We should have leveled Aden.....
We should have leveled Aden.....
Remember the Cole. AMEN!
FYI
Attack on USS Cole exposes a fundamental failure (USA Today)
After several days of finger-pointing and a flurry of technical questions
about vessel security, the larger question about why 17 sailors died in a
terrorist attack on the USS Cole last week is getting shortchanged: Should
the destroyer even have been in the terrorist-rife Yemeni port of Aden last
Thursday?
Navy vessels have visited Yemen since 1998, as part of an effort to build
diplomatic bridges with that traditionally unfriendly Arab state. The former
commander for military operations in the Mideast, Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni,
set up the refueling stop and other military ties, arguing that engagement
with such countries deters terrorism.
In the aftermath of Thursday's attack, the execution of that policy, if not
the policy itself, is a glaring failure. Either Yemen cannot be made safe
enough to justify the risk, or the military failed to prepare adequately.
Yemen is a poor country where security forces aren't good at keeping watch on
terrorists. Officials at the U.S. Embassy have said the climate is unsafe,
and the government is far less hospitable toward the United States than are,
say, the governments of neighboring Oman or Saudi Arabia.
By contrast, other forms of engagement such as joint military exercises
between the two countries or training of Yemeni officers in the U.S., pose a
far lower terrorist risk.
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger defended the Yemen refueling Sunday,
saying that the places where naval vessels can refuel are limited. But that's
a rationalization. The Cole could have refueled in friendlier Gulf ports,
including Saudi Arabia and Oman. Alternately, U.S. warships can be refueled
at sea, by supply vessels called tenders.
And even if engagement with Yemen was worth the risk, it certainly demanded
special procedures. For instance, the U.S. could have demanded tighter
control over the Yemeni refueling operation.
Instead of focusing on those issues, some at the Pentagon and State
Department were busy trying to blame each other, just when they should be
trying to find common answers to a joint failure.
For all of the danger, the U.S. doesn't appear to have gained much from its
two years of military diplomacy: The president of Yemen reacted to the
bombing by denying there are terrorists in his country. He has since amended
his comments.
Unless tough questions are asked about the use of naval vessels for
diplomatic purposes, the right lessons won't be drawn from Thursday's tragic
bombing. The situation recalls the aftermath of the 1983 bombing that killed
241 Marines in Beirut. Then, a commission asked narrow questions, and the
broader lesson -- don't send a tiny, lightly armed force to build peace in
the middle of a conflict -- was not learned. The mistake was repeated in
Somalia in 1993.
Using port calls as a tool of diplomacy is worthwhile only if the cost and
risks are acceptable. The 17 dead and 40 wounded show the cost in Yemen was
far too high.
bump
In July 2003 was visiting the Norfolk shipyards with my elderly folks. We took a boat ride where the guide explained all the ships in drydock. The USS Ronald Reagan was ready for commissioning and was about 3 days later. However, the huge burst of patriotism (and sadness) was seeing the repaired USS Cole and the guide explaining the history. God bless our military!
Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote to all DIA personnel this week to explain the protest resignation of a DIA analyst in October. The analyst, Kie Fallis, quit the day after the USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers in Aden, Yemen. Mr. Fallis charged that a report he had written on the threat of a terrorist attack in Yemen was suppressed by senior DIA officials.Mr. Fallis also uncovered terrorist info related to 9/11:Mr. Fallis' resignation letter stated that he had "significant analytic differences" with DIA superiors over a terrorist threat assessment produced in June.
U.S. intelligence officials said there were warnings, but they arrived too late. The National Security Agency issued a report shortly after the Cole was bombed warning of attacks in the region too late to be useful.
Adm. Wilson said he asked the Pentagon inspector general (IG) to investigate Mr. Fallis' charges. In an awkwardly worded statement, the three-star admiral said on Wednesday the IG "found no evidence to support the public perception that information warning of an attack on Cole was suppressed, ignored or even available in DIA." What about the private perception?
The admiral's statement drew smirks from several intelligence officials. It relied on a dodge often used by intelligence analysts to dismiss unwelcome information. Saying there is "no evidence" like that presented to a court of law is often used to mask the fact there is lots of intelligence to the contrary that spooks would rather not talk about in public.
One piece of the puzzle that Mr. Fallis uncovered was an intelligence report about a secret meeting of al Qaeda terrorists in a condominium complex in Malaysia in January 2000.Information obtained after September 11 identified two of them as Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who would be on American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon. They met with a former Malaysian army captain, Yazi Sufaat, described by Malaysian authorities as a key link in Southeast Asia for al Qaeda, who later would be tied to the bombing of the Cole.
What alarmed U.S. intelligence at the time was that Malaysian security officials traced the men to the Iranian Embassy there, where they spent the night.
Even though the Do-Nothing Slickster would like Americans to forget he did absolute nothing in response.
Even though the Do-Nothing Slickster would like Americans to forget he did absolute nothing in response.
Remember the Cole..May we never allow an attack to go unanswered again..
I am so grateful to all who serve our country.