Government doesn't ensure prosperity; it can (or should) ensure a legal environment conducive to individual liberty which is essential to prosperity.
The article above (and its "citations," if one can call them that) make no reference to any real scholarship in the field whatsoever.
This is false.
First of all (since it says "vanity" at the top of the article and you therefore don't read very carefully), I wrote this article. So, allow me to point out the deficiency of your assertion:
Consider the first link to Article the Fourteenth in the submission to be considered for the BOR. There are enough "scholarly citations" in that piece to satisfy anybody. Strike one.
The second link contains 53 references to original sources. Strike two.
The third link to the Constitution Society contains 149 references to original sources. Strike three.
The article wasn't meant to be a scholarly discussion on the origins of the 14th Amendment, it was to be a synthesis of a number of reliable sources concerning the way it has been used and why. It was intended to help people articulate how the court has twisted the Constitution. It is intended to caution "conservatives" from relying upon federal protection through the courts, and how in the case of Kelo it backfired, thus admonishing them from future cases involving, for example, the Second Amendment. It was written for public fora (whatever you may think of them), not a scholarly law or history journal. It therefore refers to reasonably reliable sources containing appropriate citations with links, which is perfectly appropriate for a public forum.
The article attempts to portray Bingham as a crafty lawyer with a grand plan, but the debates show that Bingham was, at best, extremely sloppy and inconsistent, and at worst, an idiot.
Even the most intelligent people can easily look that way when they are covering for something, especially on paper and particularly in a setting where bombast, coercion, posturing, and butt-kissing are the currency of discourse, certainly not scholarly reason. Not to consider that possibility as the source of the record is indicative of the kind of self-reinforcing condescension that led you to conclude errantly the intent of the article.
The amendment itself appears to make a distinction (due process to persons, P&I to citizens) but the conduct of Bingham and others during the debates seems to imply that there was no distinction intended.
What they said later notwithstanding?
There isn't any reference to the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act or the 13th Amendment, which are absolutely key to understanding the 14th Amendment. It's a joke. It's not serious.
Simply because the article did not focus upon the topic you would have preferred is not reason to say it isn't serious. I could easily say the same things about your post, because it offers nothing constructive.
It doesn't even make reference to the Congressional Globe, which the author can't even properly identify, referring to the Congressional Record, which didn't even begin publication until 1873!
How many people reading this piece would know what the Congressional Globe was? I'd bet they would think it was a newspaper. Seeing as it had a similar function as the Congressional Record, dubbing it by its modern name avoids confusion for the reader. If you think that dishonest, mea culpa.
There isn't any reference to the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act or the 13th Amendment, which are absolutely key to understanding the 14th Amendment. It's a joke. It's not serious.
Are you defending the selective incorporation doctrine here or Miller's interpretation in the Slaughterhouse Cases? Try contributing something instead of posturing about what a studly scholar you are. It actually would be appreciated.
I am an engineer doing habitat restoration, not a legal academic or historian. I am trying, in my own limited way, to get SOMEONE to ask serious questions of Judge Roberts that will indicate his opinions on federalism, equal protection for fictitious persons, and particularly about the manner in which the 14th Amendment has been abused. I am trying, in my own limited way, to get conservatives to reconsider using the Federal courts as a venue whereby to regain accountability in government and respect for the Constitution. Are you doing that? Have you taken the time and trouble to write one? Maybe it's worth your time; maybe it isn't.
“It doesn't even make reference to the Congressional Globe, which the author can't even properly identify, referring to the Congressional Record, which didn't even begin publication until 1873! And I'm supposed to take him seriously”
Experts Honor Life of Raoul Berger
CHICAGO --- Distinguished scholars and jurists will gather at Northwestern University School of Law for a symposium to honor the life and work of the late Raoul Berger, who was one of the nation’s leading authorities and most prolific commentators on the U.S. Constitution and legal history.
The symposium honoring Berger, a 1935 graduate of the law school who passed away on Sept. 23, 2000, at age 99, is open to the public. It will be held at 4 p.m. Friday, Oct. 25, at the law school, 357 E. Chicago Ave.
The symposium will feature speeches by Judge Danny J. Boggs of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals; Judge Edith H. Jones of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals; Gary L. McDowell, director of the Institute of United States Studies at the University of London; and Edwin Meese III, the Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow of Public Policy at The Heritage Foundation.
"Raoul Berger was one of the most loyal and fervent supporters of the rule of law in general and Northwestern’s law school in particular," said Stephen B. Presser, who also will deliver a speech at the symposium. Presser, the Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History at Northwestern, knew Berger well.
Berger was the author of more than 100 articles and seven books. Among his most recent works are "Federalism: The Founder’s Design" (1987) and "The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights" (1989).
Born in Russian Ukraine in 1901, Berger moved to the United States as a child and subsequently attended the Institute of Musical Art in New York. After leading a distinguished career as a young concert violinist for a number of years, Berger decided to pursue a different career path.
At the age of 35, he graduated from Northwestern University School of Law and first practiced law in Chicago. He worked for the Securities and Exchange Commission and as special assistant to the U.S. attorney general and general counsel to the alien property custodian during World War II. Berger began teaching law at the University of California at Berkeley in 1962 and was the Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History at Harvard University from 1971 to 1976.
His fond memories of Northwestern inspired Berger to establish the Raoul Berger Chair in Legal History, the Raoul Berger Fellowship in Legal History and the Raoul Berger Prizes Fund.
Adamson v. California (No. 102)
27 Cal.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring.
No. 102 Argued: January 15-16, 1947 --- Decided: June 23, 1947
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution and the beginning of the present membership of the Court -- a period of seventy years -- the scope of that Amendment was passed upon by forty-three judges. Of all these judges, only one, who may respectfully be called an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first eight Amendments theretofore limiting only the Federal Government, and that due process incorporated those eight Amendments as restrictions upon the powers of the States. Among these judges were not only those who would have to be included among the greatest in the history of the Court, but -- it is especially relevant to note -- they included those whose services in the cause of human rights and the spirit of freedom are the most conspicuous in our history. It is not invidious to single out Miller, Davis, Bradley, Waite, Matthews, Gray, Fuller, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo (to speak only of the dead) as judges who were alert in safeguarding and promoting the interests of liberty and human dignity through law. But they were also judges mindful of the relation of our federal system to a progressively democratic society, and therefore duly regardful of the scope of authority that was left to the States even after the Civil War. And so they did not find that the Fourteenth Amendment, concerned as it was with matters fundamental to the pursuit of justice, fastened upon the States procedural arrangements which, in the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, only those who are "narrow or provincial" would deem essential to "a fair and enlightened system of justice." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325. To suggest that it is inconsistent with a truly free [p63] society to begin prosecutions without an indictment, to try petty civil cases without the paraphernalia of a common law jury, to take into consideration that one who has full opportunity to make a defense remains silent is, in de Tocqueville's phrase, to confound the familiar with the necessary.
After all, an amendment to the Constitution should be read in a "‘sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption.' . . . For it was for public adoption that it was proposed." See Mr. Justice Holmes in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220. Those reading the English language with the meaning which it ordinarily conveys, those conversant with the political and legal history of the concept of due process, those sensitive to the relations of the States to the central government, as well as the relation of some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the process of justice, would hardly recognize the Fourteenth Amendment as a cover for the various explicit provisions of the first eight Amendments. Some of these are enduring reflections of experience with human nature, while some express the restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the best methods for the ascertainment of facts. The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment was a covert way of imposing upon the [p64] States all the rules which it seemed important to Eighteenth Century statesmen to write into the Federal Amendments was rejected by judges who were themselves witnesses of the process by which the Fourteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution. Arguments that may now be adduced to prove that the first eight Amendments were concealed within the historic phrasing [*] of the Fourteenth Amendment were not unknown at the time of its adoption. A surer estimate of their bearing was possible for judges at the time than distorting distance is likely to vouchsafe. Any evidence of design or purpose not contemporaneously known could hardly have influenced those who ratified the Amendment. Remarks of a particular proponent of the Amendment, no matter how influential, are not to be deemed part of the Amendment. What was submitted for ratification was his proposal, not his speech. Thus, at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutions of nearly half of the ratifying States did not have the rigorous requirements of the Fifth Amendment for instituting criminal proceedings through a grand jury. It could hardly have occurred to these States that, by ratifying the Amendment, they uprooted their established methods for prosecuting crime and fastened upon themselves a new prosecutorial system.
Indeed, the suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the first eight Amendments as such is not unambiguously urged. Even the boldest innovator would shrink from suggesting to more than half the States that [p65] they may no longer initiate prosecutions without indictment by grand jury, or that, thereafter, all the States of the Union must furnish a jury of twelve for every case involving a claim above twenty dollars. There is suggested merely a selective incorporation of the first eight Amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment. Some are in and some are out, but we are left in the dark as to which are in and which are out. Nor are we given the calculus for determining which go in and which stay out. If the basis of selection is merely that those provisions of the first eight Amendments are incorporated which commend themselves to individual justices as indispensable to the dignity and happiness of a free man, we are thrown back to a merely subjective test. The protection against unreasonable search and seizure might have primacy for one judge, while trial by a jury of twelve for every claim above twenty dollars might appear to another as an ultimate need in a free society. In the history of thought, "natural law" has a much longer and much better founded meaning and justification than such subjective selection of the first eight Amendments for incorporation into the Fourteenth. If all that is meant is that due process contains within itself certain minimal standards which are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, putting upon this Court the duty of applying these standards from time to time, then we have merely arrived at the insight which our predecessors long ago expressed. We are called upon to apply to the difficult issues of our own day the wisdom afforded by the great opinions in this field, such as those in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. This guidance bids us to be duly mindful of the heritage of the past, with its great lessons of how liberties are won and [p66] how they are lost. As judges charged with the delicate task of subjecting the government of a continent to the Rule of Law, we must be particularly mindful that it is "a constitution we are expounding," so that it should not be imprisoned in what are merely legal forms, even though they have the sanction of the Eighteenth Century.
It may not be amiss to restate the pervasive function of the Fourteenth Amendment in exacting from the States observance of basic liberties. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 et seq.; Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 et seq. The Amendment neither comprehends the specific provisions by which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the federal government nor is it confined to them. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency, precisely as does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in relation to the Federal Government. It ought not to require argument to reject the notion that due process of law meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth. The Fifth Amendment specifically prohibits prosecution of an "infamous crime" except upon indictment; it forbids double jeopardy; it bars compelling a person to be a witness against himself in any criminal case; it precludes deprivation of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." Are Madison and his contemporaries in the framing of the Bill of Rights to be charged with writing into it a meaningless clause? To consider "due process of law" as merely a shorthand statement of other specific clauses in the same amendment is to attribute to the authors and proponents of this Amendment ignorance of, or indifference to, a historic conception which was one of the great instruments in the arsenal of constitutional freedom which the Bill of Rights was to protect and strengthen. [p67]
A construction which gives to due process no independent function, but turns it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would, as has been noted, tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in the several States, and would deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom. It would assume that no other abuses would reveal themselves in the course of time than those which had become manifest in 1791. Such a view not only disregards the historic meaning of "due process." It leads inevitably to a warped construction of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to bring within their scope conduct clearly condemned by due process but not easily fitting into the pigeonholes of the specific provisions. It seems pretty late in the day to suggest that a phrase so laden with historic meaning should be given an improvised content consisting of some, but not all, of the provisions of the first eight Amendments, selected on an undefined basis, with improvisation of content for the provisions so selected.
And so, when, as in a case like the present, a conviction in a State court is here for review under a claim that a right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been denied, the issue is not whether an infraction of one of the specific provisions of the first eight Amendments is disclosed by the record. The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings which resulted in conviction deprived the accused of the due process of law to which the United States Constitution entitled him. Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward [p68] those charged with the most heinous offenses. These standards of justice are not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. But neither does the application of the Due Process Clause imply that judges are wholly at large. The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice, and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. The fact that judges, among themselves, may differ whether, in a particular case, a trial offends accepted notions of justice is not disproof that general, rather than idiosyncratic, standards are applied. An important safeguard against such merely individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the State court under review.
*
The prohibition against depriving the citizen or subject of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law is not new in the constitutional history of the English race. It is not new in the constitutional history of this country, and it was not new in the Constitution of the United States when it became a part of the fourteenth amendment, in the year 1866.
FRANKFURTER, J., Opinion of the Court
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Bartkus v. Illinois
No. 1 Argued: November 19, 1957 --- Decided: March 30, 1959
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment does not impliedly extend the first eight amendments to the States. Pp. 124-126.
Since the new prosecution was by Illinois, and not by the Federal Government, the claim of unconstitutionality must rest upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Prior cases in this Court relating to successive state and federal prosecutions have been concerned with the Fifth Amendment, and the scope of its proscription of second prosecutions by the Federal Government, not with the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on state action. We are now called upon to draw on the considerations which have guided the Court in applying the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment on state powers. We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such. [n2] The relevant historical materials have been canvassed by this Court and by legal scholars. [n3] These materials demonstrate conclusively that Congress and the members of the legislatures of the ratifying States did not contemplate that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand incorporation of the first eight amendments, making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the States.
Evidencing the interpretation by both Congress and the States of the Fourteenth Amendment is a comparison of the constitutions of the ratifying States with the Federal [p125] Constitution. Having regard only to the grand jury guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, the criminal jury guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, and the civil jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment, it is apparent that, if the first eight amendments were being applied verbatim to the States, ten of the thirty ratifying States would have impliedly been imposing upon themselves constitutional requirements on vital issues of state policies contrary to those present in their own constitutions. [n4] Or, to approach the matter in a different way, they would be covertly altering provisions of their own constitutions in disregard of the amendment procedures required by those constitutions. Five other States would have been undertaking procedures not in conflict with, but not required by, their constitutions. Thus, only one-half, or fifteen, of the ratifying States had constitutions in explicit accord with these provisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments. Of these fifteen, four made alterations in their constitutions by 1875 which brought them into important conflict with one or more of these provisions of the Federal Constitution. One of the States whose constitution had not included any provision on one of the three procedures under investigation adopted a provision in 1890 which was inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. And so, by 1890, only eleven of the thirty ratifying States were in explicit accord with these provisions of the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution. Four were silent as to one or more of the provisions, and fifteen were in open conflict with these same provisions. [n5] [p126]
Similarly imposing evidence of the understanding of the Due Process Clause is supplied by the history of the admission of the twelve States entering the Union after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of each, Congress required that the State's constitution be "not repugnant" to the Constitution of the United States. [n6] Not one of the constitutions of the twelve States contains all three of the procedures relating to grand jury, criminal jury, and civil jury. In fact, all twelve have provisions obviously different from the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Amendments. And yet, in the case of each admission, either the President of the United States or Congress or both have found that the constitution was in conformity with the Enabling Act and the Constitution of the United States. [n7] Nor is there warrant to believe that the States, in adopting constitutions with the specific purpose of complying with the requisites of admission, were, in fact, evading the demands of the Constitution of the United States.
391 U.S. 145
Duncan v. Louisiana
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.
No. 410 Argued: January 17, 1968 --- Decided: May 20, 1968
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting.
I believe I am correct in saying that every member of the Court for at least the last 135 years has agreed that our Founders did not consider the requirements of the Bill of Rights so fundamental that they should operate directly against the States. [n2] They were wont to believe rather that the security of liberty in America rested primarily upon the dispersion of governmental power across a federal system. [n3] The Bill of Rights was considered unnecessary by some, [n4] but insisted upon by others in order to curb the possibility of abuse of power by the strong central government they were creating. [n5]
9. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan.L.Rev. 5 (1949). Professor Fairman was not content to rest upon the overwhelming fact that the great words of the four clauses of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been an exceedingly peculiar way to say that
The rights heretofore guaranteed against federal intrusion by the first eight Amendments are henceforth guaranteed against state intrusion as well.
He therefore sifted the mountain of material comprising the debates and committee reports relating to the Amendment in both Houses of Congress and in the state legislatures that passed upon it. He found that, in the immense corpus of comments on the purpose and effects of the proposed amendment, and on its virtues and defects, there is almost no evidence whatever for "incorporation." The first eight Amendments are so much as mentioned by only two members of Congress, one of whom effectively demonstrated (a) that he did not understand Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, and therefore did not understand the question of incorporation, and (b) that he was not himself understood by his colleagues. One state legislative committee report, rejected by the legislature as a whole, found § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment superfluous because it duplicated the Bill of Rights: the committee obviously did not understand Barron v. Baltimore either. That is all Professor Fairman could find, in hundreds of pages of legislative discussion prior to passage of the Amendment, that even suggests incorporation.
To this negative evidence the judicial history of the Amendment could be added. For example, it proved possible for a Court whose members had lived through Reconstruction to reiterate the doctrine of Barron v. Baltimore, that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States, without so much as questioning whether the Fourteenth Amendment had any effect on the continued validity of that principle. E.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90; see generally Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 Stan.L.Rev. 140 (1949).