congressionally mandated $1.7 billion per copy). Would not the $30 billion savings pay for crew training and reconstitution of the spare parts, ammunition, and support infrastructure trashed by the Navy, with some of this in clear violation of the law, (PL104-106)? The battleship's boilers are fired by "diesel fuel marine," not oil, as stated in the Commentary article. It uses the same power plant and the same fuel as the AOE-1 fast supply ships that support our carriers today. Presumably, AOE-1 ships will be replaced by the gas-turbine-powered T-AOE(X). There is wonderful synergy going on here. This would free up a considerable pool of sailors who would be quite familiar with the battleship's propulsion system, answering another manpower issue cited by the Navy. Contrary to the article, the battleships would be far from single mission platforms. They would, in the near term: 1) meet the Marine Corps' near-term requirements for naval surface support; 2) be an extremely effective anti terrorist platform in the Pacific littorals because of their unique capability to obliterate training camps before the "students" could disperse; and 3) serve as deterrent to Chinese adventurism in Taiwan, and North Korea's threat to the South. On the longer term, the battleship's long-range guided projectiles could open a new strategic and tactical dimension, with guided ballistic projectiles arching over uncooperative states to reach targets many hundreds of miles away in a matter of minutes. The Navy has made decisions that there never again will be a need for forced entry by the sea, and invasions, should they be called for, will be accomplished by audacious 50-to-100 mile incursions using the unproven V22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft. The Navy suggests that fire support will be provided by $500,000 per-copy cruise missiles and by the (endangered) aircraft-launched Joint Standoff Weapon, a GPS-guided gliding bomb of comparable cost. Theslowspeedsofthese weapons compared to battleship-launched projectiles result in inadequate tactical response times and vulnerability to antiaircraft defenses, severely limiting the viability of this form of fire support. The costs per round are more than 10 times that of the tactically responsive, anti-aircraft-fire-immune,battleship-launched guided projectile. What in the world can the Navy be thinking? As detailed in June Op-Ed, "Battleships fit for Duty," they do not even recognize the real strategic threats we face. The Marine Corps generals (Semper Fidelis?) dare not contradict their Navy bosses. It is time for Congress to impose some rational supervision. Dennis Reilly, a physicist, serves as science adviser to the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association. Copyright © 2005 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. |
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There might be some, but during the first Gulf War the USAF used some cruiser tubes to make bunker buster GBU's. It was a shake-n-bake engineering project that yielded a dozen or so of these special purpose bombs.
The heaviest bomb carried by Navy/Marine aircraft was probably a 500-lb GP bomb. It would have been delivered in a shallow dive -- probably not very accurate when you're trying to hit a cave entrance (nor would it penetrate all that far as you said). Todays aircraft delivered weapons would tend to be a lot more accurate and penetrate much further.
I respectfully suggest that you re-read the facts of the Battle of (off) Samar. Kuritas order were to eliminate carriers and surface ships before steaming to wipe up the Leyte gulf landing forces. He though the jeep carriers were fleet carriers under Halsey, but even if they hadn't been, his orders included taking them out as well.
The Yamato was forced to break off the attack and turn away from her shelling of the jeep carriers due to the torpedo attack of Taffy 3 planes and the screen. By the time she had outrun the torpedoes she was effectively out of the battle.
Again, re-read the accounts of the battle and the post-war analysis from both sides. Kurita himself credits the tenacity of the destroyer and destoyer escort attacks for delaying and scattering his attack and his ultimate defeat.
Wrong. The gas-turbine boats are extremely fast. We clocked the David R. Ray (Spruance class) going 60 knots in 1981. The bow wave was totally obscuring the bridge, the fantail was nearly awash, and she was throwing twin, 30-foot high roostertails. It was the most awesome thing that I'd seen a ship do. I've heard that the Ticonderoga class cruisers and Burke class cans are equally fast.
I realize that, but the poster said "the battleships", meaning all four of them. That didn't happen until the early 1980's.
You acknowledged the need for screening ships to protect the BB's. Do you advocate pulling screens off the carriers in order to privde BB support? Where would these screens come from? The Navy, and the country, can neither aford nor justify the creation of entire BB fleets.
Maybe if you'd said that you worked on the planning and design in the 1970's for their re-commissioning in the 1980's?
I fear that if they retire them without replacing them, then they will never be replaced. The Navy has a strong need for a BB with heavy armor to stop missles, 16-inch guns for NGFS, VLM with the capability to launch anything in our arsenal, two helos with hangers, maybe even a pair of JSF's. She has to be able to outrun and outfight any ship currently in our inventory.
I don't know why they wont do it.
A GPS thousand pound bomb going through the airvent or door or window somewhere around the speed of sound will do more than a 16" shell ever thought about.
But as said before, a battleship sitting just on the edge of the horizon would be a scary ass thing to see.
But then, just blowing up without seeing what hit you (say a hellfire from a loitering predator) is pretty darn scary, too.
Emphasis supplied. Idiocy provided at no extra charge.
Did it ever occur to you that if the same job can be done by a less expensive asset then you can also purchase more of them? Instead of two ships of limited usefulness you might have 5 or 10 that are as effective and far more flexible? Of course it didn't.
Where are the carriers, the Air Force, Marine Aviation, and Marine artillery battalions in your scenario?
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