|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Threat Matrix HTML designed by: Ian Livingston
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| This thread has been locked, it will not receive new replies. |
|
Locked on 11/01/2005 7:06:52 PM PST by Sidebar Moderator, reason:
New thread: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1513784/posts |
Posted on 10/01/2005 8:27:27 AM PDT by nwctwx
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Threat Matrix HTML designed by: Ian Livingston
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Thank you Granny for the update.
Long Island
Thanks for the ping. I heard it on the radio on my commute home and just checked in to post it. I should have known you guys would be on the ball, as always.
Adding to your post, the radio report said there were 4 men.
4 men, yikes.
Baby formula?
Twin Infants Die In Brooklyn
Tragedy in Brooklyn, after a set of twin brothers die.
It all happened just after noon, when the two 3-month-old boys were found unconscious in an apartment on East 96th Street, in the Brownsville section. The boys were rushed to Brookdale Hospital, but were dead on arrival.
The boys are identified as Ises and Moorfiyah Mathurin.
It's not clear what causes this, but police say carbon monoxide poisoning has been ruled out. They are investigating whether something might have been bad in the formula given to the infants.(suspicious)
http://wcbstv.com/topstories/local_story_293161348.html
ON THE NET...
http://alfurqan-ansar.com/
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22alfurqan-ansar%22&hl=en&lr=&filter=0
http://blogs.icerocket.com/search?q=irhabi007
http://blogs.icerocket.com/search?q=%22irhabi+007%22
http://blogsearch.google.com/blogsearch?hl=en&q=irhabi+007&btnG=Search+Blogs
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1506254/posts
"US, UK teams search quake rubble for Osama Bin Laden"
Daily Times (Pakistan) ^ | October 20, 2005
Posted on 10/20/2005 4:13:14 PM PDT by Jim Robinson
This is so sad.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1506290/posts
"Canada Court to Hear Arab Muslim's Appeal"
AP ^ | October 20, 2005 | Unknown
Posted on 10/20/2005 4:53:28 PM PDT by river rat
OTTAWA Oct 20, 2005 —
Thanks to Domestic Church for the Update and post on The Avian Flu Surveillance Project Thread:
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1399613/posts?page=1880#1880
Sorry if previously posted - just received this summary
from Statfor.com.
STATFOR.COM 10/19/05
TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Nalchik: The 9/11 That Wasn't
By Fred Burton
Russian military forces are continuing mop-up operations in Nalchik, a city in the Caucasus region where Islamist militants last week staged a series of coordinated attacks -- signaling attempts to widen the Chechen conflict to other parts of Russia. The incident, which burst into the international news Oct. 13, is significant on several levels -- not least of which was the much-improved counterterrorism response by Russian forces, without which the raids conceivably might have expanded into something approaching the Sept. 11 attacks in terms of geopolitical impact.
As it happens, the events that took place involved some 100 to 150 armed militants, who attempted to seize control of the airport at Nalchik while also assaulting police stations, government offices and the regional headquarters of the Russian prison system, among other targets. All told, about 100 people were killed -- more than 60 of them militants, and roughly equal numbers of security forces and civilians. That's hardly what anyone would term a "minor incident," but compared to other attacks by Chechen militants -- such as the school hostage crisis in Beslan in 2004 or a similar event at a Moscow theater in 2002 -- the Russian response was swifter and the outcome much better.
This is not due to dumb luck: The response logically stems from drastically improved intelligence-gathering and targeting priorities in Russian counterterrorism strategies, which underwent a sea change following the Beslan incident. In fact, there is reason to believe that the militants who planned the attacks in Nalchik (an operation that has been claimed by Moscow's arch-enemy, Shamil Basayev) actually were forced into carrying out their operation prematurely, after Russian intelligence got wind of a much larger and more chilling plot -- one combining all the most deadly tactics of both Sept. 11 and Beslan.
Russian military contacts and other sources have told us that the events in Nalchik apparently were supposed to be only the first phase of a plan that ultimately was to include flying explosives-laden aircraft into high-profile targets elsewhere in Russia. Though the exact targets have not been confirmed, sources say possible targets included the Kremlin, a military district headquarters and railway hub in Rostov-on-Don, a nuclear plant in the vicinity of Saratov, and a hydroelectric plant or dam on the Volga. Sources also say the militants had a back-up plan that would have involved mining important government buildings and taking hostages -- tactics the Chechens have used in other headline-grabbing attacks.
Intelligence from human sources is rarely golden: Analysts always must play the skeptic and filter out the sources' own motives for providing the information -- and in this case, the Russian military certainly has reason to want to appear to have pre-empted a catastrophe. In this case, the list of possible targets reads like a laundry list of nightmare scenarios that have been widely discussed, in the U.S. context, since Sept. 11 -- so, admittedly, it is not much of a stretch to assume such assets also could be targeted in Russia. That said, the Nalchik incident fits into wider trend that we have been following in the Chechen/Islamist insurgency for more than a year, and the target sets make sense for what is becoming an increasingly Wahhabist-dominated campaign in Russian territory.
The events on the ground also seem to bear out the sourced intelligence: The militants opened their attack with attempts to seize the airport in Nalchik, where -- had they not been beaten back by Russian forces already guarding the target -- they would have been able to commandeer the aircraft needed for follow-on operations. The incidents in other parts of the city, which were closely time-coordinated but appear to have involved poorly trained recruits, are believed to have been intended as distractions -- drawing attention and Russian security forces away from the strategically crucial airport.
The fact that the follow-on attacks were more or less quickly put down, with (relatively) small loss of life, also fits the notion of a busted operation. Reportedly, the grand plot was to have been carried out on Oct. 17, with a force of about 700 militants -- most of whom had not yet moved into Nalchik when the Russians began taking action. The entire plan apparently started to unravel nearly 10 days in advance: Acting on tips from local residents, Russian forces arrested two suspected militants -- who reportedly confessed to planning attacks -- as early as Oct. 8.
Accepting, then, that the intelligence concerning the shape of the plot is credible, we have an operation that, if carried to fruition, would have mirrored Sept. 11 in many respects -- opening up a new front in the global jihadist war and, conceivably, could have reinvigorated the organized Islamist militancy in other parts of the world.
Considering Basayev's claims of responsibility for the Nalchik plot, that clearly seems to have been the intent. Basayev, it must be remembered, is the Chechen commander who has authored many of the most horrific terrorist incidents in Russia. Attacks like those at Beslan and the Moscow theater, and hostage-takings at hospitals and other soft targets typically have resulted in hundreds of deaths at a time -- both before and during the bloody responses by Russian security forces. To say that Basayev has a penchant for grand, showy schemes would be something of an understatement.
Operationally speaking, that trait seems to undermine his effectiveness as a militant leader -- and, in fact, eventually could be his undoing. The fact that that has not yet happened points more toward particular aspects of the political conflict between the Chechen/Islamist insurgents and Moscow than to best practices taught in Terrorism 101.
Under those principles, the most effective forms of attack are those that are simple yet ruthless: They require few resources, and operatives practice airtight "need-to-know" communications. The fewer people who know about a plan -- or have access to more details than they need in order to carry out their own part -- the less likely the plan is to leak out and be pre-empted. Except for the fact that Basayev has, for the most part, operated in territory where locals have supported at least some aspects of the militant campaign against Russian rule, it is nothing short of amazing that he and his cast of thousands have succeeded to the degree that they have.
But the amount of local support Basayev still is able to command has become something of a question mark, as Chechens themselves have grown weary of the death and destruction in their war. It is said that, partly because of this, Basayev increasingly has surrounded himself with Wahhabi militants -- including some Saudi commanders -- and is seeking ways to export the campaign from the Muslim-dominated Caucasus republics into Russia proper.
All of this seems logical: Judging from details of the Nalchik plot and others within the past year, Basayev appears intent on mimicking elements of the Sept. 11 attacks -- indicating that he at least is studying and learning from al Qaeda, even if he is not intimately linked to it. At the very least, his emerging fixation with air assets is reminiscent of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed -- another tactical genius with a penchant for spectacular strikes.
Both the Nalchik operation and the wider plot, had it been carried out, would have mirrored Sept. 11 in other ways as well: Multiple targets, representing a mix of both hard (government installations) and soft (civilian infrastructure) nodes, might have been struck -- maximizing the political, economic and sheer terror value of the strikes. The plot shows high degrees of strategic planning and, as a result, could have been designed to inspire audiences in the Muslim world -- whether that world is defined to include Russia's Muslim-majority provinces or other regions.
It is important to note here that, though Sept. 11 has become the gold standard for "effective" terrorist attacks, we and others believe that even al Qaeda likely was stunned by its success. The plot was redundant in most aspects: two economic facilities (the World Trade Center towers) and two government facilities (the Pentagon and, it is believed, the Capitol) were targeted, building in a margin of error for planners who likely never expected three of the four aircraft to strike their targets. Similarly, Basayev appears to be hatching redundant plots, so that operations can still be politically and economically effective even if some aspects of the mission fail.
But at Nalchik, almost the entire operation failed before it could get off the ground. The points of failure appear to rest in two areas.
First, there is evidence that Basayev used some and ill-prepared operatives in Nalchik -- rather than highly trained and ruthlessly efficient cells, like those that carried out the 9/11 attacks. The assailants acted in groups of five men. Typical al Qaeda operations use four-man cells, in which each member plays a specific and crucial role. Larger cells appear to be the norm in Chechen operations -- partly because this allows commanders to play a greater role on the ground, but also perhaps because strikes often include local militants who have been poorly trained. This can be a mixed blessing. For instance, we saw in Beslan would-be suicide bombers who ran away; in Nalchik, some of the fighters -- many of whom were well-equipped -- fired their weapons while running toward their targets (a tactic very likely to draw return fire and get them killed). The use of larger cells allows for this kind of attrition without endangering the mission, but it also brings into the mix local operatives who have supreme area knowledge -- and thus are able to identify launching points and escape routes with lower operational overhead.
Second, and crucially, there was poor operational security in Nalchik. In short, someone snitched, and the op was blown. The snitch could have been someone motivated by the bounties Moscow now is offering for intelligence targeting Chechen commanders, or a mole who has infiltrated the militants' ranks, or perhaps a local parent who overhead a conversation between teenagers -- or all of the above. Given the hundreds of people who, according to sources, ultimately would have taken part in the plot, anything is possible. The point is, a lot of people were in the know, and COMSEC -- communications security -- was next to impossible.
At this point, the Russians have to be feeling both relieved and shaken, asking the inevitable "What if?" Basayev certainly has the means and ability to hatch grandiose plots that, if effectively executed, would have serious geopolitical implications -- and, of course, he is alive and free to fight another day. On the other hand, his soaring ambition -- combined with the obviously improved intelligence capabilities and response strategies of the Russian forces -- could be his undoing.
Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.
Note: The following text is an exact quote:
---
http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/2005/10/008629print.html
October 20, 2005
British Muslim group declares new jihad
Sheikh Omar Bakri is still spreading his message of peace. From Ynet News, with thanks to Jihad Watch News Editor Eric Schwappach:
A declaration of war on Britain and the West is continuing to be issued by British Muslims in the United Kingdom, as the pro-jihad message of Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, recently banned from Britain, is echoed by his followers who have remained behind.
Bakri, who is now based in Beirut, once headed the al-Muhajiroun group, linked to the 2003 terror attack on the Mike’s Place Bar in Tel Aviv. The suicide bomber behind that attack was a British Muslim.
Using internet sermons, recordings, videos and documents, followers of Bakri, who say they are in touch with the Lebanon-based preacher, call on British Muslims to join al-Qaeda and to carry out acts of terrorism.
Ynetnews has monitored late night chat room sessions on the Paltalk chat network, used by Bakri six months ago to declare war on Britain.
“We’ve always had these two camps,” said the chat room’s administrator, “Mizaan,” in the early hours of Tuesday morning, in a room called “The Muslims in the UK.”
Mizaan, who told listeners “that is my real name,” said: “There is the camp of Islam and the camp of Kuffar (non-Muslim). Today we still have these two camps. And today there is the camp of Islam behind Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, the emir (leader) of jihad today, and we have the camp of kuffar led by George Bush with his cross. So yes we are two distinct groups, and we should never stand with the kuffar.”
“Islam is better than everything and it will rule over the whole world, whether the kuffar likes it or not,” declared Mizaan.
Read it all.
Posted at October 20, 2005 08:17 AM
Thanks Charlotte for that update.
Do you have a url available for that article?
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1506354/posts
"James Bond goes Japanese? Tokyo eyes MI6-style spy agency"
Japan Times ^ | Friday, October 21, 2005 | TSUKASA ARITA
Posted on 10/20/2005 6:38:37 PM PDT by Flavius
ARTICLE SNIPPET: "The idea of a Japanese James Bond may sound hilarious, but serious discussions are under way in Japan on whether to create a secret intelligence service along the lines of Britain's MI6 to conduct overseas espionage.
The deliberations were triggered by a proposal from a panel of experts under Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura that was tasked with coming up with ways of strengthening the country's international information-gathering systems.
The five-member committee is headed by Yoshio Omori, a former chief of the Cabinet Information Research Office, and includes military critic Kensuke Ebata.
The group came up with the proposal last month after reaffirming that Japan's current system information-gathering capabilities are not commensurate with its international standing."
"Indonesia reported its first bird flu cases in humans on July 20, after a man and his two daughters died from the
H5N1 virus, the deadliest known form of the illness.
The second grouping was an eight-year-old boy who is healthy even as he tested positive for bird flu. He is the
nephew of a 37-year-old woman who died from the same disease."
The 8 year old will shed that virus where ever he goes.
I subscribe to the free www.Stratfor.com Intelligence Alerts.
It came via email in my weekly report. I can try to forward the email to your freepmail. Or you might find the article on their website. There are subscription fees to
most of their articles. But you can go to their website and sign up for the free reports as well.
Thanks Charlotte.
THANKS DC for that update.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
