Posted on 11/14/2005 12:48:53 AM PST by baseball_fan
NEW YORK What policy should the United States adopt toward China's rise? How should we greet India's emergence, Japan's new assertiveness, Europe's drift or the possible decline of Russia? How can the United States reduce terrorism, promote trade, stop nuclear proliferation and increase freedom?
These are among the toughest questions on the foreign policy agenda, and right now Washington is trying to answer them without a compass. Containment, the doctrine of resisting Soviet and communist expansion, survived some four decades of challenge, but could not survive its own success. What we need is a foreign policy for both the post-Cold-War and the post-9/11 world.
That a guiding principle is needed NEW YORK What policy should the United States adopt toward China's rise? How should we greet India's emergence, Japan's new assertiveness, Europe's drift or the possible decline of Russia? How can the United States reduce terrorism, promote trade, stop nuclear proliferation and increase freedom?
These are among the toughest questions on the foreign policy agenda, and right now Washington is trying to answer them without a compass. Containment, the doctrine of resisting Soviet and communist expansion, survived some four decades of challenge, but could not survive its own success. What we need is a foreign policy for both the post-Cold-War and the post-9/11 world.
That a guiding principle is needed cannot be doubted. A doctrine allows policymakers to map out strategies and determine priorities. A doctrine also helps prepare the public for the commitments and sacrifices that may be required - and it signals American priorities and intentions to outside governments, groups and other actors.
There has been talk of a "Bush doctrine" during this presidency, but in truth the Bush administration has not applied a coherent policy so much as it has employed a mix of tactics...
(Excerpt) Read more at iht.com ...
Does this signal an internal administration debate and retreat from "The Case for Democracy" to a Brent Scowcroft "realism" or is it just the opinion of a well intended author who also happens to be the President of the Council of Foreign Relations? The phrase "missionary foreign policy" doesn't seem to correctly portray the self-defense aspect of our foreign policy objectives. Is establishing a greater degree of justice for now on the path to eventual democracy later the way to go or are political rights for representation necessary to establish that justice to begin with?
Coping With the Lippmann Gap
Samuel P. Huntington
From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1987/88
"Summary: A 'Lippmann gap' exists when a nation's foreign policy commitments exceed its power. Such a gap existed for the USA by the end of the 1960s, and until 1981 the USA sought to deal with it by reducing commitments and by increasing the role of US allies. President Reagan instead used policies of rhetorical assertion, military build-up, strategic defence, insurgency support, coercive diplomacy and arms control. The next administration's economic inheritance will compel reorganization of the defence establishment, conventional arms cuts, and greater effort by US allies. Concludes that the Lippmann gap will best be coped with by a middle-of-the-road administration."
This discussion topic is grounded within "The Public Philosophy" (1955!)
I'll be doing plenty of catch up!
And those relationships would be expanded to include other countries and peoples, so that they too can come to enjoy the benefits of physical security, economic opportunity and political freedom. Finally, we should offer rogue states the advantages of integration into the global economy in exchange for fundamentally changing their ways.
What does this person think we have been trying to do? This to me sounds like some pointy-head stating the obvious, and repackaging it in pollyanna form under a new title 'integration' to make it sound like he's found something new. The author gives me the impression of a student who has been sleeping in class for the past 5-10 years.
Recent experience shows that 'collective actions' are not 'effective inernational arrangements', quite the opposite. The nations who would make such actions 'multi-lateral' have chosen to undercut this option on the most serious issues. Iraq was tailor-made for collective action, but others found it more advantageous to undercut that mechanism. If there is one lesson to take about rogue states over the past decade, it's that 'advantages of integration into the global economy in exchange for fundamentally changing their ways' is simply not enough. These psycho-states led by ideological despots have grander objectives than the mundane, disempowering requirements of economic integration, and are thus immune to incentives. The question is, what to do when the nice-guy approach gets you nowhere, and other states don't step up to share the burden of external pressure on rogues.
That's where we are. Other free states are still free-riding on US military protection, and bashing our efforts at the same time. China may be waking up regarding N Korea, but they are no fan of democracy or its spread, per se.
We have tried sending out embossed invitations to the global economic party, noting that we will provide security for the event. Some nations spit on the invitations, and show up to try and burn down the dance hall. Others (Europe) fraternize with vandals and earn their temporary camaraderie by railing againt the security forces. Still others (China, Russia) lurk in the background with delusions of starting their own party if ours goes up in smoke.
In some sense US military preoccupation may be part of the short-term solution. It makes other nations deal with their own regional messes (Europe and Israel vs. Islam, destabilization from North Korea), and awakens them to the reality that we might not show up in case of emergency when emergency is increasingly knocking at the door. What is required is a new era of pragmatism and acceptance of reality from states outside the US who continue to think the party will go on forever, or that what replaces it will be even remotely acceptable.
If they do not like our kind of party, there some increasingly viable options -- rule in the model of Iran, or China. Those are the choices. This piece is sort of on the right track, in that it states the obvious in many places, but is ultimately very naive about what consitutes the 'era in which we live'.
["Foreign policy," wrote Walter Lippmann in 1943 in an oft-quoted phrase, "consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation?s commitments and the nation?s power." If this balance exists, the foreign policy will command domestic support. If commitments exceed power, insolvency results which generates deep political dissension.]
Thank you for putting me onto Samuel P. Huntington. When you referred to Walter Lippman at first I was thinking Henry Luce. I had heard the phrase, "Clash of Civilizations," but had not appreciated the scope of Huntington's work. In addition to the phrase above, however, it would seem there needs to be a correlary phase along the lines of if we don't make the commitment in proportion to the danger, death or slavery results. This may also not be "comfortable" if I am not misinterpreting Lippmann's word. I think there were points during WWII where England could have been considered insolvent. Eisenhower in his Farewell address gave the best statement I've ever heard on balance and shared sacrifices to maintain the long term fight: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html.
"That's where we are. Other free states are still free-riding on US military protection, and bashing our efforts at the same time."
Well said. In the past with more conventional threats regional security arrangements offered protection. When a person can smuggle in a nuclear device across open borders, the calculus seemingly has to change. A parallel might be trying to stop the bird flu at its source because if we wait for it to evolve into a more lethal form, that lag in vaccination just takes too long before the damage to be done. We have to play offense too in terms of creating an environment at the source that lessens the threat. This will require the cooperation of many nations. Gaining the same consensus and cooperation on radical Islam as on bird flue means fighting a new kind of war. The French are lucky the more lethal strain hasn't broken out amidst their current rioting.
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