Posted on 08/05/2005 10:20:31 PM PDT by Enchante
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 28 November 2003
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Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been dissected like no other product in the history of the US Intelligence Community. We have reexamined every phrase, line, sentence, judgment and alternative view in this 90-page document and have traced their genesis completely. I believed at the time the Estimate was approved for publication, and still believe now, that we were on solid ground in how we reached the judgments we made.
I remain convinced that no reasonable person could have viewed the totality of the information that the Intelligence Community had at its disposalliterally millions of pagesand reached any conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different from those that we reached. The four National Intelligence Officers who oversaw the production of the NIE had over 100 years' collective work experience on weapons of mass destruction issues, and the hundreds of men and women from across the US Intelligence Community who supported this effort had thousands of man-years invested in studying these issues.
Let me be clear: The NIE judged with high confidence that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of the 150 km limit imposed by the UN Security Council, and with moderate confidence that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons. These judgments were essentially the same conclusions reached by the United Nations and by a wide array of intelligence servicesfriendly and unfriendly alike. The only government in the world that claimed that Iraq was not working on, and did not have, biological and chemical weapons or prohibited missile systems was in Baghdad. Moreover, in those cases where US intelligence agencies disagreed, particularly regarding whether Iraq was reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for its nuclear weapons program, the alternative views were spelled out in detail. Despite all of this, ten myths have been confused with facts in the current media frenzy. A hard look at the facts of the NIE should dispel some popular myths making the media circuit.
Myth #1: The Estimate favored going to war: Intelligence judgments, including NIEs, are policy neutral. We do not propose policies and the Estimate in no way sought to sway policymakers toward a particular course of action. We described what we judged were Saddam's WMD programs and capabilities and how and when he might use them and left it to policymakers, as we always do, to determine the appropriate course of action.
Myth #2: Analysts were pressured to change judgments to meet the needs of the Bush Administration: The judgments presented in the October 2002 NIE were based on data acquired and analyzed over fifteen years. Any changes in judgments over that period were based on new evidence, including clandestinely collected information that led to new analysis. Our judgments were presented to three different Administrations. And the principal participants in the production of the NIE from across the entire US Intelligence Community have sworn to Congress, under oath, that they were NOT pressured to change their views on Iraq WMD or to conform to Administration positions on this issue. In my particular case, I was able to swear under oath that not only had no one pressured me to take a particular view but that I had not pressured anyone else working on the Estimate to change or alter their reading of the intelligence information.
Myth #3: NIE judgments were news to Congress: Over the past fifteen years our assessments on Iraq WMD issues have been presented routinely to six different congressional committees including the two oversight committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To the best of my knowledge, prior to this NIE, these committees never came back to us with a concern of bias or an assertion that we had gotten it wrong.
Myth #4: We buried divergent views and concealed uncertainties: Diverse agency views, particularly on whether Baghdad was reconstituting its uranium enrichment effort and as a subset of that, the purposes of attempted Iraqi aluminum tube purchases, were fully vetted during the coordination process. Alternative views presented by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence in the Department of Energy, and by the US Air Force were showcased in the National Intelligence Estimate and were acknowledged in unclassified papers on the subject. Moreover, suggestions that their alternative views were buried as footnotes in the text are wrong. All agencies were fully exposed to these alternative views, and the heads of those organizations blessed the wording and placement of their alternative views. Uncertainties were highlighted in the Key Judgments and throughout the main text. Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said: "We lacked specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD program."
Myth #5: Major NIE judgments were based on single sources: Overwhelmingly, major judgments in the NIE on WMD were based on multiple sourcesoften from human intelligence, satellite imagery, and communications intercepts. Not only is the allegation wrong, but it is also worth noting that it is not even a valid measure of the quality of intelligence performance. A single human source with direct access to a specific program and whose judgment and performance have proven reliable can provide the "crown jewels"; in the early 1960s Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who was then this country's only penetration of the Soviet high command, was just such a source. His information enabled President Kennedy to stare down a Soviet threat emanating from Cuba, and his information informed US intelligence analysis for more than two decades thereafter. In short, the charge is both wrong and meaningless.
Myth #6: We relied too much on United Nations reporting and were complacent after UN inspectors left in 1998: We never accepted UN reporting at face value. I know, because in the mid 1990s I was the coordinator for US intelligence support to UNSCOM and the IAEA. Their ability to see firsthand what was going on in Iraq, including inside facilities that we could only peer at from above, demanded that we pay attention to what they saw and that we support their efforts fully. Did we ever have all the information that we wanted or required? Of course not. Moreover, for virtually any critical intelligence issue that faces us the answer always will be "no." There is a reason that the October 2002 review of Iraq's WMD programs is called a National Intelligence ESTIMATE and not a National Intelligence FACTBOOK. On almost any issue of the day that we face, hard evidence will only take intelligence professionals so far. Our job is to fill in the gaps with informed analysis. And we sought to do that consistently and with vigor. The departure of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 certainly did reduce our information about what was occurring in Iraq's WMD programs. But to say that we were blind after 1998 is wrong. Efforts to enhance collection were vigorous, creative, and productive. Intelligence collection after 1998, including information collected by friendly and allied intelligence services, painted a picture of Saddam's continuing efforts to develop WMD programs and weapons that reasonable people would have found compelling.
Myth # 7: We were fooled on the Niger "yellowcake" storya major issue in the NIE: This was not one of the reasons underpinning our Key Judgment about nuclear reconstitution. In the body of the Estimate, after noting that Iraq had considerable low-enriched and other forms of uranium already in countryenough to produce roughly 100 nuclear weaponswe included the Niger issue with appropriate caveats, for the sake of completeness. Mentioning, with appropriate caveats, even unconfirmed reporting is standard practice in NIEs and other intelligence assessments; it helps consumers of the assessment understand the full range of possibly relevant intelligence.
Myth #8: We overcompensated for having underestimated the WMD threat in 1991: Our judgments were based on the evidence we acquired and the analysis we produced over a 15-year period. The NIE noted that we had underestimated key aspects of Saddam's WMD efforts in the 1990s. We were not alone in that regard: UNSCOM missed Iraq's BW program and the IAEA underestimated Baghdad's progress on nuclear weapons development. But, what we learned from the past was the difficulty we have had in detecting key Iraqi WMD activities. Consequently, the Estimate specified what we knew and what we believed but also warned policymakers that we might have underestimated important aspects of Saddam's program. But in no case were any of the judgments "hyped" to compensate for earlier underestimates.
Myth #9: We mistook rapid mobilization programs for actual weapons: There is practically no difference in threat between a standing chemical and biological weapons capability and one that could be mobilized quickly with little chance of detection. The Estimate acknowledged that Saddam was seeking rapid mobilization capabilities that he could invigorate on short notice. Those who find such programs to be less of a threat than actual weapons should understand that Iraqi denial and deception activities virtually would have ensured our inability to detect the activation of such efforts. Even with "only" rapid mobilization capabilities, Saddam would have been able to achieve production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons in the midst of a crisis, and the Intelligence Community would have had little, if any, chance of detecting this activity, particularly in the case of BW. In the case of chemical weapons, although we might have detected indicators of mobilization activity, we would have been hard pressed to accurately interpret such evidence. Those who conclude that no threat existed because actual weapons have not yet been found do not understand the significance posed by biological and chemical warfare programs in the hands of tyrants.
Myth #10: The NIE asserted that there were "large WMD stockpiles" and because we haven't found them, Baghdad had no WMD: From experience gained at the end of Desert Storm more than ten years ago, it was clear to us and should have been clear to our critics, that finding WMD in the aftermath of a conflict wouldn't be easy. We judged that Iraq probably possessed one hundred to five hundred metric tons of CW munitions fill. One hundred metric tons would fit in a backyard swimming pool; five hundred could be hidden in a small warehouse. We made no assessment of the size of Iraq's biological weapons holdings but a biological weapon can be carried in a small container. (And of course, we judged that Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon.) When the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), led by David Kay, issued its interim report in October, acknowledging that it had not found chemical or biological weapons, the inspectors had then visited only ten of the 130 major ammunition depots in Iraq; these ammunition dumps are huge, sometimes five miles by five miles on a side. Two depots alone are roughly the size of Manhattan. It is worth recalling that after Desert Storm, US forces unknowingly destroyed over 1,000 rounds of chemical-filled munitions at a facility called Al Kamissiyah. Baghdad sometimes had special markings for chemical and biological munitions and sometimes did not. In short, much remains to be done in the hunt for Iraq's WMD.
We do not know whether the ISG ultimately will be able to find physical evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons or confirm the status of its WMD programs and its nuclear ambitions. The purposeful, apparently regime-directed, destruction of evidence pertaining to WMD from one end of Iraq to the other, which began even before the Coalition occupied Baghdad, and has continued since then, already has affected the ISG's work. Moreover, Iraqis who have been willing to talk to US intelligence officers are in great danger. Many have been threatened; some have been killed. The denial and deception efforts directed by the extraordinarily brutal, but very competent Iraqi Intelligence Services, which matured through ten years of inspections by various UN agencies, remain a formidable challenge. And finally, finding physically small but extraordinarily lethal weapons in a country that is larger than the state of California would be a daunting task even under far more hospitable circumstances. But now that we have our own eyes on the ground, David Kay and the ISG must be allowed to complete their work and other collection efforts we have under way also must be allowed to run their course. And even then, it will be necessary to integrate all the new information with intelligence and analyses produced over the past fifteen years before we can determine the status of Iraq's WMD efforts prior to the war.
Allegations about the quality of the US intelligence performance and the need to confront these charges have forced senior intelligence officials throughout US Intelligence to spend much of their time looking backwards. I worry about the opportunity costs of this sort of preoccupation, but I also worry that analysts laboring under a barrage of allegations will become more and more disinclined to make judgments that go beyond ironclad evidencea scarce commodity in our business. If this is allowed to happen, the Nation will be poorly served by its Intelligence Community and ultimately much less secure. Fundamentally, the Intelligence Community increasingly will be in danger of not connecting the dots until the dots have become a straight line.
We must keep in mind that the search for WMD cannot and should not be about the reputation of US Intelligence or even just about finding weapons. At its core, men and women from across the Intelligence Community continue to focus on this issue because understanding the extent of Iraq's WMD efforts and finding and securing weapons and all of the key elements that make up Baghdad's WMD programs before they fall into the wrong handsis vital to our national security. If we eventually are proven wrongthat is, that there were no weapons of mass destruction and the WMD programs were dormant or abandonedthe American people will be told the truth; we would have it no other way.
-------------------------------------------------------- Stu Cohen is an intelligence professional with 30 years of service in the CIA. He was acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction was published
Joe Wilson and his pals have done a tremendous disservice to every aspect of the public understanding of intelligence agencies, WMDs, and the Iraq war. I would hope that Valerie Plame is ashamed to show her face anywhere in the CIA, maybe that's why she took a year off, because any of her colleagues who are not themselves left-wing moonbats should thoroughly despise her and Joe. By hijacking the national debate to make it all about the "16 words" and Niger uranium, Wilson and the MSM have sapped all energy and focus from all of the real, serious issues of WMD proliferation. Far from contributing anything to understanding, Wilson is like a giant squid squirting black ink everywhere he goes.
Bump and ping, respectively.
One would think that Plame played a role, perhaps a major role, in the preparation of this particular NIE. At the very least, she would have been familiar with the consensus that Saddam had WMD.
As nuffsenuff pointed out on another thread, it's probable that Miss Valerie shared her knowledge about Iraqi WMD with husband Joe. Certainly, from October, 2002 thru February, 2003, Wilson was an outspoken proponent of Saddam's store of WMD.
Then, in a fit of partisan opportunism, this pair of "public servants" ignored any and every responsibility they had regarding national security...and began vigorously promoting a lie.
Traitorous? Yes, but not treason. Criminal? Perhaps, but prosecution is unlikely. Despicable? Oh, yes, definitely! Joe and Valerie are nothing more than liars and ingrates. A pair of certified losers. Yet, the MSM treats them like royalty...
I wonder if Miss Valerie had a hand in its preparation...
"I would hope that Valerie Plame is ashamed to show her face anywhere in the CIA, maybe that's why she took a year off, because any of her colleagues who are not themselves left-wing moonbats should thoroughly despise her and Joe"
Well said! Well said indeed. I think the term "left-wing moonbats" fits the Wilson pair exactly. It's clear they've long been liberal Democrats (ref. support of Gore, Kerry, and American Coming Together), but when the Dems held sway, they supported the WMD theory. Only when Wilson came under the charm of Kerry did it seem he performed a triple double back flip on this. And the NY Slimes and the rest of the MSM fawned all over him, egging him on. As you say, I think they will both regret their perfidy for a long time to come.
Bookmark
Thanks for posting this. I've never seen it before. You'd think it would have been posted all over the place, since the MSM is so interested in this burning issue. (I kid.)
As you know better tnan most, Wilson and Larry Johnson and Ray McGovern and those of that stripe, were working together to get out their propaganda very early on in the game.
A cabal of anti-American, anti-Semitic Democracy Now! creeps have driven the MSM's reports on this for more than two years.
This is Larry Burnett/Mapes/Rather to the Nth degree. They have succeeded where the Killian Memo failed. (And as you also know, these same clowns were supposed to appear on 60 Minutes but got bumped for the bogus TANG memo story.)
"This is Larry Burnett/Mapes/Rather to the Nth degree. They have succeeded where the Killian Memo failed. (And as you also know, these same clowns were supposed to appear on 60 Minutes but got bumped for the bogus TANG memo story.)"
Same, absolutely correct. They have succeeded for now with the help of the MSM, but I hope that the real facts will eventually come out as a result of the grand jury proceedings. In the mean time, I'm not holding my breath.
Holy Ridiculously Under-Reported by the MSM Goldmine, Batman!
More than ever I am convinced that Plame and her Husband took classified information on the inherent "doubts" of any intelligence estimate and used it to try to curry favor with the Dems.
And once again I reiterate that this is EXACTLY the strategy the memo written by someone on Rockefeller's staff outlined.
Do any of you have that memo bookmarked?
The one from Rockefeller's staff that a Republican "stole" off of a shared server?
It needs to be in this thread so we can compare the Dem's strategy vs the official CIA explanation.
The Insiders Are Coming Out
By William Rivers Pitt
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Tuesday 08 July 2003
On June 26 [2003], I conducted an interview with 27-year CIA veteran Ray McGovern...
One key question McGovern answered dealt with the rapidly expanding scandal surrounding Bush administration tampering with evidence of Iraqi weapons...
McGovern made a prescient prediction:
"To the degree that esprit de corps exists, and I know it does among the folks we talk to, there is great, great turmoil there. In the coming weeks, we're going to be seeing folks coming out and coming forth with what they know, and it is going to be very embarrassing for the Bush administration."
A New York Times article from Sunday July 6 quoted former US ambassador Joseph Wilson as saying...
t r u t h o u t - William Rivers Pitt | The Insiders Are Coming Out
http://truthout.org/docs_03/070803A.shtml
Ray McGovern (the head of VIPS and Ellsberg's partner with his group) had met with Wilson just a couple of days before June 26. (I think they appeared together on June 23rd, and maybe even before that.)
McGovern knew that this was coming from Wilson. (The next line in the article after McGovern's prediction is about Wilson.)
There is little room to doubt that McGovern helped Wilson coordinate his campaign of lies. He may have even given him some of his ideas--such as the forged documents line, since Wilson could not have seen them in actuality.
Democrats Subvert War Intelligence (Remember "The Treason Memo"?)
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1453971/posts
2003 Iraq Forum OnlineJune 14, 2003
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Iraq Forum Home Program Schedule | Program Report (PDF: 173K) 2002 Iraq Forum Online |
The Iraq Forum online is packed with a list of presenters, their photos, brief biographies and links to their audio presentations at EPIC's 2003 Iraq Forum. In some cases, you will find links to written transcripts and visual slide presentations. You can listen to the entire 2003 Iraq Forum including presenters and discussion by clicking here. EPIC hopes this event will continue to stimulate learning and discussion throughout the year and with it, a better situation for Iraqis and U.S.-Iraq relations.
Ray McGovern was a CIA analyst for 27 years and is on the Steering Group of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He is co-director of the Servant Leadership School, an outreach ministry in inner city Washington D.C. Hear Ray McGovern now.Or download and listen. |
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Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson, IV served as a member of the U.S. Diplomatic Service from 1976 until 1998. From 1988 to 1991, Ambassador Wilson served in Baghdad as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy. As acting Ambassador during "Desert Shield," he was responsible for the negotiations that resulted in the release of several hundred American hostages. He was the last official American to meet with Saddam Hussein before the launching of "Desert Storm." Ambassador Wilson graduated from the University of California at Santa Barbara in 1972. He has been decorated as a Commander in the Order of the Equatorial Star by the Government of Gabon and as an Admiral in the El Paso Navy by the El Paso County Commissioners. He is married to the former Valerie Plame and has four children. Hear Ambassador Joe Wilson now.Or download and listen. |
This is from a cached page on Google, which is why there are so many highlights.
http://tinyurl.com/dpg7l
So this memo was written before November 6th, 2003...
What are the chances that all this was going on around the same time frame and it wasn't coordinated?
I've never seen anything to definitively peg when it was written. I seem to recall that there are some things in the context which narrow down the time frame.
The article states that Fox broke it on November 6th.
I couldn't have been written long before that.
Re: #13: Please note date- June 14, 2003 -- one month before Novak's article.
Note also bio on Wilson -- "He is married to the former Valerie Plame."
When was this put on the web?
Myth #11: Joe Wilson, etc. etc. thought Iraq had no WMDs.
"And the NY Slimes and the rest of the MSM fawned all over him, egging him on. As you say, I think they will both regret their perfidy for a long time to come."
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