Nixon Sought Less Destructive Nuclear Option

WASHINGTON - Widely recognized as a military hawk, President Richard M. Nixon fretted privately over the notion of any no-holds-barred nuclear war, newly released documents from his time at the White House reveal.

Visions of such an all-out war involving nuclear missiles were unpalatable from the first days of Nixon's presidency, starting in 1969 and lasting until the summer of 1974, when he resigned during the Watergate scandal.

Recently declassified papers from that time in history show that Nixon wanted an alternative to the option of full-scale nuclear war — a plan for a gentler war, one that could ultimately vanquish the rival Soviet Union while still avoiding the worst-case scenario.

The White House papers from this era provided a glimpse behind the scenes at attempts there to find choices other than "the horror option," as national security adviser Henry Kissinger called the scenarios for all-out atomic war that were then in place.

Qualms about causing so much death were hardly the only motivation. U.S. officials worried that their nuclear threat lacked credibility because it was so awful adversaries questioned whether Washington would ever use it.

In a 1969 diary entry, Nixon's chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, recalled the president taking part in an exercise that day aboard the Boeing 707 outfitted to conduct nuclear warfare from the air.

"It was pretty scary," Haldeman wrote. Nixon asked many questions about "kill results," his aide said, adding about his boss: "Obviously worries about the lightly tossed-about millions of deaths."

The picture was pieced together by William Burr, a researcher at the National Security Archive at George Washington University, from Nixon-era papers released by the National Archives as well as documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

The documents reveal Kissinger's chilling insight that government budget-crunchers would prefer complete nuclear warfare because it was already planned for and would be cheaper than recasting U.S. capabilities to permit limited strikes.

"They believe in assured destruction because it guarantees the smallest expenditure," he told an August 1973 National Security Council meeting in the White House Situation Room. "To have the only option that of killing 80 million people is the height of immorality."

The papers show Kissinger struggling with a reluctant military and intelligence apparatus to sell them on the idea of limited nuclear strikes. Many doubted the Soviets would settle for a tidy little nuclear war; they feared a conflagration would quickly follow, devouring cities and killing millions.

But until Nixon took up the matter, the only options in the nuclear playbook involved the highest stakes possible and unspeakable death, and that apparently unsettled him even as he engaged North Vietnam in a war that was claiming civilian casualties.

By one official estimate, the United States, even if crippled by unprovoked Soviet missiles, could retaliate with missiles killing 40 percent of the Soviet population, or some 90 million people. Many more people would be killed if the United States struck first; that estimate remains classified.

Countless studies flowed from the effort to expand nuclear options to include "smaller packages." But it was not until 1974, the year Nixon resigned, that he signed a directive setting that process in motion.

Burr said the United States eventually achieved an expanded range of nuclear options, in part because of the development of more accurate missiles and other weapons in years that followed.

Nixon's nascent strategy echoes in the debate today over training nuclear weapons on tough but selective targets. The Bush administration decided in the fall to abandon development of bunker-busting nuclear warheads and try to achieve similar capability with conventional weapons.

Historically, Nixon is known as "unsentimental and sort of callous in some ways," Burr said, but the documents also show a president "worried about the huge number of casualties involved."

Even so, the prime concern may have been the credibility of the U.S. threat, and Burr noted that the narrower options under review targeted centers of the Soviet government and economy, not just military assets, and any such attack would have created untold casualties, too.

Kissinger pushed the idea with urgency even as the Watergate crisis unfolded. "My nightmare is that with the growth of Soviet power and with our domestic problems, someone might decide to take a run at us," he said in the August 1973 meeting.

Years earlier, he voiced skepticism that the Soviets would ever be the first to unleash a full-scale atomic assault. It was not rational, he said, "to make a decision to kill 180 million people."

R. Jack Smith, then deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, countered with skepticism that the Soviets would do anything less. A limited attack was the "least likely contingency," he argued. "One could not believe that the Soviets would launch a few nuclear ICBMS."

One secret report concluded that if wider nuclear warfare were to develop from a limited attack, a restraint, of sorts, could still be possible.

In that event, the U.S. objective would be "to minimize the enemy's residual power and recovery capability and not just destroy his population and industry."

He was not the man that his enemies made him out to be.

Nixon was an arrogant boob who stuck his nose into affairs that were none of his doggone business.

--1969--
December 1
Nixon decides he will attend the Texas-Arkansas game, a contest between the first and second spots in the Associated Press poll of college football, setting up a climatic match between the schools in the last weekend of the regular season. He also decides to present a Presidential plaque naming the winner of the game the number one team in the centennial year of college football. Several hours later, he receives telegrams from John Hammerschmidt, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Arkansas, and John Mooney, president of the Football Writers Association of America and sports editor of The Salt Lake Tribune, inviting him to watch the game in person.
December 2
The White House announces that the President will attend the Texas-Arkansas game, and present a national championship trophy to the winner. Press accounts attribute the decision to the Mooney telegram.
December 5
Gov. Raymond Shafer of Pennsylvania holds a press conference and sends a telegram to the White House protesting Nixon's decision to award the national title to the Texas-Arkansas winner. The Penn State Nittany Lions are also undefeated and have a longer winning streak than either team. Shafer claims it would be better to wait until after the bowl games are played to determine who is the number one team in college football. In response to these protests, White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler announces that Nixon will present a plaque to Penn State for having the longest winning streak in college football.
December 6
Nixon travels to Arkansas to watch the Texas-Arkansas game. Poor weather causes him to arrive just after kick-off. Arkansas takes a 7-0 lead into half-time. In a television appearance during the intermission, the President predicts that Texas offense is strong enough to score once or twice. The Longhorns score twice in the fourth quarter and win, 15-14. After the game, Nixon goes to the Texas locker room and presents head coach Darrel Royal with a plaque that awards the 1969 national championship to the Longhorns. He also visits the Razorback dressing room and talks with the team before returning to Washington.
After the game, Paterno announces he will not accept Nixon's award. "It would seem a waste of his very valuable time to present a plaque for something we already have undisputed possession of--the nation's longest winning streak," the coach explained. "To accept any other plaque prior to the bowl games games, which will determine the final number one team, would be a disservice to our squad, to Pennsylvania, to the East, which we represent and perhaps, most important, to Missouri, which may be the best football team in the country." (Penn State will play Missouri in the Orange Bowl on January 1).
December 7
The National Football Foundation and Hall of Fame awards the MacArthur Bowl, its national championship trophy, to the Texas Longhorns.
December 8
United Press International awards its national title to the Texas Longhorns.
At a press conference that evening, Nixon jokes that he might have made a mistake in trying to play a role in determining the national championship.
December 9
In a speech at the National Football Foundation and Hall of Fame Dinner, Nixon remarks that Penn State deserves a portion of the national title. He also states that Texas deserves to be number one, because the team refused to give up even though Arkansas had a strong lead. At the dinner, Royal promises Nixon that the Longhorns will win the Cotton Bowl, and secure their claim to the national title.
December 10
Penn State receives its third straight Lambert Trophy that goes to the best team in the East matching the previous mark for consecutive awards. "Any team that can tie the record of the Army juggernaut of 1944-45-46 has carved for itself an enduring place in the annals of football greatness," Nixon states in a telegram to Paterno. In accepting the award, Paterno says, "I couldn't feel better about receiving this trophy if it were presented on television by the President of the United States."
--1970--
January 1
The Texas Longhorns defeats Notre Dame in the Cotton Bowl, 21-17, ending the season with a perfect record. Penn State defeats Missouri in the Orange Bowl, 10-3, also ending their season with a perfect mark. Nixon calls Royal and congratulates him on the victory.
January 3
The Football Writers Association of America gives Texas its Grantland Rice Award, and with it the Association's national championship title. The Associated Press releases its final poll with Texas ranked first and Penn State Second, giving Texas the Associated Press national title.

Go JoePa Go!!!

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.