Posted on 10/20/2005 5:56:08 AM PDT by tonycavanagh
I read that book, it was called Invasion.
The Problem with that book was that the Germans had all the luck everything they planned went right, everything the British did went wrong.
If you look at Dunkirk the same time frame, the Luftwaffe had total control of the air, and yet they only sank six British warships, warships that were stationary.
In an invasion, its not only important to get the initial assault ashore but the follow up waves as well as supplies.
The German Navy did not have enough mine laying capacity and the Royal Navy would not of sat back and watched then lay those mines, they would off attacked sinking those mine laying ships therefore reducing the line laying capability of the Germans further.
Also although the British Army had been decimated they were not fully out of the equation, they did have some reserve troops in place the Canadian Division, and Indian brigade as well as a assortment of British units.
That is why the army wanted a broader front to be able to land more troops in the initial assault, a small beach head as the German Navy would of wanted would of been easier to contain, it would also of meant a concentration of the German supply line a better target for the RAF Bombers
The initial assault would of been mainly infantry as the German s did not have any LTC, although some of the panzer's were equipped to go through water how many would of made it to the beach would of been questionable.
Also the British plan was if need be, to withdraw air strength from the south, build up in the north and use the RAF when the invasion started.
Every German ship sunk would be one less to carry more troops and supply's.
As for the Fallschirmjaeger there numbers had been decimated in the battle for Norway and the lowlands and were understrength.
The German Navy would of lost control of the channel by the second day third at least , leaving there troops confined to a small bridgehead with no chance of supply.
Goering would of promised to supply them by air, but as in Stalingrad would of been a failed effort.
Thanks for the links. Interesting stuff.
The Problem with that book was that the Germans had all the luck everything they planned went right, everything the British did went wrong.
If you look at Dunkirk the same time frame, the Luftwaffe had total control of the air, and yet they only sank six British warships, warships that were stationary.
In an invasion, its not only important to get the initial assault ashore but the follow up waves as well as supplies.
The German Navy did not have enough mine laying capacity and the Royal Navy would not of sat back and watched then lay those mines, they would off attacked sinking those mine laying ships therefore reducing the line laying capability of the Germans further.
Also although the British Army had been decimated they were not fully out of the equation, they did have some reserve troops in place the Canadian Division, and Indian brigade as well as a assortment of British units.
That is why the army wanted a broader front to be able to land more troops in the initial assault, a small beach head as the German Navy would of wanted would of been easier to contain, it would also of meant a concentration of the German supply line a better target for the RAF Bombers
The initial assault would of been mainly infantry as the German s did not have any LTC, although some of the panzer's were equipped to go through water how many would of made it to the beach would of been questionable.
Also the British plan was if need be, to withdraw air strength from the south, build up in the north and use the RAF when the invasion started.
Every German ship sunk would be one less to carry more troops and supply's.
As for the Fallschirmjaeger there numbers had been decimated in the battle for Norway and the lowlands and were understrength.
The German Navy would of lost control of the channel by the second day third at least , leaving there troops confined to a small bridgehead with no chance of supply.
Goering would of promised to supply them by air, but as in Stalingrad would of been a failed effort.
At the time the German Navy had lost 40% of there destroyer forces the best ships for escorting a planned Invasion ship.
The Royal Navy would not of had to use there heavies, they would of mainly used destroyers and light cruisers, fast and nimble.
The E-Boat was a hit and run type ship against small targets while they may have been able to take on MBTs how effective would they have been against a force destroyers and light cruiser bearing down on the invasion fleet.
As for the U-Boats there were not that many operational at the time and most were on Atlantic duty.
Concentrating them in the channel would of made them easy targets for Royal Navy ASW units.
As for the Luftwaffe, they did not have much experience in Navel battles or against ships.
During Dunkirk, despite have air superiority and attacking stationary ships, concentrated in a small area they only succeeded sinking six destroyers, how effective would they have been against moving zig zagging targets.
As for the mine field I don't think the Royal Navy would of sat back and allowed the Germans to lay those mines.
They would of gone after the mine layers.
It's fun to discuss alternate history. If Operation Barbarossa had begun on schedule, instead of being delayed six weeks by the Balkans uprising, it is possible that the German Army might have taken Moscow and greatly weakened if not entirely defeated Russia. Then they might have turned west toward Britain with a more secure Eastern Front. Russia was completely disorganized during the early part of Barbarossa - Stalin was killing generals who had "failed", etc.
Where did you see that order of battle? Everything I've seen indicates that the Plan only allowed for a single panzer division (with light tanks), plus one panzer grenadier division. Perhaps there was a muscled-up plan that I haven't seen, but any such plan would presume even more sea-lift and would therefore have been less likely.
The Royal Navy would have made a max effort against the landing beaches. A fleet does you little good if you are facing defeat on land -- ask the French. I'm sure that the RN would have run any minefield sown by the Kriegsmarine and risked the damage. Heavy fleet units would probably have sailed around Ireland & approached the landing beaches from beyond the range of Luftwaffe fighters. Running the channel would have exposed the fleet to air, mine & torpedo attack.
"Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it!"
Agree with all of that. The book assumes that because the British forces were not mechanized (which was mostly true at that point) and with German air supperiority the Germans could build up an armored force and punch out of the bridgehead before the British could get together sufficient forces to seal it off. Given how much trouble the Allies had in getting armored forces across the Channel in 44 I think that is unlikely. Even if they could, as you point out they would need a steady supply of fuel and ammo. I do not see how they could have accomplished that. The book sort of sidesteps these issues by having the Germans find significant quantities of fuel ashore (maybe, I do not know how well executed any destruction plans would have been) but really doesn't address how the Germans coudl effectively move large quantities of other supplies across the beach.
Anyway, it is always fun to speculate.
An interesting idea Joe but not really feasible. I've a French friend who feels the Germans should have invaded down from northern Scotland, this despite the fact he was fully aware of the mountainous remote nature of that country.
To have invaded Northern Ireland would have involved the Kriegsmarine sailing all the way from northern France and the Low Countries, towing Rhine barges full of seasick soldiers, around the wild Atlantic coast of western Ireland, perhaps five days sailing, subject at all time to the attention of fifty or so Royal Navy destroyers, a Spanish Armada in reverse if you like. And when they got there where would they land? Most of Ulster's coastline is rugged cliffs, there is one broad beach at Magilligan in county Derry (it was used as a training beach for US forces prior to D-Day) but it is within twenty minutes sailing of the Royal Navy base in Derry and two minutes flying from Ballykelly and Eglinton RAF bases.
It is an apochryphal comment of Churchill that after Dunkirk the only armed, disciplined force in the UK was the Ulster Special Constabulary (the [in]famous B Specials) a reserve and armed police force, ok not much, but a darn sight better than the Dad's Army in England at the time, they were mostly veterans of WWI and the 1919-22 guerilla campaign. Having defeated them the Germans would have had to cross to the mainland, what on car ferries? They would have landed either in Liverpool or Glasgow where they would have been met by the excellent Canadian division. No, Ireland North or South was not ripe for the plucking, they mightn't like the Brits but they wouldn't have welcomed the Nazis either (well the IRA might have but they were a small minority and De Valera would have wiped them out if they tried any funny business).
Sea Lion was never a real threat, but it's easy for us to say that now in hindsight, but it sure as hell didn't look that way to the British in the summer and autumn of 1940, it is a magnificent tribute to them that they never considered surrendering to the Nazis and were prepared to accept oblivion rather than Nazi serfdom, unlike another country only 28 miles across the Channel.
Hitler's life aim was to defeat Soviet Communism and once he realised that GB wasn't going to be easy to subjugate he turned East.
On a more serious note, so much would have to have gone right for the Germans that I don't see it happening. Had they (1) continued their attacks on the RAF radar towers and fighter fields for another month instead of diverting resources to terror attacks on the cities, (2) put a major effort into developing cross-channel marine capabilities that could withstand the weather and carry their panzers and heavy artillery, (3) increased submarine warfare against RN units instead of merchant shipping, except perhaps for oilers, (4) found a period of weather mild enough to effect the landings (we lucked out in '44 and only barely then), (5) dedicated more than 160,000 troops to take the island (twice that IMHO and probably more - look, for example, at what happened at Stalingrad), and (6) succeeded in isolating Great Britain diplomatically from U.S. intervention, then maybe. Otherwise I think it would have been one of the bitterest, bloodiest battles in history and it's doubtful if many Germans would have left the island alive.
No.
I don't think Higgens copied Jap designs. The Higgens Boat Company had a history of innovative designs for working boats well before it ever got into landing craft. Their first landing craft were made by sawing off the bow and adding a ramp... In fact they had z production line doing that for a while until they got the production line for for building the boat with the ramp going.
Here's another great page:
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/japan/japan-amphibvehicles.html
Just for reference:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Japanese_WW2_Weapons#Army_vessels
My grandmother lived in southern England. When I was a kid (1960's) there was still some evidence near her house of preparations for an invasion. On a road in back of her garden there were some big concrete barriers. IIRC she said that they were intended to stop tanks. After the war they were too heavy to remove and were just pushed onto the shoulder. At the point where a main road crossed a rail line, there was a low concrete building that was some sort of guard house or bunker. We played inside a few times. None of this is so important but it made a big impression on my imagination at the time.
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