Posted on 08/11/2005 10:57:02 AM PDT by Lando Lincoln
On April 16, 2004, a Washington Times’ editorial questioned the presence of Jamie Gorelick on the Sept. 11 Commission investigating the worst terrorist attack against the United States in history. It was Gorelick who was “personally responsible for instituting a key obstacle [the so-called “wall of separation memo”] to cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence operations before the terrorist attacks” and the Times editorial held that her presence on the Commission “raises disturbing questions about the integrity of the commission itself. Ms. Gorelick should not be cross-examining witnesses; instead, she should be required to testify about her own behavior under oath.”
Now comes news that the U.S. military knew of the presence of an al-Queda cell in Brooklyn, New York, at least a year prior to the 9/11 attacks. Worse, this cell included Mohammed Atta, the so-called “mastermind” behind the attacks, as well as three other of the hi-jackers.
The information was gathered, according to a Reuters’ news article (go here) by “a small classified military operation engaged in data-mining analysis of ‘open source’ information.” Called “Able Danger,” its members sought to pass this information along to the FBI (including photographs and dossiers detailing links to al-Queda) with a recommendation that the FBI shut the cell down. They were turned down—either by attorneys in the Department of Defense or at the White House—on the grounds that the members of the suspected cell were in the United States under valid visas and because Mohammed Atta himself possessed a “green card.” Given that “Able Danger” was in possession of this information a year prior to the 9/11 attacks, it should be noted that said attorneys would have been under the auspices of the Clinton, not the Bush, White House, and very likely heavily influenced by the atmosphere that produced the Gorelick directive.
Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), who vice-chairs both the Homeland Security and the House Armed Services committees, and who has been looking into this story for some time, has said the information was provided to staff members of the Sept. 11 Commission but that for some reason commissioners were not informed. Lee Hamilton, former vice chairman of the Sept. 11 Commission, is quoted by Reuters as saying “Neither in the documents nor in the conversations [with “Able Danger” members in Afghanistan in October 2003] was there any mention of Mohammed Atta or his cell.” But a former member of “Able Danger” said he “personally told Sept. 11 commission staff members about Atta in Afghanistan, and offered to supply them with documents upon his return to the United States, only to be rebuffed.”
So, a year before the 9/11 attacks, a special unit in the U.S. military was aware of the presence of an al-Queda cell in Brooklyn, New York, and sought to share its information with the FBI but was stopped cold. Why? Because (as described in the April 16, 2004 Washington Times piece) “on March 4, 1995, [Jamie Gorelick, the then number 2 official in the Clinton Justice Department, sent a 4-page directive] to FBI Director Louis Freeh and Mary Jo White, the New York-based U.S. attorney investigating the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In the memo, Ms. Gorelick ordered Mr. Freeh and Ms. White to follow information-sharing procedures that ‘go beyond what is legally required,’ in order to avoid ‘any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance’ that the Justice Department was using Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants, instead of ordinary criminal investigative procedures, in an effort to undermine the civil liberties of terrorism suspects.”
The information that “Able Danger” knew of the presence of an al-Queda cell in New York a year prior to the 9/11 attacks was given to the Sept. 11 Commission staff in October 2003, and now we find that Commission members themselves were not informed prior to their issuing their report. And, Jamie Gorelick, the former Clinton Justice Department official responsible for the very directive that prevented “Able Danger” from passing its information to the FBI, is a member of the Commission charged with finding out what we knew and when we knew it before the 9/11 attacks.
Here is what Richard A. Clark, former counter-terrorism advisor for both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, testified to in prepared remarks before the Sept. 11 Commission on March 24, 2004: “In retrospect, we know that there was information available to some in the FBI and CIA that al Qida [sic] operatives had entered the United States. That information was not shared with the senior FBI counter-terrorism official (Dale Watson) or with me, despite the heightened state of concern in the Counter-terrorism Security Group.”
As the Washington Times noted in April 2004: “Ms. Gorelick has been among the most partisan and aggressive Democratic panel members in questioning the anti-terror efforts of the Bush administration. The nation deserves a full accounting from Ms. Gorelick of why the Clinton administration felt it necessary to go the extra mile in order to hamper the capability of law enforcement and intelligence agents to talk to one another. If Ms. Gorelick fails to provide this, her actions would bring into serious doubt the credibility of the commission.”
Mr. Clarke’s own testimony in March of 2004 corroborates that information regarding the al-Queda presence in the United States prior to 9/11 was known and not acted upon. Whether the information to which Mr. Clark referred is the same as that possessed by “Able Danger” is open to question. In his concluding remarks, Clarke attempts to pin government non-action on the Bush Administration’s less than “urgent” regard for al-Queda, rather than upon the “wall of separation memo” penned by Ms. Gorelick.
But it is clearly Ms. Gorelick’s memo, and the Clinton Administration’s scrupulosity regarding information sharing and the “civil rights” of terror-suspects, that played the key role in preventing information from being passed to the appropriate agencies prior to the 9/11 attacks. Had “Able Danger” been allowed to pass along its information to the FBI—within the limits of the laws restricting communication between counter-terrorism agents and federal prosecutors—9/11 may well have been prevented.
Given that it has now come to light that “Able Danger” was prevented from passing its information to the FBI and that this information was provided to Sept. 11 Commission members who then did not inform the Commission prior to its publishing its final report, one wonders just who those staffers were and to whom they reported. Indeed, if Representative Weldon is serious about calling for a formal inquiry in Congress after the August recess, I would suggest that the top of the witness list include Ms. Gorelick and her Sept. 11 Commission staff members.
Specifically, one would like to know what Ms. Gorelick knew and when she knew it.
About the Writer: Gregory Borse holds a Ph.D. from Louisiana State University, and an MA and BA from the University of Dallas. Dr. Borse, a family man with "a beautiful wife and four beautiful children," enjoys writing, current events, media, politics, and disc golf. Gregory receives e-mail at gregorbo@sbcglobal.net.
I think it's worth noting that the Gorelick memo came out less than 3 weeks after the Oklahoma City bombing.
bttt
That doesn't answer my question, however. My question was: What do you think we should have done?
I suppose we could keep this alive on FR for three months and it still never see the light of day.
I would agree.
bttt
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