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Posted on 07/11/2005 8:12:04 PM PDT by nwctwx
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Thank you nw.
I hope all the FReepers and lurkers read this.
Yes.
I wonder what Tancredo will say after the briefing.
---------------------------------
Graham Allison's Book: See Post #306
---------------------------------
The Four Faces of Nuclear Terror And the Need for a Prioritized Response
William C. Potter, Charles D. Ferguson, and Leonard S. Spector
From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004
Graham Allison was among the first scholars to sound the alarm about the risks of Russian loose nukes, and in "How to Stop Nuclear Terrorism" (January/February 2004), he continues to warn of this underappreciated danger. He is right to highlight the inadequacy of current U.S. and international efforts to deny terrorists access to fissile material. And he makes a compelling case for the need to develop a more coherent and multilateral strategy for stopping them.
Unfortunately, Allison's article is less successful in describing the full scope of the problem and recommending a nuanced response. In particular, it fails to distinguish among four distinct types of nuclear terrorism, the relative risks posed by the main two types of fissile materials used in nuclear weapons, and the means necessary for keeping such weapons from nonstate actors as well as states.
OUT OF STATE
Allison addresses what is arguably the most urgent aspect of the threat of nuclear terror: the danger that terrorists will acquire the fissile materials needed to make nuclear bombs. His article, however, conveys the misleading impression that nuclear terrorism is a unitary phenomenon. In fact, terrorists present at least four different kinds of nuclear threats: that they will disperse highly radioactive material by conventional explosives (i.e., "dirty bombs") or other means, that they will attack or sabotage nuclear power installations, that they will seize intact nuclear weapons, and that they will steal or buy fissile material for the purpose of building a nuclear bomb. All four threats are real and merit the attention of policymakers. All four will be expensive to prevent or protect against. They all vary widely, however, in the probability that they will actually occur, in their potential for causing harm, and in the ease with which they can be prevented.
A fundamental shortcoming of the current U.S. policy to combat nuclear terrorism is that it fails to take these differences into account. As a result, Washington has no guidelines for directing its limited resources to where they would have the greatest impact. And Allison's proposed strategy of "three no's" (no loose nukes, no new "nascent nukes," and no new nuclear weapons states) does not help in this regard.
To begin with, his analysis of the dangers posed by "nascent nukes" (that is, fissile material that can be used to build nuclear bombs) does not take into account how this threat has changed since September 11, 2001. Before that date, many influential defense experts and weapons scientists assumed that because nuclear weapons had to meet rigorous military specifications (such as having predictable yields, being compatible with delivery systems, and satisfying safety and reliability standards), they were too difficult for terrorists to build without help from a sympathetic government.
It is now clear, however, that terrorists such as al Qaeda are not so exacting, and might be willing to settle for a crude "improvised nuclear device" (IND) that could be assembled at a target site. Policymakers should thus rethink the nonproliferation checks now in place. Washington and Moscow, however, have barely begun to do so. In fact, the top Russian atomic energy official continues to deny the very possibility that nonstate actors could have the skills necessary to manufacture a nuclear bomb, and some senior U.S. government officials agree.
Allison also fails to make a crucial distinction between highly enriched uranium (HEU), which terrorists may already have the capability to turn into the simplest IND (a gun-type device), and plutonium, which is much more difficult to turn into a weapon. Prior to September 11, when states presented the main proliferation challenge, it made sense to treat HEU and plutonium as roughly equivalent dangers. Today, however, when nonstate actors constitute a far greater nuclear threat, priority must be given to rapidly securing, consolidating, and eliminating the vast global stocks of HEU.
IS RUSSIA READY?
Allison's failure to articulate the need for an HEU-first consolidation and elimination strategy leads him to make an unrealistic proposal: that the United States and Russia lead a "Global Cleanout Campaign" to "extract all nascent nukes from all other countries" in 12 months. The problem with his proposal, which focuses on plutonium as well as HEU, is that it is hard to imagine that all of the world's other non-nuclear-weapons states -- much less those that already have such weapons -- will agree to it. A more feasible approach would be to pursue a three-pronged strategy that gives priority to securing, consolidating, and eliminating nonmilitary stocks of HEU within Russia; emphasizes the rapid repatriation of all Russian-origin HEU currently abroad; and undertakes a global campaign led by the United States, Russia, and other exponents of peaceful nuclear research to convert all research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium, which cannot fuel a nuclear bomb. These measures could be facilitated by providing financial incentives to accelerate the down-blending of HEU to an enrichment level unsuitable for nuclear weapons, and by securing several hundred tons of Russian HEU within the newly opened Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, currently reserved for plutonium storage.
Unfortunately, there are few significant advocates in Russia today for these kinds of steps. As a consequence, although Allison may be right that Russia would be "flattered by the prospect of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States" in a new global alliance against nuclear terrorism, Moscow is unlikely to do much about it. The lack of headway made in improving intelligence-sharing on illicit nuclear trafficking, for example, and the slow pace of upgrading security at many Russian nuclear sites both suggest how difficult it will be to improve actual cooperation. Russia's government has expressed far more interest in preventing terrorist acquisition of radioactive sources that could be used in a dirty bomb -- an important but secondary nuclear threat -- than in safeguarding fissile materials.
Allison is right to propose a new "International Security Standard" to help guarantee that nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material are made inaccessible to terrorists. But he neglects to discuss the greatest risk in this regard: Russia's large stockpile of tactical nukes. These weapons are relatively small in size, are deployed in forward locations, and, in some instances, lack electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use. Despite a growing chorus of international calls to improve security for and reduce the number of such weapons, neither the United States nor Russia has expressed much interest in doing so, beyond the limited voluntary steps they initiated in 1991. Moreover, although Russia has yet to implement fully its earlier pledges, the United States has not pressed the matter, and both sides have resisted calls to reaffirm their parallel unilateral declarations.
Allison highlights the nuclear threats posed both by states and by nonstate actors. He should, however, have explained the differences in their motivations and what these imply for how to stop them. Instead, his focus shifts back and forth between blocking terrorist access to fissile material and denying the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. Although both objectives are laudable, curbing state proliferation will not necessarily prevent nuclear terrorism. The multifaceted challenges require a multifaceted response by national governments and international organizations. Allison proposes a number of very useful measures, especially for keeping fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists. If U.S. policymakers hope to grapple with the full range of nuclear terrorist threats, however, they will need a more complete discussion of the differences between these dangers, and a prioritized set of recommendations.
I think Tancredo is walking a tight rope by listening to such news. I'm sure they will discredit him for requesting this meeting.
I like Tom a lot and would hate to se him being told that he's a stain on the WH and, hence, no longer allowed to see the President.
Night y'all.
"Preventable" is an inspiring word.
I understand your concern.
Goodnight TA.
U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON
COUNTERTERRORISM: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
---------------------------------
...excerpt...
Al Qaeda members have repeatedly met with different officials and scientists in order to understand how to acquire and use nuclear weapons in their jihad. Recovered documents suggest they are actively pursuing a nuclear capability. Although these documents mostly reflect a crude understanding of nuclear weapons design, some are relatively sophisticated. Any previous ambiguity regarding the use of WMD according to Islam has also now been clarified. The ''Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infidels'' establishes the intellectual and moral framework for these attacks against non-Muslims.
Three years after September 11, and with jihadists having expressed a desire to carry out a much larger-scale operation, one major question arises: why haven't there been any other major attacks? Is al Qaeda in the middle of a planning cycle? Or is the acquisition and use of a weapon of mass destruction too difficult? While it is certainly to be hoped that the international community has made it impossibly difficult to acquire WMD, these are open questions that need to be investigated more thoroughly.
Thus far, there is no evidence that al Qaeda has acquired either a nuclear or significant biological weapons capability. Given the large number of scientifically capable members, however, the possibility that the group or some other jihadist group will acquire WMD will grow over time. Al Qaeda itself has taken numerous blows from post-September 11 counterterrorism efforts, and its capabilities have probably been diminished. But these positive results have been undermined by the galvanizing effects of September 11 and subsequent attacks in Europe, the Middle East, and South East Asia on Islamist groups around the world.
Overall, there has been a process of both splintering and energizing. Given how many of the newly galvanized groups are appearing in the developing world-with little exposure to al Qaeda training under bin Laden in Afghanistan-it is a reasonable assumption that most of these terrorists have lower technical skills than al Qaeda trainees. In light of the mobilization of European radicals, however, it is entirely possible that a new cell or organization could emerge with superior skills. In short, the WMD threat is not going away, and as barriers to entry for, say, biological weapons fall, the conclusion of participants in the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism is that the overall danger is growing.
Cindy, the climate there is getting very intense. Raiding on Jewish schools, Cuban "observers" in all classrooms, public and private, "Bolivian Circles," huge influx of middle easterners, hajeebs and all, it's just so weird. He already gave 1MM immediately following 9/11 to obl.. I don't get the failures to take him out.
******************WAR NEWS FLASH**********************
June 1, 2005 Editor Gary Gillespie
* 300,000 deaths - Energy Department Estimates on Nuke Attack
* Terrorist linked investors buying sensitive US corporations
* Why does Pakistan need nuclear missile equipped stealth subs?
http://eagle.northwestu.edu/academic/artsci/faculty/ggillespie/WAR%20NEWS%20FLASH.htm
I understand your concern.
Well, that's in plain English.
Interesting reading, thank you nw.
3 bombers were of Pakistani origin: London police
Police on Wednesday said at least three of the bombers involved in bombing the London transport system are believed to be British males of Pakistani origin who lived in West Yorkshire in Leeds.
The bus bomber is believed to be dead, and police said there was "strong forensic and other evidence" a second bomber died at Aldgate. Investigators are now trying to establish if the other two are alive or died in the explosions.
A relative of one of the suspects was arrested in West Yorkshire on Tuesday and was being brought to London to be quizzed by the anti-terrorist branch.
Six search warrants were served on Tuesday under the Terrorism Act on houses in and around Leeds.
"These included the home addresses of three of the four men," an officer said. "A detailed forensic examination will now follow and this is likely to take time to complete."
The investigation has already established that personal documents bearing the names of three of the four men were found close to three of the explosions.
Armed officers and army bomb disposal experts took part in the pre-dawn raids on the properties in the Leeds area. Materials seized during the operation have been taken away for examination.
At least one controlled explosion was carried out ahead of a raid on one of the properties.
Around 500 to 600 people were evacuated from the area close to the address in the Burley district of Leeds at around 11.30 am.
A neighbour said a 22-year-old man had lived at the house on Hyde Park Road with his family but had gone missing.
A house in Lees Holm, Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, was one of those surrounded by police.
Neighbours said an Asian couple lived there with a young baby daughter. It is believed that the baby was aged about eight or nine months.
A neighbour said the couple had not been there for more than a year. She said the man was aged 29, while his wife was several years younger. The couple originally came from Pakistan but had moved from Leeds.
Earlier, police cordoned off a white semi-detached house in Colwyn Road, a quiet residential street in the Beeston area of the city, and a terrace house in Strateford Street, around two minutes' walk from Colwyn Road. Material seized during the raids have been taken away for examination.
The CCTV images showed the four men suspected had boarded a Thames link train at Luton, carrying rucksacks.
Sir Iqbal Sacranie of the Muslim Council of Britain said they have received the latest news from the police with "anguish, shock and horror."
He said, "It appears our youth have been involved in last week's horrific bombings against innocent people.
"While the police investigation continues we reiterate our absolute commitment and resolve to helping the police bring to justice all involved in this crime of mass murder. Nothing in Islam can ever justify the evil actions of the bombers."
http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/jul/13bomb.htm
Stepping back in time... this is interesting:
---
Terror risk map puts London on a par with Kabul Christine Seib/ The Times (UK) Online/ posted 4/18/2005
BRITAIN is near the top of world terrorism risk ratings for a second year amid fears that Islamic extremists will try to disrupt the general election with an attack on a big city.
Britain has an "elevated" risk of being hit by terrorists, while London is at "high" risk, together with Baghdad, Kabul and Jerusalem, according to a terrorism risk map published today by Aon, the world’s second-largest insurance broker.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1386094/posts
PAKISTAN....not surprising, huh?
Yep.
I'll add it to the London Attack thread.
http://www.satp.org
http://www.saag.org
===
===
http://www.saag.org/papers15/paper1453.html
Paper no. 1453
10.7.2005
"COUNTER-TERRORISM: TIME FOR BASICS"
by B.Raman
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1441750/posts
"Could the same thing happen here? (re: London bombings)"
TownHall.com ^ | Wednesday, July 13, 2005 | by Linda Chavez
Posted on 07/13/2005 1:19:18 AM PDT by JohnHuang2
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1441766/posts
"breaking news: 17 year old arrested who had explosives"
nos (dutch state television) ^
Posted on 07/13/2005 2:51:36 AM PDT by dutch52
ARTICLE SNIPPET: "the amsterdam police have arrested a 17 year old boy, in his room the police found a self-made explosive. the boy was arrested in connection with the so called "hofstadgroep", de extremist group which mohammed Bouheri, the murderer of theo van gogh was part of it."
Thanks to F15 Eagle for pointing to this thread:
===
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1441755/posts
"Egyptian Court Orders Sadat Assassin Freed"
Newsday ^ | July 12th, 2005, | By Associated Press
Posted on 07/13/2005 1:50:22 AM PDT by M. Espinola
ARTICLE SNIPPET: "CAIRO, Egypt -- An Islamic militant convicted in connection with the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was ordered released from prison Tuesday after a court ruled he had completed his sentence."
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