[Calpernia]

And he had a position in this odd company, Post Properties, that just seems to be some holding company for a bunch of smaller real estate companies.

NOTE: Wachovia is a partner too.

Company Name

POST PROPERTIES INC

Last Name	First Name
ADDICKS	LORI K.
ADVISES	WILLIAMS
BLOOM	BERNICE
BLOOM	DERRICK N.
BLOOM	HERSCHEL
BLOOM	HERSCHEL M.
BLOOM	HERSHEL M.
BONNER	CARL D.
BOYER	RAY
BREMER	ANDREAS K.
BRYANT	FRANCIS J.
BRYANT	FRANCIS J.
BRYANT	FRANCIS L.
BRYANT	FRANCIS L.
BRYANT	FRANK
BUCKLER	ROBERT H.
BUILDINGS	WILSON
BUILDINGTM	WILSON
BURCH	DANIEL H.
BUTLER	POLLY
BUTLER	WALTER C.
CANOCK	R. BYRON
CARLOCK	BYRON
CARLOCK	R. BYRON
CARLOCK	R. BYRON
CARLSON	PATRICIA R.
CARLSON	TRICIA
CASEY	CATHY A.
CHANG	P.F.
CHAPMAN	TERRY
CHAPMAN	TERRY L.
CHARLES	ARTHUR M. BLANK
CHARLEY	HURRICANES
CHASE	GEORGIA POST
CHASE	GLENDA WHITE POST
CHASE	MORGAN
CHIU	FRANK
CIRCLETM	ADDISON
CLAGGETT	S. VAN
CLARK	CHRISTI
CLINEBURG	WILLIAM A.
COHEN	SHERRY
COHEN	SHERRY S.
COHEN	SHERRY W.
COLLIER	SHARYN E.
CONDON	MARGARET C.
CONLEY	HOLLY
CONNOR	DAVID O
CONNOR	J. DAVID O
CORNERS	ANNE CARSWELL POST
CORNERS	GEORGIA POST
CORNERS	VIRGINIA POST
CORRELL	A. D.
COVALESKY	NINA
CRAWFORD	VIRGINIA C.
CROCKER	DOUG
CROCKER	DOUGLAS
CROCKER	DOUGLAS
CURETON	WILL
CUSTER	BETSY
DAVIS	BILL
DAVIS	JIM
DAWCZAK	GENINE M.
DAWSON	HAROLD A.
DE WAAL	RONALD
DEDUCTIONS	NONRECOURSE
DEMOUEY	PHILIP
DENMAN	JUDY
DENMAN	JUDY M.
DENNEDY	LARRY
DENNEDY	LAWRENCE
DENNEDY	LAWRENCE E.
DENNY	RICHARD A.
DERISO	WALTER M.
DERISO	WALTER M.
DERISO	WALTER M. SONNY
DILLION	BENNIE
DILLIONTM	BENNIE
DILLON	BENNIE
DOLINOY	PAUL J.
DONALDSON	BARTON
DONALDSON	THOMAS J.
DOUGLAS	GRAY
DRUMMOND	BRIAN
DUFFY	JAMES F.
DWYER	CORNELIUS J.
ECHOLS	BRYAN
ELLIS	DAVID G.
ESPY	WILLIAM W.
FAULK	DAN
FAULK	W. DANIEL
FAULK	W. DANIEL
FEUERLEIN	LYNN
FIELDING	JEREMY
FILED	WILLIAMS
FIQUE	TAMARA J.
FLIEGER	R. SCOTT
FOX	ALISSA R.
FOX	G. GREGORY
FOX	GREG
FOX	GREGORY
FOX	R. GREGORY
FRANCIS	E. BARNES
FRANCIS	ROY E. BARNES
FRENCH	RUSSEL R.
FRENCH	RUSSELL E.
FRENCH	RUSSELL R.
FRYREAR	STACEY
GALLAGER	GLEN
GATZEK	DEBORAH R.
GEER	STACEY K.
GEORGE	EDWARD LOWENTHAL
GLOVER	JOHN T.
GODDARD	BOB
GODDARD	ROBBERT C.
GODDARD	ROBERT C.
GODDARD	ROBERT C.
GOOLSBY	MICHELLE P.
GORRELL	J. WARREN
GRAY	DOUG
GRAY	DOUGLASS
GREIPP	AMY
GRIFFITH	JOSEPH F.
GUTFLEISH	RONALD E.
HAGAN	MARK
HAGAN	MARK E.
HALE	GAYLE P.
HARDIN	EDWARD J.
HARRIS	JEFF
HARRIS	JEFFREY A.
HARRIS	LISA
HARTERT	JEFF
HAYAN	GEORGE T.
HEE	TERESA
HELFAND	THOMAS R.
HELLER	DAN L.
HERZER	CHARLENE R.
HESSEL	CHARLES W.
HIEGEL	SUSANNE
HOLMAN	SUZANNE H.
HOOKS	JOHN D.
HOUK	CARLA
HOWELL	CATHERINE
HOWELL	M. CATHERINE
HOWLE	MARTIN
HUMPHREY	ROBINSON
HUNTER	RUSSELL L.
JANET	THOMAS L. WILKES
JOHN	JANE S. MADDOX
JOHN	SHERRY W. COHEN
JOHN	W. COHEN
JOHNSON	CHARLES B.
JOHNSON	MARK A.
JOHNSON	RUPERT H.
JU	BRUCE M. J.
KAMINSKAS	SUSAN
KEKST	BOB MARESE
KELLEY	JOHN J.
KELLEY	KATHARINE W.
KEMPF	DONALD G.
KLOPF	JEFFREY A.
KONAS	CHARLES A.
KONAS	CHUCK
KRAMER	MARC
KRATTER	LESLIE M.
KRIGER	KIMBERLY
LAHAIE	GERALD
LAKE	GEORGIA POST
LAKE	MICHELLE SANDERS POST
LANE	CLYDE
LANE	JEFFREY HOLLINGTON POST
LANE	JOHNSON
LARRY	ANDERSON ROBERT
LATHAM	JOHN L.
LAVIN	THOMAS J. A.
LAWRENCE	WILLIAM B.
LECRAW	JULIAN
LENNON	KELLY
LESEMAN	BILL
LESEMAN	WILLIAM F.
LEUNG	PATRICIA
LEVETAN	LIANE
LEVIN	THOMAS J.A.
LEWIS	J. MICHAEL
LINCICOME	WILLIAM C.
LOGAN	MARTHA J.
LOMENICK	ARTHUR E.
LONG	ELIZABETH
LONG	ROBERT R.
LOWENTHAL	ED
LOWENTHAL	EDWARD
LUCE	STACEY A.
MAATMAN	R.H.
MADDOX	JANIE
MADDOX	JANIE S.
MANN	ROBIN
MCCRANIE	KATHY
MCDANIEL	REUBEN R.
MCELROY	LEONA
MCELROY	LEONA J.
MEARS	JOHN B.
MILL	AMY JONES POST
MILL	GEORGIA POST
MILL	JAW
MILLER	SUSAN T.
MILMOE	J. GREGORY
MISIURA	JACK
MISIURA	JOHN S.
MISURACA	KAREN E.
MOLVAR	ROGER H.
MORGAN	J. P.
MORRILL	WILLIAM K.
NEILL	W. JOHN
NELSON	KENNETH
NIX	DAVID A.
NOVICK	DAVID T.
NOYES	JAMES
NOYES	JANSEN
NOYES	JAY
O MALLEY	DAVID J.
O NEILL	TIMOTHY A.
ORGANT	DENISE R.
OTTO	CARSTEN
PAPA	CHRIS
PAPA	CHRISTOPHER
PAPA	CHRISTOPHER J.
PARKER	ALBERT N. BUD
PARKER	STEVE
PARKER	WILLIAM A.
PARKER	WILLIAM A.
PATTERSON	MARK R.
PAUL	E. BARNES
PAULEY	KEITH R.
PAUMGARTEN	NICHOLAS B.
PAUMGARTEN	NICK
PETERSEN	TIMOTHY A.
PETERSON	TIMOTHY A.
PETRIK	ROD
PORTER	SUSAN D.
POST	MICHAEL HAYS
PRESIDED	WILLIAMS
PRIMROSE	SCOTT
PRIMROSE	SCOTT G.
PROFILES	JOHN F. KENNEDY
PROPOSING	WILLIAMS
PUSHKAR	GEORGE R.
PUSKAR	GEORGE R.
QUIRK	ARTHUR
QUIRK	ARTHUR J.
RATKOVICH	CLIFFORD
RECOMMENDS	WILLIAMS STRONGLY
RENNER	DALE
RESMONDO	LYRIC
REUPKE	RICHARD R.
RICE	CHARLES
RICE	CHARLES E.
RICKLEF	LINDA J.
ROBERT	CHARLES E. RICE
ROBERT	GODDARD
ROBERT	HERSCHEL M. BLOOM
ROBERTSON	WAYNE
ROBERTSON	WAYNE P.
RODWELL	MARY
ROY	GEORGE R. PUSKAR
RUPERT	CHARLES B. JOHNSON
RUSKIN	STEVEN A.
RUSSELL	L. ANDERSON
RUTZEN	DONALD J.
SADLER	STEVE
SAKWA	STEVE
SALEM	WINSTON
SAPORTA	MARIA
SECHREST	WINSTEAD
SENKBEIL	THOMAS D.
SENKBEIL	TOM
SHAPIRO	SAM
SHAW	J. C.
SHAW	J.C. BUD
SHAW	R.
SHAW	ROBERT L.
SHEET	FRANKLIN BALANCE
SHERIDAN	CAROL
SHERROD	TERRI
SHERRY	COHEN
SHERRY	JANET M. APPLING
SIG	GODDARD
SILVERSTEIN	LEONARD A.
SMITH	GLEN P.
SMITH	LISA S
SMITH	RAY A.
SPRATLIN	SONNY
SQUARETM	ROOSEVELT
STAUBACH	ROGER T.
STEERS	ROBERT H.
STEET	PRATT
STEIN	ELLIOTT V.
STOCKERT	DAVE
STOCKERT	DAVID P.
STOLLER	DANIEL E.
SULLIVAN	DANIEL J.
TATE	SUSAN M.
TAYLOR	JOSEPH R.
TEABO	JAMIE
TEABO	S. JAMIE
TEABO	SHEILA J.
TEABO	SHEILA JAMES
TEAGUE	BARRY
TEAGUE	L. BARRY
TEAGUE	LAWRENCE BARRY
TEMPLETON	HAVEN
THOMAS	PAUL J. DOLINOY
THOMAS	SHEILA JAMES TEABO
THOMPSON	HOWARD
TIBBITTS	TODD
TIBBITTS	TODD T.
TOUPS	MICHELLE G.
TUBB	JUDY
TURNER	TONY
UPTOWN	CHARLOTTE
VAN CLAGGETT	S.
VAN ROEKEL	J.C.
VANLOH	LAURA
VANLOH	LAURA J.
VINOCUR	BARRY
VOUGHT	CRAIG G.
WACHOVIA	JOHN A. WILLIAMS
WALKER	MASON WOOD
WATTS	RALPH S.
WENDLER	W. JOHN
WHITEHILL	DEAN R.
WILBER	SALLY
WILKES	THOMAS L.
WILKES	TOM
WILKINSON	JUDITH
WILL	GRAY
WILLIAMS	JOHN A.
WILLIAMS	JOHN A.
WILLOUGHBY	JO ANN
WOODS	JAW
WORTMAN	MARK
WRIGHT	GREGORY S.
YANG	JULIE
YERGEY	HARRY
ZANKEL	ARTHUR
ZANKEL	I. ARTHUR
ZELL	SAM
ZIEGLER	PETER F.
ALLUMS	JOHN R.
ANDERSON	ROBERT L.
ANDERSON	ROBERT LARRY
APPLING	JANET
APPLING	JANET M.
ARTHUR	L. ANDERSON
ARUNDEL	ANNE
ASHFORD	GEORGIA POST
AUSTIN	GLENN
AUSTIN	S. GLENN
AXELROD	COHEN POLLOCK MERLIN
BALLESTRACCI	CHRIS
BALTIMORE	PRATT STEET
BARNARD	STACEY
BARNES	ROY E.
BARRY	TEAGUE LAWRENCE
BENNE	JENNIFER
BENTON	DANIEL
BIO	EDWARD LOWENTHAL
BIO	JOHN A. WILLIAMS

[Calpernia]

Interesting read....


Corporate Board Member May/Jun 2003

Feature Story

How Citigroup’s Board Cleaned the Stable
by Monica Langley

Sandy Weill built the world’s most profitable financial empire. Then Citigroup—and Weill—became embroiled in scandal. Here’s how he got his board to sign off on his plan to save the company and redeem himself.

During his tumultuous career, humbly born Sanford I. Weill survived setbacks that would have finished most people and went on to build Citigroup, the singularly profitable agglomeration of Citibank, Travelers, Smith Barney, and other financial businesses (2002 revenues: $75.8 billion). But last year, as Weill, 69, continued to resist boardroom pressure to name a successor, the scandals of Enron and other companies reached Citigroup too. The company ultimately paid $300 million as part of the settlement of an investigation into whether Citigroup and Jack Grubman, a top security analyst, had put the interests of corporate clients above those of other investors.

Weill, scrambling for survival, recognized that he had to make a dramatic move to show he was ready to clean the stable. He decided to reassign Michael Carpenter, head of the brokerage firm Salomon Smith Barney and the lightning rod for much of the bad publicity and legal problems, and replace him with Charles Prince, one of Citigroup’s attorneys and a staunch Weill loyalist.

In this excerpt adapted from her new book, Tearing Down the Walls: How Sandy Weill Fought His Way to the Top of the Financial World . . . and Then Nearly Lost It All, Wall Street Journal writer Monica Langley describes how Weill, in an uncharacteristic display of consensus-seeking, decided to put his plan before the board and ask its members to back him. Weill’s directors reflected his acquisitive corporate history. Some members dated back several decades and counted as old friends. Others had joined him recently, through mergers, and their loyalty was less certain. Now he had to get them all on his side.

On Sunday morning, September 8, 2002, the Citigroup directors solemnly gathered at ten-thirty in the big meeting room at Armonk, New York. Sandy was casually decked out in a golf shirt. Some of the directors, aware of Sandy’s penchant for keeping rooms cool, had brought sweaters. Arthur Zankel, one of the old guard, glanced around, noted that no one else was wearing a tie, and took his off. As usual, the plush armchairs were arranged in a U-shape and the buffet table was groaning under the weight of a brunch spread. But no one seemed comfortable or hungry this morning. The directors were horrified at the turn events had taken over the past few months. Yet none of them was prepared to question Sandy’s leadership. Indeed, most of them felt that Citigroup needed Sandy’s wisdom and experience now more than ever.

Sandy wasn’t his usual self. There were no jokes, he wasn’t heaping his plate at the buffet table, and he wasn’t slouching in his chair. Usually Sandy would begin a board meeting by simply talking from his seat. But this morning he did something unusual: He stood up to address his directors, as if he were giving a speech.

“I’ve been doing a lot of thinking,” the Citigroup CEO began. “We all seem depressed. We have to take this crisis very seriously, and we have serious choices to make.

“As the leading financial-services institution, I think we need to set the standard for the industry,” he continued. “That’s what I’m determined to do.”

He then told them that Marty Lipton, the legendary Wall Street lawyer, and his associates had been examining Salomon Smith Barney’s actions and practices, and turned the meeting over to him. Lipton began reviewing the particular transactions and management actions his law firm had investigated. Some directors interrupted to ask for specific details, especially about Jack Grubman and his dealings with Sandy and others at the firm. After 20 minutes, Zankel was getting restless with the drawn-out blow-by-blow recitation of Grubman’s actions.

“I know Sandy didn’t tell Grubman anything to write, because that would be f— stupid,” Sandy’s old friend interjected. “Marty, why don’t you tell us where we’re going, and then we’ll circle back if we need all this information?”

Lipton got to the point. “The business isn’t out of control; the house isn’t on fire,” he assured the directors. “But it’s clear in the harsh light of hindsight that there have been industry excesses in which the firm participated.”

“So there’s no feeling or finding that there are a lot of sleazy crooks here?” Andrall Pearson, another longtime director, asked. “You’re saying Salomon Smith Barney did what the securities industry had been doing for years—that the problems are the product of an industrywide disease?”

Lipton nodded. “But to rein in the excesses and correct the problems, you must be prepared to take convincing action,” the lawyer advised. “Small changes around the margins won’t be sufficient.”

Reuben Mark, the chairman and chief executive officer of Colgate-Palmolive Co., asked what specific steps Sandy planned to take to improve the business culture and his oversight of the securities business. Something of a self-appointed conscience of corporate governance, Mark, who had served as a director of Citicorp before it merged with Weill’s Travelers in 1998, could be a stickler for demanding details.

At Mark’s prompting, Sandy said he wanted to recommend that Chuck Prince replace Mike Carpenter as head of Citigroup’s corporate and investment bank. In the past, he would have simply told the board that he was going to make the change and would expect their acquiescence. But chastened as he was by the firestorm surrounding him, he politely asked for the board’s advice. “That’s what I’m thinking, but there are other alternatives.” Prince, who was attending the meeting as the corporate secretary, made a swift exit.

“Let’s discuss if this is a good thing to do,” said Andrall Pearson. “It’s unusual for a guy with no management experience in the business to take on a job like this.”

Several directors quickly echoed that their main concern about Prince was his lack of an operations track record. At the same time, they agreed that Carpenter should be replaced with someone from the inside, someone who knew Citigroup thoroughly, who was well respected and could work effectively to overcome the regulatory and legal hurdles confronting the company. The only other executive at Citigroup that the board believed had those qualities was Bob Willumstad, its president and consumer-group head.

“But should we take him out of the consumer business, which is the best performer right now?” one director asked.

No, Pearson said adamantly. “You have to focus on the business while you’re cleaning all this stuff up. If the business goes down the tubes, then it doesn’t matter too goddamned much what else you’re doing.” As directors debated the notion of moving Willumstad, Pearson tried again to convince them that the overall business needed Willumstad right where he was: “You have to clean up the stable, but the horse race is what it’s all about,” he said.

The mood in the room had shifted from depressed to determined. The directors liked the bold steps Sandy was prepared to take. Still, some, led by Mark, wanted him to go further to improve Citigroup’s corporate governance. The Colgate-Palmolive CEO, who had a tendency toward bombast once he had climbed on his corporate governance soapbox, pushed hard for a new “business-practices committee” to provide vigorous scrutiny of operations and to ensure that Citigroup embraced the industry’s highest standards. The directors agreed.

Mark also proposed a separate nominations and governance committee inside the board. The directors agreed and selected six of their members to serve on it, three from the original Citicorp and three from the original Travelers. [Mark later decided to leave the Citigroup board to protest a lack of progress in identifying Weill’s potential successors.] Despite the fact that Citigroup had been a single entity for four years, the directors weren’t forgetting their origins. The new committee determined that it would persuade Jack Roche, Citicorp’s longtime general counsel, to come out of retirement and act as counsel to the committee.

Next they agreed with Sandy’s proposal to move Carpenter out of Salomon Smith Barney “to make a clean break” from past management practices. Carpenter was given the low-profile job of heading Citigroup’s investment unit, which managed the bank’s more than $100 billion in assets.

After four hours, the board meeting broke up. Directors passed Prince, who was waiting in a sitting room, as they left. “Good man for the job,” one told him with a handshake. Sandy was the last one out of the room.

“Well, I guess you’re it,” the CEO said, turning over to Prince the job of saving his company and his legacy.

Sandy asked the senior executives of Salomon Smith Barney to come to Armonk at four that afternoon. When Robert Druskin, Salomon’s chief operating officer, got the call, he remembered only one other time when they had been summoned to the conference center on a Sunday afternoon—the firing of Jamie Dimon, Weill’s longtime heir apparent. He guessed that Carpenter was about to be next.

Once the eight top securities executives arrived, they began speculating about who their next boss would be. Most of the bets were on Deryck Maughan, the former head of Salomon Brothers before it was purchased by Travelers.

Then Sandy, executive committee chairman Bob Rubin, Chuck Prince, and Mike Carpenter walked in. Carpenter looked ashen, almost gray. Surveying the foursome, the managers tried to figure out what was going on. Rubin wouldn’t return to the securities business, they thought, even though he had headed Goldman Sachs before going into the government, where he’d served as Treasury secretary. And Prince, he was Sandy’s right hand, firmly planted at the Park Avenue headquarters. What was going on?

When Sandy announced Prince’s appointment as chief executive of Salomon Smith Barney, the men didn’t know how to respond. Druskin, the only executive who knew Prince well from his time at the parent company, jumped in to fill the silence. “Chuck is a great guy with great judgment,” he told his colleagues. “Whenever anyone at 399 Park has a thorny problem, they gravitate to Chuck’s office. You’ll see that.”

Rubin assured the executives that he stood ready to help Prince and them. He supported Prince as the right man for the job, someone who could start fresh in the industry, where “standards of behavior are changing.”

In an unusual move, Citigroup issued a press release announcing the management shakeup that Sunday night at six. Prince’s appointment as CEO of Salomon Smith Barney was a big surprise. But observers inside and outside the company recognized it for what it was: a strong signal that Sandy Weill meant business. Prince was dubbed “the Fireman.” He was expected to put out the fires that were threatening Citigroup and to reach speedy resolutions to the numerous probes into the company’s securities business. After all, if Citigroup didn’t solve its reputation and regulatory problems, there wouldn’t be much of a business to run, some analysts said, noting dryly that in this economy there wouldn’t be much activity anyway.

One phrase in the company’s press release was especially surprising to Citigroup insiders. In the statement, Sandy said: “Although we have found nothing illegal, looking back, we can see that certain of our activities do not reflect the way we believe business should be done. That should never be the case, and I am sorry for that.” Sandy Weill apologizing! His colleagues knew Sandy had a deep-seated aversion to apologies. Whenever he blasted one of them, rightly or wrongly, he never apologized later. Instead, he just acted a little nicer for a while, or at least acted as if nothing had happened. Others worried that the apology was premature.

When Sandy came to the office on Monday, an executive asked him point-blank: “How can you write ‘I’m sorry’? Doesn’t it sound like we’re conceding guilt?”

“Of course I’m sorry,” Sandy said, trying to make light of it. “Look at the stock price. I’m really sorry!” Joking aside, he knew that the regulators and investigators were looking for remorse, something they hadn’t seen a lot of lately among financial executives.

Later that morning, a meeting was called at Salomon Smith Barney’s 27th-floor auditorium at 388 Greenwich Street. Sandy spoke first.

“This was an uncomfortable weekend for a lot of people,” he said, fully aware that Carpenter was well liked by the securities troops. “This change is made in the best interest of the firm. Mike has been terrific. He’s not a scapegoat.”

Prince told his new subordinates that Sandy and Bob Rubin would be available to help out with clients.

“Not so fast with my time,” Rubin quipped.

When it was Carpenter’s turn to speak, he noted that most of the problems had been inherited through mergers, which some took to be an attempt to deny responsibility for them. Then he tried to put on a good face and told his colleagues, “You’re a winning team.”

At noon Carpenter appeared at the private dining room for executives, where he rarely ate lunch. Colleagues knew he was putting up a brave front. That night all of Carpenter’s personal belongings and furniture were moved out, and Prince’s were moved in.

Soon a flurry of other changes were implemented at Salomon Smith Barney, but only after Sandy reviewed every single document and release. The current heads of research were retired or reassigned. A new policy on IPO allocations was established. Structured-financing transactions—the type of complicated deals that Citigroup had done for Enron—that were in the works were canceled. Some executives who had been with Sandy since Commercial Credit were reminded of how Sandy could roll up his sleeves and wade right in, getting involved in every detail and nuance of the business, acting as if the very fate of the company depended on his ability to motivate and guide the troops.

This time, however, more than half of the company was producing record profits. Citigroup’s consumer business was the star of the conglomerate, carrying the load for the rest of the firm, just as Sandy had predicted when he pushed for repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which had prevented banks from entering the brokerage business. The consumer bankers decided they’d better be certain that the corporate side’s headline issues weren’t harming their half. The results of a market-research poll of American consumers, done by phone over a three-week period in September, were encouraging. For Citibank, CitiFinancial, and Citi Cards, the impact of Citigroup’s corporate scandals was minimal at most. Few consumers were following the latest news on Jack Grubman. The client base was remarkably stable: They weren’t cutting up their credit cards or closing their accounts. To customers, the most important concern was the solvency of their bank. And with more than $1 trillion in assets, that wasn’t a problem.

The changes in Citigroup’s management had been sudden and bewildering to the company’s thousands of employees, including many senior executives. Each September Sandy and Joan invited a few hundred upper-level executives and their spouses and children to pick apples in the Weills’ Greenwich orchard. Coveted invitations to the stylish affair, which featured a lavish smorgasbord, entertainment for the children, and even Porta-Potties adorned with fresh flowers and running water, guaranteed important face time for executives with their top bosses. On a warm fall Saturday in 2002, many Citigroup executives used the opportunity to chat with or just observe Bob Willumstad and Chuck Prince, the two once-obscure, quiet and affable men who seemed positioned to succeed Sandy.

Other executives huddled under the buffet tent to speculate about the penalties that Citigroup would surely face to settle all the securities investigations, apart from investors’ class-action lawsuits. A “global settlement” was being negotiated between Wall Street and government regulators. It looked as though Citigroup’s Salomon Smith Barney would pay the biggest fine, perhaps as much as $500 million. But some of the senior executives knew enough to put such a huge fine in its proper perspective. Granted, Citigroup’s stock-price declines as a result of the scandals had produced a loss of up to $100 billion in market value. But that could easily be regained when investors once again became confident about the company’s future. And if this year was any indication, what a future it would be—Citigroup in 2002 was poised to earn an amazing $16 billion in profit, itself a record, making Sandy’s empire the most profitable financial-services company in the world. Even though a $500 million fine might look bad, it would bring Sandy’s most difficult crisis to a close, and the cost would amount to a measly two weeks of profit for the world’s largest financial superpower.

Yet few questioned that Sandy Weill would still be their boss come apple-picking time next year. The harsh turn of events this year had seemed to weigh on him heavily at first. But, true to form, he had rallied under pressure, and lately he seemed energized, ready for any challenge. They knew he would never leave in the midst of difficulties. There was a reason insiders at Citigroup referred to it as “Sandygroup.” He might be talking occasionally about his last years in the business, but everyone noticed that it was “years,” not “year.”