If you have read and followed the numerous threads on AD, you will note that I keep getting back to an important point...this computer program worked, and worked exteremely well...and yet... somebody apparently decided to not only erase all the data generated by the program, but also to erase the programs SOURCE CODE, and DOCUMENTATION as well. We will find out who, when, and why when the hearings get under way.
As I have maintained, IMHO, this is non-routine destruction of government property, and a loss of a valuable technology resource, which was paid for by the American taxpayer.
If you read this article, you will see that many software development programs run by the government (its all governments...not just the Feds) do not produce software that works nearly as well as AD apparently did. This is why..aside from what AD may have produced in the way of incriminating associations...the destruction of the program technology, technology that according to this article... the FBI DOES NOT YET HAVE AT THE PRESENT TIME , is in my mind a scandel, and needs to be answered for.
An excellent post and I'm quite certain you are correct...that the destruction of this government property is most certainly not routine.
There are several scandals here. One is why the FBI still does not have (apparently) the capability that Able Danger had way back in 2000. The related scandal is why AD source code was (apparently) destroyed when it would have been invaluable to a wide variety of counter-terrorism agencies. Another scandal is why the FBI persists to believe it has any competence at all to oversee software development and project management for IT. Sounds like it has burned through a lot of tax dollars with nothing to show for it.... and we are still years away from having adequate database software for the FBI and our national security. What a mess!
Bump
SAIC still has the source code, the program was a piece of meat, and the Government could never agree on what the software was suppose to do. From an IT perspective it was doomed to fail because of the Feds constantly changing the requirements.
"Lost amid the recriminations was an early warning from one member of the development team that questioned the FBI's technical expertise, SAIC's management practices, and the competence of both organizations. Matthew Patton, a security expert working for SAIC, aired his objections to his supervisor in the fall of 2002. He then posted his concerns to a Web discussion board just before SAIC and the FBI agreed on a deeply flawed 800-page set of system requirements that doomed the project before a line of code was written. His reward: a visit from two FBI agents concerned that he had disclosed national security secrets on the Internet."
Source: http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/sep05/0905fbi.html
"If you read this article,"
Page is no longer available.
Send the entire FBI out to the parking lot. Call in the Agents you need each day by name. After 30 days of doing this, send home those remaining in the parking lot who have not been called.