China Advances Missile Program

The Washington Times ^ | 6/22/2005 | Bill Gertz

[Paul Ross]

China has successfully flight-tested a submarine-launched missile that U.S. officials say marks a major advance in Beijing's long-range nuclear program.

"This is a significant milestone in their effort to develop strategic weapons," said a U.S. official familiar with reports of the test.

[ninenot]

That's the Mongol Horde's map--except ol' Tamurlane never knew about Australia and New Zealand.

The Chinese do NOT have an ethnic presence to speak of anyplace but China and Taiwan. (Maybe N Korea.)

The rest of the ethnics in the countries on that map might not be real happy to learn that they are actually part of some grand Chinese design.

Which is just fine. The Paks and the Hindoos have nukes.

[Paul Ross]

Please provide some links with proof of all these weapons movements.

Easily done.

The Syrians admit it albeit not their government.

As for Iraq's nuclear scientistsgoing to Iran the best evidence is from hearings before Congress, which I will let you dig up.

[Marine_Uncle]

Paul,
Thank you for your follow up response to a number of folks.
I do appreciate the references made in how our nuclear sub fleet has dwindled down in more then one way. The Bangor move is trully bad news. I was aware of that one. What I have not been aware of since I no longer follow things as you are, is the very sad fact of how many of our nuclear subs in all classes have been retired or at least are no longer patrolling the worlds seas. Bad news. Very bad news. I am aware of the capabilities afforded by using GPS, as an example. Let me say this. My response to you ininitally in saying "No one wins in pre-emptive nor follow up nuclear strikes:, and my follow up reponses to our member pesmerga, in essence where based on my INCOMPLETE knowledge of just how bad our aging nuclear deterrant has become. I simply do not follow things as once had.

One thing is quite clear in my head. And that is the fact that only those countries that are willing to spend the required R&D followed up with high levels of excellance in the fabrication and production levels of all type defensive/offensive weapontry, to equal or outclass rivals, has a chance of maintaining any level of soverienty and say in this world.
Having with been from 1966 through 1979 directly involved, lab development through in some cases final testing stages on the world's first Harpoon Cruise Missle (I worked on the onboard computer), F16 Fire Control Radar System (again the computer), the original Westinghouse ECM pods (was a beam me up scotty at the time), APG-120 analog FC. Radar system, and other defense projects, I do have a sense of the need for not only keeping equal but far exceeding any technology any potential enemy or otherwise power can produce.
So believe me I do not live in a rose glassed world. My comment should have perhaps been better worded. To indicate that killing hundreds of millions of peoples by first strikes or required follow up strikes by nuclear means is a hell of a way to have to go. But I truly am aware we must have the worlds best and powerful weapon capabilities in all forms, e.g. ground, air, sea, and associated monitorihng, and detection grids, ground, air, sea, and space. Our potential or outright enemies must always view it as simply a ridiculus proposition to even think about starting a war with us. In this I see your well thought out responses show, we truly are lacking. We know longer can as under JFK and Ronnie, make it clear we will have the means to remove the aggressor from existence should the need arise.

Now if we just had a senate and house that would support the need to fully re-arm in mass, then obviously any future POTUS would have the means to put us back on the right track. As you are fully aware, there are those in our DoD and military at large, it has always been the case, hey George S. Patton as you are aware had to fight harder against those that did not seek a fully trained modern at the time equiped mobile army both teeth and nail. The problems just have gotten worse over the years, for many well documented reasons.

At any rate, thanks for the effort to update some of us on just how precauious a position we have put ourselves into.
Without not even considering the air/ground/space issues, not having a dominant and new technological and number wise nuclear fleet to keep the status quo, this nations is at risk of continued blackmail, and intimidation. To damn many
people in congress are more worried about how many bucks can be spent to keep certain elements of our society and those from other nations, living on the same standard of living as those that work hard for their money. They are to be blamed partly for our current demise. In this I am certain. As usual one expects unless they write a carefully "cover all an angles book", within a single post to perhaps not convey adequately what angle they are coming from.
But again thanks for the bad news.

[A. Pole]

The "plenty of warnings" were essentially nothing that McArthur or JCS were convinced by.

It means that McArthur and JCS were not very smart.

The main factor in deterrence is credibility.

So the Chicoms got it. Next time they issue a subtle warning they will be taken seriously.

[BayouCoyote]

P.S. Check out the prophecy inscribed on the inner chamber of the Giza Pyramid. Eerie stuff!!

Could you please send me a link to the afore mentioned prophecy, thanks!

[Paul Ross]

You're very welcome!

I too believe things can be turned around...but I am also concerned about the degree of political ennervation...fueled by a broad misunderstanding of the yawning vulnerabilities we are exposing to our enemies.

Confronting the notion of a real enemy...especially one pretending to be harmonious, and with four times your population...is a disquieting thought at the best of times. Hence people prefer not to want to think about it, and will latch onto comfortable evasions. This includes many in the media who have never defended the country...or thought about what it takes to do so.

Many ignoring the threats for a variety of political reasons (both left and right) also, would rather listen to soothsayers who minimize the risks, the enmity of the enemy, and the vulnerabilities. Some even appear to be in the OMB.

If only our enemies evil were as manifestly visible to the naked eye, as was Grima Wormtongue! But life isn't Hollywood...

[Marine_Uncle]

"But life isn't Hollywood..."

heh heh heh. Make one wonder sometimes with the folks one bumps into on the street these days.
Hang in there.

[Kuehn12]

Ok, you got me I am not submarine expert, but my point was that China doesn't have the numbers of advance submarines as well enough large platform submarines. Another valid point is that it will take some time before they do, a layman guess would be twenty plus years.

A question if you will, what do you think we do with all those subs? Surely they are all on station in the Gulf. I willing to bet that a number of them are right now off China shore. The point being that we have eyes on the target, their subs where ever they might be. So, if they try anything KA Boom, down to the bottom of the ocean.

[Paul Ross]

All it will take is Hillary back in the White House, or in the alternative, another 8 years of GWB's disarmament treaties at the rate he is going in his mistaken idealism, and China will have easily surpassed the number we will have deployed...here is a telling newsblurb:

Last Of Peacekeeper Missiles Will Be Deactivated By September
(Inside The Air Force, May 27, 2005, Pg. 1)

The last of the U.S. military's Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles will be dismantled this summer, closing a three-year deactivation process that is part of a larger scaling down of the country's nuclear arsenal.

And let's not get overly cocky at our technological lead either. Even where we assumed it was greatest...our AirForce. The Indians fly basically the same Russian-built Sukhoi-30's as the Chinese...who have a great many more of them. The USAF had a calamitous joint exercise against the Indian. The USAF lost the engagement. And not by a little bit. We need the F-22, and more serious "Blue on Blue" training, instead of the bean-counter-approved "Blue on Red" training. Rumsfeld is making like we can't afford any of them. And get this he is cutting $272 million of training "flying hours" in peace time...effective immediately?! I thought we were at war..

And as for "lead time" we need to be aware of what is happening to our forces, as our industrial base is allowed to implode. We are losing the industry base, which supports the defense base. Both economically, and in skills and hardware availability. The USN Submarine Fleet commander is extremely worried about the failure to sustain rebuild rates to prevent massive attrition in his force that is pending in the next 10 years...

And on the Chinese side, we all need to be FULLY aware we have been surprised badly by the Chinese already...and the same people who screwed up are still in the CIA, rationalizing, denying and backbiting. They most likely are Fifth Columnists like Alger Hiss, hence there will be no self-correcting mechanism. Note the following report:

Analysts missed Chinese buildup
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 9th, 2005, p. 1.

A highly classified intelligence report produced for the new director of national intelligence concludes that U.S. spy agencies failed to recognize several key military developments in China in the past decade, The Washington Times has learned.

The report was created by several current and former intelligence officials and concludes that U.S. agencies missed more than a dozen Chinese military developments, according to officials familiar with the report.

The report blames excessive secrecy on China's part for the failures, but critics say intelligence specialists are to blame for playing down or dismissing evidence of growing Chinese military capabilities.

The report comes as the Bush administration appears to have become more critical of China's military buildup.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said in Singapore over the weekend that China has hidden its defense spending and is expanding its missile forces despite facing no threats. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also expressed worries this week about China's expanding military capabilities.

Among the failures highlighted in the study are:

•China's development of a new long-range cruise missile.

•The deployment of a new warship equipped with a stolen Chinese version of the U.S. Aegis battle management technology.

•Deployment of a new attack submarine known as the Yuan class that was missed by U.S. intelligence until photos of the submarine appeared on the Internet.

•Development of precision-guided munitions, including new air-to-ground missiles and new, more accurate warheads.

•China's development of surface-to-surface missiles for targeting U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups.

•The importation of advanced weaponry, including Russian submarines, warships and fighter-bombers.

According to officials familiar with the intelligence report, the word "surprise" is used more than a dozen times to describe U.S. failures to anticipate or discover Chinese arms development.

Many of the missed military developments will be contained in the Pentagon's annual report to Congress on the Chinese military, which was due out March 1 but delayed by interagency disputes over its contents.

Critics of the study say the report unfairly blames intelligence collectors for not gathering solid information on the Chinese military and for failing to plant agents in the communist government.

Instead, these officials said, the report looks like a bid to exonerate analysts within the close-knit fraternity of government China specialists, who for the past 10 years dismissed or played down intelligence showing that Beijing was engaged in a major military buildup.

"This report conceals the efforts of dissenting analysts [in the intelligence community] who argued that China was a threat," one official said, adding that covering up the failure of intelligence analysts on China would prevent a major reorganization of the system.

A former U.S. official said the report should help expose a "self-selected group" of specialists who fooled the U.S. government on China for 10 years.

"This group's desire to have good relations with China has prevented them from highlighting how little they know and suppressing occasional evidence that China views the United States as its main enemy."

The report has been sent to Thomas Fingar, a longtime intelligence analyst on China who was recently appointed by John D. Negroponte, the new director of national intelligence, as his office's top intelligence analyst.

Mr. Negroponte has ordered a series of top-to-bottom reviews of U.S. intelligence capabilities in the aftermath of the critical report by the presidential commission headed by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Sen. Charles Robb, Virginia Democrat.

According to the officials, the study was produced by a team of analysts for the intelligence contractor Centra Technologies.

Spokesmen for the CIA and Mr. Negroponte declined to comment.

Its main author is Robert Suettinger, a National Security Council staff member for China during the Clinton administration and the U.S. intelligence community's top China analyst until 1998. Mr. Suettinger is traveling outside the country and could not be reached for comment, a spokesman said.

John Culver, a longtime CIA analyst on Asia, was the co-author.

Among those who took part in the study were former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Lonnie Henley, who critics say was among those who in the past had dismissed concerns about China's military in the past 10 years.

Also participating in the study was John F. Corbett, a former Army intelligence analyst and attache who was a China policy-maker at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration.

[Paul Ross]

As for what we do with our subs now, let's first discuss the impact of the proposed reduction to one sub yard. Let me know if you can read this article, otherwise I will reprint it for you: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings: Save Navy Sub Shipyards.

Oh what the heck, here it is:

NORTHROP GRUMMAN (JOHN WHALEN)

Save the Submarine Shipyards

Captain James H. Patton, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
Proceedings, June 2005

Keeping a defense industry going in a democracy has never been easy—but it has always been important. Without two submarine builders, the United States could find itself in a lot of trouble.

The United States needs the capabilities offered by the two commercial yards building submarines—Northrop Grumman Newport News (above) and General Dynamics Electric Boat (below)—and cannot afford to lose the skills resident in the teams they have put together over the years.

The political-military environment in Washington these days is all aflutter with the congressionally-directed study of military strategy and force structure termed the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the more geographically threatening (for certain locales and constituencies) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Some of the defense cognoscenti have warned of a gathering storm that could reach tsunami proportions in which budgetary pressures, a stretched military, and a poisonous political atmosphere combine to wreak havoc on the nation's armed forces as they fight an ongoing war on terrorism and try to hedge against longer-term, emerging threats.

Of course, our military has survived such policy onslaughts in the past, and it is probable that these two deliberative processes will wind up doing more good than harm in preparing the armed forces for an uncertain future. But caveats apply—particularly because some of the very tough choices facing defense decision-makers have been deferred over the last few years. Defense budget analysts argue that there simply is not room for all the fighters, all the ships, all the future combat vehicles and, yes, all the submarines embraced in existing service programs. This top-down review might result in cuts that scrape the bottom.

For a number of reasons, the nation's nuclear submarine force and, particularly the Virginia (SSN-774)-class submarines and the industrial base that supports them, have been seen as a potential bill-payer for other priorities—or, at least, an area where near-term savings can be achieved by moving the planned program to the right, or by diminishing the industrial base. Neither of those proposed policy paths would take us in the right direction. And each involves added cost and risk.

Building Nuclear Submarines

Historically, submarine construction has been a difficult, inefficient, and very expensive proposition. It has often been identified as analogous to building a ship in a bottle, since much of the equipment and piping systems were installed after the pressure hull was essentially completed, bringing bits and pieces through 25-inch hatches to then assemble in place. For instance—and more art than science—a given segment of piping fabricated off-hull to match a heavy wire template would then be bent to shape on the ship to go above, behind, or around other already installed pipes, pumps, and paraphernalia. To allow for unavoidable inaccuracies, the ends of the pipes would have an extra few inches which would then be "dressed" (ground off) by an onboard pipefitter for a custom fit before being welded up by a different tradesman and artisan—who, incidentally, might have had to literally stand on his head to make the joint.

As a result, even within a given class of ship sequentially built at the same shipyard, no two submarines were alike regarding plumbing, wire runs, and other system layouts—much like automobiles before Henry Ford came along. A notable exception to this generalization was within the primary (reactor-associated) propulsion plant, where Admiral Rickover demanded a "non-deviation from plans" approach. Otherwise, with just a bit of exaggeration, building plans only helped assure that submarines of the same class were about the same width, height, and length.

During the period between 1963 and 1978, the author had the experience of both building and conducting refueling overhauls at each of the two shipyards presently involved in producing Virginia-class attack submarines. Each had its own personality at the time, and different internal techniques and procedures. The products from each yard, however, were uniformly good in spite of these different non-nuclear approaches to the task.

The author also saw, but was not directly involved with, the difficulties that originally plagued the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered submarines in the late 1970s and early 1980s when Electric Boat, traditionally the lead design agent for submarines, was building ships to Newport News plans and specifications. This forced marriage resulted in each yard essentially accusing the other of either producing blueprints that didn't match with realities or with an inability to read them correctly. One of the results of this dichotomy was that, for a period, the failure to deliver submarines resulted in the Groton, Connecticut, and Newport News, Virginia, shipyards each having one of the largest four or five nuclear submarine forces in the world. Similar, though less traumatic, problems occurred during the Seawolf design, where "the front end" was designed in Newport News and the propulsion plant in Groton, and there were real or imagined cases where "interfaces" between each shipyard's efforts didn't properly mate up.

For the most part, however, all this changed with the construction of the Seawolf class, and the advanced construction techniques pioneered in that program were further refined in the Virginia class. On 23 October 2004, USS Virginia became the first U.S. nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in seven years. Testifying to this improvement in production is the fact that this "first-of-a-class" ship was delivered within four months of a schedule written six years earlier, and was constructed with more than a 25% savings in labor costs when compared with Seawolf.1 To thoroughly appreciate the impact of these revolutionary changes in the manner by which submarines are built, consider the findings of the U.S. Navy In Service (INSURV) board. This organization inspects all new and, periodically, already commissioned, ships for their compliance with specifications, safety, and other standards. It is common for newly constructed, particularly first-of-a-class ships, to have far more deficiencies than a ship that has been operating for some period of time. The Virginia, however, had fewer deficiencies than any other operating ship that had been inspected during the previous twelve months. If any further proof is needed that the design and construction of Virginia heralded a true revolution in shipbuilding, it is generally accepted that its techniques and procedures were the reason why the 104-foot USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) "Multi-Mission Platform" insert could be conceived, constructed, and rolled into a Seawolf hull as quickly as it was. This second success story bodes well for generating future versions of Virginia to include those to replace current nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs).

Targeting Nuclear Submarines

Why, then, is the future of a vibrant and busier-than-ever submarine force, supported by efficiently produced and operationally capable platforms of the Virginia class, threatened by stretched-out production schedules and a weakened industrial base? The reason, as is so often the case, is money—and short-range solutions to near-term fiscal shortfalls are now seriously undermining the nation's long-term capability to build and sustain a dominant undersea force. U.S. submarine roles and missions, alternative force levels, and the various options on how to reach and maintain them were the focus of a recent Congressional Research Service report.2 In that study, the present method—where the General Dynamics Electric Boat shipyard in Groton and the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard co-produce Virginia hulls then alternate final assembly, test, and delivery—was compared to alternate schemes. The present arrangement was deemed optimum for what was to be initially a one ship per year buy, but planned to increase to two ships per year (one for each yard) construction rate as early as 2002.

Budgetary pressures, however, have caused planners to keep shifting the transition to the higher rate almost continually to the right. Unless current plans are changed, the earliest fiscal year in which two submarines could be authorized is 2012. A decision to build only one ship per year would result in the present force level of about 54 SSNs (down from 98 in 1990) steadily diminishing to a low of 28 before leveling out at 33—the expected life of a Virginia. This is far below the numbers of submarines that even the most optimistic of Navy and DoD studies show will be required in the future.

One of the tempting short-term options for reducing unit cost of the Virginia-class SSN is to eliminate the present two-shipyard approach to one-ship-per-year construction, assuming that the two-shipyard option would always be available in the future when additional fiscal resources were available or when geopolitical realities made it urgent. This would be a strategic mistake of the first order, with a multitude of unintended consequences. First, to even conceive of a myth that a two-shipyard submarine industrial base could be resurrected in the future, the production line terminated would have to be the Northrop-Grumman Newport News shipyard (presuming the yard could survive on carrier business), since ending the line at General Dynamics Electric Boat would be tantamount to shutting the yard down. If the Newport News submarine production were terminated, however, there would be an inevitable impact on the shipyard's ability to support the two-a-decade nuclear-powered aircraft carrier program, since the steady submarine effort justifies their world-class Apprentice School and maintains nuclear skills between carrier construction.

In this regard, remember that the United kingdom, the world's third largest builder of nuclear submarines, allowed its nuclear shipbuilding skills to atrophy and was obliged to request intervention from U.S. shipyards to get the new Astute-class SSN program back on track. Also, although support of the present two-shipyard concept acknowledges room to fine-tune procedures and practices to gain further savings, those steps pale in comparison to what some say would be as much as $1 billion in "disentanglement costs" associated with breaking the present teaming agreement.

Moreover, the administrative and engineering differences that plagued two-shipyard construction are a thing of the past. Because of the efforts in establishing an entirely digital on-line-data/blueprint base from which both shipyards operate and can exchange engineering changes in real time, there is virtually no difference between the yards in processes, procedures, or product. For the first time in U.S. shipbuilding history, two geographically remote shipyards are producing identical products. As previously touched upon, this achievement will pay significant dividends in the mid- and long-term future as the techniques and procedures created in and for the design and production of the basic Virginia hull (particularly the propulsion plant) support the development of follow-on SSNs, SSGNs, and SSBNs (perhaps all functions being performed by a common hull, serially and identically produced in both shipyards).

Finally, the argument for two separate yards supporting this key element of US strategic dominance must be bolstered by the realities of the threat of terrorism. TOPOFF 3, the largest Homeland Security drill ever conducted, was held recently around the New London, Connecticut, area, which includes Groton. Although this particular simulated terrorist attack was of a chemical and conventional explosive nature, it is clear that a very real terrorist threat exists, particularly in and about seaports, involving nuclear devices or radiological dirty bombs. As a side benefit, nuclear-capable shipyards and naval personnel from nearby nuclear-powered ships might serve as an invaluable "first responder" and subsequent clean-up source. But in the worst imaginable case, with two shipyards forming the industrial base, the resources of one area might compensate for the incapacitation of the other.

Saving Nuclear Submarines

Indisputably, there is a delicate balance to be achieved between cost, a continuing design and industrial base, and a militarily necessary force level. The extraordinary present capabilities and room for growth of the Virginia are not to be treated lightly. Just as the late-1950s Skipjack was really the prototype for about 100 subsequent SSNs and SSBNs in the 20th century, essential elements of the Virginia will be with us for the better part of the 21st century in SSN, SSBN, and SSGN variants. The present two-shipyard approach evolving to a two-per-year submarine build rate is the proper means by which to both populate and maintain a minimum force level while maintaining the "cocked" gun industrial surge capability to four or even six a year if a rapid restocking of the nation's military portfolio with these crown jewels (or their evolved relatives) becomes a mandate. The relatively high present unit cost is an unfortunate artificiality caused by a draw-back from the planned build rate, but should be tolerated as the price of admiralty for a nation that hopes to continue to dominate the maritime commons—and to dominate from them.

For a good description of the highly innovative practices and procedures improved, devised, and implemented in support of these newest attack submarines, see RAdm. John D. Butler, USN, "Building Submarines for Tomorrow," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2004, pp. 51-54.

Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate: Background and Issues for Congress," updated January 18, 2005, Order Code RL32418.

Captain Patton served on five nuclear-powered attack submarines, two ballistic-missile submarines, and commanded the USS Pargo (SSN-650). A frequent Proceedings contributor, he was the technical consultant to Paramount Pictures for the film version of The Hunt for Red October, which was based on a book first published by the Naval Institute Press in 1984—now in its 39th printing.

GENERAL DYNAMICS ELECTRIC BOAT

[anonymoussierra]

Dzieki"A.Pole" Translation thank you all

“Many of you make a good point.  Needless I would like to give you some insight what your country is up against.

Communism is separated into three main circles:

1.                  outer circle

2.                  inner circle

3.                  core

 

Outer circle works like a filter of two circles behind.  Per se perfect example is media.  You are constantly informed of issues that actually are not as important as you make think, those that are most important are removed or wash out, in order to satisfy public consumption.  Once that happens; second line of still outer circle comes along, persuasion of public in lying while presuming its trustiness.

 

In order for outer circle to operate they receive all necessary information from inner circle.  Inner circle is a filter of a core nothing more nothing less.  From its core comes all that needs to be address and filter it.  By this moment you should know the flow of information and you should comprehend that everything is well calculated and design before hand.

 

Thus its ugly head of a core.  What actually is a core?  Core is a nervous system of communism and its other organizations and systems (notice I wrote organizations and systems) which go all the way to outer circles.  Nothing happens without core approval.  To fathom core you would have to go back in history and really read not Marx but Lenin and Trotsky.  You really need to understand psyche of communist ideology.  Unlike normal octopus sitting with head up and its legs outward, this one is hiding underneath earth with legs up.  Thus is more illusive and cunning and allows hitting enemy with unpredictable force and without warning. 

 

Its deceitful nature is destructive, its devilish face is profound and all it brings is suffering and hate for its heart beat is based on hate; hate which has shown its ugly head before; and it’s already awaken among us.

 

While China and Russia are progressing with suppose mutual agreements, though each and one of them have their own agenda; keep in mind what I wrote above and it would make some sense.  You need to wake up and realistically as much as I like US president, this eye to eye doesn’t work,  you are being played on a big chess board time to make a move, either fore check mate is coming.”

 

 

[Kuehn12]

Thank, you for the post. It isn't surprising that we are having budget problems. We are caring a huge national debt of about 7 trillion dollars, and current budgetary debt of, current CBO numbers, 368 billion which isn't to bad. Including all other budgetary priorities, it is hard to get money to build new subs. I hear that 44 billion is spent on black projects, so called of budget items. I really don't have much of point, but when I was in the military every time the brass said we were zero out for the year, they seem to find the money some where. I guess if I have a point it is that in Washington math is fuzzy and no one really knows where money is going.

[Paul Ross]

Here is the nugget of information that will help you ascertain what is crucial from the above article, which is germane to your earlier question...what are they doing?

A decision to build only one ship per year would result in the present force level of about 54 SSNs (down from 98 in 1990) steadily diminishing to a low of 28 before leveling out at 33—the expected life of a Virginia. This is far below the numbers of submarines that even the most optimistic of Navy and DoD studies show will be required in the future.

[<1/1,000,000th%]

Hopefully these missiles are similar to the one the Russians used to launch Cosmos 1.

[Paul Ross]

They are likely better. They are using stolen U.S. solid-fuel and guidance and control technology.

[Paul Ross]

Thought you guys would be interested in taking a gander at the revisionist anti-submarine spin of several "defense" think tanks. These MUST be who Rumsfeld and GWB are being influenced by:

The Independent.

G2Mil

Note the disparaging lingo in this one:

Shows no respect for the service whatsoever. Perhaps one of you, without breaking regs, could speak to the disparaging of the SSN intelligence mission value.

G2Mil Practically preaches that the SSN force should be zeroed out, and is oblivious to the Pearl Harbor problem of a premptive first strike by China when we are in a low alert posture, as we have been since Xlinton. Furthermore, G2Mil totally ignores the threatening political situation of U.S. isolation being orchestrated from China, Russia, and France....and Venezuela and Brazil. It ignores the Mutual Assistance Pact between China and Russia...and what that really portends. The Russian's Topol-M is never once mentioned as the first strike weapon it could be. Their retention and continued maintenance until 2017 of the SS-18s which are purely first strike weapons. The at-sea SSN force presumably would survive such a knock-out blow, and at least still leave us with anything resembling a navy. The in-port ships would be lost. Carriers and subs all. The at-sea surface vessels may be much more vulnerable than we know, especially if the Chinese catch us completely unawares, and go full nuclear at the get go with their lethal stash of cruise missiles...many of which could be launched in fire & forget fashion from unconventional platforms...COSCO container/Freight ships for instance.

We need to be thinking outside the Liberal Box of G2Mil. G2Mil is right about the other Navy requirements, however. Which to me just says we are not spending enough for overall naval force mainentance and rebuilding. Cheney's mistake with regard to F-14 tooling is now really being felt. We need to look beyond force projection studies...and keep our eye on the vulnerability situation to preemption. And using Herman Kahn's approach to viewing all situations through the lens of enemy capability to do such a premptive attack. A robust SSN force, rather than where we are headed, would give us an optimum deterrent, in my view.

Also recommended reading: Interview of Rear Admiral Malcolm Fages, USN

[Marine_Uncle]

Thanks for these posts. Truely a mind opener. Sadly the eyes open to see a quite griveous situation unfold. What you write, posts, take some time to attempt to absorb. It is almost like one must already be "onboard" to appreciate the full ramifications you set forth. One thing. As with any DoD , their wisdom is fashioned mostly by the wisdom of others. One must select who best represents the best set of goals to work toward. We can use so many fine examples from the past, say the mental cacoon the Admiralty found itself in prior to the NAM war. How they where sucked in mostly by the weapon developers into a false idea that one no longer would fight in a ACM enviroment but fight long distance intercept type engagments, and therefore relied on the F4 Phantom design to be the new generation air superiority fleet aircraft using no guns only sparrow and sidewinders.
The rest is history. Likewise, Rummy only can do his best within budget restraints, and what is handed down to him, to best decide what paths to walk. For every admiral that may suggest one course of future development, you will find another group of admirals suggesting another path to follow.
If the status quo of fleet officers hand down a set of weapon systems to be adequate (what the hell that means half the time withing the context of current/future technologies), then that is what Rummy goes to congress with. It seems like the blame rest on our military planners as much if not more then on the SoD. No response solicited, I am sure you are quite aware of this. Just adding a generic thought as pertaining to Rummy's judgement.
Thanks for the really great horrible news.......groan.

[GOP_1900AD]

Excellent plan! Good stuff!

[Smokin' Joe]

bttt

[HiTech RedNeck]

Bush doesn't want China to drink up all the oil in the world. Sounds reasonable.