Atta way to blow 9/11 panel's credibility [Mark Steyn]

SUN-TIMES ^ | August 14, 2005 | Mark Steyn

[Forgiven_Sinner]

If you want to know everything wrong with the 9/11 Commission in a single sound bite, consider this from Al Felzenberg, its official spokesman, speaking Wednesday:

''There was no way that Atta could have been in the United States at that time, which is why the staff didn't give this tremendous weight when they were writing the report. This information was not meshing with the other information that we had.''

In fairness to Felzenberg, he was having a bad week, and a hard time staying on top of the commission's ever-shifting version of events. It emerged that the U.S. military had fingered Mohammed Atta -- the guy who plowed Flight 11 into the first World Trade Center tower -- well over a year before before 9/11. Or as the Associated Press puts it:

"A classified military intelligence unit called 'Able Danger' identified Atta and three other hijackers in 1999 as potential members of a terrorist cell in New York City."

At first, the commission denied that it knew anything about "Able Danger": "The Sept. 11 Commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell," insisted Lee Hamilton, the Democratic co-chair. "Had we learned of it, obviously, it would've been a major focus of our investigation."

But within 48 hours this version was non-operative. As the AP subsequently reported: "The Sept. 11 Commission knew military intelligence officials had identified lead hijacker Mohamed Atta as a member of al-Qaida who might be part of U.S.-based terror cell more than a year before the terror attacks but decided not to include that in its final report, a spokesman acknowledged Thursday."

So, far from being a "major focus" that they just happened to miss -- coulda happened to anyone -- it turns out they knew about it but "decided not to include" it.

How'd that happen? Well, as Felzenberg says so disarmingly, "this information was not meshing with the other information.'' As a glimpse into the mindset of the commission, that's astonishing. Sept. 11 happened, in part, because the various federal bureaucracies involved were unable to process information that didn't "mesh" with conventional wisdom. Now we find that the official commission intended to identify those problems and ensure they don't recur is, in fact, guilty of the very same fatal flaw. The new information didn't "mesh" with the old information, so they disregarded it.

But, hey, let's not have a philosophical discussion, let's keep it practical: There was "no way" that Atta could have been in the United States except when the official INS record says he was? No INS paper trail, "no way" he could have got in?

Here's one way just for a start. Forget the southern border, insofar as there is such a thing. Fact: On America's northern border, no record is kept of individual visitors to the United States. All that happens is that a photo scanner snaps your rear license plate. The scanner is said to be state-of-the-art, which is to say, as one Customs & Border official told me, it's "officially" 75 percent accurate. On the one occasion my own license plate was queried, it turned out the scanner had misread it. So, just for a start, without any particular difficulty, a friend of Mohammed Atta could have rented a car for him in Montreal and driven him down to New York -- and there would be never be any record to connect him to the vehicle anywhere in the United States or Canada.

Would al-Qaida types have such contacts in Montreal? Absolutely. The city's a hotbed of Islamist cells and sympathizers.

Fact: The only Islamist terrorist attack prevented by the U.S. government in the period before 9/11 was the attempt to blow up LAX by Ahmed Ressam, a Montrealer caught on the Washington/British Columbia frontier by an alert official who happened to notice he seemed to be a little sweaty. A different guard, a cooler Islamist, and it might just have been yet another routine unrecorded border crossing.

So, when the 9/11 Commission starts saying that there's "no way" something can happen when it happens every single day of the week, you start to wonder what exactly is the point of an official investigation so locked in to pre-set conclusions.

For example, they seemed oddly determined to fix June 3, 2000, as the official date of Atta's first landing on American soil -- even though there were several alleged sightings of him before that date, including a bizarre story that he'd trained at Maxwell/Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, Ala. Atta was a very mobile guy in the years before 9/11, shuttling between Germany, Spain, Afghanistan, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, the Philippines with effortless ease. I've no hard evidence of where he was in, say, April 2000. The period between late 1999 and May 2000 is, in many ways, a big blur. He might have been in Germany, he might have been in Florida, attempting to get a U.S. Farm Service Agency loan for the world's biggest cropduster, as reported by USDA official Johnell Bryant.

But I do know it's absurd to suggest he was never in the United States until June 3, 2000, simply because that's what the INS says -- especially when U.S. military intelligence says something quite different.

Sept. 11 was a total government fiasco: CIA, FBI, INS, FAA, all the hot shot acronyms failed spectacularly. But appoint an official commission and let them issue an official report and suddenly everyone says, oh, well, this is the official version of 9/11; if they say something didn't happen, it can't possibly have happened.

Readers may recall that I never cared for the commission. There were too many showboating partisan hacks -- Richard ben Veniste, Bob Kerrey -- who seemed more interested in playing to the rhythms of election season. There was at least one person with an outrageous conflict of interest: Clinton Justice Department honcho Jamie Gorelick, who shouldn't have been on the commission but instead a key witness appearing in front of it. And there were far too many areas where the members appeared to be interested only in facts that supported a predetermined outcome.

Maybe we need a 9/11 Commission Commission to investigate the 9/11 Commission. A body intended to reassure Americans that the lessons of that terrible day had been learned instead engaged in what at best was transparent politicking and collusion in posterior-covering and at worst was something a whole lot darker and more disturbing.

The problem pre-9/11 was always political: that's to say, no matter how savvy individual operatives in various agencies may have been, the political culture of the day meant that nothing would happen except a memo would get typed up and shoveled into a filing cabinet. Together with other never fully explained episodes -- like Sandy Berger's pants-stuffing at the national archives -- the Able Danger story makes one thing plain: The problem is still political.

[AmericanVictory]

Isn't Podhoretz a guy who makes his living selling his writings? Why should we trust him? If everyone who tries to sell their writings cannot be trusted, it will be difficult to get trustworthy information. Maybe we should look into what they're saying and find out where it leads and whether it's true or not.

[TVenn]

Tuesday

Lee Hamilton, co-chairman of the now-disbanded commission, said Tuesday that members of the panel could issue a statement by the end of the week after reviewing claims that officials had identified ringleader Mohamed Atta and three other hijackers.

"The 9/11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohamed Atta or of his cell," said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana. "Had we learned of it, obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation."

---

Friday

AP) The leaders of the 9/11 commission late Friday disputed a congressman's criticism that the panel did not adequately investigate a claim that four hijackers were identified as al Qaeda members more than a year before the attacks.

In a joint statement, former commission chairman Thomas Kean and vice chairman Lee Hamilton said a military official who made the claim had no documentation to back it up. And they said only 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta was identified to them and not three additional hijackers as claimed by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees.

[kimosabe31]

This is a bombshell. I'm worried that Bush will try to smother it in the interest of preserving public trust /faith in government.

[OESY]

The 9/11 Commission report para. 11.1 concluded that the emergence of al Qaeda in the late 1990s "presented challenges to U.S. governmental institutions that they were not well-designed to meet." Among the failures was that we did not understand the gravity of the threats posed by terrorists because leaders could not imagine such attacks.

Now it appears the Commission itself was woefully inadequate in design, i.e., its membership composition, and in its failure of imagination to suspect that existing mindsets should be challenged, that the INS-supplied information which didn't mesh with military-intelligence findings might have been wrong.

Instead of reporting all known facts about Atta, including evidence contradictions and analytical dissents that the Commission prescribed for the Bush administration, Kean, Hamilton, other members and their staff excluded information that did not agree with their predetermined notions of how 9/11 happened.

The question is, What other pieces of information were withheld because they did not "mesh" with conventional wisdom, or were rejected as being too controversial for the report, or were left out because of time pressures brought on by the rapidly approaching presidential election?

[OESY]

EXHIBIT 1.

[jaydubya2]

The 9/11 Commission. What a bunch of idiots. Why have investigations if there only for show. These people ignored the obvious and wasted our time and money!

[Binghamton_native]

We also had most of the other hijackers come through here (to stay somewhere) during this earlier period.

I probably should know from other posts, but where is 'here'?

[OrioleFan]

At first, the commission denied that it knew anything about "Able Danger": "The Sept. 11 Commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell," insisted Lee Hamilton, the Democratic co-chair.

Hamilton probably called Gore-lick and asked her if she knew anything about Able Danger, and she probably fed him this response and the subsequent response that the dates/times didn't match up.

[CyberAnt]

You are so correct! Visuals say a lot more.

[johnb838]

Ashcroft?

[johnb838]

Weldon says he's going to subpoena the military intelligence guys. And since it was all open source data, it won't compromise a thing. I wish he'd subpoena Jamie Gore-lick and roast her @ss over an open fire.

[johnb838]

I think a Citizen Oversight Committee would be great, but actual goobernmental hearings and charges would be better. How about Ashcroft as a special prosecutor? How about Ken Starr? Heh Heh.

I hate congressional hearings, but apparently what I hate more is ex-goobernmental hacks and suspects preening and posturing and trying to relive the glory days while they bury the bast under BS.

[johnb838]

I don't think the Bush administration is strategizing.

[johnb838]

that crew needs to go dark and go deep to keep that name from view.

"What boat are you on, Sailor?""SSN 223,Sir!"

[OESY]

Mark Steyn, August 14, 2005:

"So, when the 9/11 Commission starts saying that there's "no way" something can happen when it happens every single day of the week, you start to wonder what exactly is the point of an official investigation so locked in to pre-set conclusions.

"For example, they seemed oddly determined to fix June 3, 2000, as the official date of Atta's first landing on American soil -- even though there were several alleged sightings of him before that date, including a bizarre story that he'd trained at Maxwell/Gunter Air Force Base in Montgomery, Ala. Atta was a very mobile guy in the years before 9/11, shuttling between Germany, Spain, Afghanistan, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, the Philippines with effortless ease. I've no hard evidence of where he was in, say, April 2000. The period between late 1999 and May 2000 is, in many ways, a big blur. He might have been in Germany, he might have been in Florida, attempting to get a U.S. Farm Service Agency loan for the world's biggest cropduster, as reported by USDA official Johnell Bryant."


The 9/11 Commission Report, Foresight--And Hindsight, page 347 (Authorized Edition):

" 2. The CTC [CounterTerrorism Center] did not develop a set of telltale indicators for this method of attack. For example, one such indicator might be the discovery of possible terrorists pursuing flight training to fly large jet aircraft, or seeking to buy advanced flight simulators."


COMMENT: For starters, here are a few telltale indicators that might have concerned those who evaluated the findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission after learning members and staff omitted information contrary to its conclusions:
1. Young male Islamic radicals traveling widely, having expressed a desire to harm the U.S. and Israel.
2. Porous U.S. borders and insufficient immigration controls on foreign aliens in country.
3. Inquiries into crop dusting, weaponized sprays, flight training, etc., not business-related on the part of a known 9/11 hijacker who was not supposed to be in country in that time-period.
4. Military intelligence units reporting information contrary to accepted Commission premises.
5. Prosecutors uncomfortable with artificial (not legally required) "walls" erected against sharing intelligence information.
6. Hypotheses rejected without reliable and credible proof under slipshod or politicized processes of review.
7. Commission members with conflicts of interest or self-serving agendas in an election year.
8. Weak commission leadership that valued consensus over results that would lead to strengthening American defenses, including the effectiveness of its national intelligence apparatus.

[eureka!]

bump

[txhurl]

I often wonder how much FReeping (if any) goes on in Crawford.